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Abstract
Some programming language features (coercions, type-classes, implicits) rely on inferring
a part of the code that is determined by its usage context. In order to better understand
the theoretical underpinnings of this mechanism, we ask: when is it the case that there is
a unique program that could have been guessed, or in other words that all possible guesses
result in equivalent program fragments? Which types have a unique inhabitant?
To approach the question of unicity, we build on work in proof theory on more canonical
representation of proofs. Using the proofs-as-programs correspondence, we can adapt the
logical technique of focusing to obtain more canonical program representations.
In the setting of simply-typed lambda-calculus with sums and the empty type, equipped
with the strong βη-equivalence, we show that uniqueness is decidable. We present a
saturating focused logic that introduces irreducible cuts on positive types “as soon as
possible”. Goal-directed proof search in this logic gives an effective algorithm that returns
either zero, one or two distinct inhabitants for any given type.
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Motivation
This thesis is concerned with the following question:
Which types have a unique inhabitant?
This is a question about computer programming.
A program is a recipe that a computer should follow to build a particular piece of
data (file, picture, sound, etc.) or behavior (interaction with the user). We distinguish
executions of the program (what happens when the computer follows the recipe) from the
description of the program, in a symbolic form that humans programmers can understand,
manipulate and change.
A type is an interface that computer programs, or fragments of computer programs, may
or may not provide to its users. A program term is said to inhabit a type when it respects
the described interface; a type for a function that adds number, for example, may specify
that it takes two positive integers and returns a positive integer. A type system is a formal
description of a collection of types and program terms, along with rules to explain which
terms inhabit which types.
Which types have a unique inhabitant? I think that this question is both of theoretical
and practical interest. In the following sections of this introduction, we discuss the motiva-
tions for studying this question, but we should first have a few words about the approach,
and correspondingly the nature of the results that are presented in this document.
To make our question precise, we must precisely specify the type system we consider.
There are many, from the very simple to the extremely sophisticated. We must also be
more precise about what we mean by unique: a type is uniquely inhabited if all the
programs at this type are equal, but what does it mean for two programs to be equal?
Program equality, or equivalence, is a rich and subtle notion. Fortunately, for the simple
enough type systems that we consider in this thesis, there is a natural choice of equivalence
that we use to define unicity.
A result that is now folklore among programming language researchers is that there is
a correspondence between computer programs and formal (mathematical) proofs: we can
understand formal proofs as specific kinds of well-behaved programs, whose interface is
described by the logical statement they prove. By giving two very different points of view
on these objects, the correspondence has helped transfer intuitions, ideas and results in
both directions: from proof theory to programming language theory, and vice-versa.
This correspondence, called the Curry-Howard correspondence, is of interest to us for
at least two reasons. First, the question of unicity (is there exactly one ...) is closely
related to its older sister, existence (is there at least one...). Existence of programs at
a given arbitrary type is arguably peripheral for programming (it does have interesting
application, but is not central to the craft) whereas it is a central question in logic, as it
corresponds to the question of whether a given logical statement is provable – existence
of at least one proof. There is a rich field of research concerned with the question of
“which statements are provable?”, looking for practical way to automatically answer it for
restricted classes of statements. We may look at their ideas and techniques, and try to
adapt them to answer the stronger question of unicity.
Second, proof theory is often concerned with the question of what is an appropriate rep-
resentation of proofs. There is some intuition that some proofs are “obviously the same”,
and proof theoreticians tend to prefer representation systems where not too many proofs
with distinct representations are “obviously the same”. Eliminating such duplicates allow
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them to better understand what proofs really are, and may also have practical benefits: in
a tighter representation system with fewer possible proofs, it may be easier to tell if any
given statement has a proof, because the proof search process has less proof candidates
to consider. Proof theory comes with a large body of work on such representations (such
as focused proofs, proof nets, connection-based methods, etc.), and a natural question is
whether those can be re-used in our quest for unicity.
Unfortunately, it is not obvious to define which proofs are “obviously the same” (many
different notions have been proposed), because it is not clear exactly which requirements
such a notion should satisfy. In particular, while most mathematicians expect that the
mathematical proofs they produce can be elaborated into fully formal proofs, the question
of identity of proofs is not of central importance to them. Simplicity, generality of proofs
matters; one also wonders about their dependencies (which existing theory they use in the
course of the proof, for example). Two proofs may look very similar (if they share their
key arguments), or completely unrelated, but there is no evident criterion for whether
they are “the same”.
On the contrary, there is a clear definition of whether two programs are equivalent:
provided the same inputs, do they behave in the same way, in particular do they return
the same outputs? There are other things we could wish to observe (is one program
faster than the other?), but there is a natural idea of “same input, same outputs” or
more generally “same environment, same observable behavior” that gives a good notion
of equivalence.
And this is where we come in. This rich body of work on the question of existence
and representations of proofs carries many interesting ideas, but before applying them to
programs we need to pay close attention to their treatment of equality. Some techniques
remove redundant proofs in a way that corresponds to throwing away some possible pro-
grams: they must be avoided. Some techniques remove only duplicates that are equivalent
as programs, but not all of them, so they can be reused but need to be strengthened to
precisely decide unicity. Furthermore, the fact that they preserve the identity of programs
may be true but have never been proved (or even asked) before, as their authors were
satisfied with the weaker property of preserving provability. It is time to revisit them with
programming mind.
Some sensible thesis writing advice suggests to center the document around a thesis, a
central claim that the whole document supports. Here is our take on this helpful exercise:
The proof theoretic technique of focusing can be adapted and reused to reason about
programs, provided one gives a careful look at its treatment of the identity of proofs.
Background: programming language design, and how we go
about it
Humans programmers have invented many different symbolic representations for com-
puter programs, which are called programming languages. One can think of them as
languages used to communicate with the computer, but it is important to remember that
programming is also a social activity, in the sense that many programs are created by a
collaboration of several programmers, or that programs written by one programmer may
be reused, inspected or modified by others. Programs communicate intent to a computer,
but also to other human programmers.
Programmers routinely report frustration with the limitations of the programming lan-
guage they use – it is very hard to design a good programming language. At least the
three following qualities are expected:
• concision: Simple tasks should be described by simple, not large or complex pro-
grams. Complex tasks require complex programs, but their complexity should come
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solely from the problem domain (the specificity of the required task), not accidental
complexity imposed by the programming language.
For example, early Artificial Intelligence research highlighted the need for language-
level support for backtracking (giving up on a series of decisions made toward a goal
to start afresh through a different method), and some programming languages make
this substantially easier than others.
• clarity : By reading a program description it should be easy to understand the intent
of its author(s). We say that a program has a bug (a defect) when its meaning
does not coincide with the intent of its programmers – they made a mistake when
transcribing their thoughts into programs. Clarity is thus an essential component
of safety (avoiding program defects), and should be supported by mechanized tools
to the largest possible extent. To achieve clarity, some language constructions help
programmers express their intent, and programming language designers work on
tools to automatically verify that this expressed intent is consistent with the rest of
the program description.
For example, one of the worst security issues that was discovered in 2014 (failure of all
Apple computers or mobile phones to verify the authenticity of connections to secure
websites) was due to a single line of program text that had been duplicated (written
twice instead of only once). The difference between the programmer intent (ensure
security of communications) and the effective behavior of the program (allowing
malicious network nodes to inspect your communications with your online bank)
was dramatic, yet neither the human programmers nor the automated tools used by
these programmers reported this error.
• consistency : A programming language should be regular and structured, making it
easy for users to guess how to use the parts of the language they are not already
familiar with. In particular, consistency supports clarity, as recovering intent from
program description requires a good knowledge of the language: the more consistent,
the more predictable, the lower the risks of misunderstanding. This is an instance
of a more general design principle, the principle of least surprise.
Of course, the list above is to be understood as the informal opinion of a practitioner,
rather than a scientific claim in itself. Programming is a rich field that spans many activi-
ties, and correspondingly programming language research can and should be attacked from
many different angles: mathematics (formalization), engineering, design, human-machine
interface, ergonomics, psychology, linguistics, sociology, and the working programmers all
have something to say about how to make better programming languages.
This thesis was conducted within a research group – and a research sub-community –
that uses mathematical formalization as its main tool to study, understand and improve
programming languages. To work with a programming language, we give it one or sev-
eral formal semantics (defining programs as mathematical objects, and their meaning as
mathematical relations between programs and their behavior); we can thus prove the-
orems about programming languages themselves, or about formal program analyses or
transformations.
The details of how mathematical formalization can be used to guide programming lan-
guage design are rather fascinating – it is a very abstract approach of a very practical
activity. The community shares a common baggage of properties that may or may not
apply to any given proposed design, and are understood to capture certain usability prop-
erties of the resulting programming language. These properties are informed by practical
experience using existing languages (designed using this methodology or not), and our
understanding of them evolves over time.
Having a formal semantics for the language of study is a solid way to acquire an under-
standing of what the programs in this language mean, which is a necessary first step for
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clarity – the meaning of a program cannot be clear if we do not first agree on what it is.
Formalization is a difficult (technical) and time-consuming activity, but its simplification
power cannot be understated: the formalization effort naturally suggests many changes
that can dramatically improve consistency. By encouraging to build the language around a
small core of independent concepts (the best way to reduce the difficulty of formalization),
it can also improve concision, as combining small building blocks can be a powerful way
to simply express advanced concepts. Finding the right building blocks, however, is still
very much dependent of domain knowledge and radical ideas often occur through proto-
typing or use-case studies, independently of formalization. Our preferred design technique
would therefore be formalization and implementation co-evolution, with formalization and
programming activities occurring jointly to inform and direct the language design process.
The presented thesis work was not started as an attempt to design a complete program-
ming language, but rather to study one specific aspect of programming: the situations
where the computer can automatically “guess” some program fragments that the user left
unfilled – we call this code inference. This capability exists in several existing program-
ming languages, and is bound to be employed in many future languages as well. We wish
to develop a theoretical understanding of the following question: when can we be sure
that the guess made by the computer was the correct answer?
Motivation: Unicity as the ideal code inference criterion
Many existing code inference features have a history that can be traced to one or both of
the following simple concepts, that occur rather naturally to programmers – or other users
of formal, precise notations, such as engineers or mathematicians – during their activity.
• coercions are transformations of values from one representation to another that are
natural, in the sense that there is one (and, hopefully, only one) way to do it that
makes sense in all situations. For example, consider an information system that rep-
resents various categories of persons by a data record containing information about
them. A “user” is described by a name and an email address, a “student” by a
name, an email address, and a department of studies. There is a natural, obvious
way to turn a data record representing a student into a data record representing an
user, simply dropping the department information. A programmer that manipulates
a student record may want to be able to pass it to another program fragment ex-
pecting a user record, without having to write tedious conversion code. It expects
the programming language to implicitly “coerce” from one format to the other.
In mathematics, some well-defined embeddings play this role of coercions; for exam-
ple, any natural number can be “seen as” a real number (although the way they are
defined often gives them different representation: the natural number may or may
not have to be transformed to become its real number equivalent).
• disambiguation is the process of selecting, for a symbol that may have several distinct
significations, one meaning that is appropriate in the context of a given use-case. For
example, the addition symbol (+) may mean several different operations with fairly
different properties, such as addition of natural numbers, of real numbers, of complex
matrices, of ordinals, etc. But for any given occurrence of the symbol (+), it should
be clear from the context which of these operation we mean.
Both these concepts have simple motivations but, once extended to the scale of full pro-
gramming languages, they may become complex and raise difficult questions. For example,
for some expressive enough programming language, the questions of whether a given type
of data may be coerced into another may be an undecidable problem. Disambiguation
may seem at first to be a purely local problem, but there are sometimes good reason to
delay a disambiguation choice. For example, if I define the function double
def
= x 7→ x+x,
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I may not have a particular addition operation in mind, but instead expect to be able to
use this function double on any sort of values for which an addition operation is defined.
In other words, the meaning of the symbol (+) becomes an implicit parameter of the
function double.
In the general case, the resolution of these situations has been formulated as a constraint
satisfaction problem: given some basic facts (here are the basic coercion rules, the basic
disambiguation rules) and a set of rules to deduce new facts, does the specific coercion
or disambiguation problem posed by this specific point in the program have a solution
that can be deduced from these facts and rules? If yes, we can inspect this solution to
understand how to transform a data into another, or which unambiguous operation to use;
if no, the program is ambiguous, incomplete and should be rejected.
In my opinion (this is not a scientific claim), it is time to recognize that we are actually
inferring a program fragment, rather than an arbitrary constraint resolution problem. A
coercion can be represented by the code of a transformation function. Disambiguation can
be seen as the inference of a type-correct program among a set of programs determined
by the symbol to disambiguate. The constraint problem can thus be formulated as the
guessing of a program fragment; the state of the resolution, as a partially inferred program
– plus some bookkeeping information. Of course, the set of possible programs representing
valid solutions is constrained (not every function is a valid coercion). These restrained
programs may be constrained by a stricter environment, stricter validity and formation
rules, than arbitrary programs. The question of whether the situation is unambiguous now
boils down to the question of whether, in this restricted setting, the possible programs are
uniquely inhabited.
It may seem, at first, that this approach gives up on some flexibility and freedom in
designing a constraint resolution strategy. However, thanks to the correspondence between
proof and programs, we know that the design space remains huge: searching a program
is just as expressive a satisfiability problem as search for a proof in these corresponding
logics. The sophisticated techniques developed for proof search can be transferred to these
term inference formulation.
Furthermore, forcing ourselves to formulate these problems as the search for a valid
program in some type system has design benefits. When a first attempt at formulat-
ing an inference problem fails to be non-ambiguous (the types involved are not uniquely
inhabited), the language designer needs to reformulate the problem and restrict it to re-
cover unicity. A term-inference formulation gives us a natural toolkit of design choices to
make: restricting the environment available to the elaborated programs, restricting the
rules that determine program validity, etc. I believe that these techniques will “blend
in” the general programming language design better than arbitrary rules coming from a
constraint-solving formulation; at the very least, they can be explained to the programmer
users using concepts they are already familiar with.
Method: focusing towards canonicity
Focusing is a technique of proof theory to restrict a given logic to eliminate sources of
redundancy from its proof representation. One gets a logic that is equivalent to the
original one in terms of expressivity – it proves the same statements – and has a more
structured representation of proofs.
In the present thesis, we will instead make use of focusing on typed programs. The
adaptation is direct, and gives a discipline that does not restrict a language’s expressivity
– all programs remain expressible – but imposes more structural constraints on program
representations. This is good to decide unicity: we want to know if all possible programs
are equivalent, and focusing gives us fewer candidates to test for equivalence.
Ideally, we would like a type system in which there are no duplicates to test: each
expressible behavior has a unique representation. Focusing does not give us this property,
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but it is a good building block to start from. In this thesis, we propose a variant of
focusing, saturated focusing, that achieves this property for the simple type system we are
studying.
An interesting side-result of this work is a focusing-based approach to program equiva-
lence. Once we have a redundancy-free representation that is also complete, we can test
whether two given programs are equivalent by converting them to this representation, and
simply checking that they have the exact same representation. In particular, our technique
provides a way to test equivalence between categories of program for which no equivalence
procedure was previously known, namely simply-typed programs in presence of an empty
type 0.
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Background
The first part of this thesis, Part I (Background), gives an introduction to the scientific
topics covered. Because a thesis is also a personal document, we get much more freedom
to make choice about their structure than in an article (tightly constrained by size limits
and presentation norms), and the choice made here is to attempt to be as self-contained as
possible: I hope that, eventually (in the internet age, a thesis is also a living document that
can be amended following readers’ feedback), anyone with a scientific background should
be able to follow those introductory chapters. Of course, we cannot be exhaustive in our
covering of those introduction topics, but instead focus on the parts that are relevant to
the later contributions. We will point to more complete reference material.
These chapters are thus mostly about things that are already well-known in the com-
munity, not new contributions of the thesis. I have made on a few occasions choices that
may interest the reader, and will try to point them out in this plan. Expert readers, you
should feel free to skip the rest. Really, do skip it! I have included back-references to
these chapters in the other parts of the thesis, so there is no risk of missing important
background content.
In Chapter 1 (Introduction to the formal study of logic: natural deduction), we give
a self-contained introduction to a way to define proofs, and the formal study of logic,
that is very close to the type theory also used to study typed programming languages.
More precisely, we study natural deduction – in presence of disjunctions (sums). The
chapter concludes on the usual proof of consistency (by measuring the types appearing
in elimination-introduction pairs), in absence of disjunctions, as this usual proof fails in
presence of disjunctions.
In Chapter 2 (Introduction to the formal study of programming: the λ-calculus), we
give a self-contained introduction to the λ-calculus (untyped then typed), which is the
fundamental calculus for the study of functional programming languages. Experts may
be interested to note that we tried to actually motivate the apparition of types (instead
of vaguely speaking of “reasoning about programs” or promising a normalization result
that jumps out of nowhere), which is difficult in the pure λ-calculus (functions only) as
dynamic failure never happens there. We made a detour through λ-calculi with several
constructors to understand failure. I think this is important: the study of programming
is not only about allowing programs to be expressed, but also about preventing errors in
programs.
In Chapter 3 (Curry-Howard of reduction and equivalence), we expose the Curry-Howard
correspondence, which is a tight relation between logics (and their proofs) and type sys-
tems (and their programs). We also study program equivalence, look at its counterpart
on proofs, and take the tourist deviation through category theory (this part is not self-
contained) to justify strong η-rules for disjunction and the empty type. As a side-result
of the study of program equivalence in presence of disjunction elimination, we fix the
consistency proof of Chapter 1 to prove consistency of the whole logic, sums included.
Expert readers will remark that because we have insisted that, in proofs, the hypothesis
context are sets of formulas, our correspondence between proof and programs is not as
tight as it is usually crafted to be (by cunningly defining logic judgments with multi-set
of formulas, which makes little sense if one just wants to understand provability without
any λ-afterthoughts); we only have a forward simulation result (β-reductions in programs
are valid substitutions in proofs) instead of an isomorphism.
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In Chapter 4 (A better proof system: sequent calculus), we introduce the sequent calcu-
lus. It is a better proof system than natural deduction, and in particular its cut-elimination
procedure gives us a direct (no fix required) proof of consistency of intuitionistic logic with
disjunctions. It is also a worse support for programming languages than natural deduc-
tion, and in particular the identity of proofs in sequent calculus looks more problematic
– but we still define a term language for it for convenience, which may be of interest to
readers that have never looked at a (naive and not that useful) term syntax for the sequent
calculus. We will mention that sequent calculus is easily extended to define classical logic,
and make a remark on the multi-succedent presentations of intuitionistic logic – there is
an intuitionistic negative sum!
In Chapter 5 (The bothersome equivalence of cut-free sequent proofs), we discuss the
identity of sequent proofs, and in particular the equivalence relations between sequents
that correspond to βη-equivalence for natural deduction. While the sequent calculus is
arguably more harmonious and regular than natural deduction, and thus better-suited
for proof search, its notion of equivalence is rather more bureaucratic. Developing this
bothersome equivalence is useful to serve as a basis specification, to evaluate refined notions
equivalences in more structured calculi – focused or polarized calculi.
Chapter 6 (Proof and type systems, in general) gives a precise definition of concepts
related to proof or type systems, and in particular how those systems relate to each other
– for example, there are several notions of completeness of interest. As applications, we
develop some concepts that hold for proof search in many of the systems we consider: the
subformula property, and the positive (covariant) and negative (contravariant) positions
for subformulas. Decidability of provability in intuitionistic and classical propositional
logic is directly obtained from the subformula property.
Chapter 7 (Focusing in sequent calculus) is also mostly an introductory chapter, but it
covers a more advanced topic that many in the programming-language community are not
familiar with (focusing was discovered in proof theory in 1992 [Andreoli, 1992b]). Most
introductions to focusing are done using linear logic; in the interest of space we present
focusing for intuitionistic logic directly, but still in the usual setting of sequent-calculus.
There are many different choices of presentation of focused systems that are made in the
literature, and we try to cover the main ones and how to transition from one presentation
to the other.
Finally, Chapter 8 (Semantics) presents some results on program equivalence. Contex-
tual equivalence is defined, as well as a more “semantic” equivalence obtained by inter-
preting atoms as ground formulas. We show that βη-equivalence is sound with respect to
those equivalences.
Focusing on program equivalence
The second part of this thesis, Part II (Focusing for program equivalence and unique
inhabitation), presents contributions on questions related to program equivalence that have
been obtained during this thesis. It is rather clear that a good understanding of equivalence
is necessary to attack unicity, and these chapters, which started off as diversions from the
thing I was supposed to work on, ended up being invaluable in understanding the relation
between a practically-justified algorithm we were developing for unicity checking, on one
hand, and focusing and polarization on the other.
In Chapter 9 (Counting terms and proofs), we give a preliminary result on the number
of distinct programs that share the same shape as a logical derivation. In particular, we
prove that it suffices to consider program environments with at most two variables of each
type to tell if there are two distinct programs of the same logical shape. This result is
used to obtain termination result for our unicity-checking algorithm.
In Chapter 10 (Focused λ-calculus), we give a term system for focused natural deduction
that is designed to be as close as possible to the usual λ-calculus. This contrasts with the
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usual presentations using the sequent calculus, more convenient to work with as a logic,
but it has the advantage of easier transfer of our λ-calculist intuitions. The statement
of our completeness result, which guarantees preservation of computational behavior, is
slightly stronger than the usual completeness results for focused system which only claim
preservation for provability – the usual proofs do not need to be changed to provide this
strengthened statement.
Chapter 11 (Saturation logic for canonicity) is thus the first chapter to actually cover the
question that started the thesis: “which types have a unique inhabitant?”. It describes an
algorithm to decide unicity for the simply-typed λ-calculus in presence of sums, building on
the previous work on focusing – although we in fact understood the idea of the algorithm
before we realized it was maximal multi-focusing in disguise. A central contribution to
answer this question is a canonical saturating intuitionistic logic, a variant of multi-focusing
that allows goal-directed proof search – whereas maximal multi-focused proofs have no
goal-directed search procedure as the minimality criterion is highly non-local.
Finally, Chapter 12 (From the logic to the algorithm: deciding unicity) concludes by
describing the unicity-checking algorithm arising from the canonical proof system of the
previous chapter. We prove that it is correct and terminates on any input.
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Part I.
Background
23

In this part we summarize the basic concepts needed to follow the exposition of the
contributions of this thesis, which are presented in the following parts. It is also an
occasion to present the particular notations and conventions we follow.
This is a curious exercise, because there is a natural urge to try to make it as self-
contained as possible, so that non-specialists that would be curious about this work could
have a good chance of following it if they are motivated. On the other hand, this is not
the time and space to write a good course on these topics. We tried to only present results
that will be useful for the other parts, and resisted to the temptation of including remarks
on the many other perspectives opened by this introductory material.
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1. Introduction to the formal study of logic:
natural deduction
1.1. A first introduction to inference rules
1.1.1. Derivation trees and their notation
In this warm-up section, we will study a highly simplified notion of formula and proof, in
order to introduce general concepts that will be used throughout this document. In the
following chapters, we will use richer definitions, but for now we define a formula as a pair
of natural numbers m and n, and a proof as a tree of formulas, satisfying the following
rules:
• all the leaves of the tree are pairs of the form (0, n)
• all the nodes have exactly one child sub-tree (the tree is list-like), and if the sub-tree
has the formula (m,n) at its root, then the tree has the formula (m+ 1, n+ 1)
For example, the following trees are valid proof trees (we draw leaves with a rectangular
box):
0, 3 2, 7
1, 6
0, 5
1, 1
0, 0
and the following are not:
3, 2 0, 2
0, 1 1, 2
6, 5
0, 4
Question (to the reader) What are the integers (m,n) such that there exists a proof
with root (m,n)?
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Answer They are exactly the pairs (m,n) such that m ≤ n.
As an introduction to the notions used in this thesis, we will prove it formally in this
section.
Notation 1.1.1 (proof trees).
We use the following notation to represent proof trees. We write
0 4 n
for the leaf tree (0, n), and
m 4 n
m+ 1 4 n+ 1
for the node (m+ 1, n+ 1), placing the sub-tree of root (m,n) above it.
For example, the valid trees we presented previously can be written as follows:
0 4 3
0 4 5
1 4 6
2 4 7
0 4 0
1 4 1
We use the variable Π (and cousins: Π′, Π3, . . . ) to name proof trees. We can also write
Π :: m 4 n to represent a proof, when Π has conclusion (m,n).
We have defined a very simple notion of proofs, specialized to proving facts of the form
m ≤ n, as purely syntactic objects (trees). In the rest of the section, we see how to
formally prove things about those proof objects. This formal study will convince ourselves
that they indeed capture evidence that m ≤ n, and give us a few useful tools to work
with such syntactic objects: structural induction, derivability, and admissibility. Logic,
as done by computer scientists, uses these same techniques on more complex notions of
proof objects, that represent richer mathematical propositions than just m ≤ n.
We call the trees in our syntax using vertical bars derivations, and the tree-forming
rules are called inference rules. The inference rules of our system (giving them names for
future reference) are
leq-zero
0 4 n
leq-succ
m 4 n
m+ 1 4 n+ 1
and they completely determine what the valid proofs are. Note that they are in fact
“schemas”, in the sense that each rule describes an infinite family of valid proof-formers,
for all instances of m and n. In the other sections (for other logics), we will “define” the
set of valid proofs by simply giving the inference rules that generate all valid proof trees.
In the general case an inference rule toto may be of the form
toto
J1 J2 . . .
J
with arbitrary many children. The J ,J1, . . . are the things being proved, we call them
judgments. The rule can be intuitively understood as “if all the things above the bar are
true, then the thing below is true” – but the rule is the way to construct proofs, the
syntactic evidence of truth. We call J the conclusion of this rule, and the J1,J2, . . .
the premises of this rule – they need to be filled with sub-derivations to get a complete
derivation.
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1.1.2. Proofs by structural induction
Theorem 1.1.1 (Soundness).
For any natural numbers m and n, if there exists a valid derivation Π :: m 4 n, then
indeed we have m ≤ n.
We claimed that proof trees of conclusion m 4 n represent proofs of the fact m ≤ n.
This theorem tells this interpretation of proof objects is sound, correct. To prove it, we
use the proof technique of structural induction, which is a generalization of proofs by
recurrence on natural numbers to arbitrary tree-like structures (in particular derivations).
Structural induction To prove that a property P (Π) is true of all valid derivations Π,
we prove that:
• P holds of all leaf derivations formed by rules without premises – in our case,
leq-zero.
• For any inference rule
J1 J2 . . .
J
we can prove that it holds for a proof Π :: J whose root node uses this rule, assuming
that P holds of all of its sub-proofs with conclusions J1,J2, . . . . In our case, we get
to assume that P (Π) holds for some Π :: m 4 n, and we need to prove that P also
holds of the derivation
leq-succ
Π :: m 4 n
m+ 1 4 n+ 1
This generalizes recurrence on natural numbers, as you can represent natural numbers
as trees with one leaf rule (zero) and one one-child rule (successor), and then structural
induction on those trees is exactly recurrence on natural numbers.
This can also be justified from recurrence on natural numbers, by presenting it as a
recurrence on the height of proof derivations. Just as natural recurrence can be extended
to “strong recurrence” (proving P (m) by assuming P (n) for all n < m), we will occa-
sionally use “strong induction” (proving P (Π) by using the induction hypothesis on all
sub-derivations of Π, not only its direct children).
Finally, it is sometimes useful to reason by induction not only on the children of Π or
on its sub-derivations, but on all valid derivations of strictly smaller size, or height (as
trees), than Π. This let us inspect sub-derivations of Π and, sometimes, transform them
in a way required by the proof, as long as we do not increase their size (or height). In this
case, we will indicate that we are performing a strong induction on the size (or height) of
the derivations, not the derivations themselves.
Proof (Theorem 1.1.1 (Soundness)). By structural induction on the proofs Π :: m 4 n.
In the leq-zero case we have Π :: 0 4 n, and it is true that 0 ≤ n.
In the leq-succ case, Π is of the form
Π′ :: m 4 n
m+ 1 4 n+ 1
By induction hypothesis on Π′ we may assume m ≤ n, and thus we have m+1 ≤ n+1. 
To the non-specialist reader: the small square  at the right of the last paragraph is
a conventional notation indicating that the proof that was ongoing is now finished. This
visual cue is helpful if you want to browse the text quickly, skipping the proofs. Similarly,
we give closing symbols to remarks (∗) and examples (♦).
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1.1.3. Partial derivations and derivability
A derivation is complete if all the leaves of the proof correspond to rules with no premises
(leaf rules). It is often convenient to manipulate partial derivations, that is valid compo-
sitions of rules with some missing subtree(s), for example:
m 4 n
leq-succ
m+ 1 4 n+ 1
leq-succ
m+ 2 4 n+ 2
leq-succ
m+ 3 4 n+ 3
This is a partial derivation: it is an incomplete proof of m + 3 4 n + 3, which needs
a derivation of m 4 n to become a complete derivation. Note that the judgment at the
leaf of the proof has no bar on top of it (it is not justified by a rule with no premises);
we call it an open leaf of the partial proof – by opposition to closed leaves, the judgments
justified by a rule with no premises, in our setting always of the form 0 4 n.
Definition 1.1.1 Derivability.
We say that a judgment J is derivable from a set of judgments J1,J2, . . . ,Jn if there
exists a partial proof of J , whose open leaves are among the J1, . . . ,Jn. We just proved
that m+ 3 4 n+ 3 is derivable from m 4 n for any m,n, and we can generalize this.
Lemma 1.1.2.
For any natural numbers m,n, k, the judgment m+ k 4 n+ k is derivable from m 4 n.
Proof. Immediate, by recurrence/induction on k. For k = 0 we take the empty partial
derivation: if filled with a complete proof of m 4 n, it becomes a complete derivation
of m + 0 4 n + 0. In the successor case, assume we have a partial derivation Πk of
m+ k 4 n+ k, with open leaf m 4 n, then the derivation Πk+1 defined as
leq-succ
Πk :: m+ k 4 n+ k
m+ k + 1 4 n+ k + 1
is a partial derivation of m + (k + 1) 4 n + (k + 1) as expected, and it has an open leaf
with the judgment m 4 n, as part of its sub-derivation Πk. 
Remark 1.1.1. “Lemma” is a technical word to describe something we claim is formally
true because we have a proof, but which is of lesser importance than a “theorem”. We
usually demonstrate several auxiliary lemmas before claiming each theorem; theorems are
supposed to formulate the grand results. ∗
1.1.4. Admissibility
Definition 1.1.2 Admissibility.
We say that a judgment J is admissible from the judgments J1,J2, . . . ,Jn if, given
complete proofs Π1 :: J1, . . . ,Πn :: Jn, we can construct a complete proof of J .
If by “construct” we meant just “plug the Π1, . . . ,Πn as subtrees of a partial proof”,
this would be equivalent to the notion of derivability. Admissibility is more general, as we
accept any procedure that produces a complete proof of J ; for example, it is possible to
build a proof by case analysis on the structure of the proofs Π1, . . . ,Πn.
Notation 1.1.2 (admissible rule).
To say that J is admissible from J1, . . . ,Jn for the reason foo, we write
J . . . Jn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . foo
J
and we say that foo is an admissible rule. This notation can be composed to create larger
admissible rules, possibly mixed with valid inference rules.
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Lemma 1.1.3 (Transitivity).
The following transitivity rule is admissible:
m 4 n n 4 p..................... leq-trans
m 4 p
Proof. By structural induction on the proof Πmn :: m 4 n. (The induction property
P (Π :: m 4 n) is the following: “for any p and proof Πnp of n 4 p, the judgment m 4 p
is provable”.)
If Πmn is of the form
0 4 n
then we have m = 0, and we can prove m 4 p with simply
0 4 p
If Πmn is of the form
Πm′n′ :: m
′ 4 n′
m′ + 1 4 n′ + 1
then m = m′+1 and n = n′+1. In this case, the proof Πnp :: n 4 p cannot be a leq-zero,
as n is strictly larger than 0, so it is itself of the form
Πn′p′ :: n
′ 4 p′
n′ + 1 4 p′ + 1
with p = p′ + 1. By induction hypothesis on Πm′n′ , a sub-derivation of Πmn, we get a
complete derivation Πm′p′ :: m
′ 4 p′, and we can conclude with the complete derivation
Πm′p′ :: m
′ 4 p′
m′ + 1 4 p′ + 1
of the judgment m 4 p. 
Let us emphasize that this transitivity rule is admissible but not derivable: we have not
simply plugged proofs of m 4 n and n 4 p, unchanged, in a larger derivation. On the
contrary, we have peeled them off, looking at sub-derivations of them. In fact, none of the
inference rules of the final proof come of either input derivations, they were just built by
looking at the shape of the inputs – looking at a strictly smaller sub-derivation at each
induction step, which makes this proof technique valid.
1.1.5. Completeness
We have now seen the main tools used to work with proofs, presented as derivations of
inference rules. We can conclude this section with the result of completeness, which tells
us that whenever the mathematical fact m ≤ n (m is smaller than n) is true, then there is
a corresponding derivation of the judgment m 4 n – soundness (Theorem 1.1.1) only told
us that those of the m 4 n that could be proved really satisfied m ≤ n, but there may be
m ≤ n pairs for which no derivation exists. With soundness and completeness together,
we know that m 4 n is provable exactly when m ≤ n holds.
Theorem 1.1.4.
If m ≤ n, then m 4 n is provable.
Proof. To have a convincing proof, we need a precise definition of m ≤ n – we have
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handled this statement rather informally so far. Let us define the relation (≤) between
natural numbers as the reflexive transitive closure of the relation that has all m ≤ m+ 1;
that is, we say that m ≤ n if either m = n (reflexivity), or n = m + 1 (the relation
m ≤ m+ 1), or there is some k such that m ≤ k and k ≤ n (transitivity).
To show that m ≤ n implies that m 4 n is provable, is thus to prove that the three
following rules are admissible:
. . . . . . . . leq-refl
n 4 n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . leq-succ’
n 4 n+ 1
m 4 k k 4 n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . leq-trans
m 4 n
The rule leq-trans has already been proved admissible by Lemma 1.1.3. The two
other rules are direct consequences of Lemma 1.1.2 (derivability, and thus admissibility,
of m + k 4 n + k from m 4 n for any k). The rule leq-refl (0 + n 4 0 + n) is shown
admissible by plugging the proof of 0 4 0, and the rule leq-succ’ (0 + n 4 1 + n) by
plugging the proof of 0 4 1, both constructed by leq-zero. 
1.2. Propositional intuitionistic logic
In the previous section, we used simple pairs of natural numbers (m,n) to represent the
statement “m is less than n”; pairs are just inert mathematical objects, but we chose to
interpret them as those statements. We extend this to a richer language of formulas, that
we can interpret as describing many more statements.
What we call logic here is a set of judgments (the judgments that we interpret as being
“true”). One may then study general properties of this set (for example, it may be the
case that, for any judgment of a certain shape in the set, another judgment of a slightly
different shape is also in the set), but this is not what we do directly.
Instead, we define a proof system, which is given by a family of inference rules as we have
already seen: a proof of a judgment in this proof system is a valid derivation using these
inference rules. Each proof system determines a logic (the set of judgments that have a
valid complete proof), but different proof systems may correspond to the same logic (there
are several examples in this thesis). Each proof system may make it easier or harder to
study a particular aspect of the logic; choosing a good proof system is important, and we
will also discuss some criteria that make a proof system comfortable and useful.
1.2.1. Formally defining the formulas
We describe in Figure 1.1 a grammar of the formulas we consider – they will be the
judgments of our proof system.
Figure 1.1.: Formulas of the propositional intuitionistic logic
A,B,C,D ::= formulas
| X,Y, Z atoms
| A×B conjunction (“and”)
| A+B disjunction (“or”)
| A→ B implication (“if” .. “then” ..)
| 1 true
| 0 false
Figure 1.1 defines a grammar of formulas. Formulas are objects with the following
structure: a formula is either an atom (or “atomic formula”), or a conjunction of formulas,
or a disjunction of formulas, or an implication of formulas, or true or false. For example,
(X → Y ) × 0 is a valid formula: it is a conjunction whose left formula is an implication
of atoms, and whose right formula is the false formula. We call the operator symbols
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(×,+,→) connectives, as they connect formulas together to build larger formulas. Because
we are building a logic (rather than a type system), we call them logical connectives. We
give a name to this logic we are defining, because we may also manipulate variants of it and
other logics, using their names to distinguish them: we call this logic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) –
I like descriptive names.
A quick remark on the notation – how to read Figure 1.1. The column on the right
starting with “formulas” is not part of the definition, it is a series of informal annotations
to help the reader by indicating the intuitive interpretation of the different cases. The
weird equal sign (::=) is a way to say that the stuff of the left is defined by the description
given on the right. On the left, the letters A,B,C,D mean that to denote a formula, we
use one of these meta-variables or variations of them (A3, B
′, Cobj, etc.). On the right,
you have a series of cases separated by vertical bars: (| · · · | · · · | · · · ). This means that an
element of the syntactic class we are defining (here, formulas), is of one of these forms. It
may be an atom X,Y, Z, or it may be a conjunction for example if it is of the form A×B,
where A and B denote any formula. When we write X,Y, Z to describe the syntactic class
of atoms, we actually mean either one of these letters, or variations of them: X ′, Y2, Zfoo,
etc.
Our previous example (X → Y )×0 is a valid formula because it can be decomposed using
the rules given in the figure: it is a product of the form B×C, where B is the implication
X → Y , and 0 is the “false” formula – it is just the symbol 0, but we understand it
informally as meaning “false”.
The “atoms” are primitive formulas that reasoning cannot decompose further. If you
wonder whether the sentence “If I am hungry and in a good mood, then I am hungry” is
provable in the logic we are defining, you may model “I am hungry” and “I am in a good
mood” as two atoms Xh and Ygm, and study the provability of the formula (Xh×Ygm)→ Xh.
The symbols chosen to represent conjunction and disjunction are a bit unusual, because
I reuse notations coming from the programming world. To my defense, on one hand the
specialists will immediately make sense of those notations, and on the other the usual
notations (A ∧B and A ∨B) are no easier to learn for non-specialists.
Remark 1.2.1. The usual rule about distributivity of multiplication over addition
A× (B + C) ⇐⇒ (A×B) + (A× C)
is true for our formulas: “A and (B or C)” is equivalent to “(A and B) or (A and C)” –
both intuitively and in the formal logics we study.1 ∗
On meta-variables In mathematics, if we express the function that doubles its input as
(x 7→ 2× x), the symbol x as used in this expression is called a “variable” and is part of
the formal mathematical object being defined, (x 7→ 2× x). If we then say “let’s call this
function f”, and use this name f in a mathematical expression (f(3)), we mean that the
name f should be (implicitly) replaced by its definition to understand the mathematical
object that we are describing; the name f itself is not a formal variable of the object. This
is another notion of “variable”, present at the level of our discussion, the level of discourse,
called the meta-level. Hence the name, “meta-variable”. When we discuss the properties
of a formula A, the symbol A is only a name for an actual formula (such as Y → Z), it is
a meta-variable.
In usual mathematics, the distinction between variables and meta-variables is rarely
made, because we quickly add other layers of abstraction such that what were previously
meta-variables become object variables. For example, it is natural to express higher-order
functions that take functions as arguments, such as the object f 7→ f(3), where f now
plays the role of a variable.
1You may be interested in the remark that, if we wrote BA for the implication A → B, the usual
rules about exponentiation would hold as well. For more details on those non-coincidences, see Fiore,
Di Cosmo, and Balat [2006] and Ilik [2014].
33
Remark 1.2.2. Early mathematicians did not think of functions as mathematical objects,
only as descriptions of transformations between objects. Even “the square of x” was only
an element of discourse at the meta-level. ∗
On the contrary, when defining logics and programming languages, distinguishing the
object level and the meta-level can be important. For example, if the object level is
a logic that is different from the logics we usually reason with (it does not accept the
same reasoning principles), confusing the object and meta-level can lead to mistakes.
In the theory of programming languages, some meta-level concepts can be turned into
objects of discourse, but that requires a deep understanding of them that can take years
of research. For example, polymorphism is the programming-language counterpart of
turning formula metavariables into object variables, and it is a subtle and difficult notion.
Explicit substitutions turned a meta-level notation of substitution into an object-level
concept, and again it took years to find good formulations.
The prefix “meta” is a common modality meaning “one level up”, by analogy with
“meta-physics”, often understood to describe what is “beyond physics”, the truths inde-
pendent from the physical world. This comes from the Greek prefix µετα, meaning “after”
or “beside”: the name “meta-physics” was given to the subject of the books of Aristotle
that were placed, on the shelves of the library, next to his book on physics2.
1.2.2. Formally defining the proofs
We have described a set of objects that we call formulas, whose structure is given by
a grammar. Similarly, what we call proof is nothing more than a set of objects with a
certain structure, which we can manipulate and study. Both are some sort of trees. It
may be useful to consider why we could use a simple grammar to describe formulas, but
had to use a more complex notation (inference rules) for proofs.
The reason for this different notation is that the structure of proofs is more complex
than the structure of formulas, in the following sense. A formula is built up, recursively, of
other formulas that appear inside it (we call them “subformulas”); an implication formula,
for example, has left-hand and right-hand sides that are themselves formulas, and may
contain subformulas. Any of those subformulas has exactly the same structure as any
other: they are formulas.
On the contrary, the structure of proofs depends in important ways on what is being
proved. The proof of a conjunction does not have the same formal structure as the proof of
a disjunction. A proof contains sub-proofs that correspond to intermediate steps, but their
structure depends on what this intermediate step is trying to establish. Simple recursive
context-free grammars, as used to describe formulas, cannot capture this dependency.
Thus, to represent proofs, we use derivation trees as defined in Section 1.1 (A first intro-
duction to inference rules). If we use logic formulas as the judgments of these derivations,
we can have different rules to form derivations whose conclusion is the conjunction A1×A2
and derivations whose conclusion is the disjunction A1 +A2.
However, formulas are not quite enough to capture proofs. To prove the formula A1×A2,
we could require complete proofs of the formulas A1 and A2:
A1 A2
A1 ×A2
But which premises should we require to prove the implication A → B? We would like
to say that “assuming A holds, we require a proof of B”. This means that our notion of
judgment should tell us not only what formula is to be proved, but what assumptions we
have made in the process of proving it. We will use the syntax A ` B to represent the
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics#Etymology
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judgment “prove B assume A”. A rule for implication could be:
A ` B
A→ B
However, in the general case, we may have not only one assumption (here A) but a set of
various assumptions. For example, to prove A → (B → C) is to prove C under the as-
sumptions {A,B}. We will use the meta-variable Γ to represent these sets of assumptions,
that we call contexts, and the notation Γ, A to represent the addition of the assumption
A to the set Γ – that is, the set Γ ∪ {A}. The general rule for implication is thus, for any
context Γ:
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
It reads: “to prove that A implies B under the assumptions Γ, it suffices to prove B under
the assumptions Γ plus the assumption A”.
In other words, the judgments that we establish in our proof systems are not a single
formula A, but a pair (Γ, A) of a context Γ that is assumed, and a formula A that is to
be proved. The syntax Γ ` A is just a notation for the pair (Γ, A), just as the judgment
m 4 n of Section 1.1 was just a notation for the pair of natural numbers (m,n).
Remark 1.2.3. The symbol ` is inspired by the weird notations proposed by Frege in
his famous Begriffsschrift in 1879, probably the first attempt to represent mathematical
statements and proofs as precise mathematical objects themselves, instead of just an
informal mathematical text.
You will easily spot the ` in the following example of Frege’s notation – whose type-
setting is attributed to Marcus Rossberg by Quirin Pamp3. It represents a particular
rendition of the second-order Geach-Kaplan sentence4, “Some critics (C) admire (A) only
one another.”, ∃F, (∀a,F(a)→ C(a))×(∃b,F(b))×(∀c d, (F(c)×A(c, d))→ (F(d)×c 6= d)).
This is for the reader amusement only, I will not attempt to explain or use the notation.
 F
f
(
 a C(a)
F(a)
)
 b F(b)
 c  d c = d
F(d)
F(c)
A(c, d)
∗
In Figure 1.2, we describe the proofs of propositional intuitionistic logic in natural
deduction style (there is another common presentation, called “sequent style” which we
also describe in this document, in Chapter 4), specified as a system of inference rules.
For example, below is a complete proof of the formula 1 × (0 + X) (“true and (either
false or X)”), with the assumption that the atom X is true in context. That is, a proof
of the judgment X ` 1× (0 +X):
X ` 1
X ` X
X ` 0 +X
X ` 1× (0 +X)
3http://mirrors.ctan.org/macros/latex/contrib/frege/frege.pdf
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonfirstorderizability
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Figure 1.2.: Propositional intuitionistic logic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0), in natural deduction style
nd-axiom
Γ, A ` A
nd-and-intro
Γ ` A Γ ` B
Γ ` A×B
nd-and-elim
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ ` Ai
i ∈ {1, 2}
nd-or-intro
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2
i ∈ {1, 2}
nd-or-elim
Γ ` A+B
Γ, A ` C
Γ, B ` C
Γ ` C
nd-impl-intro
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
nd-impl-elim
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
nd-true-intro
Γ ` 1
(no elimination rule for 1)
(no introduction rule for 0)
nd-false-elim
Γ ` 0
Γ ` A
The first rule of Figure 1.2, named nd-axiom (nd for “Natural Deduction”), tells us that
if A is among the current assumptions (Γ, A) of the judgment, then A is provable. Note
that Γ, A is a notation for the (non-disjoint) union of sets (or insertion of an element in a
set): Γ may itself contain A, and then (Γ, A) and Γ are the same set.
Γ, A ` A
Note the side-condition in the rule nd-or-intro:
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2
i ∈ {1, 2}
The formula Ai is either A1 or A2. The side-condition insists that i be either 1 or 2 – in
the other systems of this thesis we often omit it, as it is often evident, from the way the
index i is used. In the case of our example X ` 1 × (0 + X), we have used the rule with
i = 2:
X ` X
X ` 0 +X
We proved the right-hand side of the disjunction, as the left-hand side would not have
been provable.
Figure 1.2 has several kind of rules. The axiom rule nd-axiom is one-of-a-kind; it is
called a structural rule because it does not pertain to a specific logical connective, but is a
general principle for any formulas of the logic; some other logics have more such structural
rules.
nd-axiom
Γ, A ` A
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The introduction rules are the rules where a logical connective appears below the bar.
Introduction rules allows us to prove a formula using this connective, from premises in-
volving the sub-formulas: they introduce a proof of the connective. Here we have one such
rule for each connective: nd-and-intro for conjunction, nd-or-intro for disjunction, and
nd-impl-intro for implication. To prove (“introduce”) an implication A → B, it suffices
to assume A by adding it to the context, and then prove B.
nd-and-intro
Γ ` A Γ ` B
Γ ` A×B
nd-or-intro
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2
i ∈ {1, 2}
nd-impl-intro
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
Finally, the elimination rules have a formula using a logical connective above the bar.
Elimination rules describe how to use the proof of a formula starting with a given connec-
tive to prove things about its sub-formulas: they use, or eliminate, proofs of the connective.
The elimination rule for the conjunction, nd-and-elim, tells you that from a proof of A×B
you can obtain a proof of A (when applying the rule with i
def
= 1) or B (with i
def
= 2). The
rule nd-or-elim uses a disjunction A + B to prove a formula C; you have to be able to
prove C assuming A, and also prove C assuming B. Finally the rule nd-impl-elim lets you
use (“eliminate”) the implication A→ B to deduce B, provided that you can prove A.
nd-and-elim
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ ` Ai
i ∈ {1, 2}
nd-or-elim
Γ ` A+B
Γ, A ` C
Γ, B ` C
Γ ` C
nd-impl-elim
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
The base formulas 0 and 1 are a bit special: the true formula has only one (trivial)
introduction rule, but no elimination rule (it is not very useful to deduce other formulas).
The false formula, on the contrary, has no introduction rule (you do not want to help
the users of your logic prove false results!), only an elimination rule, which let us deduce
anything from an absurdity.
You may have noticed a certain symmetry between some of those rules: the introduction
rule for the disjunction nd-or-intro resembles the elimination rule of the conjunction
nd-and-elim – it is a bit harder to see a relation between the two other rules, nd-and-intro
and nd-or-elim.
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ ` Ai
i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2
i ∈ {1, 2}
This is no coincidence, but this particular logical system is not the best suited to exhibit
and discuss this symmetry. We present a more symmetrical system in the form of a sequent
calculus in Section 4.1.
Finally, let us come back to the opening remark of this section, that describing the
structure of valid proofs required a richer formalism than the context-free grammar used
to described valid formulas. System of inference rules permit exactly this: valid proofs
are trees where not all parts of the tree have the same structure: the only rules that
can be applied at a given point in the proof are those that match the current judgment
Γ ` A. All context-free grammars could be presented as systems of inference rules, but
the converse is not true. For your amusement, below is a system of inference rules for
a different judgment A formula that defines the valid formulas (A is valid if and only if
A formula is provable), just as the grammar of Figure 1.1 (Formulas of the propositional
intuitionistic logic), only in a more verbose way.
A formula B formula
A×B formula
A formula B formula
A+B formula
A formula B formula
A→ B formula
A ∈ {X,Y, Z . . . }
A formula 1 formula 0 formula
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1.2.3. Rootward and leafward reading of inference rules
There are two natural ways to look at any inference rule of a logic, and people familiar
with that notation often jump from one interpretation to the other, at the cost of confusing
the less confident reader. A rule
tata
J1 J2 . . .
J
can be read:
• Rootward (downward): if you have succeeded in proving the sequents J1,J2, . . . ,
then you can now prove J . This is useful when you know what you have, and
wonder where you can go with it.
• Leafward (upward): if your goal is to prove J , then the rule tells you that one way
you may try is to prove J1,J2, . . . . This is useful when you know what you want,
but not how to go there.
Remark 1.2.4. The use of the words “rootward” and “leafward” is a personal choice;
they have the advantage (compared to for example “downward” and “upward”) of being
independent of the particular spatial convention that we adopted to represent trees with
their leaves up and their root down – this convention is absolutely omnipresent in the field,
but some of our neighbors, for example in “tableaux proof systems”, take the opposite
one. I prefer to avoid using “up” and “down”. People sometimes use “bottom-up” for
leafward and “top-down” for rootward (I caught Stéphane Graham-Lengrand doing this
in a talk); this is absolutely wrong, because for everyone else “bottom-up” means “from
the small atomic parts to the composed result” (in our setting, that would be rootward),
and “top-down” means “from the composed results to the atomic parts” (in our setting,
leafward). ∗
There is no “right choice” between the rootward and leafward reading of inference rules.
Different users of the logic have different biases. The designer of (goal-directed) proof
search algorithms, for example, almost exclusively favor the leafward reading. Because we
tend to think of logics in terms of “how can we prove its formulas?”, it is a rather common
view. Have a look at the order in which people write those rules on a blackboard: it may
reveal their natural reading order. But there are also proof-search algorithms (such as the
so-called “inverse” method) that work by saturation from the axioms, and thus rather use
the rootward reading.
In the natural deduction system we have presented, introduction rules have a more
natural leafward interpretation, and elimination rules are more naturally explained in a
rootward way. When you see
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
a natural explanation of the first rule is “to prove an implication, it suffices to ...”
(leafward), while the second is more “if you have proved an implication, then you can
...” (rootward).
A fairly confusing aspect of this ambiguity is that, even though I suspect most people
naturally use the leafward reading most of the time, the naming of the rules consistently
comes from their rootward interpretation. For example, we have defined in our logic
contexts Γ as sets of hypotheses, in particular the sets {A,B,A} and {B,A} are the same,
they contain the same elements A and B. Some other logics have contexts with a more
restricted structure (multisets for example, or even ordered lists), and are careful about
38
the number of time each hypothesis is used. They may have the following rule:
Γ, A,A ` B
Γ, A ` B
I find natural to read this rule leafward: it is ok to split any hypothesis of the context
in two, to be used in two different ways by the leafward derivation. But it is named
the contraction rule, from its rootward interpretation: if you have a proof that uses two
distinct copies of a hypothesis, you can contract it in a proof using only one copy. Similarly,
a rule that is commonly discussed is
Γ ` B
Γ, A ` B
My personal intuition for this rule is a form of “hiding”: we are trying to prove B in
the context Γ, A, but we claim that it is ok to forget about the hypothesis A, we decide
to be brave and look for a proof that does not use it at all. (That is also the natural
interpretation in terms of programming language design, through the proof-as-programs
correspondence.) Yet this rule is named weakening from its rootward interpretation: if we
have a complete proof of B using the assumptions Γ, then we may weaken it by adding the
unnecessary hypothesis A – which makes it applicable in less situations, hence the idea of
weakness.
This confusion is to be taken as a strength: by tilting your head and inverting your
reading order, you get to see new things about the same rule, maybe connections to other
concepts and new ideas.
1.2.4. Structural presentations vs. Hilbert-style proofs
In my first course of mathematical logic, I was presented a very different formal structure
for proofs. We would first pick a closed set of reasoning axioms (formulas that are assumed
to be always true in classical logic), then define a proof of a statement S as a sequences
of propositions P (i) indexed by natural numbers [0;n], such as each step is either one of
the axioms, or the modus ponens of two previous steps (that is, deducing B from A and
A⇒ B), and such that P (n) = S.
For example, a proof with conclusion
Π1 :: Γ ` A1 Π2 :: Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2
would be represented as the linear sequence of steps:
• a sequence of formulas representing Π1, ending with Γ⇒ A1, at step index (k1),
• followed by a sequence of formulas representing Π2, ending with Γ ⇒ A2, at step
index (k2),
• followed by the classical tautology ∀X,Y, Z, (X ⇒ Y ) ⇒ ((X ⇒ Z) ⇒ (X ⇒
(Y ∧ Z))), at index (k2 + 1),
• followed by the formula (Γ⇒ A2)⇒ (Γ⇒ (A1∧A2)), as the modus ponens of steps
(k2 + 1) (with choice of parameters X
def
= Γ, Y
def
= A1, Z
def
= A2) and (k1), at index
(k2 + 2),
• ending with the formula Γ ⇒ (A1 ∧ A2) as the modus ponens of steps (k2 + 2) and
(k2).
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert_system
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This representation, called Hilbert-style5, is simple to define, but it also feels very “low-
level”. In particular, the representation we propose, as a tree of inference rules, exposes
more information on the “structure” of the proof. Our connective (×) is given meaning by
the inference rules to form and use proofs of A×B. In a Hilbert-style system, it is the set
of axioms (a list with no particular structure) that gives meaning to all the connectives of
the logic.
Our more structural definition of proofs allows us to prove important results by inspec-
tion of the tree structure, by induction over it; in particular, we can prove this way that
our logic is consistent: it admits no proof of false in the empty context (Theorem 3.3.9
(Consistency of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0))). With Hilbert-style proof, the structure of proofs con-
tains almost no information, and any consistency result must be obtained by studying the
set of all tautologies.
Structural presentations also give stronger intuitions of what the “computational” mean-
ing of each logic may be. That said, Hilbert-style proofs can be extended with more struc-
tural proof-formers (combinatory logics), and then have corresponding notion of programs
(combinator languages). Combinatory logics6 have been a fertile ground for research with
many applications to computer science, for example for type inference and term rewriting.
1.3. On the meaning of logical connectives: testing a logic
We have been a bit dishonest in the previous section: we introduced some formal symbols
and some formal rules, and at the same time we gave them the names of existing concepts
(“and”, “or”, “implies”, “true”, “false”), speaking informally of those formal objects as
if they corresponded to those notions that we all already understand intuitively. But do
the connectives that we defined correspond to those informal notions? Does the notion of
proof that we define correspond to what is usually understood as a proof?
The answer is “no, and that is sort of the point”. We are not trying to make a philo-
sophical stance on what Reasoning and Truth are about, or even about what would be
the Right way to reason and prove. We are defining one precise, simple, formal notion of
reasoning and proofs, and studying how far we can go with it, which interesting things it
allows us to do – a parallel (or nested) world where the rules are purposely different. The
meaning of our connective (×) is not defined as an approximation of what we understand
of the informal notion of “and”, but precisely by “whatever you can do using the rules we
have given”, in the present case nd-and-intro and nd-and-elim.
We could make a parallel with the non-euclidean geometries that emerged during the
nineteenth century: there are many possible geometries that can be defined formally, and
they are not (only) judged on the resemblance to our physical space, but also on their
interesting properties and applications – they turn out to be useful to think about other
things than the physical world. We have scratched the beginning of a toolbox to define
new logics, which can then be judged on their properties and applications.
(The specialist have recognized that this logic is intuitionistic rather than classical, and
thus does not prove certain things that most people would consider intuitively valid. I
explain this difference and bridge the gap in Section 4.3 (Classical logic).)
Of course, the ability to define arbitrary proof systems and play with them does not mean
that anything goes: some definitions are better (more interesting, have more applications,
etc.) than others. What defines a good proof system is extremely subtle, but there are
some tests that can tell us if we did an obvious mistake. For computer programs, a test is
a particular input to feed the running program, along with a description of the expected
output. For mathematical objects the notion of test is more delicate; a common form of
test is a particular mathematical property that most objects of this class verify – that
good objects of this class ought to verify: lemmas as tests. Following this idea, we now
discuss two kinds of properties of proof systems, some that are local in nature – they test
6http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-Tcombinatory/
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each connective separately – and some that are global – they test the logic as a whole.
Remark 1.3.1. We could also try to prove soundness and completeness of our rules, as
we did for the simpler judgments m 4 n in Section 1.1 (A first introduction to inference
rules). There is no hope to prove soundness and completeness of our formal definition
of proofs against the informal idea that most people (including mathematicians) have of
what a proof is. To rigorously formulate soundness and completeness conjectures and
prove them, we need another formal description of logic to compare against.
This can be done (for example, comparing our rules for intuitionistic logic with Kripke
semantics), but it requires to develop these alternate formal presentations of logics, which
we will not do, by lack of space. In any case, our proofs of soundness and completeness
would require most of the results that we describe as tests below.
When you create a new logic, or a new programming language, finding the right alter-
native formal model to compare to is an important first step towards validating your new
idea, and it can be difficult. ∗
1.3.1. Global tests: weakening and substitution
A first example of test is the following: is the logic monotonic? That is, does adding new
hypotheses to the context Γ always let us prove more things? Or is it the case that some
formula A is provable in a given context Γ, but not in a larger context Γ, A′? This is a
global test, because we test all the rules of the logic together: any of them could break
this monotonicity property.
The logic we have defined is monotonic, in other words the following property holds.
Lemma 1.3.1 (Weakening for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
If Γ ` A admits a partial proof Π, then Γ, A′ ` A admits a partial proof Π′, for any
additional hypothesis A′. The open leaves of the form ∆ ` B in Π becomes leaves of the
form ∆, A′ ` B in Π′, and there are no other open leaves in Π′.
The proof which follows is a constructive procedure that takes as input the partial
derivation Π :: Γ ` A, and returns a new derivation Π′ :: Γ, A′ ` A. Because it is
constructive, we can use this proof as if it was a reasoning step: this almost as if it was
a rule of the logic (this is the concept of admissibility, explained in definition 1.1.2). We
write:
Π :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A
to denote the (uniquely defined) proof obtained by applying this procedure to Π. The
dotted horizontal line is here to remind us that this is not a built-in inference rule. This
particular admissible rule is called weakening because we obtain a “weaker” judgment with
more hypotheses.
Proof. The first case of the proof is simple: if Γ already contains A′, then the proof
is immediate: Π is already a proof of Γ, A′ ` A as (Γ, A′) and Γ are the same set of
hypotheses.
Otherwise, the proof proceeds by induction on the structure of Π. For example, consider
the weakening of a proof concluded by the conjunction introduction rule,
Π1 :: Γ ` A1 Π2 :: Γ ` A2 nd-and-intro
Γ ` A1 ×A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A1 ×A2
Doing an induction on the sub-proofs of the judgments Πi :: Γ ` Ai gives us, as induction
hypotheses, two proofs Π′i :: Γ, A
′ ` Ai that we write with the same “admissible rule”
notation:
Π1 :: Γ ` A1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Π′1 :: Γ, A
′ ` A1
Π2 :: Γ ` A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Π′2 :: Γ, A
′ ` A2
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From these two induction hypotheses, we can form a valid proof of the desired goal
Γ, A′ ` A1 ×A2 as follows:
Π′1 :: Γ, A
′ ` A1 Π′2 :: Γ, A′ ` A2 nd-and-intro
Γ, A′ ` A1 ×A2
In other words (using a more compact notation), we can define the weakening of the
conjunction introduction rule as follows:
Γ ` A1 Γ ` A2 nd-and-intro
Γ ` A1 ×A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A1 ×A2
def
=
Γ ` A1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A1
Γ ` A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A2
nd-and-intro
Γ, A′ ` A1 ×A2
The rest of this proof uses a similar notation for all other rules.
nd-axiom
Γ, A ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A,A′ ` A
def
= nd-axiomΓ, A,A′ ` A
Γ ` A1 ×A2 nd-and-elim
Γ ` Ai. . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` Ai
def
=
Γ ` A1 ×A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A1 ×A2
nd-and-elim
Γ, A′ ` Ai
Γ ` Ai nd-or-intro
Γ ` A1 +A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A1 +A2
def
=
Γ ` Ai. . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` Ai
nd-or-intro
Γ, A′ ` A1 +A2
Γ ` A1 +A2 Γ, A1 ` C Γ, A2 ` C
nd-or-elim
Γ ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` C
def
=
Γ ` A1 +A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A1 +A2
Γ, A1 ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A1, A
′ ` C
Γ, A2 ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A2, A
′ ` C
nd-or-elim
Γ, A′ ` C
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Γ, A ` B
nd-impl-intro
Γ ` A→ B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A→ B
def
=
Γ, A ` B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′, A ` B
nd-impl-intro
Γ, A′ ` A→ B
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A nd-impl-elim
Γ ` B. . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` B
def
=
Γ ` A→ B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A→ B
Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A
nd-impl-elim
Γ, A′ ` B
nd-true-intro
Γ ` 1.. . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` 1
def
= nd-true-introΓ, A′ ` 1
Γ ` 0 nd-false-elim
Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` A
def
=
Γ ` 0.. . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A′ ` 0
nd-false-elim
Γ, A′ ` A
Note that, in the rules that add hypotheses to the context, nd-impl-intro for example,
it may be the case that A′ belongs to the context of the premise – when introducing an
implication of the form A′ → B. In this case the definition of the admissible rule applies,
but the inductive weakening of the premise is just the premise itself. 
Notice that all inference rules of our logic have been considered in this proof – this is a
global test. For an example of rule that would break this monotonicity property, consider
the following restricted axiom rule:
nd-axiom-linear
A ` A
This rule let us prove A ` A, but not A,B ` A for B 6= A: it breaks monotonicity. It is
also a central rule in linear logic, a beautiful and useful logic – failing some tests can be a
good thing.
Remark 1.3.2. A less obvious example is a rule, in a different logic with a different
notion of implication, that tells you, for each implication, what was the environment at
the place where the implication was proved (in terms of programming, that tells us about
the variables captured by the function closure):
nd-closure-intro
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` [Γ](A→ B)
To make this logic monotonic, you need to ensure that whenever [Γ](A→ B) is provable,
then [Γ, A′](A→ B) is also provable. I designed such a system once, and at first I forgot to
describe this lifting of implication – it was kept implicit in the representation of proofs. An
anonymous reviewer promptly reminded me that monotonicity is an important property
that should be explicitly preserved, and fixing this mistake led to a more precise, better
description of the system. ∗
The second global test is even more important than weakening. Suppose we have a
proof Π of B assuming A, and independently we came up with a proof of A. Can we
transform Π into a proof of B that does not assume A anymore (as it is proved)?
Theorem 1.3.2 (Substitution for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
The following rule is admissible
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B ΠA :: Γ ` A...................................... subst
Γ ` B
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In particular, some valid proofs of Γ ` B are all the proofs that have the same struc-
ture as the complete proof ΠB, except that some axiom rules on A have been replaced by
(weakenings of) ΠA.
We speak of the proofs resulting of substitution, instead of the proof, because there may
be several possible admissible proofs. For example, consider the proof Π :: A ` A → A
defined as
nd-axiom
A ` A
A ` A→ A
If we provide a proof ΠA :: ∅ ` A, we may substitute it inside Π to obtain a proof of
∅ ` A→ A, but there are two possible such proofs:
nd-axiom
A ` A
∅ ` A→ A
ΠA :: ∅ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
A ` A
∅ ` A→ A
In a sense, the two proofs result from different views of where the hypothesis used in
the axiom rules of the original proof Π “comes from”. If it comes from the hypothesis
A added by implication introduction, it should not be replaced by ΠA (first proof). If it
comes from the hypothesis A that was present in the context, it is the one assumption
that we remove and substitute with ΠA (second proof). We cannot distinguish these two
cases in the original proof, as the two hypotheses A are merged, in the context, as the
singleton set {A}.
Remark 1.3.3. It is possible to make this idea more precise by using not a set of hy-
potheses, but a multi-set of hypotheses. We would have several copies of A in the context
of the axiom rule, one coming from the root context and one from the implication intro-
duction. Some authors prefer this approach (which is closer to the way we name variables
when programming; and thus makes it easier to have a correspondence between proof
derivations and programs), and arguably it is closer to some historic presentations of nat-
ural deduction, where there are no contexts, and introducing an hypothesis A is done by
“discarding” a subset of the open leaves of type A.
I still prefer the set-of-hypotheses approach, which I find a more faithful rendering of
intuitionistic (or classical) logic: there is no reason we should care about having different
hypotheses of the same formula, either it is provable or it is not – this is the approach
taken by search procedures, for example. ∗
Our statement of the theorem says that the notation
Π :: A ` A→ A ΠA :: ∅ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
∅ ` A→ A
may denote either of those proofs, and no other: those two are all the proofs obtained by
replacing some of the axiom rules of Π by (weakenings of) the proof ΠA. In the general
case there may exist other valid proofs of the desired judgment (consider the case A
def
= 1
for example), but by this admissible notation we mean one of the proofs with the shape
we described. Restricting the set of proofs meant by this notation is important in later
sections where we prove and use properties of substitution.
Proof (Theorem 1.3.2 (Substitution for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0))). As for the case of weakening,
we define the admissible rule
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B ΠA :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B
by induction on the structure of ΠB.
The axiom case is the most delicate. We have either
nd-axiom
ΠB :: Γ, B,A ` B
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with B 6= A, and we can return the proof
nd-axiom
ΠB :: Γ, B ` B
Or we are in the case where B = A, namely
nd-axiom
ΠB :: Γ, A ` A
and we may simply return the proof (ΠA :: Γ ` A), but if furthermore we have A ∈ Γ
(that is the set (Γ, A) is in fact equal to the set Γ), we also have the choice of returning
the proof
nd-axiom
ΠB :: Γ ` A
It is the choice between those two latter proofs (ΠA or an axiom rule), in the case where
A ∈ Γ, that makes this admissible rule non-deterministic: there are two possible proofs
that we could return. They both respect the structure described in the lemma: they have
the structure of the initial proof ΠB where some (but maybe not all) axiom rules on A
have been replaced by (weakenings of) ΠA.
There is no such choice in the other cases, which simply mirror the structure of the
proof ΠB; they are directly handled by a case analysis on the root inference rule.
Γ, A ` B1 Γ, A ` B2
Γ, A ` B1 ×B2 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1 ×B2
def
=
Γ, A ` B1 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1
Γ, A ` B2 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B2
Γ ` B1 ×B2
Note that using substitution as an admissible rule on the premises Γ, A ` Bi is an
induction hypothesis that may return one of several possible substitutions proof, and that
the proof structure described for Γ ` B1 × B2 thus denotes many possible proofs, all
sharing the structure of the initial proof.
Γ, A ` B1 ×B2
Γ, A ` Bi Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` Bi
def
=
Γ, A ` B1 ×B2 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1 ×B2
Γ ` Bi
Γ, A ` Bi
Γ, A ` B1 +B2 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1 +B2
def
=
Γ, A ` Bi Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` Bi
Γ ` B1 +B2
Γ, A ` C1 + C2 Γ, A,C1 ` B Γ, A,C2 ` B
Γ, A ` B Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B
def
=
Γ, A ` C1 + C2 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s
Γ ` C1 + C2
Γ, A,C1 ` B
Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, C1 ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s
Γ, C1 ` B
Γ, A,C2 ` B
Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, C2 ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s
Γ, C2 ` B
Γ ` B
Γ, A,B1 ` B2
Γ, A ` B1 → B2 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1 → B2
def
=
Γ, A,B1 ` B2
Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, B1 ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ, B1 ` B2
Γ ` B1 → B2
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Γ, A ` B1 → B2 Γ, A ` B1
Γ, A ` B2 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B2
def
=
Γ, A ` B1 → B2 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1 → B2
Γ, A ` B1 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1
Γ, A ` B2
Γ, A ` 1 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` 1
def
= Γ ` 1
Γ, A ` 0
Γ, A ` B Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B
def
=
Γ, A ` 0 Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` 0
Γ, A ` B
One may notice that, in these proofs, whenever the induction hypothesis (the ability to
perform substitution on a sub-derivation) is called in the leaves of a rule that adds a new
hypothesis in context, a weakening is applied to the substituted Γ ` A proof. This will be
familiar to people that have worked with De Bruijn indices. 
1.3.2. Derivability and Admissibility
A priori, one could distinguish many different notions of “A is more general, stronger than
B” in our system, among which:
• Implication: A implies B (under a context Γ) if the judgment Γ ` A→ B is provable.
• Provability: B is provable from A (under a context Γ) if Γ, A ` B is provable.
• Derivability: B is derivable from A (under a context Γ) if the judgment Γ ` B is
derivable from a judgment (in a weaker context) of the form Γ,∆ ` A.
• Admissibility: B is admissible from A (under a context Γ) if the judgment Γ ` B is
admissible from a judgment (in a weaker context) of the form Γ,∆ ` A.
Luckily, those notions are not unrelated – a jungle of distinct concepts would make
our logic rather difficult to work with. Implication and provability are equivalent (inter-
derivable). They are also equivalent to derivability of formulas. In the general case of
judgments, rather than simple formulas, derivability implies admissibility. These relations
are established using weakening and substitution: this is one of the reasons why those
global properties are important.
The equivalence between “B is provable from A” and “A implies B” is by design: it is
a direct consequence of the introduction and elimination rules for implication, but note
that we need to use weakening in one direction:
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
Γ ` A→ B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A ` A→ B Γ, A ` A
Γ, A ` B
The fact that a connective of our logic, implication, completely captures provability is
an important property of the logic. It avoids having to make distinctions between the
provability results that can be described as formulas, and those that can only be discussed
at the meta-level.
The fact that provability implies derivability is precisely the substitution principle: if
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Γ, A ` B has a complete proof Π, we can compute the substitution with the open leaf
Γ ` A,
Π :: Γ, A ` B Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B
and this gives a partial proof of Γ ` B whose open leaves are all Γ ` A.
Conversely, if we have a proof of Γ ` B whose open leaves are each of the form Γ,∆ ` A
for some ∆, then weakening the root judgment into Γ, A ` B gives a proof whose open
leaves are of the form Γ, A,∆ ` A, and can thus be closed by an axiom rule. In other
words, if Γ ` B is derivable from judgments of the form Γ,∆ ` A for some ∆, then B is
provable from A under Γ.
The fact that derivability implies admissibility is trivial: a partial proof Π of J from
the J1, . . . ,Jn gives a direct way to obtain a complete proof of J from complete proofs of
the J1, . . . ,Jn – just plug these complete proofs at the leaves of Π.
An important difference between derivability and admissibility is that derivability is
stable with respect to the addition of new inference rules to the logic, while admissibility
is not in general: a partial proof of J using J1 (witnessing derivability) will remain a valid
partial proof, but a case-analysis on all possible complete proofs of J1 may start failing if
new rules are added, which the case-analysis cannot handle. This (meta-level) reasoning
proves that admissibility does not imply derivability.
Contravariance and equiprovability If B is admissible from A then, by weakening, Γ ` B
is admissible from Γ ` A for any context Γ, that is, B can always be replaced by the
stronger A in succedent position. But then it is also the case that Γ, A ` C is admissible
from Γ, B ` C, that is, A can always be replaced by the weaker B in hypothesis position.
Indeed, we have:
Γ, B ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A,B ` C
Γ, A ` A. . . . . . . . . . . .
Γ, A ` B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ, A ` C
In particular, if two formulas are equiprovable, (A ` B and B ` A, or equivalently
` A → B and ` B → A), one can always be replaced by the other in any part of a
judgment, and the new judgment is provable if and only if the old judgment was provable.
The fact that “succedent position” and “hypothesis position” play symmetric roles will
be extended to a more general notion of (sub)-formula occurrences in Section 6.2.4 (Positive
and negative positions in a formula).
1.3.3. Local tests: reduction and expansion
The local tests below apply to each logical connective separately. They guarantee that
the handling of each connective in the logic is “harmonious” in some sense. There are two
natural local tests:
• reduction: If we apply the elimination rule of some connective on a proof that is the
direct result of an introduction rule, can we reduce this proof to something simpler
that does not use the introduction rule?
• expansion: By applying the elimination rule of some connective to a proof, can we
extract enough information to be able to re-apply the corresponding introduction
rule(s)?
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Reducing the conjunction
Suppose we have two proofs ΠA :: Γ ` A and ΠB :: Γ ` B. We can introduce the product
A×B using nd-and-intro, and immediately destruct it with nd-and-elim, for example in
the case i
def
= 1:
ΠA :: Γ ` A ΠB :: Γ ` B
Γ ` A×B
Γ ` A
You see that using the elimination rule for the product gives us something we already
knew: we already have a simpler proof of the conclusion Γ ` A, namely ΠA. The applica-
tion of this elimination rule to the result of the introduction rule could be reduced to the
simpler proof ΠA.
The point is not that this particular use of the elimination rule (with i
def
= 1) has this
property, but that all the possible uses of elimination rules for conjunctions share it.
Indeed, the only other form of elimination is to use nd-and-elim with i
def
= 2, and then we
would get a sophisticated proof of Γ ` B that can be reduced to ΠB.
This test tells us that the elimination rule are in a sense “reasonable” with respect to
the introduction rule. They do not allow us to deduce new stuff that was not already
there at introduction time – it would be highly suspicious. For example, a way to break
this property would be to add the following rule to our logic:
suspicious-and-elim-rule
Γ ` A×B
Γ ` C
This rule is obviously wrong, as it let us prove the false proposition 0. But one more
systematic way to realize quickly that it is wrong is to check that it breaks the reduction
principle for the conjunction connective: when this rule is applied rootward from a con-
junction introduction, the derivation cannot be reduced to any simpler proof not using
the introduction.
Expanding the conjunction
By looking at what happens when we eliminate the result of an introduction rule, we have
shown that the elimination rule for the conjunction does not allow to deduce more than
what the introduction rule requires: eliminations are not “stronger” than introductions.
Expansion is the other way around: given the results of all possible eliminations of a
proof of a formula, can we re-introduce the eliminated connective? This tests whether the
elimination rule let us deduce “enough”, or whether the introduction rule requires “too
much”.
Assume we have a proof Π :: Γ ` A×B. We can eliminate its conclusion in two different
ways:
Π :: Γ ` A×B
Γ ` A
Π :: Γ ` A×B
Γ ` B
It is not a coincidence that the conclusions of these eliminations are exactly the require-
ment of the introduction rule. We say that Π can be expanded into the more complex
proof of the same judgment
Γ ` A×B
Γ ` A
Γ ` A×B
Γ ` B
Γ ` A×B
A rule that would violate that test would be the following introduction rule:
suspicious-and-intro-rule
Γ ` A ∅ ` B
Γ ` A×B
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which requires its right premise to be in the empty context, disallowing the use of any
assumption in the current context Γ.
This suspicious introduction rule requires “too much” – with respect to the available
elimination rule. In particular, if this rule replaced the usual nd-and-intro, then we would
not be able to prove Γ ` (A×B)→ (B×A) for non-empty contexts Γ, which violates our
intuition of what our logic should allow.
1.3.4. A notation for reductions and expansions
Notation 1.3.1 Π .R Π
′.
We write Π .R Π
′ to say that Π′ can be considered a reduction of a proof Π which
eliminates an introduction – both proofs prove the same judgment. Similarly we write
Π .E Π
′ to say that Π can be expanded into Π′ by introducing the result(s) of elimination.
We can similarly check that other connectives are reducible (the elimination of an in-
troduction can be simplified) and expansible (the result(s) of eliminations can be re-
introduced). In some places we need to use the admissible operations of substitution and
weakening introduced in Section 1.3.1.
1.3.5. Reducing, expanding implications
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B ΠA :: Γ ` A
Γ ` B
.R
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B ΠA :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B
Π :: Γ ` A→ B .E
Π :: Γ ` A→ B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A ` A→ B Γ, A ` A
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
The substitution rule on the right-hand side of the reduction relation may mean many
different proofs. We consider that the left-hand side is in relation to any of those proofs.
1.3.6. Reducing, expanding disjunctions
Π :: Γ ` Ai
Π :: Γ ` A1 +A2 Π1 :: Γ, A1 ` C Π2 :: Γ, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
.R
Π :: Γ ` Ai Πi :: Γ, Ai ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` C
Π :: Γ ` A1 +A2 .E Π :: Γ ` A1 +A2
Γ, A1 ` A1
Γ, A1 ` A1 +A2
Γ, A2 ` A2
Γ, A2 ` A1 +A2
Γ ` A1 +A2
1.3.7. No reductions/expansions for true and false
The true and false formulas have no reduction or expansion to check, because they lack
either an elimination or an introduction rule.
1.3.8. Reducing, expanding sub-proofs
The relation Π .R Π
′ holds if Π ends with an elimination of an introduction rule, and if
Π′ is its simplification removing these two reasoning steps.
We extend this simplification relation (.R) to what is called a congruent relation (→R),
which also considers simplification of elimination-introduction pairs that are not at the
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conclusion of the proof, but anywhere inside the proof. For example, we have
ΠA :: Γ ` A ΠB :: Γ ` B
Γ ` A×B
Γ ` A
Γ ` 0 +A
→R
ΠA :: Γ ` A
Γ ` 0 +A
while these two proofs are not in the relation (.R) because the last rule is not an elimination
rule applied to an introduction rule, it is the disjunction-introduction rule nd-or-intro.
Notation 1.3.2.
More generally, for a relation whose notation is a variation on the notation (.), we use
the same variation on the notation (→) to indicate its congruent extension – for example,
(→E) is the relation that let us expand a subproof by eliminating then reintroducing the
same connective.
Credits I realized that the reduction and expansion principles were a thing in logic alone
(I was familiar with their programming-language counterpart) and could be used to test the
logic during excellent lectures by Frank Pfenning at the Oregon Programming Language
Summer School. Frank Pfenning has lecture notes on Linear Logic available online, that
present this idea (named harmony, in reference to the philosophy of logic of Michael
Dummett) and many more – warmly recommended. Noam Zeilberger also has lecture notes
discussing harmony [Zeilberger, 2013], which are a pleasure to read; they are also meant
to introduce focusing, an important notion in proof theory that we study in Chapter 7.
1.4. Proving consistency (without disjunctions) by normalization
1.4.1. Defining consistency
The global and local properties discussed in Sections §1.3.1 and §1.3.3 are relatively easy
to establish: they can serve as an obvious sanity check for whatever new logic system you
just came up with.
A more ambitious property to establish is consistency : can our logic prove false? Notice
that due to the elimination rule nd-false-elim for the false formula 0, if we can build a
proof of 0 in our logic then we can prove any formula A in our logic:
∅ ` 0
∅ ` A
nd-false-elim
A subtlety is that not all logics have an explicit false formula such as our 0 formula. In
this case, what is a consequence of inconsistency (being able to prove false) in our logic
can be taken as its definition, and we ask: can the logic prove all formulas? A logic that
can prove all formulas (or no formula) is not very interesting.
When we ask whether a logic can “prove false”, we mean a proof of false in the empty
context ∅. Indeed, it is not very hard to prove false if we can choose the context: we just
need to add 0 as an assumption in the context, and use the axiom rule nd-axiom.
A more general way to phrase this question would be to ask for the set of consistent
contexts, those which cannot prove false, to be non-empty: then the logic is consistent if
there exists a context for which there exists a formula that cannot be proved. The concept
of consistent context is important (for example in terms of language design [Scherer and
Rémy, 2015]) and offers a richer dichotomy than just “empty” vs. “non-empty”. In a
logic that admits weakening (such as the one of Figure 1.2), asking for the empty context
to be consistent is the strongest requirement: if ∅ ` 0, then any context Γ is inconsistent
(Γ ` 0) by weakening.
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1.4.2. A plan to prove consistency
Consistency is a very important property for a logic to have, but it is sensibly harder to
establish than the previous checks we discussed. In fact, our proof of consistency relies on
one of those sanity checks, the idea of reduction of eliminations of introductions – which
in turns relies on the global property that weakening and substitutions are admissible.
The idea of the consistency proof is to study the subset of proofs that have a very
particular form: they never apply an elimination rule to an introduction rule for the same
connective – in other words, they cannot be reduced to a simpler proof. Those proofs,
which we call normal proofs, have a specific structure that we can reason about. In
particular, we can prove that there exists no normal proof of the false judgment ∅ ` 0.
To then deduce that the whole logic is consistent, we also prove that we can repeatedly
reduce any proof of a judgment J to simpler proofs, until we obtain a normal proof of J .
In other words, if we had a (non-normal) proof of ∅ ` 0, then we could repeatedly reduce
it into a normal proof of ∅ ` 0, which is absurd as no such proof exists. Thus, our logic is
consistent. We formalize this argument in the rest of this section.
This proof technique introduces two important ideas. The first idea is to look at a
particular subset of proofs which have a stronger, more precise structure (here the normal
proofs). Many interesting logics can be first discovered as particular restrictions of existing
logics. It is often possible to present them more directly, by giving a system of inference
rules characterizing exactly those proofs – we see this idea at work in Chapter 7 (Focusing
in sequent calculus). But studying the properties of the proofs in this subset, typically
showing the substitution principle, often requires reasoning in the larger world of the initial
space of less-structured proofs.
The second idea is the process of repeated reduction. It is a powerful idea that is useful
in many other situations than proving consistency; to the point that (although proving
consistency is essential), some would say that the essential property a proof system should
have to be a “good logic” is a form of normalization – often called the cut elimination
property for reasons that are explained in Chapter 4 (A better proof system: sequent
calculus). It is also the principle at the core of the correspondence between proofs and
programs, as detailed in Chapter 3 (Curry-Howard of reduction and equivalence).
Unfortunately, the presence of disjunctions makes it sensibly more difficult to study
the normalization properties of our proof system. For now we must restrict our cut-
elimination result to the disjunction-free fragment of our logic, PIL(→,×, 1, 0). This is a
good illustration of the issues raised by disjunctions (sums). Consistency of the full logic
will be shown in Theorem 3.3.9 (Consistency of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)), Chapter 3, using ideas
coming from program equivalence.
1.4.3. Defining normalization
The idea of normalization is very simple: a proof is normal if it does not contain an
elimination of an introduction (for the same connective). To show that if there exists a
proof Π of a given judgment J , then there exists a normal proof of J , we show that we
can repeatedly apply one of the reduction rules:
Π→R Π1 →R Π2 →R . . .→R Πn→R
After some number of reduction steps (which depends on the initial proof Π), this repeated
simplification stops, because Πn is normal: no more reduction rule can be applied. Because
the reduction relation (.R) preserves the conclusion of proofs, we know that Πn is a normal
proof of the judgment J .
Notation 1.4.1.
For a relation (R) we write ( R) for its negation: a R b holds if and only if a R b does not
hold.
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Notation 1.4.2.
For a relation (R) we write (a R) to say that there exists no b such that a R b.
Under this apparent simplicity lies a surprise. A proof may have elimination-introduction
pairs in several places, so there may be several possible choices of where to simplify the
proof. These choices could, in turn, lead to simplified proofs that themselves have sev-
eral possible elimination-introduction pairs, leading to several choices, etc. (Furthermore,
because some reductions use the substitution principle which may duplicate some sub-
derivation, they may duplicate existing elimination-introduction pairs and thus increase
the number of possible choices.)
This means that many different reduction sequences could be possible, starting from a
given proof. Some could lead to a normal proof, and some could not lead to a normal
proof by introducing new elimination-introduction pairs (by substitution) indefinitely. Or
maybe all possible choices lead to a normal proof? There are in fact two closely related
statements:
• weak normalization: for any proof Π :: J , there exists a finite sequence of reductions
(one sequence of simplification choices) that lead to a normal proof of J
• strong normalization: for any proof Π :: J , any sequence of reductions (for any
choice of simplification) leads to a normal proof of J – after a finite number of
reduction steps
Strong normalization being a stronger property (it implies weak normalization), it is
harder to prove. In this thesis we only prove weak normalization, which suffices to prove
that the logic is consistent.
Remark 1.4.1. I find it surprising that, in the case of the propositional logic we are
working with, it is relatively easy to prove weak normalization (done in Section 1.4.4),
and it is hard to prove strong normalization.7
One explanation for that difference is that difficulty of proofs is intuitively related to
the length of those reduction sequences (the larger the number of repeated reductions,
the harder to prove finite). To prove weak termination, it suffices to describe a particular
reduction strategy, an algorithm to decide which reduction to perform next. If there is
a strategy that is easy to define (there is) and gives short enough reduction sequences
(they are), proving weak reduction is easy.8 On the contrary, strong reduction forces us
to consider the worst case, the longest sequence among all sequences, and even for the
simply-typed lambda-calculus, it can be very large.9 In some more powerful logics or type
systems, there are terms for which all reduction sequences are extremely long, so both
weak and strong normalization are hard. ∗
1.4.4. Weak normalization
Theorem 1.4.1 (Weak normalization of PIL(→,×, 1, 0) – no sums).
For any proof Π :: J without sums, there exists a finite sequence of reductions (for the
relation (→R) defined in Section 1.3.4)
Π→R Π1 →R Π2 →R . . .→R Π′ 6→R
such that Π′ :: J is a normal proof, in the sense that there does not exist any Π′′ such
that Π′ →R Π′′.
7All proof techniques I know of are inspired of either Tait’s strong computability or Gandy’s strictly
monotonic functionals.
8On the other hand, the strategy we pick may not be optimal, there may exist other strategies that
perform less reduction steps. But those are much, much harder to describe.
9Not elementary recursive, see Statman [1977].
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(More generally, for any relation (→) we say that a proof Π is (→)-normal if there does
not exist any proof Π′ such that Π→ Π′.)
Proof. To obtain a weak normalization proof, we use a complexity measure: a quantity
that we compute for each proof, such that we can always choose to reduce a proof in
another proof of strictly smaller measure. We can then argue that this measure cannot
decrease indefinitely, and thus that the reduction sequence must be finite – it stops at
some point on a proof that cannot be reduced anymore, a normal proof.
Consider a reduction pair, for example
Π1 :: Γ ` A1 Π2 :: Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ ` Ai
.R Πi :: Γ ` Ai
The initial proof contains an intermediary judgment proving a conjunction, Γ ` A1×A2,
which has disappeared from the reduced proof. The idea to prove weak normalization is
to formalize the intuition that reduction reduces the complexity of the formulas appearing
in a proof. We can formally define the complexity ‖A‖ of a formula, a natural number, as
follows:10
‖X‖ = ‖0‖ = ‖1‖ def= 1 ‖A×B‖ = ‖A→ B‖ def= 1 + max(‖A‖ , ‖B‖)
To find a terminating sequence of reductions from an initial proof Π, we look, along
all the elimination-introduction pairs in Π, at the one(s) whose succedent is of maximal
complexity. We obtain a terminating sequence by reducing one of those pairs at each step.
One would be tempted to use, as a complexity measure for complete proofs, the complex-
ity of the most complex elimination-introduction pair. As the complexity of a formula is a
positive natural number, it cannot strictly decrease indefinitely – this is a good complexity
measure. There are however two difficulties.
The first difficulty is that there may be several pairs of maximal complexity. Reducing
one of them does not necessarily reduce the maximal complexity of the whole proof. To
avoid this problem, we can measure both the maximal complexity of any pair, and the
number of pairs that have this maximal complexity. If we remove one such pair, the
number of pairs decreases strictly, and if we had the last pair of maximal complexity, then
the maximal complexity of all pairs decreases strictly.
More precisely, we define the complexity measure ‖Π‖ of the proof Π as a couple (m, c)
of natural numbers: m is the maximal Measure of all elimination-introduction pairs, and
c is the Count of pairs with this measure. A couple is strictly smaller than another,
written (m, c) < (m′, c′), if either m is strictly smaller than m′ (the maximal formulas are
strictly less complex) or m and m′ are equal but c is strictly smaller than c′ (the maximal
formulas are equally complex, but there are less of them). Notice that there infinite
descending chains of strictly smaller measures do not exist: for any couple (m, c), there
is a finite number of smaller couples with the same m (the couples (m, 0), . . . , (m, c− 1)),
and one can descend to a strictly smaller m only finitely many times (formula complexities
cannot be smaller than 1).
The second difficulty is that a simplification may in fact introduce new elimination-
10This is the height of the formula seen as a tree.
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introduction pairs. Consider the following example:
ΠB1 :: Γ, A ` B1 ΠB2 :: Γ, A ` B2
Γ, A ` B1 ×B2
Γ ` A→ (B1 ×B2) ΠA :: Γ ` A
Γ ` B1 ×B2
Γ ` Bi
→R
ΠB1 :: Γ, A ` B1 ΠB2 :: Γ, A ` B2
Γ, A ` B1 ×B2 ΠA :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1 ×B2
Γ ` Bi
=
ΠB1 :: Γ, A ` B1 ΠA :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B1
ΠB2 :: Γ, A ` B2 ΠA :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B2
Γ ` B1 ×B2
Γ ` Bi
The first step simplifies the elimination-introduction pair for implication, and the second
step is just an unfolding of the definition of substitution (Section 1.3.1) in the case of the
introduction rule for conjunction nd-and-intro – the third proof is equal to the second
proof, just written differently.
We can see that an elimination-introduction pair for conjunction appears that was not
present in the original proof, as the elimination and introduction rules of this pair were
separated by the implication pair. But this is not a problem for our complexity measure,
as the new pair has complexity ‖B1 ×B2‖, which is strictly smaller than the complexity
of the eliminated pair, ‖A→ (B1 ×B2)‖.
We will do a case analysis of all possible reductions, looking at the “new pairs” they
can form. For each form of reduction we have to prove, as in this example, that all newly
introduced pairs are on formulas of strictly smaller complexity.
Before this, we should remark that, as we have seen in Section 1.3.1, the substitution
operation may make zero, one or several copies of the subproof ΠA; in particular, it may
increase the number of elimination-introduction pairs of maximal complexity if some of
them are present in ΠA – these pairs are not really “new”, they are copies of existing pairs.
To avoid this increase in complexity, we must be careful when picking a maximal pair to
reduce. We need to choose a maximal pair such that its subproofs themselves contain no
maximal pair, but only elimination-introduction pairs of strictly smaller complexity. This
is always possible: otherwise, if all pairs contained a subterm of the same complexity,
the proof would be infinite, and we have defined valid proofs as finite derivation trees of
inference rules. Making this choice of a specific pair to reduce (instead of considering any
reducible pairs) defines a reduction strategy: we are proving weak reduction.
New elimination-introduction pairs after implication reduction Consider the reduction
of implication:
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B ΠA :: Γ ` A
Γ ` B
.R
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B ΠA :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B
How can this reduction create new elimination-introduction pairs that were not present
in the initial proof? As we have seen in our previous example, this can happen if ΠB
contains an axiom rule for A that is the eliminated premise of an elimination rule, and
the rootwardmost rule of ΠA is an introduction that gets substituted there. This can also
happen if the rootwardmost rule of ΠB is an introduction, and the whole proof is a premise
of an elimination rule on B. These are the two only possible cases.
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In these two cases, the new pairs that appear cut on formulas that are smaller than the
first simplified pair: we simplify a pair of the form A→ B, and create new pairs either on
B or A, whose complexities are strictly smaller than ‖A→ B‖, by definition of the latter
as 1 + max(‖A‖ , ‖B‖).
New elimination-introduction pairs after conjunction reduction
Π1 :: Γ ` A1 Π2 :: Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ ` Ai
.R Πi :: Γ ` Ai
The only possible new elimination-introduction pair in this case is on Ai: it can appear
if Πi starts with an introduction rule, and the simplification is the eliminated premise of
an elimination rule. We have, as desired, that ‖Ai‖ < ‖A1 ×A2‖.
Negative result: new elimination-introduction pairs after disjunction reduction We
have explicitly excluded disjunctions of our weak normalization result, because our proof
technique fails in this case. Consider the reduction
Π :: Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2 Π1 :: Γ, A1 ` C Π2 :: Γ, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
.R
Πi :: Γ, Ai ` C Π :: Γ ` Ai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` C
New elimination-introduction pairs may come from the substitution of Π :: Γ ` Ai,
creating a new pair on Ai if ΠA has an introduction at its root. This new pair on Ai is
strictly simpler than the reduced pair on A1 +A2.
Unfortunately, if the rootwardmost rule of Πi is an introduction, and the simplification
is the eliminated premise of an elimination rule, we may have a new pair on C. We have
no control over the complexity measure ‖C‖, which is unrelated to ‖A1 +A2‖.
(A tempting idea (we tried) is to define the complexity of such introduction-elimination
pairs as max(‖A1 +A2‖ , 1+‖C‖). Then the complexity of this reduction seems to decrease
strictly, but the problem is reported on substitutions: if one of the Ai is itself a sum, and
gets substituted in place of an axiom rule just above a disjunction elimination on some
gigantic formula C ′, then the maximal complexity of the proof can grow arbitrarily.)
Conclusion We have been able to show that, in absence of disjunctions, the new introduction-
elimination pairs introduced by reducing a pair of maximal complexity that has no pair
of maximal complexity in its subproof are strictly less complex. This means that our
notion of complexity is a valid complexity measure: the complexity of the whole proof de-
creases strictly at each reduction step, so reduction eventually stops. This specific choice
of elimination-introduction pair to reduce always results in a normal proof after a finite
number of reductions. 
1.4.5. Consistency
Recall the plan to prove consistency (§1.4.2): we have proved that for any valid proof
Π :: J there is a (→R)-normal proof of the same judgment J . We now prove that there
is no (→R)-normal proof of the false judgment ∅ ` 0.
Because 0 has only an elimination rule and no introduction rule, we know that a normal
proof of ∅ ` 0 necessarily starts with an elimination proof; this elimination could be, for
example, an elimination of the conjunction A × 0 for an arbitrary A, or an implication
A → 0, or a disjunction A + B. To prove that these cannot happen, we need to prove a
stronger result than consistency (we strengthen our induction hypothesis); we do not only
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prove that there is no proof of ∅ ` 0 that starts with an elimination, but that there is no
proof of ∅ ` A, for any A, starting with an elimination.
Lemma 1.4.2 (Closed normal proofs are not eliminations).
Any PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) judgment in the empty context ∅ ` A has no (→R)-normal proof
starting with an elimination rule.
Proof. We prove (by induction on non-necessarily-normal proofs) that, inside a complete
proof, an elimination rule in the empty context either is part of an elimination-introduction
pair, or has one premise that is also an elimination rule in the empty context.
This suffices to conclude our proof. Indeed, in (→R)-normal proofs the case of an
elimination-introduction pair is impossible, so a proof starting with an elimination in the
empty context would necessarily have one premise starting with an elimination, also in
the empty context. Unfolding this reasoning, we see that such a proof would need to
be infinite – said otherwise, we can prove by structural induction that no finite proof
starts with an elimination: no leaf rule is an elimination, and if a proof started with an
elimination it would have a subproof that is also an elimination, which is impossible by
induction hypothesis.
Conjunction
Π :: ∅ ` A1 ×A2
∅ ` Ai
The proof Π either introduces the conjunction, forming an elimination-introduction pair,
or starts with an elimination rule itself – in the empty context. (Besides introduction and
elimination rules, the only other rule of natural deduction is the axiom rule, which is not
applicable in the empty context.)
Implication
Π :: ∅ ` A→ B ∅ ` A
∅ ` B
The proof Π either introduces the implication, forming an elimination-introduction pair,
or starts with an elimination rule itself – in the empty context.
Disjunction
Π :: ∅ ` A+B A ` C B ` C
∅ ` C
The proof Π either introduces the disjunction, forming an elimination-introduction pair,
or starts with an elimination rule itself – in the empty context. 
Using our weak (.R)-normalization result, we can prove consistency of the disjunction-
free fragment PIL(→,×, 1, 0). For the full logic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0), we can only show that
the (.R)-normal fragment is consistent.
Corollary 1.4.3 (Consistency of (.R)-normal PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
There is no valid (.R)-normal proof of ∅ ` 0 in PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0).
Proof. By Lemma 1.4.2 (Closed normal proofs are not eliminations), the first rule of a
proof of ∅ ` 0 cannot be an elimination. It cannot be an axiom rule either, as the context
is empty. Finally, it cannot be an introduction, as 0 has no introduction rule. 
Theorem 1.4.4 (Consistency of PIL(→,×, 1, 0)).
There is no valid proof of ∅ ` 0 in the disjunction-free propositional intuitionistic logic
PIL(→,×, 1, 0).
Proof. If there was a proof Π :: ∅ ` 0, then by Theorem 1.4.1 (Weak normalization of
PIL(→,×, 1, 0) – no sums) there would also be a (→R)-normal proof Π′ :: ∅ ` 0. This
would contradict the previous corollary. 
Consistency of the full logic will be shown in Theorem 3.3.9 (Consistency of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
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Credits Much of what I know about logic comes from the seeds planted by the “Groupe
de travail de logique” at École Normale Supérieure, a working group that was completely
organized and run by students (in particular Marc Bagnol). Around the same time I
prepared my undergraduate “mémoire” in collaboration with Silvain Rideau. I presented
a consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic, using an infinitary rule for induction to justify
the ordinal numbering used in the proof – as explained by Wilfried Buchholz. Silvain
presented a model-theoretic demonstration that first-order Peano Arithmetic cannot prove
termination of Goodstein sequences. Contrasting my intuition (and lack of, respectively)
for these two techniques was one more reason to jump ship from mathematical logic to
proof theory as computer scientists do it.
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2. Introduction to the formal study of
programming: the λ-calculus
2.1. The (untyped) λ-calculus
In Chapter 1 (Introduction to the formal study of logic: natural deduction), we have
precisely defined the notions of logic and proofs as mathematical objects, and demonstrated
how to prove some properties of a given logic and its proofs. The purpose of this section
is to introduce similarly formal definitions of the notions of program and computation.
The logic of Section 1.2 is a toy system: it is useful to understand what logic is about,
but it is too simple to fully model the reasoning tools of working mathematicians. For
example, we allow proof by implication (the implication elimination rule corresponds to
the modus ponens principle), but not proof by contradiction – proving A by proving that
A → 0 leads to falsity. Neither does it express general statements such as “for all n ∈ N
there exists a m such that ...”. Still, it is a useful first model to develop a theory of proofs,
which can be extended in many ways, and made powerful enough to capture mathematical
practice.
Similarly, you should expect our notion of program to be highly simplified, missing many
aspects that working programmers feel essential. For example, we do not say anything
about interaction with the user – our programs just compute results. Still, it is a useful
basis to study programming concepts and notions of computations, which can be extended
in many ways into full-blown programming languages.
2.1.1. The essence of programming
When describing programming to students that have never programmed before (the coolest
class, even if you have to use Java), I usually tell them to think of a computer as a very
dumb person, who does what you ask very fast, and never gets bored. You can use this
marvelous speed to efficiently automate many useful things, but the price to pay is that
you have to describe what you want in an extremely simple, very precise way, without
being able to make assumptions about what it already knows and understands.
An immediate temptation when describing tasks to a computer is to copy-paste instruc-
tions whenever we want to do the same thing several times, or slight variations of the
same things. This is problematic if you later change your mind about what the computer
should do, and have to modify dozens or hundreds of instructions. Consider the following
program, computing a multiplication table for 7 as a list of triples (a, 7, a× 7):
[
(1, 7, 1*7);
(2, 7, 2*7);
(3, 7, 3*7);
(4, 7, 4*7);
(5, 7, 5*7);
(6, 7, 6*7);
(7, 7, 7*7);
(8, 7, 8*7);
(9, 7, 9*7);
(10, 7, 10*7);
]
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If I ask my computer to evaluate this program, it instantly returns the following answer:
[(1, 7, 7); (2, 7, 14); (3, 7, 21); (4, 7, 28); (5, 7, 35); (6, 7, 42);
(7, 7, 49); (8, 7, 56); (9, 7, 63); (10, 7, 70)]
Unfortunately, if we decide to change it to get the multiplication table for 6, we have
20 changes to make to the program. On the contrary, consider:
let k = 7 in
[
(1, k, 1*k);
(2, k, 2*k);
(3, k, 3*k);
(4, k, 4*k);
(5, k, 5*k);
(6, k, 6*k);
(k, k, k*k);
(8, k, 8*k);
(9, k, 9*k);
(10, k, 10*k);
]
We have given a name to the multiplicative coefficient 7. To compute the table for 6, we
now have only one place to modify, the definition of k. This program computes the same
result but it is objectively better, as it is easier to evolve and adapt to changing needs.
There is still a lot of redundancy in the way the rows of the table are computed. Yet we
cannot just give a name to the row computation, because they are not exactly the same:
the multiple of k is different in each row. The solution is to give a name to the moving
part, and define rows parametrized over that name.
let k = 7 in
let row(a) = (a, k, a*k) in
[
row(1);
row(2);
row(3);
row(4);
row(5);
row(6);
row(7);
row(8);
row(9);
row(10);
]
Finally, we can get a more compact description of our program by relying on pre-existing
functions provided to us under the form of software libraries: the function List.init takes
an integer n, a function f, and return the list of values [f(0); f(1); ...; f(n-1)].
let k = 7 in
let row(a) = (a, k, a*k) in
List.init 10 (fun i -> row(i+1))
We have used several different ways to eliminate redundancies and make the code easier
to change. We named expressions of the program, without parameters (k) or with parame-
ters for varying subexpressions (row(a)). Finally, we built a function (fun i -> row(i+1))
to pass to an existing library function.
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2.1.2. The minimal λ-calculus
The minimal lambda-calculus (from the Greek letter λ, spoken “lambda”; we sometimes
write λ-calculus) is a formal toy programming language whose programs are described by
the following grammar (reusing the description language presented in Section 1.2.1). We
name it ΛC(→) – the first letter is an uppercase “lambda”.
Figure 2.1.: Terms of the minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→)
t, u, r ::= terms
| x, y, z variables
| λx. t abstraction
| t u application
Instead of “program”, we often speak of “terms”, or “expressions”; these traditional
names make it clearer that we look not only at complete programs, but also program
fragments in isolation.
The term λx. t represents an expression t parametrized over a variable x. In terms of
programming, it can be understood as “the function that, given input x, returns output
t”, but parametrization has other uses. This syntax was in fact introduced in the 1930s
by Alonzo Church who was trying to get the essence, not of programming, but of the
first-order quantifiers ∀x. P and ∃x. P of mathematical logic.
If t is a parametrized expression of the form λx. t′, then t u is the expression that fixes
the value of the parameter x to be u. Rather conveniently, if you interpret λx. t′ as a
function, then this also corresponds to applying the function t to the parameter u.
For example, the expression y z may be understood as the specialization of the general
pattern x z, with the parameter x instantiated by y. It can thus also be written (λx. x z) y.
More generally, (λx. t) u can also be seen as a way to “give the name x to the term
u” inside the term t: this is equivalent to what we wrote let x = u in t in the previous
section. In other words, λ-calculus does not only allow to define functions, it also captures
the central idea of giving a name to reduce redundancy. This is a good formal vehicle to
explore the essence of programming.
Finally, a word on priorities in our syntax. We consider that application is left-
associative, that is, write t u r as an equivalent to (t u) r. We also consider that ap-
plication has precedence over abstraction: λx. t u is equivalent to λx. (t u) – intuitively,
λ-abstraction scopes as far to the right as possible.
2.1.3. Binding, bound, free variables, and shadowing
Consider the term λx. y x x – with parentheses, this is λx. ((y x) x). The variable x
occurs three times in this term, but the occurrences do not all play the same role. In
λx. , the parameter x is introduced. In (y x x), the variable x refers to this parameter
that has been introduced. We say that uses of a parameter are bound to its definition
– the concept at work is variable binding. We say that the occurrence of x in λx. is a
binding occurrence, that the two occurrences in (y x x) are bound occurrences (bound to
the binding occurrence), and that λ, as a programming language construction, is a binder.
A variable may have several binding occurrences, and several bound occurrences that are
not bound to the same binder. This is the case for example of x in the term (λx. x) (λx. x).
Finally, sometimes variables appear that are bound to nothing. For example in the term
x (λy. y), the occurrence of the variable x has no corresponding binder. We say that it is
a a free occurrence, that the variable x is free in this term.
The same variable may have both free and bound occurrences in the same term, for
example in x (λx. x). A variable may even be bound at a place where it was already
bound to some binding: consider λx. x (λx. x) for example. In this case, we say that the
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innermost binding shadows the previous bindings: inside the scope of this binding, x refers
to it, and the “previous” definitions of x cannot be referred to – they are shadowed.
This should all be familiar to mathematicians: in the function definition x 7→
∫ r
0 t
xdt,
the variables x and t are bound (the binding occurrences are in “x 7→” and “dt”), while
the variable r is free.
2.1.4. On α-equality
It is not quite right to say that λ-terms are exactly the terms described by the grammar
in Figure 2.1. The binding structure is what matters, but the precise choice of variable
names does not matter so much. For example, we consider that λx. x and λy. y are “the
same” object (the function that returns its argument), while in terms of concrete syntax
they use different names. On the contrary, x and y are not the same object, as they refer
to distinct free variables.
We could formally define an equivalence relation (traditionally named α-equivalence)
that captures this notion of being “the same” modulo renaming of bound variables, but
it is tedious, technical, and not the point of interest of this thesis. We skip over this
difficulty, and simply consider two α-equivalent terms as equal. Formally, we are working
on the objects represented by the grammar quotiended over the α-equivalence relation.
Again, mathematicians will not be surprised by the fact that
∫ 1
0 t
2dt and
∫ 1
0 s
2ds have
the same meaning.
2.1.5. Substitution of variables
We write t[u/x] for the term t where all free occurrences of x have been replaced by
the term u. This meta-operation is called substitution. For example, (x (λy. x))[u/x]
is a notation for u (λy. u). There are many other notations for this operation, such as
t{u/x}, t[x\u] or even [u/x]t; the important thing to notice is the direction of the slanted
bar: the stuff “on top” of the bar replaces the stuff “below” the bar. Syntactically, we
give substitution the highest precedence: t t′[u/x] means t (t′[u/x]), and λy. t[u/x] means
λy. (t[u/x]).
We use substitution a lot so it makes sense to give a formal definition of it, usable in
proofs. It is defined in Figure 2.2 (Substitution for the minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→)).
Figure 2.2.: Substitution for the minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→)
x[u/x]
def
= u
y[u/x]
def
= y
(λy. t)[u/x]
def
= λy. t[u/x]
(t t′)[u/x]
def
= t[u/x] t′[u/x]
There are two notational assumptions that are left implicit in this definition. First, the
first two cases handle all cases where the substitution is performed on a variable: x[u/x]
is the case where this variable is equal to the variable being substituted (we replace it by
u), and y[u/x] implicitly defines the meaning on all variables that are distinct from x (we
leave them unchanged).
Second, when defining substitution on a λ-abstraction, we have explicitly used a binder
that is different from the one on which the substitution is performed. If we did not take α-
equivalence into account (Section 2.1.4), this would not cover all cases: λx. x is a perfectly
valid term and we may want to compute (λx. x)[u/x]. The idea is that λx. x is equal to
λy. y by α-equivalence, and thus (λx. x)[u/x] is necessarily equal to (λy. y)[u/x]; the later
is clearly well-defined in the notation of Figure 2.2, equal to λy. y[y/x], that is λy. y.
When we “open” a λ-abstraction during substitution (λ . . . )[u/x], α-equivalence let us
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pick any name for the λ-bound variable. We have argued that we never choose the same
name as the variable x being substituted. There is one last subtlety: we should also
avoid variable names that appear free in the substituted term u. This is always possible
because there are finitely many free variables in u, and infinitely many possible choices
of variable names. Consider for example the substitution (λy. x)[(y y)/x]. If we naively
perform the substitution without α-renaming the binder λy. first, we would get the result
λy. y y. If we rename it into z, we get the result of λz. x[y y/x], which is just λz. y y. The
first choice is wrong: it places the term y y, where the variable y is free, inside a subterm
where the variable y is bound: we say that the free occurrences of y would be captured
by the binder λy. during the substitution. By (implicitly) requesting that the binder y in
the definition of (λy. t)[u/x] not appear in the free variables of u, we avoid this case: our
notion of substitution is capture-avoiding. Capture-avoiding substitution is almost always
the right thing for substitutions of variables that can be bound locally; other notions of
substitutions are sometimes used, but then it is always explicitly stated.
This subsection shares the general embarrassment of this field, that one of our central
notions (variable binding) is actually quite subtle to define formally. The good news is
that, to humans that have some habit of working with variables, what I just described
is obvious (and boring); this let us leave most of the obvious details out, and express
ourselves concisely (the verbiage on shadowing and capture will hopefully remain limited
to very specific places in this document). The bad news is that this thorn resurfaces when
doing computer-checked proof, a laudable tendency of computer science in general, where
one must be fully-explicit about the intricacies of variable bindings – again. Whole PhD
theses have been written about this. The present thesis is about something else, so we
have to tolerate a certain degree of imprecision.
Remark 2.1.1. For the working mathematician this should again be an obvious (if some-
what nitpicky) remark: if I define f : x 7→
∫ 1
0 t
xdt, and then try to integrate f itself, for
example
∫ 2
1 f(t)dt, this is not equal to the double integral
∫ 2
1 (
∫ 1
0 t
tdt)dt, but it is equal
to
∫ 2
1 (
∫ 1
0 s
tds)dt for example. When replacing f by its definition, we have performed a
capture-avoiding substitution. Note that mathematicians most often do not discuss these
issues at all and take them as granted. There are two reasons why we are more precise
here:
• In our field, unlike in mathematics (sadly), it is common to implement on an actual
computer the programs or algorithms we describe formally, and the issue of variable
representations is thus one that is encountered in practice, in a setting where the
usual human way to keep those subtleties unspoken does not suffice.
• From a didactic point of view, one reason why mathematicians have a harder time
understanding the λ-calculus than integrals is that meaning of λ-terms is to be found
in their syntax, while integrals are often understood from their semantics (as real
numbers) first. That is, mathematical students think of the sequence of symbols∫ r
0 t
xdt as a description of how to compute a particular number; so this expression
is perceived to reduce to something they are already familiar with. On the contrary,
the “meaning” of the expression (λx. (y x)) is the expression itself (this is syntax: un-
interpreted data), we cannot explain it away by saying that it computes to something
we already know. The same phenomenon happens in mathematics: there are many
different notions of integrals, that are all specific interpretations of a common syntax;
or people can manipulate what they call “formal sums” Σ∞i=0f(i) as pure syntax when
they do not know how to give them a meaning as convergent sequences – in general
“formal foo” means “foo as syntax”. But it happens in more advanced setting, while
here syntax must be understood, or at least accustomed to, as the first step towards
the study of programming language theory.
∗
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Remark 2.1.2. This underlying worry about variable binding is not only of consequence
inside the ivory tower of cloud-gazing academics. Practical technologies, in particular
programming languages, have displayed tremendous creativity in getting variable binding
wrong. These failures would be amusing if they didn’t impose a tax on programmer efforts,
occasionally distracting them from real work in insidious ways. Lisp had dynamic scope
and we made jokes about it, but Python has nonlocal, most languages wrongly assume
that loop indices are mutated rather than rebound, and Coffeescript doesn’t allow to
express variable scope (and thus shadowing) without elaborate defensive strategies. Even
the high-brow languages of the ML family (OCaml, SML, Haskell) long failed to recognize
the utility of proper binders for type variables. ∗
2.1.6. Reducing λ-terms
If those λ-terms are formal objects representing programs, there should also be a formal
notion of computation. There are several good ways of defining computation used by
programming language researchers. The one we present here is called small-step semantics,
and consists in seeing the execution of a program as a series of program transformations,
from the initial program to simpler and simpler programs. When a program cannot be
simplified anymore, computation stops, and this final program is “the result”. This is a
very simple way to define computation as it does not require defining an additional class
of “program results” (those are just programs); but it would need to be extended to cover
many computational phenomena happening in realistic programming languages, such as
user interaction and mutable memory.
For historical reasons, we call β-reduction (this is the Greek letter “beta”) this reduction
relation on programs. It is defined in a very simple way. First, we define a “head β-
reduction” relation (.β) as follows:
Figure 2.3.: Head reduction for the minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→)
(λx. t) u .β t[u/x]
Then we define the full β-reduction (→β) as the congruence closure of (.β), that is the
relation that let us apply (.β) anywhere inside a subterm. For example, if t .β t
′, then we
have λz. z t→β λz. z t′. More precisely, we can define this congruence closure as a system
of inference rules:
Figure 2.4.: Full β-reduction for the minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→)
t .β t
′
t→β t′
t→β t′
λx. t→β λx. t′
t→β t′
t u→β t′ u
u→β u′
t u→β t u′
Notation 2.1.1.
For any relation (R) from a set to itself, we write (R∗) for its reflexive transitive closure:
we have a R∗ b if there is a chain
a = a0 R a1 R a2 . . . R an = b
This chain may be empty if a = b; in other words we always have c R∗ c.
For example, we write t→∗β u if u can be reached from t by a (possibly empty) sequence
of β-reductions.
Notation 2.1.2.
For any relation (R) we use the symmetric notation (R) for the symmetric relation. For
example, a / b if and only if b . a, and a← b if and only if b→ a.
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Notation 2.1.3 Equivalence closure.
We write (≈β) for the smallest equivalence1 containing (→β). In other words, t ≈β u if
there is a chain t0, t1, . . . , tn such that t0 = t, tn = u, and for each i ∈ [1;n[ we have
ti →β ti+1 or ti ←β ti+1.
In general we write (≈R) for the equivalence closure of an arbitrary congruent relation
(→R).
2.1.7. Computing with λ-terms
In Section 2.1.2 we mentioned that the simple mechanisms of λ-abstraction and application
could express several different programming patterns: both the creation of parametrized
functions and the introduction of auxiliary definitions to decrease redundancy.
We can, in fact, go much further than that: those two constructions are enough to
express many interesting computational behaviors, such as booleans and conditionals,
natural numbers and arithmetic operations on them, or even aggregation of data such as
pairs, optional data, lists, etc. In fact, the functions from natural numbers to natural
numbers definable as λ-terms are exactly those definable using a Turing Machine, usually
considered as the gold standard for the notion of “computable” – λ-calculus is just as
expressive as a foundational formalism to define computability. We say that the minimal
λ-calculus is Turing-complete.
Booleans To represent booleans, the core idea is that the conditional test (if t then u1 else u2)
can be represented as just a function application with two parameters, (t u1 u2). Because
(if true then u1 else u2) should be equal to u1, we ask that (true u1 u2) reduce to u1;
it suffices to define(true
def
= λx. λy. x). Conversely, we pose false
def
= λx. λy. y. We have,
as expected
if true then u1 else u2
= (λx. λy. x) u1 u2
→β (λy. x)[u1/x] u2
= (λy. u1) u2
→β u1[u2/y]
= u1
Remark 2.1.3 (Encoding arbitrary datatypes). Retrospectively, there is another way to
read this definition that generalizes to other encodings into the λ-calculus. The idea is
that we want to define booleans in a language that has no data, only parametrization.
How can we define true and false? Well, let’s just parametrize over them! We can
represent all boolean values as terms of the form λx. λy. t, where t is the definition of the
boolean we want, assuming the parameter x represents “true” and y represents “false”.
From this point of view, true is just x; with the parametrization made explicit, this is
λx. λy. x, our previous definition. Then, our definition for if t then u1 else u2 has an
interesting interpretation: by defining it as (t u1 u2), we say that the result is the boolean
t, where specific choices have been made for the meaning of “true” and “false”: truth is
locally defined as u1, and falsity as u2. This does correspond to a conditional branch. ∗
Natural numbers Natural numbers can be built from just two concepts: the natural
number 0, and the successor operation n 7→ (n+ 1). Any natural number can be written
as 0, on which the successor operation is called several times: 3 is ((0 + 1) + 1) + 1.
We can use the idea of parametrization above to encode natural numbers into untyped
λ-terms: we will parametrize over the definition of zero, z, and the definition of succes-
sor, s. The number 3 is represented by s (s (s z)) or, with the parametrization made
1An equivalence is a relation (R) that is reflexive (a R a), transitive (if a R b and b R c then a R c) and
symmetric (if a R b then b R a).
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explicit, λs. λz. s (s (s z)). There is another way to read this definition: we are defining
the operation that takes a function s and a value z, and applies the function s three times
to z; this corresponds to what mathematicians sometimes write s3(z) (the composition
operator is the natural choice of product for endofunctions).
This reading makes it easy to define operations on the natural numbers represented as λ-
terms. For example, the addition of two natural numbersm and n is just λs. λz.m s (n s z):
we first repeat n times the application of the function s to the value z, and then apply it
again m times to the result. In total, the function s was applied m + n times to z. The
reader may be interested in the following table of simple definitions:
0
def
= λs. λz. z
1
def
= λs. λz. s z
2
def
= λs. λz. s (s z)
3
def
= λs. λz. s (s (s z))
(m+ 1)
def
= λs. λz. s (m s z)
succ
def
= λm. (m+ 1)
(m+ n)
def
= n succ m
(m× n) def= n (λk. (k +m)) 0
(mn)
def
= n (λk. (k ×m)) 1
(n = 0)
def
= n (λx. false) true
It is easy (but very boring; good for computers rather than humans) to check, for
example, that the encoding of 32 reduces to the encoding of 9 after a large number of
β-reduction steps.
Unfortunately, this definition of natural numbers makes it difficult to write the prede-
cessor function n 7→ (n − 1). The integer n makes it easy to iterate a transformation n
times, and as we have seen with the definition of n = 0 we can easily turn this into “zero
or more times”, but there is no simple solution to iterate exactly n− 1 times – the reader
might want to consider this a puzzle, we will give a solution in the next paragraph.
Pairs To define a pair (t, u), the only operator to parametrize on is the “comma” used
in the pair construction: we can simply encode this term as (λc. c t u). Then, to obtain
the first (respectively, second) element of a pair, is suffices to instantiate the comma with
the function that returns its first (respectively, second) element.
(t, u)
def
= λc. c t u
π1 p
def
= p true
π2 p
def
= p false
Pairs allow to define n − 1. The idea is that instead of a single number on which to
perform an operation n times, we will operate on a pair of numbers, one representing the
current iteration of the operation, and one recording the result we had one step before.
Repeating n times the increment operation m 7→ (m+ 1), starting from 0, gives the same
number n we started from, and the value of the previous round gives n−1. We first define
an auxiliary function shift such that shift f (x, y)
def
= (f(x), x) – and in particular
shift f (fn(x), fn−1(x)) = (fn+1(x), fn(x)) – and use this to define (n− 1).
(n− 1) def=
(
let shift = (λf. λp. let x = π1 p in (f x, x)) in
π2 (n (shift succ) (0, 0))
)
Remark 2.1.4. This is admittedly scary. There are other ways to represent the natural
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numbers that make the predecessor function much easier to define – and give its com-
putation a better complexity in term of number of necessary reduction steps. But this
encoding is simple and neat, and the predecessor function provides an amusing exercise
to combine already-seen notions – it serves as the first non-trivial program.
The present encoding is named the “Church Encoding”, and was extended in Berar-
ducci and Böhm [1985] into a general encoding scheme for inductive datatypes, informally
described in Remark 2.1.3 (Encoding arbitrary datatypes). It is simple and adequate
when one is interested in the expressivity of a system, rather than more precise, demand-
ing notions of complexity or ease of programming. Other usual encodings include the
Scott encoding (which makes predecessor trivial but does not provide recursion for free),
and a combination of both Church and Scott techniques named Church-Scott or Parigot
encoding by Geuvers [Geuvers, 2015]. ∗
Bugs It is possible to write many useful programs in the λ-calculus, but also relatively
useless ones. Let us define auto
def
= λx. x x the function that applies its parameter to
itself. This already reeks of paradoxes: the element that does not belong to itself, the
parameter that applies to itself, etc. We make this suspicion precise by considering the
term auto auto, which has the following reduction sequence (and no other):
auto auto
= (λx. x x) auto
.β (x x)[auto/x]
= auto auto
.β auto auto
.β auto auto
.β . . .
This term reduces to itself in(de)finitely. In particular, there is no reduction sequence
that eventually reaches an irreducible term – our notion of “result” of a computation.
auto auto is a computation with no result.
Remark 2.1.5. There are some programs for which never stopping is actually useful: an
alarm system, a mail server, etc. Those programs do something along the way: they loop,
but they are “reactive” or “productive” in senses that can be precisely defined [Turner,
1995]. In contrast, our auto auto program loops and does nothing (it reduces to itself,
producing no data or interaction along the way). We may call this silent non-termination.
∗
Fixpoints and general recursion We can define in the λ-calculus a fixpoint operator
Y such that Y f ≈β f (Y f): applying the function f to the argument Y f leaves it
unchanged. Several distinct definitions share this property, but the following (called the
Y combinator) relies on the same bag of tricks used to define our looping program:
Y
def
= λf. (λx. f (x x)) (λx. f (x x))
Y f
.β (λx. f (x x)) (λx. f (x x))
= (f (x x))[(λx. f (x x))/x]
= f ((λx. f (x x)) (λx. f (x x)))
←β f (Y f)
Such a fixpoint combinator let us define arbitrary recursive functions. For example, the
reader may want to check that the following expression reduces to (the λ-term encoding
of) 40320, the factorial of 8:
Y (λf. λn. if n = 0 then 1 else n× f (n− 1)) 8
Remark 2.1.6. Y (λf. f) reduces to auto auto, our previous looping term: the function
defined only as “the fixpoint of itself” is a simple example of silent non-termination. ∗
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Expressibility of general recursive functions Turing machines are relatively complex to
define and inelegant to work with, so we will not attempt to show the correspondence
with the minimal λ-calculus in this introduction. There is a third computational model,
however, that is known to be equivalent to both, namely the so-called µ-recursive partial
functions, a generalization of the class of primitive recursive functions. We now prove that
all such functions can be represented as λ-terms.
The class of µ-recursive functions is the smallest set of partial functions from tuples of
natural numbers to a natural number which contains constant functions (we have those),
the successor function succ (we have it), projection functions (representing tuples as pairs
of pairs of pairs... defining projections is immediate), and is closed by
• composition, trivially defined in the λ-calculus
• primitive recursion, a glorified way to define functions by induction on natural num-
bers (we can define those easily with a fixpoint iteration, and a bit more subtly
without)
• minimization, that is the existence for any partial function f : Nk+1 → N of a partial
function µ(f) : Nk → N such that µ(f)(p) returns the smallest natural number n
such that f((n, p)) = 0, if it exists. This can be easily encoded in the λ-calculus as
µ(f)
def
= λp. Y (λK. λn. if f (n, p) = 0 then n else K (n+ 1)) 0
We have described how to build a λ-term from any of the “building blocks” of recursive
functions: this let us “encode” any recursive function as a λ-term. The correspondence
between the encoding result and the initial recursive function f is then as follows: f is
defined on some input p and f(p) = n if and only if the encoding of f applied to the
encoding of p reduces to the encoding of n (which is a normal form).
2.2. Programming errors and the λ-calculus
2.2.1. To understand failure, we should first allow it
For all its expressive power, the minimal λ-calculus has one irritating defect: it is unable
to represent a very common form of failure in actual programming languages, the invalid
state error. Sometimes programs end up in a situation where they are asked to perform
invalid operations, that have no meaning. They have no better choice than stopping their
normal execution.
This is not the case of the λ-calculus we have seen so far, because all the term-forming
operations are total: in particular, anything can be applied to anything. For example,
the application (1 x) makes sense, because the number 1 is defined as a function. In fact,
everything is a function, a very strange property that most other programming languages
do not share.
The minimal λ-calculus is a reasonable choice to talk about what can be expressed as a
program, what is computable. But if the only available notion of failure is non-termination,
which is fairly hard to manipulate, it is insufficient as a formal vehicle to study errors in
programming.
Remark 2.2.1. We are in a situation similar to the literal reading of foundational works
on mathematics, claiming that everything can be defined as sets. We can indeed define
all mathematical objects as sets, but this abstraction-free view has the downside that, for
example, 1 ⊆ ((x : N) 7→ x + 1) is a valid propositional statement: is 1, seen as a set,
included into the successor function on natural numbers, also a set? We would rather
reject this question as nonsensical than attempt to answer it.
A common (categorical) way to handle the problem is to remark that the answer depends
on the specific choice of sets used to encode these objects, and to only consider statements
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that are well-defined in the sense that they do not depend on such choices. This requires,
of course, to be explicit about the level of abstraction at which we are presently speaking;
are sets, or natural numbers, the objects of consideration? ∗
To fix this issue in the simplest possible way, we will add a concept of “boxes” to our
untyped λ-calculus, that adds absolutely no expressive power but is an easy and useful
way to obtain terms to which it is invalid to apply arguments. This is done by introducing
a new term-former box(t) that puts its subterm “in a box”, and saying that boxes are not
functions: the application box(t) u is an error. To manipulate boxed terms we provide the
symmetric construction unbox(t) that removes a box around a term – and is invalid if the
inner term is a λ-abstraction, not in a box. In other words, we introduce an ability to fail
in order to be able to study failure.
2.2.2. The administrative λ-calculus
We call administrative λ-calculus the extension of the minimal λ-calculus described in
Figure 2.5. We name it ΛC(→, box).
Figure 2.5.: Syntax of the administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box)
t, u, r ::= terms
| x, y, z
| λx. t
| t u
| box(t)
| unbox(t)
Notation 2.2.1.
To extend a previous grammar, we may specify the extended grammar by using . . . to
denote the rules of the old grammar, and only explicitly write the new rules. For example,
the grammar of Figure 2.5 may be rewritten as:
t, u, r ::= terms
| . . . minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→)
| box(t)
| unbox(t)
The head-reduction relation extends the relation (.β) of the minimal λ-calculus (Fig-
ure 2.3), with another rule to say that unboxing a box removes the box.
To distinguish the two relations, we will write (.β
ΛC(→)) for the reduction relation of
ΛC(→) and (.βΛC(→,box)) for the reduction relation of ΛC(→, box).
Figure 2.6.: Head reduction for the administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box)
(.β
ΛC(→)) ⊆ (.βΛC(→,box)) unbox(box(t)) .βΛC(→,box) t
Notation 2.2.2.
When we want to be explicit about the domain2 Dom of a relation (R), we write (RDom)
instead. In general it should be clear from the context.
We can see in particular that applying an argument to a λ-term reduces, that applying
an unbox( ) to a box( ) reduces, but that applying an argument to a box( ) or unboxing a
2The domain of a relation is the set of objects that may be related together by this relation. The domain
of a function is the set of objects to which the function can be applied.
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λ-abstraction creates an irreducible term: a term, for example (box(t) u), from which no
head-reduction is possible. This is different in nature from the status of x u (applying an
argument to a variable), which also cannot perform any head-reduction; it may be the case
that later a λ-abstraction is substituted for x, allowing reduction. In the case of (box(t) u)
we know that it cannot reduce now, but it will also never head-reduce in the future, after
applying substitutions. This is, by essence, a failure of computation. We could be even
more explicit in our presentation, by listing not only the cases that do reduce, but also
those that will never reduce.
(λx. t) u .β
ΛC(→,box) t[u/x] unbox(box(t)) .β
ΛC(→,box) t
box(t) u .β
ΛC(→,box) unbox(λx. t) .β
ΛC(→,box)
Note the difference between unbox(λx. t), which we know will never reduce and, in-
formally, is an “invalid” term, and terms like unbox(x) or unbox(t u) that are also not
head-reducible, but may become reducible after a substitution is applied, or after some
sub-term is itself reduced: in the second example, t u could reduce into some box(r).
2.2.3. Reduction contexts to define full reduction
We could extend the definition of the full β-reduction relation (→β) given in Figure 2.4,
but this would be cumbersome. Notice that relation already requires a rule for reduction
under λx and two rules for applications (depending on whether one reduces on the left or
on the right). This requires adding two extra rules, one for box( ) and one for unbox( ),
and in the general case this definition would grow to have uncomfortably many rules –
which also makes reasoning on the relation rather tedious. To wit:
t .β t
′
t→β t′
t→β t′
λx. t→β λx. t′
t→β t′
t u→β t′ u
u→β u′
t u→β t u′
t→β t′
box(t)→β box(t′)
t→β t′
unbox(t)→β unbox(t′)
A good solution to reduce this redundancy, proposed in the seminal article Wright and
Felleisen [1994], is to factorize these rules using a grammar of contexts. Intuitively, those
rules say that a full reduction may “go under” the term-forming constructs of the language:
you can reduce under a λx , on the left of an application ( u), etc. Those things reduction
may “go under” are not terms, there are term fragments with one part unfilled. We will
reify this intuition into a syntax of partial terms, where the missing part, the hole, is
written . This grammar of contexts is defined in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7.: Reduction contexts of the administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box)
E,F ,G ::= contexts
| 
| λx.E
| E u
| t E
| box(E)
| unbox(E)
Notation 2.2.3.
If E is a context with one hole , we write E [t] for the non-capture-avoiding substitution
of t for  in E. This operation is often called plugging the term t in the context E
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By extension, if E and F are contexts, we also write E [F ] for the non-capture-avoiding
substitution of F for  in E. This operation is often called composing the context E and
the context F .
The full reduction can then be defined with a single rule over contexts, instead of the
six rules we used previously:
Figure 2.8.: Full reduction for the administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box)
t .β t
′
E [t]→β E
[
t′
]
The full-reduction rule can be applied for any context E. In particular, when E is just
a hole , we recover the rule saying that (.β) is included in (→β).
We insist that plugging a term in a context is not a capture-avoiding substitution. For
example to justify that λx. (λy. y) x→β λx. x, we use the decomposition
(λy. y) x .β x
(λx.) [(λy. y) x]→β (λx.) [x]
where the variable x is (intentionally) captured by the context (λx.).
Remark 2.2.2. A contrarian reader may remark that we only need one rule instead of
our six previous rules because we introduced an extra object with six different cases – we
have not really reduced the complexity of the system as a whole. We have two different
answers:
• A context-free grammar is a simpler object than an arbitrary system of inference
rules. Doing the same with simpler concepts is a win, even at equal sizes. For
example, all six rules had both a premise and a conclusion, and the premises were
all the same; we factored this redundancy out.
• Contexts will be reused to get further simplifications. In Section 2.2.4 (Formally
defining failure), for example, we will reuse our definition of contexts to uniformly
define the notion of failure terms. Without contexts, we would again add six extra
inference rules to express that failures can occur deep inside a term.
∗
Another benefit of contexts is that it gives us an easy way to change the reduction rela-
tion, if we wish to do so. For example, practical programming language often do not allow
to reduce under a λ-abstraction (the body of a function is “frozen”, not to be evaluated,
even partially, before the function is applied). We could represent this by simply remov-
ing the case λx.E from the grammar of contexts – no rule change is needed. Reduction
contexts are the right formal representation of many different evaluation strategies.
2.2.4. Formally defining failure
We need one more remark to be able to formally define a class of failures corresponding to
the “invalid state” error of general programming languages. If you look at the definition
of head reduction (.β
ΛC(→,box)),
(λx. t) u .β t[u/x] unbox(box(t)) .β t
it seems rather clear that the term-former go by pairs: λ-abstraction and application are
related by a reduction rule, and boxing and unboxing are similarly related. A reduction
may happen exactly when two related term-formers meet. In both cases there is a term
(λx. t and box(t) respectively) that constructs some structure (a function, a box), and
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Figure 2.9.: Constructors and destructors of the administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box)
tc, uc, rc ::= constructors
| λx. t
| box(t)
Ed, F d, Gd ::= destructors
|  t
| unbox()
a term-with-a-hole ( u and unbox() respectively) that destructs it. We can formally
define a grammar of constructor terms and a grammar of destructor contexts as follows:
Notice that we have not specified the pairing between constructors and destructors.
This is unnecessary, as this information is contained in the head reduction relation: tc and
Ed are paired if and only if their composition can perform a head reduction (Ed [tc] .β).
We call a redex this reducible meeting of a constructor and a destructor.
Conversely, a failing term is a term where a constructor tc meets a destructor Ed to
which it is not paired (a failing redex ) – possibly under some reduction context F . We
thus define the set F of failing terms:
Figure 2.10.: Failures in the administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box)
FΛC(→,box) def= {F [Ed [tc]] | Ed [tc] .βΛC(→,box)}
Notation 2.2.4 {a | P}.
The notation {a | P} is standard in mathematics, it means “the subset of the a such that
the statement P is true” – P may mention the variable(s) used in the expression a. It
is called a set comprehension. For example, {(a, b, c) ∈ N3 | a2 + b2 = c2} describes the
Pythagorean triples.
Remark 2.2.3. A failing term contains a failing redex, but it may still contain other
reducible redexes somewhere in the term – this is a slightly different notion from the
notion of stuck term that is often used to define program errors. When using stuck terms
(terms that cannot perform any (→β)-reduction), one must distinguish the “good ones”,
such as (x (λy. y)), from the “bad ones” that contain a failing redex, so it is no simpler
than our definition.
For example, box(x) ((λx. x) z) is a failing term (you cannot apply an argument to a box)
which can also reduce to box(x) z – another failing term. In this example, the reducible
redex is part of the reduction context around the failing redex. Another example would
be unbox(λx. (λy. y) z), where the reducible redex is inside the failing redex. ∗
The set of failing terms is stable by substitution – if t ∈ F then t[u/x] ∈ F – but not by
reduction: we can have t ∈ F →β u /∈ F . For example, (λx. y) unbox(λz. z)→β y. Failing
term is to be understood as “may fail”: depending on the choice of reduction to perform,
the computation may or may not encounter an invalid operation.
2.2.5. An exercise in administration
You may wonder why the name administrative for the extension of the λ-calculus with
boxes. The name comes from the existing concept in the programming language theory
literature of “administrative variants” of term-formers, and “administrative reductions”.
In some situations it is convenient to have two different notions of λ-abstraction and of
application: the usual one, and the “administrative”one. Consider a language defined as
follows:
In addition to the usual abstraction λx. t and application t u, this language has an
“administrative variant” of these constructions, λax. t and t ·a u respectively. It is an
independent copy that behaves in the exact same way, but notice that the two copies do
not mix: you cannot do a regular application on an administrative λa-abstraction, nor do
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Figure 2.11.: Minimal λ-calculus with administrative functions ΛC(→, λa)
t, u, r ::= terms
| . . . minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→) (§2.1)
| λax. t
| t ·a u
E,F ,G ::= reduction contexts
| 
| λx.E | λax.E
| E u | E ·a u
| t E | t ·a E
tc, uc, rc ::= constructors
| λx. t
| λax. t
Ed, F d, Gd ::= destructors
|  t
|  ·a t
(λx. t) u .β t[u/x] (λax. t) ·a u .β t[u/x]
t .β t
′
E [t]→β E
[
t′
]
administratively apply an argument to a regular λ-abstraction.
It should be obvious that in terms of expressive power, this farcical copy of the core
mechanism has no benefits: every computation we can express there could already be
expressed without administrative functions. A way to formally demonstrate this is to
define a translation, J Ka : ΛC(→, λa) → ΛC(→), from the calculus with administrative
functions to the minimal λ-calculus:
Jx Ka
def
= x
Jλx. t Ka
def
= λx. Jt Ka
Jλax. t Ka
def
= λx. Jt Ka
Jt u Ka
def
= Jt Ka Ju Ka
Jt ·a u Ka
def
= Jt Ka Ju Ka
For example, we have J(λat. t) ·a u Ka =ΛC(→) (λt. t) u. This very simple translation
simply “forgets” about the administrative variants, by translating them to the usual ab-
straction and application.
Forward simulation Our intuition is that “everything the λ-calculus with administrative
functions can compute, the translation into the minimal λ-calculus can compute as well”.
We will prove, more formally, that if two terms with administrative functions are in the
full reduction relation, then their translation is in the full reduction relation of the minimal
λ-calculus.
We assume (this is easily provable) that the definition of (→βΛC(→)) we have given for
the minimal λ-calculus (before we introduced reduction contexts) is equivalent to one given
with reduction contexts, with the “obvious” grammar of reduction contexts:
E,F ,G ::=ΛC(→)  | λx.E | E u | t E
A reduction in either calculi is thus characterized by a context E and some head reduc-
tion t .β t
′. To show that the translation preserve reduction, we will show how to translate
contexts, and how to translate head reductions. Only then will we be able to prove that
full reductions can be translated.
The translation from the terms of the λ-calculus with administrative functions to the
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minimal λ-calculus can be extended to a translation of contexts:
J Ka
def
= 
Jλx.E Ka
def
= λx. JE Ka
Jλax.E Ka
def
= λx. JE Ka
JE u Ka
def
= JE Ka Ju Ka
JE ·a u Ka
def
= JE Ka Ju Ka
Jt F Ka
def
= Jt Ka JF Ka
Jt ·a F Ka
def
= Jt Ka JF Ka
The translation of terms and of contexts are compatible, in the sense that the translation
of the term E [t] is equal to plugging the translation of t in the translation of E.
Lemma 2.2.1 (Translation of context decomposition).
For any term t and context E in the λ-calculus with administrative functions, we have
JE [t] Ka = JE Ka [Jt Ka]
Proof. This is done by induction on the context E. In the base case E
def
= , we have
simply
J [t] Ka = Jt Ka =  [Jt Ka] = J Ka [Jt Ka]
We will only do one inductive case as they are all very similar. Suppose we want
to prove this property of the context λax.E, assuming it is true for E. That is, our
induction hypothesis is JE [t] Ka = JE Ka [Jt Ka]. We want to prove that J(λax.E) [t] Ka =
Jλax.E Ka [Jt Ka]. By definition of context plugging we have (λax.E) [t] = λax. (E [t]), and
thus J(λax.E) [t] Ka = Jλax.E [t] Ka = λx. JE [t] Ka. Then, by induction hypothesis, we
have λx. JE [t] Ka = λx. (JE Ka [Jt Ka]). We can finally conclude with λx. (JE Ka [Jt Ka]) =
(λx. JE Ka) [Jt Ka] = Jλax.E Ka [Jt Ka].
Notation 2.2.5.
Another notation for the reasoning in the case above is the following presentation as a
series of equalities (with justifications for the non-immediate steps):
J(λax.E) [t] Ka =
Jλax. (E [t]) Ka =
λx. JE [t] Ka = (by induction hypothesis)
λx. (JE Ka [Jt Ka]) =
(λx. JE Ka) [Jt Ka] =
Jλax.E Ka [Jt Ka]

Lemma 2.2.2 (Translation of head reductions).
The translation preserves head reductions: if t .β
ΛC(→,λa) t′, then Jt Ka .β
ΛC(→) Jt′ Ka.
Proof. Translation of (λx. t) u .β
ΛC(→,λa) t[u/x]:
J(λx. t) u Ka =
(λx. Jt Ka) Ju Ka .β
ΛC(→)
Jt Ka[Ju Ka/x] = (property of substitution)
Jt[u/x] Ka
The “property of substitution” needed for the last equality is the fact that the translation
commutes with substitution: Jt Ka[Ju Ka/x] = Jt[u/x] Ka for all t, x, u. This is immediately
proved by induction on t – much like we proved the translation of context decomposition.
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The other case of head reduction, (λax. t) ·a u .βΛC(→,λa) t[u/x], is almost identical:
J(λax. t) ·a u Ka =
(λx. Jt Ka) Ju Ka .β
ΛC(→)
Jt Ka[Ju Ka/x] = (property of substitution)
Jt[u/x] Ka

We can finally prove our main result on this translation. This form of translation of
a reduction relation is called a forward simulation result: we show that everything the
initial programs do, the translation can do as well, it “simulates” (imitates) the initial
system.
Theorem 2.2.3 (Forward simulation).
If t→βΛC(→,λa) t′, then Jt Ka →βΛC(→) Jt′ Ka.
Proof. If t→βΛC(→,λa) t′, then t must be of the form E [u], and t′ of the form E [u′], with
u .β
ΛC(→,λa) u′
E [u]→β E
[
u′
]
By Lemma 2.2.2 (Translation of head reductions) we have that Ju Ka .β
ΛC(→) Ju′ Ka.
By Lemma 2.2.1 (Translation of context decomposition) we have that JE [u] Ka = JE Ka [Ju Ka],
and similarly for u′. We can thus build the following proof of the desired goal JE [u] Ka →βΛC(→)
JE [u′] Ka:
Ju Ka .β
ΛC(→) qu′
y
a
JE Ka [Ju Ka]→β
ΛC(→) JE Ka
[q
u′
y
a
]

Failure to simulate failure Our forward simulation result tells us that adding adminis-
trative functions does not add computational power, as any computation possible in this
extended calculus could be computed in the minimal calculus. A property that we do
not have, however, is that a failing term with administrative functions is translated into
a failing term of the minimal λ-calculus. See the following counter-example:
J(λx. x) ·a y Ka = (λx. x) y
The term (λx. x) ·a y attempts an administrative application on a non-administrative λ-
abstraction: a destructor meets an unrelated constructor, it is a failing term in FΛC(→,λa).
Its translation, however, is not a failing term in FΛC(→), and it head-reduces to y.
This is problematic if we try to lift results about correctness of programs. Suppose
I have proved that a certain class of terms of the minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→) is “safe”,
that it never reduces to a failing term. Then I define a class of terms in ΛC(→, λa), and
show that they always get translated to safe terms. Intuitively, I would expect that those
administrative terms are also safe, they never reduce to failing term. But this is wrong:
a term that gets translated to a safe term could very well be a failing term itself, as in
the example above. I cannot reuse results about correctness of ΛC(→) programs to reason
about programs in my extended calculus.
To solve this problem, we will change our translation. Instead of translating terms of
the λ-calculus with administrative functions into terms of the minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→),
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we will translate them into terms of the administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box), as follows:
Jx Kboxa
def
= x
Jλx. t Kboxa
def
= λx. Jt Kboxa
Jλax. t Kboxa
def
= box(λx. Jt Kboxa )
Jt u Kboxa
def
= Jt Kboxa Ju K
box
a
Jt ·a u Kboxa
def
= unbox(Jt Kboxa ) Ju K
box
a
Our previous example (λx. x) ·a y now gets translated unbox(λx. x) y, a failing term.
The additional level of boxing “protects” the translation of the administrative abstractions
and applications from undesired interactions with the regular abstractions and applica-
tions.
Lemma 2.2.4 (Translation of context decomposition).
JE [t] Kboxa = JE K
box
a
[
Jt Kboxa
]
Proof. As with the previous translation. For example,
J(λax.E) [t] Kboxa =
Jλax. (E [t]) Kboxa =
box(λx. JE [t] Kboxa ) = (by induction hypothesis)
box(λx. (JE Kboxa
[
Jt Kboxa
]
)) =
(box(λx. JE Kboxa ))
[
Jt Kboxa
]
=
Jλax.E Kboxa
[
Jt Kboxa
]

Lemma 2.2.5 (Translation of head reductions).
If t .β t
′, then Jt Kboxa →∗β Jt′ K
box
a in at most two reduction steps.
Proof. As with the previous translation. The case which uses more than one step (in fact
exactly two steps) is the redex for administrative functions
J(λax. t) ·a u Kboxa =
unbox(box(λx. Jt Kboxa )) Ju K
box
a →β
λx. Jt Kboxa Ju K
box
a .β
Jt Kboxa [Ju K
box
a /x] =
Jt[u/x] Kboxa

Lemma 2.2.6 (Forward simulation).
If t→βΛC(→,λa) t′, then Jt Kboxa →∗β Jt′ K
box
a , and this translated reduction takes at most two
(→βΛC(→,box))-steps.
Proof. The proof is exactly as for the previous translation. 
The interest of the translation is in the preservation of failures, which was not the case
for our previous translation.
Theorem 2.2.7 (Failure simulation).
If t ∈ FΛC(→,λa), then Jt Kboxa ∈ FΛC(→,box).
Proof. In both calculi the failing terms are formed by a failing constructor-destructor pair
Ed [tc] plugged inside an arbitrary reduction context F :
FΛC def= {F [Ed [tc]] | Ed [tc] .βΛC}
We have JF [Ed [tc]] Kboxa = JF K
box
a
[
JEd [tc] Kboxa
]
, so we only need to check that failing
destructor-constructor pairs Ed [tc] translate to failing terms. By case analysis:
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1. (λx. t) ·a u translates to unbox(λx. t) u, which is a failing term
2. (λax. t) u translates to box(λx. t) u which is also a failing term.

This concludes our study of the λ-calculus with administrative arrows ΛC(→, λa). This
is one example of a λ-calculus with extra construction that is expressible in the minimal
λ-calculus ΛC(→), but needs at least the administrative calculus ΛC(→, box) to properly
translate failures. There are many such calculi, which can all be translated in ΛC(→, box).
In a way, ΛC(→, box) captures the essence of failure – a kind of failure that is easier to
manipulate and more representative of real-world languages than silent non-termination.
In Section 2.3 ((Simply) Typed λ-calculi), we will investigate formal ways to reason about
correctness, that is the absence of failures.
Remark 2.2.4. We can, in fact, refine Lemma 2.2.6 (Forward simulation) by a more fine-
grained analysis of the reduction steps involved. The idea is that reducing a λ-abstraction
is a potentially costly process (we have to perform a substitution, etc.), this is where the
real computation happens, while reducing a box is a trivial step that only removes marks
on terms. We can define (.β(λ)) as the subrelation of (.β) that only involves λ-reductions,
and (.β(box)) as the subrelation only involving boxes:
(λx. t) u .β(λ) t[u/x] unbox(box(t)) .β(box) t (.β) = (.β(λ)) ∪ (.β(box))
We can then easily prove the following result:
Lemma 2.2.8.
If t .β
ΛC(→,λa) t′, then
Jt Kboxa →
∗
β(box) .β(λ) →
∗
β(box)
q
t′
ybox
a
This tells us that each translated reduction contains exactly one λ-reduction step (actual
computations), and an irrelevant number of administrative steps; zero or one steps, in fact,
but this weaker result generalizes better to other calculi.
This refined relation (→∗β(box) .β(λ) →
∗
β(box)) has a stronger property that (→
∗
β) does not
have, which is that whenever a translation Jt Kboxa reduces to another translation Ju K
box
a
by this relation, then the source term t also reduces to the source term u in the source
system. This would allow us to establish a bisimulation result – two simulations that are
inverse from each other. ∗
Credits I learned this elegant characterization of failure in an untyped setting from Julien
Crétin’s PhD thesis [Crétin, 2014]. I had the pleasure of discussing with Julien as we
were both students working with Didier Rémy during the same period. The (minor)
idea of isolating a boxing construct (as a dynamic counterpart of abstraction sealing) to
use in simulating translations is a side-effect of some more recent work by Didier and
myself [Scherer and Rémy, 2015] which was motivated and inspired by Julien’s thesis.
2.3. (Simply) Typed λ-calculi
2.3.1. Reasoning on programs: type systems for modular verification
information
There is no free lunch, and in my field a free lunch would be a programming language that
lets us easily express any desired program without ever letting us insert bugs.
Remark 2.3.1. A (software) bug is a mismatch between the behavior intended by the
authors of a program, and the behavior actually specified by the program source code
as they have written it. (People wrongly blame the machines for bugs. Machines do
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what they are told.) It is natural that programming language design, working on the
interface between author intentions and their practical means of expressions, play a key
role in the development of practices and tooling to reduce bugs. The mathematics-inspired
formal study of programming languages, as we practice it in this thesis, is only one tool
among many to help us improve programming languages: there are others engineering,
psychological and sociological aspects to be considered. ∗
In the previous section we have seen examples of the immense expressive power of
the minimal λ-calculus. With this power to express what we want comes the power to
make mistakes, such as silent non-termination and failing terms. There are fundamental
theorems, that can be transferred between calculability theory, logics, and programming
languages, that seem to indicate that allowing these mistakes is unavoidable – forbidding
them endangers the expressiveness of the calculus.
For example, we can prove that there is no algorithm that can tell for all programs
of a Turing-complete programming language (for example the minimal or administrative
λ-calculus) whether they eventually reduce to an irreducible value or not. There is no
algorithm taking the description of a µ-recursive function and an input, able to always
decide if the function is defined on this input. The intuition for these results is that there
is no shortcut: informally, the only way to tell is to run the program, to start computing
the function, and this may never stop.
In fact, no non-trivial property can be decided for all the programs of such a language,
this is the Rice-Myhill-Shapiro theorem from the 1950s. In logic it is known since Gödel’s
theorems in the 1930s that no consistent logic (rich enough to express computation) can
prove all true statements. There is a direct relation between consistency (for a logic) and
allowing silently non-terminating programs (for a programming language).
This means that, to reliably reason on programs, to check that they respect some prop-
erty such as termination, we need extra help, some additional information that let us verify
the property of interest (for example, “the program does not crash and does not send priv-
ileged, security-sensitive information to an untrusted third-party”). A priori, the structure
of this information could strongly depend on the property being checked.
In the limit case, this information could be a mathematical proof of the property of
interest, accompanying the program. This is maximally expressive, but often impractical:
few programmers are willing to write proofs, fewer to check them properly.
We are interested in two additional properties of such verification information. First,
it should be expressed in a syntactic form that a computer can manipulate (not just
humans); we generally expect that there is an algorithm that can take any program and
its verification information, and checks that the information correctly justifies the property
of interest. Some verification systems lift that restriction (for example most presentations
of extensional type theory), but they can be seen as an erasure of a more explicit system
that provides the extra information needed for decidability.
Second, we expect the verification information to be modular, in the sense that informa-
tion for a program can be derived from information on its sub-parts (without inspecting
the syntactic structure of those sub-parts). There are practical benefits to modularity.
It means that the checking process can scale to very large programs; and indeed, large
computer programs have reached a scale comparable or larger than the most complex
human-built physical structures, with tens of millions of lines of code and as little re-
peated patterns as possible – the Eiffel tower, on the other hand, has many repeated
patterns, and its design could be fully described by a comparatively smaller computer
program. Yet the main benefit is conceptual: designing a modular verification structure
forces us to understand the property of interest in depth.
There are non-modular program analyses, and they have their uses. For programs
for which no verification information is provided, reconstructing it is undecidable in the
general case, but we may design a best-effort algorithm that answers either “yes, here
is the verification information”, “no, the program does not satisfy the property”, or “I
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don’t know”. For a given property of interest which has both modular and non-modular
verification structures, it may be easier (or even faster) to automatically reconstruct the
non-modular one – being less powerful, it is easier to describe. In term of language design,
however, I think that modularity is key: if we are to co-design a programming language
and a specific verification structure together, it should be modular, with non-modular
analyses delegated to external tools.
Definition 2.3.1 Type system.
We call type system a verification structure for a given property which is syntactic and
which is modular with respect to program structure.
Remark 2.3.2. In practice many things are called type systems by theoreticians and
practitioners that do not quite fit this framework. For example, in many programming
languages typing information is only available during the program execution, in a partial
way (these are called dynamically typed languages); they do play the role of a verification
structure, in the sense that type errors abort the program before other, worse kind of
failures happen, but it is unclear whether the typing information is computed “modularly”
with respect to the program text itself.
On top of this dynamic verification system, some languages add a static system that
reasons on the program test, but they make simplifying assumptions that make its veri-
fication incomplete (even for the class of errors it was designed to detect). This trade-off
can give a simpler system that is easier for end-users to understand.
Finally, modularity can be hard to achieve and first attempts at static verification of
a particular aspect often resort to less-modular approaches, even inside a language that
is generally typed in a modular way. For example, verification of contractivity in the
OCaml module system (which should allow to define fixpoints across module boundaries),
or positivity of Coq inductive definitions (which should allow to split mutually recursive
inductive definitions across module boundaries) are non-modular, in the sense that those
cannot be expressed in the interface language describing the statically deducible informa-
tion of program fragments/modules. ∗
2.3.2. A simple type system for the administrative λ-calculus
We will now present a simple type system for the administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box),
whose purpose is to ensure that the reduction of verified programs never results in failing
terms.
We can start building our system from very simple examples. The term t u reduces to
a failing term if t reduces to a box; as long as it remains a variable or a λ-abstraction,
the application does not cause a failure – but other parts of the term may lead to failures.
In essence, we want to verify that t “is a function”. Correspondingly, unbox(t) does not
cause failure if t “is a box”. Let us call this information the shape of a term.
In fact, we need to know a bit more than that: if the shape of t is “box”, then what is
the shape of unbox(t)? We do not know, it may be either a function or a box. We are
not able to determine the shape of unbox(t) from the shape of its subpart t, so the shape
system as suggested does not satisfy our modularity requirement. We should demand some
information on the shape inside the box: our types for box will be of the form box(A)
(rather than just box), where A is some information about the shape of what is inside the
box.
Similarly for functions, knowing that t is “a function” is not enough, because it does
not let us deduce anything about t u, which may be either a function (if t is λx. λy. y
for example) or a box (λx. box(x) for example). Besides the shape of the output of the
function, we also need some information on the shape expected for the input of the function.
Our types for functions will thus be of the form A→ B, where A is the type of the input
of the function, and B the type of its output.
Finally, there are parts of the program about which we have little information, and on
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which we do not need extra information. For example if the whole program to verify is
λx. x (this program is safe, it will never reduce to a failing term), we do not really need
to know the shape of x, as it is neither used as a function or a box. We may assume
that it has a “base type”, for example X, on which we do not know or need anything.
By assuming nothing on X, we have the guarantee that if we decide to assume a more
informative shape for x later, then the program will remain correctly verified.
In Figure 2.12 we present our type system for ΛC(→, box). It is described as (you guess)
a system of inference rules, whose judgments are of the form Γ ` t : A. The term t is the
program that is given a type, the type A is the given type, and Γ is a typing environment
that records the type we assumed for each free variable of the program: it is a mapping
from variables to types.
Figure 2.12.: Typed administrative λ-calculus ΛC(→, box)
talc-var
Γ, x : A ` x : A
talc-lam
Γ, x : A ` t : B
Γ ` λx. t : A→ B
talc-app
Γ ` t : A→ B Γ ` u : A
Γ ` t u : B
talc-box
Γ ` t : A
Γ ` box(t) : box(A)
talc-unbox
Γ ` t : box(A)
Γ ` unbox(t) : A
We claimed that type systems should be compositional. This can be seen by the fact
that, to build a typing judgment Γ ` t : A on a particular term t, we only require to know
typing judgments on its direct subterms, and do not otherwise inspect them. The typing
pair (Γ, A) is the compositional verification invariant.
Remark 2.3.3 (Comma notation in typing environments). When we introduced logical
contexts that are sets of variable in Section 1.2.2 (Formally defining the proofs), we pro-
posed to interpret the comma notation Γ, A as non-disjoint union (A may already be
present in Γ). For typing environments that are mappings from variables to typing en-
vironments, however, the comma notation Γ, x : A denotes disjoint union: x must not
already occur in Γ.
Because we use the notation Γ, x : A for variables x introduced by term binders – above,
in the talc-lam rule, for the λ-bound variable – we can α-rename bound variables to ensure
this condition is respected.
Of course, A may already be present in Γ under a different names. This notation is thus
not inconsistent with its variable-less counterpart Γ, A: the set of types present in the
typing environment formed by disjoint union of Γ and {x : A} is the non-disjoint union of
the set of types of Γ and of {A}. ∗
To validate the fact that our rules correctly verify what they were designed to verify,
we need to establish the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3.1 (Soundness of the ΛC(→, box) type system).
If t is well-typed for ΛC(→, box), then
∀u, t→∗β u =⇒ u /∈ FΛC(→,box)
There are many techniques to prove soundness, but the classic approach is to do a purely
syntactic proof by combining subject reduction and progress. This was introduced by the
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same article [Wright and Felleisen, 1994] that proposed to define reduction by decomposing
terms into reduction contexts and head redexes.
Lemma 2.3.2 (Substitution in ΛC(→, box) preserves typing).
If Γ, x : A ` t : B and Γ ` u : A, then Γ ` t[u/x] : B. In other words, the following rule is
admissible:
Γ, x : A ` t : B Γ ` u : A................................... subst
Γ ` t[u/x] : B
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ, x : A ` t : B, replacing any use of the variable
x by the complete derivation Γ ` u : A. For example, in the application case we have
Γ, x : A ` t : A→ B Γ, x : A ` t′ : A
Γ, x : A ` t t′ : A
and we build the partial derivation
Γ ` t[u/x] : A→ B Γ ` t′[u/x] : A
Γ ` t[u/x] t′[u/x] : B
by induction on the premises: Γ, x : A ` t : A→ B can be turned into a full derivation of
Γ ` t[u/x] : A→ B by induction hypothesis, and similarly for t′ : A. Finally, it suffices to
remark that t[u/x] t′[u/x] is equal to (t t′)[u/x] by definition to conclude.
In the variable case, we transform the full derivation
Γ, x : A ` x : A
into the full derivation of the judgment Γ ` u : A we assumed as hypothesis of this lemma.
(If the variable is different from x, the derivation in unchanged.)
In the λ-abstraction case, we have
Γ, x : A, y : B ` t : C
Γ, x : A ` λy. t : B → C
which we transform by induction into
Γ, y : B ` t[u/t] : C
Γ ` λy. t[u/x] : B → C
Note that the bound variable’s type B may or may not be equal to A, but that there is no
ambiguity on which variable we should replace – this is not a non-deterministic definition
as substitution in proof derivations (Theorem 1.3.2 (Substitution for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0))).
Finally, the (un)boxing steps are directly solved by induction:
Γ ` t[u/x] : A
Γ ` box(t[u/x]) : box(A)
Γ ` t[u/x] : box(A)
Γ ` unbox(t[u/x]) : A

Theorem 2.3.3 (Subject reduction for ΛC(→, box)).
Reduction in ΛC(→, box) preserves typing: if Γ ` t : A and t→β u, then Γ ` u : A.
Proof. The reduction relation t →β t′ means that some subterm occurrence u of t is
replaced in t′ by a term u′ in the head reduction relation, u .β u
′. Because typing is
compositional – the typing of a term depends only on the typing judgments of its subterms,
not their syntax – it suffices to prove that u′ has the same typing judgment than u.
In other words, it suffices to prove that if Γ ` t : A and t .β t′, then Γ ` t′ : A. We do
this by case analysis on t .β t
′: from a typing derivation for t, we build one for t′.
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Γ ` t : A
Γ ` box(t) : box(A)
Γ ` unbox(box(t)) : A
.β Γ ` t : A
Γ, x : A ` t : B
Γ ` λx. t : A→ B Γ ` u : A
Γ ` (λx. t) u : B
.β
Γ, x : A ` t : B Γ ` u : A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` t[u/x] : B

Theorem 2.3.4 (Progress for ΛC(→, box)).
Failing ΛC(→, box) terms are not well-typed.
Proof. Immediate by inspection of failing constructor/destructor pairs, which are never
well-typed. 
Combining these two theorems immediately gives soundness.
Proof (Theorem 2.3.1 (Soundness of the ΛC(→, box) type system)). If we have Γ ` t : A
and t →∗β u, we can prove by induction on the reduction chain that Γ ` u : A by
Theorem 2.3.3 (Subject reduction for ΛC(→, box)). Then by Theorem 2.3.4 (Progress
for ΛC(→, box)) we know that u /∈ F . 
2.3.3. Equivalence of ΛC(→, box) terms
A first attempt at defining program equivalence would to say that two terms t, u are equal
if one can be reached from the other by a series of β-reduction or β-expansion steps, a
relation we defined as (≈β) in Notation 2.1.3 (Equivalence closure).
This quickly shows its limit. For example, consider the two following programs of type
A → (B → C): id1
def
= λf. f and id2
def
= λf. λx. f x. One cannot be reached from the
other by performing β-reductions, but we argue that they should be considered equal, as
for any choice of arguments t : A, u : B, we have id1 t u ≈β t u ≈β id2 t u.
To equate id1 and id2, we thus add the following “equality principle”, which is tradi-
tionally called an η-equality (η is a “long e” Greek letter pronounced “eta”):
(t : A→ B) ≈η λx. t x
Remark that this is exactly the term-level counterpart of the “expansion principle”
for implication, presented in Section 1.3.3 (Local tests: reduction and expansion). This
suggests that we should add another η-principle for the other connective in our type
system, namely box(A):
Γ ` t : box(A) .η
Γ ` t : box(A)
Γ ` unbox(t) : A
Γ ` box(unbox(t)) : box(A)
This expansion principle is useful, as without it we could not prove that the function
that unboxes then re-boxes is the identity: we have λx. box(unbox(x)) ≈η λx. x at any
type box(A)→ box(A).
To summarize, our βη-equality is the smallest equivalence relation on well-typed terms
(≈βη) that contains the congruence closure (→β), (→η) of the following β-reduction and
η-expansion relations:
(λx. t) u .β u[t/x] (t : A→ B) .η λx. t x
unbox(box(t)) .β t (t : box(A)) .η box(unbox(t))
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3. Curry-Howard of reduction and
equivalence
3.1. The Curry-Howard correspondence
We have seen the three ingredients, namely logics, programs, and type systems, that
are necessary to present the Curry-Howard correspondence between proofs and programs.
This correspondence holds between pairs of a logic (given as a system of inference rules)
and a typed programming language whose programs are terminating. When it holds, the
proofs of the logic correspond to the terms of the programming language; in particular, the
proposition A is provable if the type A is inhabited by a program. Furthermore, reduction
of programs and proofs correspond, in the sense that a proof is reducible if and only if the
corresponding program is also reducible.
3.1.1. The full simply-typed λ-calculus ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
Let us present in Figure 3.1 the typed λ-calculus ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0), whose programs cor-
respond to the proofs of the proof system PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) we presented in Figure 1.2 –
the term grammar is summarized in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.1.: Full simply-typed lambda-calculus ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
stlc-var
Γ, x : A ` x : A
stlc-lam
Γ, x : A ` t : B
Γ ` λx. t : A→ B
stlc-app
Γ ` t : A→ B Γ ` u : A
Γ ` t u : B
stlc-pair
Γ ` t : A Γ ` u : B
Γ ` (t, u) : A×B
stlc-proj
Γ ` t : A1 ×A2
Γ ` πi t : Ai
stlc-inj
Γ ` t : Ai
Γ ` σi t : A1 +A2
stlc-case
Γ ` t : A1 +A2 Γ, x1 : A1 ` u1 : C Γ, x2 : A2 ` u2 : C
Γ ` match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2 : C
stlc-trivial
Γ ` () : 1
stlc-absurd
Γ ` t : 0
Γ ` absurd(t) : A
We established our notations in Section 2.3.2 (A simple type system for the administra-
tive λ-calculus). In a typing environment Γ is a mapping from term variables to types, and
we assume, modulo α-equivalence, that variables bound in terms are not already present
in the environment.
In the typing rules, we use colors to separate terms from types. This should allow the
reader to more easily phase terms out of typing derivations, to see what each rule means in
terms of typing only. This erasing reveals that the rules are in one-to-one correspondence
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Figure 3.2.: Term grammar for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)
t, u, r ::= terms
| . . . minimal λ-calculus ΛC(→) (§2.1)
| (t, u) pair
| πi t projection
| σi t injection
| match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2 case split
| () trivial
| absurd(t) absurd
with the rules of propositional intuitionistic logic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) in natural deduction
style (Figure 1.2).
In particular, conjunction in logic corresponds to the Cartesian product type A × B,
whose inhabitants are pairs (t, u) of a term at type A and a term at type B (stlc-pair);
projections πi t (for i ∈ {1, 2}) allow to recover either the first or second member of the
pair (stlc-proj).
Disjunction in logic corresponds to the disjoint union type A+B, which is a simplified
form of the “algebraic” or “sum” types used in functional programming: a value of type A+
B holds either a value of A or a value of B, and there is a tag σi that explicitly indicates
which side it comes from. In particular, A+A is not in general isomorphic to A, but to two
disjoint copies ofA. The case splitting construction match t with | σ1 x1 → u1 | σ2 x2 → u2
inspects a value t : A+B and branches on its tag. Either t reduces to a value of the form
σ1 t
′, and the program continues with u1 after having bound the variable x1 to the “pay-
load” t′ (of type A), or it is a σ2 t
′, and the program continues with u2 after having bound
x2 to t
′ (of type B).
There is exactly one inhabitant of the unit type 1 (in an empty environment), it is the
trivial value (), and it has no use at all. While its value is useless, the unit type 1 itself may
be useful. For example, consider the parametrized type F (α)
def
= A×α representing a type
A with some extra information. Whenever one wishes to provide no extra information at
all, one can just use F (1). (In impure languages with side-effects, turning a type A into
the thunk type 1→ A may also help controlling evaluation order.)
There is no inhabitant of the empty type 0 (in an empty environment). Thus, sub-
programs of type t can only appear in portions of the code that are un-reachable – they
are never executed when reducing a term in an empty environment. The construction
absurd(t) let us get any type out of these un-reachable fragments; one can think of it as
signaling a dynamic failure. This is useful in a situation that is dual to the α 7→ A × α
example above.
Indeed, consider the parametrized type G(α)
def
= A + α, denoting values of type A or,
depending on the instantiation of α, something else. For example, with G(1) the value
may simply be completely absent (this is the “option” or “maybe” type of functional
languages), and with G(E) it may be replaced by some explanation for the absence, of
type E (one may also think of the E as exceptions raised during the computation of A).
Finally, the type G(0) can be used in the case where one is actually sure that a value of
type A is present: the other case is impossible.
Then, we need a typing rule as strong as the one for absurd( ) to be able to effectively
manipulate this type G(0) = A+ 0. Consider for example the function extract : G(0)→
A:
extract
def
= λt. match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ xσ2 y → absurd(y)
The type of extract makes perfect sense: if we have a A + 0, as the second case is
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impossible we know we can always extract the A. However, in the second branch of the
case split, we are left in uncomfortable position of having to produce a A out of thin
air, or rather out of a value of type 0; the typing rule for absurd( ), allowing us to turn
a 0 into any type we want, is crucial to write this program. One can relate this to the
assert false construction in the OCaml programming language, that immediately aborts
the program (and should only be used in parts of the program that cannot be reached by
program execution) and has any type. The current presentation is more principled, as one
is required to provide a t : 0, acting as a proof that something indeed went wrong.
In Figure 3.3 we describe the reduction rules for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0), the computational
meaning of the language. We use reduction contexts as in Section 2.2.3, which cover the
full set of possible one-hole contexts for this grammar, and thus capture the full reduction
relation, rather than any specific reduction strategy.
Figure 3.3.: Reduction for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
E,F ,G ::= one-hole contexts
| 
| λt. E
| t E | E u
| (t, E) | (E, u)
| πi E
| σi E
|
 match E with∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2
 |
 match t with∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → Eσ2 x2 → u2
 |
 match t with∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → E

| absurd(E)
(λx. t) u .β t[u/y] πi (t1, t2) .β ti match σi t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2 .β ui[t/xi]
t .β u
E [t]→β E [u]
Lemma 3.1.1 (Substitution in ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0) preserves typing).
If Γ, x : A ` t : B and Γ ` u : A, then Γ ` t[u/x] : B. In other words, the following rule is
admissible:
Γ, x : A ` t : B Γ ` u : A................................... subst
Γ ` t[u/x] : B
Proof. The proof is done by an easy induction, exactly in the same style as the proof of
Lemma 2.3.2 (Substitution in ΛC(→, box) preserves typing). 
Lemma 3.1.2 (Subject reduction for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
if Γ ` t : A and t→β t′, then Γ ` t′ : A.
Proof. The proof is done by case analysis; the function case is identical to the one in the
proof of Theorem 2.3.3 (Subject reduction for ΛC(→, box)). The new cases, for pairs and
sums, are given below.
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Γ ` t1 : A1 Γ ` t2 : A2
Γ ` (t1, t2) : A1 ×A2
Γ ` πi (t1, t2) : Ai
.β Γ ` ti : Ai
Γ ` t : Ai
Γ ` σi t : A1 +A2 Γ, x1 : A1 ` u1 : C Γ, x2 : A2 ` u2 : C
Γ ` match σi t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2 : C
.β
Γ, xi : Ai ` ui : C Γ ` t : Ai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Γ ` ui[t/xi] :

We could go on and establish a progress theorem, and thus soundness of the calculus,
as we have done in Section 2.3.2 (A simple type system for the administrative λ-calculus).
The focus of this chapter is rather on the correspondence with proof derivations, so we
will skip this step.
3.1.2. The Curry-Howard isomorphism, technically
The correspondence between programming and logic is already apparent from the typing
rules alone: forget the term parts, and voila, you see the logic underlying your program-
ming language. But to get a full correspondence, we also want to study the relation
between the reduction of programs and the reduction of proofs. Note that reduction, for
programs, is defined on untyped terms; a first step is to show that it can be lifted into a
reduction at the level of type derivations, that is, that our reduction semantics is sound
with respect to our type system – this is exactly what we proved in Lemma 3.1.2 (Sub-
ject reduction for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)). Then, one expects to show that reduction on typing
derivations corresponds to reduction of proofs.
Definition 3.1.1 JΓ KCH, Jt KCH (Curry-Howard erasure).
If Γ is a typing environment (mapping from variables to types/formulas), we write JΓ KCH
for the set of types in its range – a proof context.
If t is well-typed in ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0), we write Jt KCH for the proof derivation of the
judgment JΓ KCH ` A in PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) obtained by erasure of the typing derivation of t
– replacing each rule of ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0) by the corresponding rule in PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0),
for example
t
Γ, x : A ` t : B
Γ ` λx. t : A→ B
|
CH
def
=
Jt KCH :: JΓ KCH, A ` B
Jλx. t KCH :: JΓ KCH ` A→ B
We recall that the notation Π :: Γ ` A, introduced in Section 1.1 (A first introduction
to inference rules), means that Π is a derivation tree for the judgment Γ ` A.
Note that the relation between proof contexts (sets of types) and typing environments
(mappings from variables to types) is one-to-many: many different typing environments
erase to the same proof context. Correspondingly, the relation between proofs and typed
programs is one-to-many.
Because proofs have lost some structure that was present in programs, the operations
on proofs may not respect this extra structure. We previously remarked – Theorem 1.3.2
(Substitution for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)) – that many different proofs may be considered as the
result of substituting one proof into another. Only one of those substitutions respect the
variable relation present in the program derivation. So we cannot hope to have a bijection
between proofs and programs that would preserve reduction; the best we can formulate is
the fact that reduction of proofs can simulate reduction of programs.
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Lemma 3.1.3 (Term substitutions erase to proof substitutions).
If Γ, x : A ` t : B and Γ ` u : A then there is a substitution
Jt KCH :: JΓ KCH, A ` B Ju KCH :: JΓ KCH ` A..................................................... subst
Π :: JΓ KCH ` B
such that Π = Ju[t/x] KCH.
Proof sketch. Parallel inspection of the definition of substitution on proofs and terms
shows that they preserve the erasing relation. Remember that we have a choice in the
definition of substitution, when encountering an axiom rule on A when A is in the context.
Erasure of the substituted variable, Jx KCH, corresponds to the case where an axiom rule is
replaced by Ju KCH. Erasure of another variable of type A, Jy KCH, corresponds to the case
where the axiom rule is unchanged. t
Theorem 3.1.4.
Curry-Howard correspondence between PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) and ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
Reduction of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) proofs forward-simulates reduction of well-typed ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
terms: if t .β u, then Jt KCH .R Ju KCH.
Proof. Let us write the proofs with reducible introduction-elimination pairs on one side,
and well-typed terms with a head redex on the other. Preservation of erasure is evident,
using Lemma 3.1.3 on substitutions.
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B ΠA :: Γ ` A
Γ ` B
.R
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B ΠA :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B
Γ, x : A ` t : B
Γ ` λx. t : A→ B Γ ` u : A
Γ ` (λx. t) u : B
.β
Γ, x : A ` t : B Γ ` u : A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` t[u/x] : B
Π1 :: Γ ` A1 Π2 :: Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ ` Ai
.R Πi :: Γ ` Ai
Γ ` t1 : A1 Γ ` t2 : A2
Γ ` (t1, t2) : A1 ×A2
Γ ` πi (t1, t2) : Ai
.β Γ ` ti : Ai
Π :: Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2 Π1 :: Γ, A1 ` C Π2 :: Γ, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
.R
Πi :: Γ, Ai ` C Π :: Γ ` Ai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` C
Γ ` t : Ai
Γ ` σi t : A1 +A2 Γ, x1 : A1 ` u1 : C Γ, x2 : A2 ` u2 : C
Γ ` match σi t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2 : C
.β
Γ, xi : Ai ` ui : C Γ ` t : Ai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` ui[t/xi] : C

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3.1.3. Curry-Howard: discussion
The name “Curry-Howard correspondence” denotes a family of such correspondence the-
orems for many different logics (but not necessarily all of their equi-provably-expressive
presentations as systems of inference rules). It evokes the now well-understood idea that
logics, in general, correspond to strongly-typed programming languages, or equivalently
that normalization of proof derivations is a rich model of computation – among others.
Another point of view would be to say that the programming languages equipped with a
type system that guarantees (strong) normalization are called “logics”, and that the part
of proof theory concerned with normalization of cut-elimination can thus be understood as
a well-defined subset of programming language theory – in general programming languages
may accept non-terminating programs. The point is not, of course, to practice reduction-
ism by saying that some field is “just” a sub-field of another, but instead to understand
the relation between them in a way that allows transfer of inspiration, concepts and results
in both directions. This approach has worked beautifully since the second half of the 20th
century; the whole point of the present thesis is to solve programming-languages questions
using proof-theoretic tools.
Once one has grown familiar with it, the correspondence result is so simple that one
would even wonder what its value is: isn’t it obvious that one can give a term syntax to
derivations of inference rules? The value, of course, is to transfer intuition and results;
but by now most of the community has grown accustomed to switching between the two
points of view with such ease that this also seems rather automatic. It may be interesting
to discuss how the two points of view differ. For example:
• As already pointed out, it is common for programming languages to allow and study
non-terminating programs, while that is generally outside the scope of logics – it
usually coincides with unsoundness, the ability to prove anything. Yet, we are
slowly coming with more logical ways to reason about some forms of usefully non-
terminating programs (in particular coinduction).
• Some logicians have a deep interest in decomposing logics into more atomic / re-
stricted / simpler notions, which goes much farther what has been realistically
achieved in minimalism for language design. Linear logic, for example, is a de-
composition of classical and intuitionistic logics that let us control resources in a
very fine-grained way. In some ways, that can be made precise, this goes in the same
direction as studies in compilation, translating programs from a high to a low-level
language, with a more algebraic perspective. It has also had fruitful applications to
programming language design, for the control of program resources such as mutable
memory.
• On a pragmatic level, term syntaxes are more concise and thus more comfortable
to manipulate than partial derivations. Many transformation of proofs gain to be
expressed at the level of terms instead.
• Programming language designers in fact distinguish several possible term syntaxes,
some that are “fully explicit” and are trivially isomorphic to a typing derivation,
and other where some of the typing information has been left implicit, and may or
may not be inferrable statically without additional information – those syntaxes are
interesting in their own right, and not isomorphic to typing derivations. For example,
a λ-abstraction may be written λx. t as in the untyped λ-calculus, or for example
λ(x : A). t, with type information about the variable t included in the syntax. In the
general case, for expressive enough type systems, recovering the full typing derivation
from a less-typed term syntax can be undecidable.
This idea of a distinction between various levels of explicitness of term syntaxes is
crucial. For example, dependent type systems have a judgment Γ ` t = u : A justifying
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that two terms are equal, and we distinguish “extensional” and “intensional” systems. The
“extensional” theories have a richer notion of equality than what can be recovered from the
usual syntax of programs, which does not explicitly mention the use of equalities during
type-checking. One need extra information, the equality derivations, to check that a term
is well-typed. On the other hand, “intensional” theories have a weaker equality whose
witnesses can be decidably recovered from the same term syntax. This distinction only
makes sense because there is consensus on some “term syntax”, shared by both families
of systems, that has less information than the typing derivation – and this syntax is not
just the untyped λ-calculus, as this would make type-recovery undecidable in all cases.
Another example of interesting notion based on this distinction is “type erasure”: when
a given system has a term syntax that is strictly less explicit than the typing derivations,
a question is whether the dynamic semantics of the language can be defined on the less-
explicit term syntax. There are two ways this could not be the case:
• It could be the case that reduction depends on information that is present in the
typing derivation, but not in the less-explicit program syntax. For example, Haskell
type-classes or Scala implicits affect the observable behavior of programs, and they
are not elaborated in the surface term syntax – one need a more explicit form, closer
to full typing derivations, for the dynamic behavior to be unambiguous.
In a slightly more general way, one may wonder whether all possible ways to give
a typing derivation for a given term or judgment give equivalent derivations. This
property is called coherence; it guarantees that the term syntax is a proper quotient
over the corresponding derivations, respecting their identity. This property of co-
herence is related to the question of which types have unique inhabitants: those are
exactly the types whose terms can be elided without losing coherence.
• It could also be the case that reduction is definable on the program syntax, but can-
not be lifted into a reduction relation on typing derivations, because some reduction
steps break typing. This happens when the type system and the reduction relation
do not match, in the sense that some well-typed programs may reduce into an error
state the type system was designed to prevent. But more interestingly it can also
happen that well-typed programs “never go wrong”, in that their reducts never run
into this class of errors, but still intermediate steps of the reduction cannot be typed
(see for example Barbanera, Dezani-Ciancaglini, and de’Liguoro [1995], Schubert
and Fujita [2014]).
In this case, there should exist a richer term syntax that restores this property by
allowing to reason on those intermediate states, but such richer syntax may not be
known. We believe that this means that the correctness invariants of the analysis are
not well-understood enough [Cretin and Rémy, 2014]; a semantic soundness proof
may go through, but is not the end of the story.
3.2. Equivalence with sums and Curry-Howard-Lambek
3.2.1. βη-equivalence for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
In Section 2.3.3 (Equivalence of ΛC(→, box) terms) we defined the βη-equality for ΛC(→, box)
as the congruence determined by the reduction and expansion principles on well-typed
terms. Doing the same for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) would give the following rules:
(λx. t) u .β u[t/x] (t : A→ B) .η λx. t x
πi (t1, t2) .β ti (t : A1 ×A2) .η (π1 t, π2 t)
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match σi t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 .β ui[t/yi]
(t : A1 +A2) .η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
Weak and strong η-rules for sums Upon inspection the η-rule for sums above is found
to be lacking. For example, we cannot prove the two following equivalences for t : A1 +A2
(t, u) ≈? match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → (σ1 y1, u)σ2 y2 → (σ2 y2, u) x ≈? match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → xσ2 y2 → x
This rule is called the “weak” η-rule (.weak η). We shall use instead the “strong” η-rule,
which quantifies over all the well-typed contexts C [x : A1 +A2].
Notation 3.2.1 Non-linear contexts C [x].
We write C [x] for a context that may use its variable zero, one or several times; for
example, (x, x) is such a non-linear context. The plugging operation C [t] is similar to a
substitution C[t/x], except that it is not capture-avoiding.
Definition 3.2.1 Strong η-rule.
∀C [x], C [t : A1 +A2] .η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → C [σ1 y1]σ2 y2 → C [σ2 y2]
We can in particular recover the two equations above by taking
C1 [x]
def
= (x, u) C2 [y]
def
= x
η-rules for units Our previous notion of expansion did not suggest what the η-rules
for 0 and 1 could be: they were defined on types that had both an introduction and
elimination form. The generalized form of the “strong” η-rule for sum, however, can
be derived into η-rules for those types. In the case of 1, there is no destructor, so we
just expand to the constructor inside the context (as C [σi . . .] in the sum case); in the
case of 0, there is no constructor, so we just expand to the destruction form — just as
(match t with | σ1 y1 → | σ2 y2 → ) in the sum case.
∀C [x], C [t : 1] .η C [()] ∀C [x], C [t : 0] .η absurd(t)
The first rule say that any term of type 1 can be rewritten into () under any context.
As a consequence, the following typed equality holds:
Γ ` t ≈η u : 1
Notation 3.2.2 Γ ` t R u : A.
We write Γ ` t R u : A when all of Γ ` t : A, Γ ` u : A and t R u hold. In particular,
Γ ` t ≈ u : A mean that the programs t, u are equivalent and of type Γ ` A.
The second rule implies that, in presence of a term t of type 0, any term t is equal
to absurd(t), as shown by considering the non-linear context that ignores its argument
C [x]
def
= t. If absurdity is provable, then the world explodes – at any type! This corresponds
to the following typed equality rule:
Γ ` t : 0 Γ ` u1, u2 : A
Γ ` u1 ≈η u2 : A
We summarized the full, strong equivalence rules for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0) in Figure 3.4
(Typed program equivalence for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
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Figure 3.4.: Typed program equivalence for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
fun-β
Γ, x : A ` t : B Γ ` u : A
Γ ` (λx. t) u .β t[u/x] : B
fun-η
Γ ` t : A→ B
Γ ` t .η λx. t x : A→ B
prod-β
Γ ` t1 : A1 Γ ` t2 : A2
Γ ` πi (t1, t2) .β ti : Ai
prod-η
Γ ` t : A1 ×A2
Γ ` t .η (π1 t, π2 t) : A1 ×A2
sum-β
Γ ` t : Ai
Γ, y1 : A1 ` u1 : C
Γ, y2 : A2 ` u2 : C
Γ ` match σi t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 .β ui[t/yi] : C
sum-η
Γ ` t : A1 +A2 Γ ` C [ : A1 +A2] : B
Γ ` C [t] .η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → C [σ1 y1]σ2 y2 → C [σ2 y2] : B
unit-η
Γ ` t, u : 1
Γ ` t ≈η u : 1
empty-η
Γ ` t : 0 Γ ` u1, u2 : A
Γ ` u1 ≈η u2 : A
We should also define precisely the weak η-equivalence (≈weak η). The reduction and
expansion principles we have given all use both the introduction and the elimination form
of the corresponding connective, so in particular we have no expansion principle for units
– which lack either forms. However, the generalization of strong η-equivalence to units
suggests a weak η-equivalence principle for them, by instantiating the context parameter
with the identity context: C [x]
def
= x. The rules for weak η-equivalence are thus given in
Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5.: Weak η-equivalence for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
fun-weak η
Γ ` t : A→ B
t .weak η λx. t x
prod-weak η
Γ ` t : A1 ×A2
t .weak η (π1 t, π2 t)
sum-weak η
Γ ` t : A1 +A2
t .weak η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
unit-weak η
Γ ` t : 1
t .weak η ()
empty-η
Γ ` t : 0
t .weak η absurd(t)
Fact 3.2.1.
If t ≈weak η u then t ≈η u.
3.2.2. Curry-Howard-Lambek
There is a third angle to the Curry-Howard isomorphism, which is a correspondence
between proofs (or programs) and morphisms in well-known categories; in the case of
PIL(→,×, 1), that would be Cartesian closed categories.
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We will not use category theory much in this PhD thesis – we have enough content
already; but one should note that categories are opinionated about what the equality of
their morphisms should be, and in particular they confirm our intuition of equality for
PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0). This is the topic of this subsection, which will assume some category-
theory background – feel free to skip it if you do not know what objects and arrows/mor-
phisms are.
Categorical models of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) The usual way to use category theory when
studying logics or typed programming language is to give a denotational semantics for a
logic or type system. A denotational semantics is an interpretation, translation, modeling,
of the logic or language into some mathematical structure, such that two equivalent proofs
or programs are given the same interpretation. It translates simple syntactic objects and
their complex equivalence relation into complex mathematical objects and their simple
mathematical equality.1
Typically, the contexts and types of the language become objects of the category, and
the terms (and/or substitutions or general contexts) of the language become morphisms
(arrows) of the category. PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) can be interpreted into any category which has
a bicartesian closed structure2: it has finite products (product types and 1), exponentials
(function types), and finite co-products (sum types and 0), and they work well together.
As any denotational semantics (model construction), this can be used to prove consis-
tency of a logic, from non-inhabitation of the empty type 0: if there is no arrow from the
“empty context” object to the “empty type” object, then we know there is no proof of
false, or closed term of type 0. For reasons of space, we will not build the full interpretation
here, but just remark on the equality of coproducts and units.
(Getting consistency proof from denotational semantics is not unique to category the-
ory, any model construction will do. One interest of categorical models is that they are
formulated in terms of the minimal structure required to model the syntax, and (in the
good cases) those categorical conditions then capture the full generality of the syntax in-
stead of being specialized, lossy interpretations. In other words, category theory serves
as a toolkit to describe the “initial” models isomorphic to the syntax with the desired
equivalence relations.)
βη from the product object The definition of the categorical product object is as follows:
an object C is the product of two objects A1, A2 if there exists two morphisms π1 : C → A1,
and π2 : C → A2 such that, for any object B and pair of morphisms f1 : B → A1,
f2 : B → A2, there exists a unique morphism 〈f1, f2〉 : B → C such that the following
diagram commutes:
B
A1 C A2
f1
〈f1,f2〉
f2
π1 π2
One can show that such a C, if it exists, is unique modulo (unique!) isomorphism; it can
be written A1 ×A2. In a model of the lambda-calculus, where objects represent contexts
and type, an arrow f : Γ → A represents a term Γ ` t : A. In particular, when B in the
diagram above is a typing environment Γ, the fi : Γ → Ai are terms Γ ` ti : Ai, and the
1As Alexandre Miquel once told me in front of a whiteboard explanation of some variant of classical
realizability for extensional choice: “C’est ça les mathématiques, on définit des objets compliqués pour
rendre les questions plus simples.”
2It is hard to find a detailed exposition on bicartesian closed categories only, for example indicating how
the isomorphism 0× A ' 0 is derived from their definition. We refer the reader to the excellent book
Lambek and Scott [1986], Section 8 (Cartesian closed categories with coproducts), page 65, easily found
on Libgen.
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product-former 〈f1, f2〉 is exactly the pair (t1, t2). The β-rule for pairs can then be read
from the commutative diagram: the diagram says that following 〈f1, f2〉 then πi is equal
to following fi, that is πi ◦ 〈f1, f2〉 = fi, in other words Γ ` πi (t1, t2) = ti : A.
Interestingly, the η-rule can also be read from this definition. For any B and morphism
p : B → C, we can define fi : B → Ai (i ∈ {1, 2}) simply by taking fi
def
= πi ◦ p, such
that the product diagram commutes. But there is another arrow in B → C that makes
this diagram commute, namely the arrow 〈f1, f2〉. By unicity of the product morphism,
these two morphisms are equal: p = 〈π1 ◦ p, π2 ◦ p〉. In particular, if we take B to be some
typing environment Γ, a morphism p : Γ → C is just a term Γ ` t : A1 × A2, and unicity
gives us Γ ` t = (π1 t, π2 t) : A1 ×A2.
βη from the co-product object To obtain the β- and η-rules for sums (coproducts), we
dualize the product diagram. C is the coproduct of A1 and A2 if there are σi : Ai → C
(i ∈ {1, 2}) such that, for any B with morphisms fi : Ai → B (i ∈ {1, 2}), there is a
unique [f1, f2] : C → B such that the following diagram commutes:
B
A1 C A2
f1
[f1,f2]
f2
σ1 σ2
Again, C is unique modulo unique isomorphism and represents the sum A1 + A2. In a
model of the lambda-calculus, a “consumer” morphisms from type A to a type B represents
a context D [x] returning a B with a hole x of type A – this hole may appear several times
in D. In particular, when the fi : Ai → B in the diagram above are contexts Di [x], the
morphism [f1, f2] is exactly the case-splitter context
D []
def
= match  with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → D1 [y1]σ2 y2 → D2 [y2]
The β-rule arises from the fact that following σi then [f1, f2] is equal to following fi,
that is [f1, f2] ◦ σi = fi; in particular, for any morphism g : Γ → Ai representing a term
Γ ` t : Ai, we have [f1, f2] ◦ σi ◦ g = fi ◦ g, that is
match σi t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → C1 [y1]σ2 y2 → C2 [y2] = Ci [t]
Now, for any B and morphism s : C → B, we can define fi : Ai → B (i ∈ {1, 2})
simply by taking fi
def
= s ◦ σi, such that the co-product diagram commutes. But there is
another arrow in C → B that makes this diagram commute, namely the arrow [f1, f2]. By
unicity of the co-product morphism, these two morphisms are equal: s = [s ◦ σ1, s ◦ σ2].
In particular, if s is some context D [x], then this equality gives us the strong η-rule,
D [x] = match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → D [σ1 y1]σ2 y2 → D [σ2 y2] .
Units 1 and 0 In a bicartesian closed category, the unit type 1 is interpreted as a terminal
object, an object 1 such that for any other object A there exists a unique morphism
1A : A → 1. The empty type 0 is interpreted as an initial object, an object 0 such that
for any other object A there exists a unique morphism 0A : 0→ A.
Our equality rule for 1 is easily derived from the unicity of morphisms into terminal
objects: if we have two terms Γ ` t, u : 1, they correspond to morphisms ft, gu : Γ → 1.
Because there is a unique arrow 1Γ from Γ to 1, we have ft = 1Γ = gu, and thus we should
have Γ ` t = u : 1.
We proposed two equalities for 0: the first says that any C [t : 0] is equal to absurd(t),
and the second says that in a context where 0 is provable, all terms are equal. The first is
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easy to derive from the categorical structure: by definition of 0 as an initial object, any
arrow C [x] : 0→ A is equal to absurd() : 0→ A.
Deriving the second equality rule – Γ ` 0 implies Γ ` t ≈η u : A – from the definition
of a bicartesian closed category is a more difficult. Intuitively, this comes from the “high
school algebra” equation a0 = 1: as soon as a context Γ can prove 0, it becomes isomorphic
to 0, and all terms in Γ become equal.
Lemma 3.2.2.
If there is an arrow f : Γ→ 0, then 0Γ ◦ f : Γ→ Γ is equal to the identity morphism idΓ.
Proof (from Lambek and Scott [1986]). Let us first show that 0 × Γ ' 0. By definition
of the exponential functor (Γ → ) as the right adjoint of the product functor ( × Γ)
– functional programmers call this “currying” – we have the bijection between sets of
morphisms Hom(0 × Γ, A) ' Hom(0,Γ → A). The latter set has a unique morphism,
therefore there is always a unique morphism from 0 × Γ to any A: the object 0 × Γ is
initial, thus isomorphic to 0.
In particular, there is a unique arrow from 0 × Γ to itself. 00×Γ ◦ π1 is such an arrow
(0× Γ π1−→ 0 00×Γ−→ 0× Γ), and so is id0×Γ, so they are equal:
00×Γ ◦ π1 = id0×Γ
Finally, remark that f = π1 ◦ 〈f, idΓ〉 (by projection) and π2 ◦ 00×Γ = 0Γ (all functions
in 0→ Γ are equal). We thus have
0Γ ◦ f = (π2 ◦ 00×Γ) ◦ (π1 ◦ 〈f, idΓ〉)
= π2 ◦ (00×Γ ◦ π1) ◦ 〈f, idΓ〉
= π2 ◦ id0×Γ ◦ 〈f, idΓ〉
= π2 ◦ 〈f, idΓ〉
= idΓ

Corollary 3.2.3.
If there is a morphism f : Γ→ 0, then any two morphisms g1, g2 : Γ→ A are equal.
Proof. We have idΓ = 0Γ ◦ f from Lemma 3.2.2, so in particular for each gi we have
gi = gi ◦ idΓ = gi ◦ 0Γ ◦ f
that is, the following commuting diagram for each gi:
A
Γ 0
gi
0Γ
f
gi◦0Γ
By the initial object property, all morphisms gi ◦ 0Γ are equal, so we have
g1 = (g1 ◦ 0Γ) ◦ f
= (g2 ◦ 0Γ) ◦ f
= g2

In particular, for any Γ such that Γ ` t : 0, we have Γ ` u1 = u2 : A for any A.
Credits I discovered category theory thanks to a book recommendation by Brice Arnould
(“Logique, ensemble, catégories (le point de vue constructif)”, by Pierre Ageron), when I
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was just beginning to understand what mathematics and programming were about. Not
using them daily in my own syntax-grounded work, it is not easy to preserve enough
working memory to follow the work of the more category-infused authors of the field.
For a positive example of excellent exposition of category-inspired ideas to programming
layperson, see the work of Ralf Hinze, for example Henglein and Hinze [2013].
I learned the fact that the strong η-rule for sums can be justified from categorical
coproducts from Andrej Filinski’s master thesis – a very interesting read. I have been
surprised to see people surprised by this fact; it is not as well-known as it should be.
3.3. Extrusion and commuting conversions
3.3.1. Splitting strong η: weak η plus extrusion
When we moved from the weak η-expansion to the strong η-expansion for sums – subse-
quently generalizing it to units (1 and 0) – we went outside the realm of the rules that had
been suggested by our study of the natural deduction in Section 1.3 (On the meaning of
logical connectives: testing a logic). In this subsection, we repair that mismatch by show-
ing that those equivalences suggested by programming intuition are reasonable operations
on proof derivations; they correspond to the permutability of disjunction elimination – and
unit rules.
Our strong η-rule is the following relation between well-typed programs:
∀C [x : A1 +A2], C [t] .η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → C [σ1 y1]σ2 y2 → C [σ2 y2]
Because of the quantification on all contexts C [x], this rule is non-local. Such con-
texts are easy to manipulate on term representations, but not so easily defined on proof
derivations. Transformations on proof derivations are traditionally rather defined as local
transformations on a small number of adjacent inference rules (what could be called a
“small-step” style). By reformulating the η-transformation in this way, we recover per-
mutation principles that are known in the logic community as (instances of) commuting
conversions.
We decompose this strong η-expansion (.η) into a combination of the weak η-expansion
(.weak η) under the context C [x], and the extrusion (≈extr) of the disjunction elimination
from the context C [x], to be defined in this section:
C [t : A1 +A2]
.weak η C
[
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
]
≈extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → C [σ1 y1]σ2 y2 → C [σ2 y2]
Let us define (≈extr) piece by piece, guided by the requirement that it captures ex-
actly the transformation performed by the strong η-expansion. One can check that each
definition below is sound, in the sense that it is derivable from (≈βη).
Extrusion out of non-binding contexts The rules to extrude a non-binding context are
given in Figure 3.6. As an example, let us show how the first rule
t
(
match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
.extr match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → t r1σ2 y2 → t r2
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Figure 3.6.: Extrusion of sum elimination out of non-binding contexts
t
(
match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
.extr match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → t r1σ2 y2 → t r2(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
u .extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1 uσ2 y2 → r2 u(
t, match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
.extr match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → (t, r1)σ2 y2 → (t, r2)(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2 , u
)
.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → (r1, u)σ2 y2 → (r2, u)
πj
(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → πj r1σ2 y2 → πj r2
σj
(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σj r1σ2 y2 → σj r2
match
(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2
.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match r1 with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2
σ2 y2 → match r2 with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2
is justified by (≈βη). For this purpose, let us define C [x]
def
= t (match x with | σ1 y1 → r1 | σ2 y2 → r2).
Then we have
t
(
match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
= C [u]
.η match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → C [σ1 z1]σ2 z2 → C [σ2 z2]
= match u with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 z1 → t
(
match σ1 z1 with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
σ2 z2 → t
(
match σ2 z2 with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
.β .β match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → t (r1[z1/y1])σ2 z2 → t (r2[z2/y2])
=α match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → t r1σ2 y2 → t r2
Remark 3.3.1. In all these rules and the following ones, an implicit assumption is that ex-
trusion preserves scoping of variables and well-typing. Consider for example the following
extrusion:
t
(
match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
.extr match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → t r1σ2 y2 → t r2
This extrusion is only well-scoped if the yi are not free in t – otherwise extrusion would
capture these free occurrences. We leave these side-conditions implicit in the rules: they
can be tediously derived from the constraint that typing and scoping be preserved. ∗
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Extrusion out of binding contexts The rules for extruding a sum elimination out of a
binding context are given in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7.: Extrusion of sum elimination out of a binding context
λx. match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2 .extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → λx. r1σ2 y2 → λx. r2
match u with
∣∣∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
σ2 z2 → u′
.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r1σ2 z2 → u′
σ2 y2 → match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r2σ2 z2 → u′
match u with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 z1 → u′
σ2 z2 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → u′σ2 z2 → r1
σ2 y2 → match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → u′σ2 z2 → r2
As before, those rules carry an implicit side-condition on the extrusion relation to make
sure that scoping (and thus typing) is preserved. For example, the first case could be
written
λx. match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2 x/∈t.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → λx. r1σ2 y2 → λx. r2
with an explicit condition x /∈ t; if the variable x bound by the λ-abstraction is used in
t, then moving t out of the binder scope breaks scoping and, in general, typing. This
restriction is stronger than the capture-avoiding side-condition of Remark 3.3.1: if the
variable condition is not satisfied, we cannot α-rename variables to satisfy it.
Also note that the two latter rules are reversible: the right-hand side may be an instance
of the left-hand side. In particular, (.extr) is not terminating as a rewrite rule, we need a
particular strategy to stop expanding. This also implies that there is no strong notion of
“canonical form” for this relation: if t and u are independent, there is no canonical reason
for one to get split before the other.
“Extrusion” out of constant contexts The strange rules of Figure 3.8 arise from ex-
trusion out of constant contexts. We will see a use for them in Chapter 10 (Focused
λ-calculus).
Note that we consider them part of the equivalence relation (≈extr), but not in the
(non-terminating) directed rewrite rule (.extr).
Merging rules Consider the following generalized context: C [x]
def
= (x, x). The strong
η-rule expands C [t : A1 +A2] into match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → (σ1 y1, σ1 y1)σ2 y2 → (σ2 y2, σ2 y2) . In particular,
t is only case-split once in the final result.
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Figure 3.8.: Extrusion of sum elimination out of a constant context
absurd(u) ≈extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → absurd(u)σ2 y2 → absurd(u)
() ≈extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → ()σ2 y2 → ()
x ≈extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → xσ2 y2 → x
It may reduce as follows using the rules we have seen so far:
C [t] .weak η C
[
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
]
=
(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2 , match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
)
.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 →
(
σ1 y1, match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → σ1 z1σ2 z2 → σ2 z2
)
σ2 y2 →
(
σ2 y2, match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → σ1 z1σ2 z2 → σ2 z2
)
.∗extr match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σ1 y1, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σ1 y1, σ2 z2)
σ2 y2 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σ2 y2, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σ2 y2, σ2 z2)
The case-splits on t have been duplicated by this transformation: weak η-expansion gen-
erates as many case-splits as there are occurrences of the hole x in C [x], and extrusion
may create even more by duplicating code in the tail of an extruded case-split. In our
example there is a first case-split on t and, in each case, a second case-split on the same
term t.
Note that this is βη-equal to the result of the strong η-expansion above. To check this,
it suffices to define a context equal to the whole term, with each occurrence of t replaced
by a hole x, and then perform a strong η-expansion (along this context) and a series of
β-reduction on this whole term. More precisely, we define the context
D [x]
def
= match x with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σ1 y1, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σ1 y1, σ2 z2)
σ2 y2 → match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σ2 y2, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σ2 y2, σ2 z2)
Note that for any σi u we have
D [σi u]
= match σi u with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match σi u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σ1 y1, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σ1 y1, σ2 z2)
σ2 y2 → match σi u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σ2 y2, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σ2 y2, σ2 z2)
.β match σi u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σi u, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σi u, σ2 z2)
.β (σi u, σi u)
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thus we have the η-equivalence:
match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σ1 y1, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σ1 y1, σ2 z2)
σ2 y2 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (σ2 y2, σ1 z1)σ2 z2 → (σ2 y2, σ2 z2)
= D [t]
.η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → D [σ1 x1]σ2 x2 → D [σ2 x2]
.β .β match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → (σ1 x1, σ2 x2)σ2 x2 → (σ1 x1, σ2 x2)
To resolve this difference between the equational theory of (≈βη) and (≈weak η∪extr), we
need to add the merging rules of Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9.: Extrusion of sum elimination: merging rules
match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r1σ2 z2 → r2
σ2 y2 → u
.extr
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1[y1/z1]σ2 y2 → u
match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → u
σ2 y2 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r1σ2 z2 → r2 .extr
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → uσ2 y2 → r2[y2/z2]
Extrusion of absurdity We have to add in Figure 3.10 a last case to our notion of extru-
sion, corresponding to the extrusion of an absurdity absurd(t) out any context.
Figure 3.10.: Extrusion out of absurdity
λx. absurd(t) .extr absurd(t) t absurd(u) .extr absurd(u)
absurd(t) u .extr absurd(t) (t1, absurd(t2)) .extr absurd(t2) (and symmetric)
πi absurd(t) .extr absurd(t) σi absurd(t) .extr absurd(t)
match absurd(t) with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2 .extr absurd(t)
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → absurd(u1)σ2 x2 → u2 .extr absurd(u1) (and symmetric)
absurd(t) ≈extr absurd(u) () ≈extr absurd(t) x ≈extr absurd(t)
Formal results
Lemma 3.3.1 (Soundness of (≈extr)).
If t ≈extr u then t ≈βη u.
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Proof sketch. All cases work as in the example we gave earlier: apply a first strong
η-reduction step (with the context being the whole term with occurrences of the extruded
term replaced by holes), then β-reduce the result. t
Theorem 3.3.2 (Completeness of (≈extr)).
For any C [x] and t of sum type, we have
C
[
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
]
→∗extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → C [σ1 y1]σ2 y2 → C [σ2 y2]
For any C [x] and t of empty type, we have
C [absurd(t)] →∗extr absurd(t)
Proof sketch. By induction on the context C [x]. If C has several subcontexts, we use
as many merging rules. If C is a constant or a variable distinct from x, we use extrusion
out of a constant context. t
Corollary 3.3.3 (Completeness of extrusion).
Strong η-equivalence (≈η) is equal to the congruent union of weak η-equivalence (≈weak η)
and extrusion equivalence (≈extr).
Definition 3.3.1 Standard extruded form (for λ-terms).
A well-typed term t is in standard extruded form if no case-splits on sum or empty types
(match u with | σ1 x1 → . . . | σ2 x2 → . . .) absurd(u)
ever appears as the eliminated subterm of an elimination form. In other words, they may
only appear
1. at the root of t, or
2. as a subterm of an introduction form, or
3. as a case of another case-split, or
4. as the argument of a function application
Theorem 3.3.4 (Standardization by extrusion).
Any well-typed term t is (≈extr)-equivalent to a standard extruded form.
Proof. This is immediate by inspection of the extrusion rules: as long as none of those
conditions are met, we can extrude the case-split higher in the term. The only non-
extrusible cases are the binding constructions (case-split or λ-abstractions) or the root. 
Remark 3.3.2. Our notion of “standard extruded form” does not attempt to be as strict
as possible; we may further rule out case-splits that appear as subterms of any construction
that does not bind variables (as they may always be extruded upward in this case), and
even reason on the dependencies between these variables and the case splits.
The design requirement for standard extrusion form is rather that there are no hidden
β-redexes: further extrusions may be possible, but they will not uncover additional β-
redexes. This weaker notion suffices for this, as we show in the rest of this section.
We describe stronger notions of normal forms in Chapter 10 (Focused λ-calculus). ∗
Definition 3.3.2 Extruding reduction.
We define the extruding reduction relation as the relation (.∗extr .β).
Definition 3.3.3 Extruded normal form.
A normal form for extruding reduction is called an extruded normal form.
Lemma 3.3.5.
A term t can perform a step of extruding reduction if and only if its standard extruded
form can perform a β-reduction step.
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Proof. The “if” direction is immediate, as the standard extruded form is reached by
extrusion – Theorem 3.3.4 (Standardization by extrusion). In the “only if” relation, the
difficulty comes from the fact that the extrusion rewriting is not normalizing: there may
be several different choice of extrusions of t, some allowing more β-steps than others.
Let us prove that, if a standard extruded form is β-normal, then no directed extrusion
step3, backward or forward, may create a β-redex. A β-redex could appear if a case-split
on a sum was blocking a beta-redex:
πi
(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → (u1, r1)σ2 x2 → (u2, r2)
) (
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → λy1. u1σ2 x2 → λy2. u2
)
r
However, none of these sub-terms may happen in a simplified form. 
Corollary 3.3.6 (Standard extruded β-normal forms are extruded normal forms).
Terms that are both β-normal and in standard extruded form are extruded normal forms.
3.3.2. Normalization and consistency for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)
As an example of the interest of studying those commuting conversions, the notion of
standard extruded normal forms brings us the missing piece to prove (.R)-normalization of
proofs in presence of disjunction, which gives consistency for the full logic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0).
In our consistency proof by normalization in Section 1.4 (Proving consistency (with-
out disjunctions) by normalization), we used a specific normalization strategy with the
following general structure:
Π→R Π1 →R Π2 →R . . .→R Π′ 6→R
In this section, we want to ensure that the proof we reduce are in (the proof-derivation
equivalent of) standard extruded form. We will perform extrusion steps before each re-
duction step, giving the following structure:
Π→∗extr Π0 →R→∗extr Π1 →R→∗extr Π2 →R→∗extr . . .→R→∗extr Π′ 6→R
In particular, we choose the resulting normal proof Π′ to also be in standard extruded
form: disjunction or empty eliminations are at the root of the proof, or in a case of another
disjunction elimination, or immediately after an implication or conjunction introduction.
The (→extr) relation is not normalizing, so we need a particular reduction strategy. We
will use the same as in Theorem 3.3.4 (Standardization by extrusion); in particular, we do
not use the extrusions out of constant contexts, so no new proof fragments appear in the
proof – but existing subtrees may be duplicated by extrusion.
The complexity measure on proofs used in Section 1.4.4 (Weak normalization) is straight-
forwardly extended to the full logic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0), defining ‖A1 +A2‖
def
= 1+max(‖A1‖ , ‖A2‖).
The fact that extrusion duplicates subterms means that extruding disjunction elimina-
tions can increase the complexity measure of proofs; but if we consider the (→R)-reduction
and the (→extr)-reductions together, we can show that the complexity measure decreases
overall, as the formulas duplicated by extrusion are strictly simpler than the one removed
by reduction.
Lemma 3.3.7.
For any relation Π→R Π′ →∗extr Π′′ such that
• Π is in standard extruded form
• the (.R)-reduction is on an elimination-introduction pair of maximal complexity that
contains no maximal pair in its sub-derivations
3The extrusions out of constant contexts, included in (≈extr) but excluded from (.extr), can create β-
redexes as it let us introduce arbitrary subterms of sum or empty type.
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• the (.extr)-steps only extrude through non-constant contexts
we have ‖Π‖ > ‖Π′′‖.
Proof. The proof follows the same structure as the weak normalization proof in absence
of disjunction: we reason on the new elimination-introduction pairs introduced by the
transformation.
Implication reduction
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B ΠA :: Γ ` A
Γ ` B
.R
ΠB :: Γ, A ` B ΠA :: Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` B
New pairs formed by this reduction may be on the types A or B, which are strictly
smaller than the formula A→ B eliminated by the reduction.
Substitution and the subsequent extrusions may duplicate elimination-introduction pairs
present in sub-derivations of the reduced derivation, but those are assumed to be of strictly
smaller complexity.
Finally, note that extrusion may create new elimination-introduction pairs. Consider
the following example (the Γ, A,B below are unrelated to those used in the reduction rule
above):
Γ ` C1 + C2
Γ, C1, A ` B
Γ, C1 ` A→ B Γ, C2 ` A→ B
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ `
(
match r with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → λx. tσ2 x2 → t′
)
u : B
.extr Γ ` C1 + C2
Γ, C1, A ` B
Γ, C1 ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
Γ, C2 ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
Γ ` match r with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → (λx. t) uσ2 x2 → t′ u : B
In this example, an implication elimination and introduction that were separated by a
disjunction elimination form a new pair after the disjunction elimination is extruded. We
informally call “hidden pair” two matching introduction-elimination rules separated by
disjunction eliminations that can be extruded.
In the general case, the formula of the new pair A → B may be unrelated to the
previous introduction-elimination pairs of the term, and thus strictly increase the proof’s
complexity measure. However, notice that all reduction steps in this proof are performed
on terms that are already in standard extruded form; in particular, there was no such
“hidden pair” in the term before reduction – Corollary 3.3.6 (Standard extruded β-normal
forms are extruded normal forms).
If a new “hidden pair” appears after the reduction step, it means that either the intro-
duction or the elimination rule is new in the term. It must come from one of the sub-proofs
substituted by the reduction. In the case of a reduction of an implication A → B, this
means that the new pairs produced are either on A or on B: the new proof (after extrusion)
is still of strictly smaller measure than the pre-reduction proof.
The same reasoning on “hidden pairs” will apply in the two other reduction cases.
Conjunction reduction
Π1 :: Γ ` A1 Π2 :: Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ ` Ai
.R Πi :: Γ ` Ai
It is immediate that the new proof is of strictly smaller complexity as we only removed
sub-proofs and one occurrence of the formula A1 ×A2.
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Disjunction reduction
Π :: Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2 Π1 :: Γ, A1 ` C Π2 :: Γ, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
.R
Πi :: Γ, Ai ` C Π :: Γ ` Ai. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` C
New elimination-introduction pairs may come from the substitution of Π :: Γ ` Ai,
creating a new pair on Ai if the last rule of ΠA is an introduction. This new pair is strictly
simpler.
If the last rule of Πi is an introduction, and the simplification is above an elimination
rule, we may also have a new pair on C. In the previous proof, this justified removing
sums altogether: there is no link between ‖A1 +A2‖ and ‖C‖ justifying a strict decrease
in complexity.
However, we now assume that the original proof is in simplified form. In particular, it
is not possible for the reduced sub-proof to bring C in eliminable position: it is either at
the root of the formula, a premise of an introduction rule, or a non-eliminated premise of
an elimination rule.
We can thus conclude that all new elimination-introduction pairs are on Ai – those
introduced by substitution, and those “hidden” after substitutions that are uncovered by
extrusion. 
Corollary 3.3.8 (Weak reduction for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) natural deduction).
Any PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) proof can be rewritten in (.R)-normal form in a finite number of
steps.
Proof. Because we can choose each transformation step (reduction then extrusions) to
strictly decrease the measure, and the measure is well-founded (no infinite descending
chains), we reach an irreducible proof in a finite number of steps. 
Theorem 3.3.9 (Consistency of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
There is no valid PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) proof of ∅ ` 0.
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4. A better proof system: sequent calculus
Historical context
Natural deduction was first defined by Gerhard Gentzen during his PhD research, in 1932.
He was trying to formalize mathematical proofs as mathematical objects themselves, in
a way that would be closer to the actual practice of mathematicians than Hilbert-style
systems relying heavily on axioms and tautologies (we briefly mentioned Hilbert-style
systems in Section 1.2.4).
Remark 4.0.1. The syntax of natural deduction proofs at this time did not use an assump-
tion context Γ, it instead relied on a more arcane mechanism of “discharged assumptions”
(I would give an example but cannot find a LaTeX package for this), where assumptions
(mere propositions without context) at the leaves of the proof are “crossed out” during the
downward construction of the derivation. Some people still use that style, but it should
be avoided as it is much less convenient to manipulate than explicit context passing. It is
slightly less verbose as contexts do not have to be repeated in each judgment, but if you
want less verbose you should rather use λ-terms directly. ∗
Gentzen remarked that this presentation of natural deduction naturally resulting in
a formal structure of proof for intuitionistic logic, while he was originally looking for a
structure of proofs of classical logics that common mathematical practice rather uses.
Note that the interest of intuitionistic logic was well-understood at the time and it was an
active topic in logic; notably, Kurt Gödel and Gerhard Gentzen independently developed
a translation from classical to intuitionistic arithmetic.
Sequent calculus arose as a solution to this problem of finding structural rules for clas-
sical logic. It represents a different point of view than natural deduction, more symmetric
(and in particular more adapted to proof search), but has a slightly more complex notion
of reduction. The problem it raises, namely commuting conversions, are interesting even
in intuitionistic logic and in particular are central to the difficulty raised by sums.
4.1. Intuitionistic sequent calculus
In this section we will only discuss the intuitionistic sequent calculus. Classical logic will
be discussed in Section 4.3.
Remark 4.1.1. I personally prefer to reserve the name calculus for term syntaxes equipped
with a computational behavior (this is what allows to run, compute them, or calculate with
them), and thus find the name sequent calculus slightly unfortunate, but it has always been
named this way. ∗
Credits I was unfortunately never taught the history of ideas of our field in university
courses; I discovered it through the “Groupe de travail de Logique”, during lectures of
Marc Bagnol and Maël Pégny. The online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a trove
of information on the history of logic in mathematics and computer science, and the article
The Development of Proof Theory, by Jan von Plato, last revised in 2014, has many more
details on the development of Gerhard Gentzen’s work.
4.1.1. Left introduction rules
We presented the rules for logical connectives in natural deduction proofs, structured
as introduction and elimination rules (§1.2). For the implication, for example, natural
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deduction has:
nd-and-elim
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
nd-and-intro
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
Elimination rules tell you how to use a complete proof of a connective to build new
proofs (rootward). The sequent calculus uses left-introduction rules instead, that tell you
how to consume a hypothesis present in context to prove your goal (leafward). The existing
introduction rule is unchanged in sequent calculus (it is called “right-introduction”), and
the left-introduction rule for implication is as follows:
seq-and-left
Γ ` A Γ, B ` C
Γ, A→ B ` C
seq-and-right
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
Suppose you have assumed an implication A→ B; how could you “consume” it to progress
in your proof of some goal C? Well, if you can prove that A holds (left premise), then you
can use B to prove your goal (right premise).
Remark 4.1.2. Note that, as for natural deduction, the comma notation for logical con-
texts Γ, A represents the non-disjoint union of sets: A may already be in Γ. In particular,
in the rule seq-and-left presented above, having Γ, A→ B in conclusion does not mean
that A → B has been removed in the premises that use Γ only as context; A → B may
or may not be present in the premises context, depending on how we decide to apply the
inference rule. ∗
Elimination and left-introduction rules are read in opposite direction (rootward and
leafward, respectively). As a consequence, natural deduction and sequent calculus proofs of
the same judgment often look like one is the “upside down” version of the other. Compare
for example those two proofs of the double-implication judgment A → B → C,A,B ` C
below. For readability, we have greyed out in each judgment the formulas (in context or
goal) that are not used in the inference rule of the judgment.
A→ B → C,A,B ` A→ B → C A→ B → C,A,B ` A
A→ B → C,A,B ` B → C A→ B → C,A,B ` B
A→ B → C,A,B ` C
A→ B → C,A,B ` A
A→ B → C,A,B,B → C ` B A→ B → C,A,B,B → C,C ` C
A→ B → C,A,B,B → C ` C
A→ B → C,A,B ` C
In the natural deduction proof, the function A→ B → C is eliminated at the very leaf
of the proof, and the goal C is used at the very root of the proof. In the sequent calculus
proof, the function A → B → C is left-introduced at the very root of the proof, and the
goal C is only used in an axiom rule at one leaf of the proof. Those two derivations are,
in a sense, “upside down” of each other.
The full rules of the sequent calculus, including the left-introduction rules for the other
connectives, are given in §4.1.3.
4.1.2. Cut rule
In sequent calculus, how can one reuse an existing proof of some judgment Γ ` A to build
a larger proof, using the knowledge of A? In natural deduction, this is done by using
elimination rules: they tell us precisely how to reuse a proof in a larger derivation. In the
sequent calculus, right introduction rules let us construct results, left introduction rules
let us deconstruct hypotheses, but there is no rule to turn a result into a hypothesis, which
is what we need to reuse existing proofs – get them as hypothesis in our context, so that
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we can manipulate them through left-introduction rules. Remark that the axiom rules,
present in both systems, does the opposite: it turns a hypothesis into a proved result.
While reuse is allowed by elimination rules in natural deduction, the sequent calculus
needs an additional rule, the cut rule, for this purpose:
seq-cut
Γ ` A Γ, A ` B
Γ ` B
This rule let us turn a proof of A, the left premise, into an hypothesis usable in the proof
of B in the right premise. To see this rule in action, suppose we are given an arbitrary
proof Π of an implication, Π :: Γ ` A → B, which we want to reuse, along with a proof
ΠA :: Γ ` A. We can reuse Π and ΠA to prove B as follows:
Π :: Γ ` A→ B
ΠA :: Γ ` A Γ, A,B ` B seq-cut
Γ, A→ B ` B
seq-cut
Γ ` B
The use of the cut rule is crucial to turn the result of Π into a hypothesis on which
left-introduction rule can be used. Note that we actually proved that the implication-
elimination rule of natural deduction is admissible in the sequent calculus, using the cut
rule. In §4.2.2 we will show that any proof of either logic can be translated into the other:
in terms of provability, natural deduction and sequent calculus really model “the same
logic” PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0).
4.1.3. PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) in sequent style
The complete rules of the sequent calculus presentation of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) are given in
Figure 4.1.
Remark 4.1.3. The reader may wonder why the elimination rule for pairs is
seq-conj-left
Γ, Ai ` C
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` C
instead of the arguably more natural
seq-conj-left-pos
Γ, A,B ` C
Γ, A×B ` C
This choice corresponds to two different styles of “inspection” of pairs: seq-conj-left
uses projections, which return only one of the components of the pair, seq-conj-left-pos
uses pattern-matching (in term syntax, let (x1, x2) = t in u), adding both components
at once to the environment. We chose the “projection” style here for consistency with
our natural deduction system, which also eliminates pairs by projections – note that
pattern-matching would be possible in natural deduction as well, with a different rule.
The two visions of this connective are, of course, equivalent for intuitionistic logic and the
λ-calculus, but they correspond to the choice of different “polarities” that influence proof
search (products with projection are “negative”, while products with pattern-matching
are “positive”) – we will discuss this further when presenting focusing in Chapter 7.
Those two rules are of course completely equivalent: projections are obtained from
pattern-matching by shadowing, and pattern-matching from projections by contraction:
Γ, Ai ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A1, A2 ` C seq-conj-left-pos
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` C
Γ, A1, A2 ` C seq-conj-left
Γ, A1 ×A2, A2 ` C seq-conj-left
Γ, A1 ×A2, A1 ×A2 ` C
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Figure 4.1.: Sequent calculus presentation of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)
seq-axiom
Γ, A ` A
seq-cut
Γ ` A Γ, A ` B
Γ ` B
seq-impl-left
Γ ` A Γ, B ` C
Γ, A→ B ` C
seq-impl-right
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
seq-conj-left
Γ, Ai ` C
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` C
seq-conj-right
Γ ` A Γ ` B
Γ ` A×B
seq-disj-left
Γ, A ` C Γ, B ` C
Γ, A+B ` C
seq-disj-right
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2
seq-true-right
Γ ` 1
seq-false-left
Γ, 0 ` A
The weakening rule used in the derivation on the left is the exact correspondence of the
weakening rule of natural deduction – see Lemma 1.3.1 (Weakening for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0))
– and is defined in the same way. ∗
Remark 4.1.4. In some sense the sequent calculus is more regular because it is a “least
common denominator” system. In natural deduction (§1.2), the elimination rule for sum-
s/disjunctions nd-disj-elim stands out of the other for introducing this type C that is
external to the disjunction A + B being eliminated – it feels heavier than other elimina-
tion rules. In the sequent calculus, all left-introduction rules have this extra type C in
the goal; you could say that it is a regression, but this removes a discrepancy between the
various connectives, and thus gives a more regular system.
Again, this irregularity can be explained through focusing (Chapter 7). Implications and
products (with projections) have nice elimination rules in natural deduction because they
are both “negative” connectives. Adding sums which are “positive” seems to introduce an
irregularity, but it in fact reveals a fundamental phenomenon of logic and computation,
occurring when both polarities are mixed.
One should be suspicious of claim that natural deduction (or term syntaxes in this style)
is (much) simpler than sequent calculus (or term syntaxes in this style). This often comes
from an incomplete study of the purely negative fragment of the system (forgetting about
sums and idly hoping that they will be easy to add back afterwards). Making sure we
add sums to the system we study keeps us honest, guarantees that our ideas will be more
robust, and let us discover beautiful generalizations. ∗
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4.1.4. A term syntax for the intuitionistic sequent calculus
Figure 4.2.: Terms of the sequent-form λ-calculus SΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
t, u, r ::= terms
| x, y, z variables
| λx. t abstraction
| let y = x t in u left application
| (t, u) pairs
| let y = πi x in u left projection
| σi t injections
| match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 left case split
| () unit
| absurd(x) absurd
| let x = t in u cut
We provide in Figure 4.2 a small term syntax for the intuitionistic sequent calculus,
which will make it easier to define its normalization process (cut-elimination) and study
its relation with natural deduction in Section 4.2 (Reduction of sequent-calculus proofs).
Because it is very close to λ-calculus ΛC, call it the “sequent-form λ-calculus”, SΛC.
The left-elimination rules are transcribed as let-binding construct with a slightly pe-
culiar shape. They act on variables (note that the argument of a left-introduced function
may be an arbitrary expression; in particular this is not an A-normal form).
Not all left rules use a let: sums and the empty type use the usual elimination construct,
with their scrutinee restricted to be a variable.
Finally, we remark that there is no overlap between the various let-using rule: left rules
such as (let y = πi x in u) are not special cases of cuts (let y = t in u), as (πi x) is not
a valid expression t.
Remark 4.1.5. The beauty of the sequent calculus comes from its deep symmetries. This
syntax is, on the contrary, not symmetric at all, and rather ugly. We chose it because
it should be familiar to anyone knowing λ-calculus, which let us lower the accessibility
barrier for defining manipulations of sequent terms. ∗
The correspondence between the term syntax and the typing rules is given in Figure 4.3.
It is overall very natural, except for the use of Γ 3 x : A instead of Γ, x : A which should
be explained in detail. Γ 3 x : A means that the typing environment Γ, a mapping from
variables to types, contains the mapping x : A.
For logical contexts (sets of formulas), the notation Γ, A denotes non-disjoint union : A
may belong to the set Γ – see Remark 4.1.2. In typing environments (mappings from term
variables to formulas), the comma notation Γ, x : A denotes disjoint union on the contrary
– see Remark 2.3.3. When writing Γ 3 x : A instead, we insist that x is a binding of Γ,
and thus that the subgoals using Γ also contain the binding for x. In other words, the two
following rules are equivalent:
Γ ` t : A Γ, y : A ` u : C
Γ 3 x : A→ B ` let y = x t in u : C
Γ, x : A→ B ` t : A Γ, x : A→ B, y : A ` u : C
Γ, x : A→ B ` let y = x t in u : C
We preferred the notation 3 because it is more concise and closer to the correspond-
ing rule seq-impl-left of the sequent calculus (as an intuitionistic logic, that is, mostly
unconcerned with matters of multiple variable usage).
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Figure 4.3.: Typing rules of the sequent-form λ-calculus SΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
slc-var
Γ, x : A ` x : A
slc-cut
Γ ` t : A Γ, x : t ` u : B
Γ ` let x = t in u : B
slc-fun-left
Γ ` t : A Γ, y : B ` u : C
Γ 3 x : A→ B ` let y = x t in u : C
slc-fun-right
Γ, x : A ` t : B
Γ ` λx. t : A→ B
slc-prod-left
Γ, y : Ai ` u : C
Γ 3 x : A1 ×A2 ` let y = πi x in u : C
slc-prod-right
Γ ` t1 : A1 Γ ` t2 : A2
Γ ` (t1, t2) : A1 ×A2
slc-sum-left
Γ, y1 : A1 ` u1 : C Γ, y2 : A2 ` u2 : C
Γ 3 x : A1 +A2 ` match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 : C
slc-sum-right
Γ ` t : Ai
Γ ` σi t : A1 +A2
(no elimination rule for 1)
slc-unit-right
Γ ` () : 1
slc-empty-left
Γ 3 x : 0 ` absurd(x) : C
(no introduction rule for 0)
The alternative would be to write a different rule, namely
seq-fun-left-no-contraction
Γ ` t : A Γ, y : B ` u : C
Γ, x : A→ B ` let y = x t in u : C
In this rule, the variable x is not available to the premises anymore. This is displeasing
from a syntactic point of view, because it breaks the excepted rules for variable scoping: a
variable defined by a let may suddenly become unavailable after it has been “consumed”
by some left-introduction rule, without much marking in the syntax that this is happening.
(Variables going out of scope is an interesting and useful phenomenon, but we should not
reuse an existing syntax for it, let, that has a different meaning.)
More fundamentally: in the case of the cut-free sequent calculus, replacing the left-
introduction rule for functions seq-fun-left with the rule seq-fun-left-no-contraction
gives a strictly weaker system that can prove less properties (some types that are inhabited
in ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0) are uninhabited in this system). For example, consider the standard
abbreviation ¬A def= A → 0, and the type ¬(¬(A+ ¬A)). It is inhabited by the following
(admittedly hard to follow) program:
λ(f : ¬(A+ ¬A)). let (x : 0) = f (σ2 λ(a : A). let y = f (σ1 a) in y) in x
Notice that the bound variable f is left-introduced twice in this program – once with a
parameter of the form σ2 (we claim to provide a ¬A to f), once with a parameter of
the form σ1 a (we finally decide to provide a A). It would not be well-typed if we used
seq-fun-left-no-contraction instead of the rule seq-fun-left allowing variable reuse. In
fact, we can check by exhaustive search, if we impose the use of seq-left-no-contraction,
there is no well-typed cut-free program at this type.
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Remark 4.1.6. This choice of formula is of course not arbitrary. A+¬A is the “excluded
middle” formula for A (either A is true, or its negation is true), which characterizes
classical logic and is unproveable in intuitionistic logic. Now, for any (quantifier-free)
formula C provable in classical logic, it is a (non-trivial) theorem that its double-negation
¬¬C is provable in intuitionistic logic. It is a lesser-known fact that this proof will involve a
contraction of a singly-negated hypothesis (for example ¬C) in an essential way if C cannot
already be proved intuitionistically. We will discuss this in more details in Section 4.3. ∗
On the other hand, the cut rule allows duplicating a variable (by simply cutting on it).
The following contraction rule (§1.2.3) is admissible in presence of slc-cut:
Γ, x : A, y : A ` B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . slc-contr
Γ, x : A ` B
def
=
Γ, x : A ` x : A Γ, x : A, y : A ` B
slc-cut
Γ, x : A ` let y = x in t : B
The fact that a proof can be written with cuts and cannot be written without cuts means
that, if we had used seq-fun-left-no-contraction, we would be unable to perform cut-
elimination! We would have to use an explicit rule for contraction, and then we could
eliminate all cuts (and reduce variable-variable cuts to contractions).
On the contrary, the rule using Γ 3 x : A→ B enjoys cut-elimination (as shown in the
next section §4.2.1). By default, all left-introduction rules introduce implicit contractions.
Focusing (Chapter 7) will again restrict the places where implicit contraction occurs. Note
that if, in a particular proof, you wish to be more “in the spirit of sequent-calculus”, with
limited use of contraction, it is always possible to not use an implicit contraction using
the following trick:
Γ, x : Ai ` u : B
Γ, x : A1 ×A2 ` let x = πi x in u : B
By shadowing the old x variable with the result of the projection, we make sure that
the proof term u cannot access the old x again: for this particular choice of new variable,
there is no contraction. Interestingly, in presence of shadowing the function rule becomes:
Γ, x : A→ B ` t : A Γ, x : B ` u : C
Γ, x : A→ B ` let x = x t in u : C
With this rule, the function is still available in the left premise, but it is shadowed in the
right one. This restriction let us write the program of type ¬¬(A+¬A) below, and in fact
one can show that it is complete for provability (all formulas that were provable with the
full rule remain provable); this observation is the basis of so-called “contraction-free logics”
introduced by Vorob’ev [Vorob’ev, 1958] and studied in particular by Dyckhoff [Dyckhoff,
1992, 2013].
Shadowing seems a rather superficial phenomenon, and I find surprising that it becomes
interesting in this use-case (controlling contraction in a system that seems to impose
contractions everywhere).
4.2. Reduction of sequent-calculus proofs
4.2.1. Normal sequent proofs: cut-elimination
Now that we have a term syntax, it is easy to define cut-elimination, as terms guide
the intuition of what the computational behavior should be. This process is a bit more
complex than in natural deduction, because cut rules can happen in any part of a sequent
calculus proof, while natural deduction only reduces when an elimination rule encounters
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a matching introduction rule, which is a more structural condition. We separate the
reduction rules in three families: principal cases, initial cases, and commutative cases. We
write (.RP), (.RI) and (.RC) for these relations, and (.R) for their union.
Remark 4.2.1. As in previous definition of equivalence or rewriting relations over well-
typed terms – see Remark 3.3.1 – we implicitly restrict our relations to preserve well-typing
and well-scoping. For example we will have the following rule
let x = t in λy. u .RC λy. let x = t in u
which implicitly assumes that y is not a free variable in t, as otherwise it would be captured
by rewritten binder λy. . ∗
The principal cases (.RP) correspond to elimination/introduction pairs of natural de-
duction; they occur when a right-introduction rule is cut over a left-introduction rule for
the same variable – this is where the real computation happens. Note that because con-
traction is implicit, the cut variable x may always be used in latter parts of the term, so
it does not disappear after the cut. The term is still simpler after reduction than before:
the right-introduction rule on a connective A1×A2, A1 +A2 or A→ B is replaced by cuts
on strictly simpler formulas, A1 or A2, or A and B.
let (x : A1 ×A2) = (t1, t2) in (let y = πi x in r)
.RP let (x : A1 ×A2) = (t1, t2) in (let (y : Ai) = ti in r)
let (x : A1 +A2) = σi t in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
.RP let (x : A1 +A2) = σi t in (let (yi : Ai) = t in ri)
let (x : A→ B) = λy. t in (let z = x u in r)
.RP let (x : A→ B) = λy. t in (let (z : B) = (let (y : A) = u in t) in r)
In the principal case for functions/implications, we have not used a substitution as
in the natural deduction, but a cut instead. This means that the propagation of the
environment is more local than in natural deduction: cuts are playing the role of explicit
substitutions [Kesner, 2007]. Note that there is no case for 1 or 0 as they lack either a
right- or left-introduction rule.
We also handle cuts on mere variables – the initial cases (.RI). There are in fact two
cases: either the formula to the right of the cut is a variable (the body of the let), or
the formula on the left of the cut is a variable (the definition of the let); the latter
case corresponds to a form of contraction, as we have already noted, and it reduces to a
variable-variable substitution – note that replacing a variable by a term would be invalid
in general, if the variable is used in a left-introduction. In all cases, the cut disappears
completely.
let x = t in x .RI t
let x = t in y .RI y
let x = y in t .RI t[y/x]
Finally, we come to commutative cases (.RC): neither sides of the cut is a variable, but
neither are they matching left- and right-introduction rules. This relation is defined as
the union of three relations (.RCll), (.RCrr) and (.RCrl): commutative cases can happen if
let-definition starts with a left rule (instead of a right rule ready to match a principal case)
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(.RCll), if the let-body is a right rule (instead of a left rule ready to match a principal
case) (.RCrr), and if the let-body is a left rule on a different variable than the cut variable
(.RCrl).
1 In all those cases, we can propagate the cut to strict subterms of the definition
or body.
let x = t in λy. u .RCrr λy. let x = t in u
let x = t in (u1, u2) .RCrr (let x = t in u1, let x = t in u2)
let x = t in σi u .RCrr σi (let x = t in u)
let x = t in () .RCrr ()
let x = (let y = z t in u) in r .RCll let y = z t in (let x = u in r)
let x = (let y = πi z in u) in r .RCll let y = πi z in (let x = u in r)
let x = match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → u1σ2 z2 → u2 in r
.RCll match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → let x = u1 in rσ2 z2 → let x = u2 in r
let x = absurd(y) in r .RCll absurd(y)
let x = t in (let y = z u in r)
.RCrl let y = z (let x = t in u) in (let x = t in r)
let x = t in (let y = πi z in r) .RCrl let y = πi z in (let x = t in r)
let x = t in match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r1σ2 z2 → r2
.RCrl match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → let x = t in r1σ2 z2 → let x = t in r2
let x = t in absurd(y) .RCrl absurd(y)
Remark 4.2.2. The left-initial case, that is the reduction for let x = y in t, seems a
bit odd and superfluous: from a λ-calculus perspective there is no good intuition of why
this should be a computation rule. However, it is really necessary to get cut-elimination;
otherwise there are some variable-variable cuts that cannot be eliminated. Consider for
example this term (λ(x : 0). let y = x in absurd(y)), of type 0→ A. No other rule than
the left-initial rule applies to remove this cut. ∗
Remark 4.2.3. The commutative rules introduce non-confluence: it may be the case that
the let-definition and the let-body match a different reduction pattern. For example,
let x = absurd(y) in () may reduce to either absurd(y) or () depending on which side
we choose to reduce first.
This example is not problematic from a program-equality point of view: if y has type 0,
then the context are inconsistent and all terms in this context are semantically equal. ∗
We have defined the relation (.R) and its sub-relations on well-typed terms of SΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0);
1Classical sequent calculus has a dual to this third case, where the let-definition is a right rule against
a different co-variable.
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this is kept implicit in the presentation of the reduction, but the reader can check that
any valid derivation on the left-hand side of a reduction determines a valid derivation on
the right-hand side, for the same root judgment. For example, taking the most complex
reduction rule:
Γ, y : A ` t : B
Γ ` λy. t : A→ B
Γ, x : A→ B ` u : A Γ, x : A→ B, z : B ` r : C
Γ, x : A→ B ` let z = x u in r : C
Γ ` let x = λy. t in (let z = x u in r) : C .RP
Γ, x : A→ B ` u : A
Γ, y : A ` t : B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, x : A→ B, y : A ` t : B
Γ, x : A→ B ` let y = u in t : A
Γ, y : A ` t : B
Γ ` λy. t : A→ B
...
Γ, x : A→ B ` let y = u in t : A Γ, x : A→ B, z : B ` r : C
Γ, x : A→ B ` let z = (let y = u in t) in r : C
Γ ` let x = λy. t in (let z = (let y = u in t) in r) : C
Lemma 4.2.1.
If u does not start with a cut, then (let x = t in u) is a head redex for the (.R) reduction.
If a term contains a cut, then it is reducible for the congruent reduction (→R).
Proof. The second part of the lemma ensures that our reduction indeed covers all cases of
terms with cuts. It is a direct consequence of the first part: if u is starts with a sequence
of cuts nested to the right, then the last one is a head redex, and u is reducible.
We prove the first part by case-distinction on u. If it starts with a right-introduction
rule, one of the principal reductions (.RP) applies. If it starts with a variable, one of the
initial reductions (.RI) applies. Finally, if it starts with a left-introduction rule, one of the
(.RCrr) or (.RCrl) applies. 
Remark 4.2.4. One should not be suspicious of the fact that the rules (.RCll) are not
used in this proof. What we are doing here is to prove that a particular reduction strategy,
the one that always reduces the innermost cuts, can indeed reduce all cuts (and thus that
the reduction relation in general can). The (.RCll) rules may be crucial to a different
reduction strategy that would also correspond to interesting computational behavior. ∗
Lemma 4.2.2.
If t, u are cut-free SΛC terms, then let x = t in u has a (→R)-normal form.
Proof sketch. The proof proceeds by induction on, by lexicographic ordering from the
less to the more important: the structure of u, the number of bound occurrences of the
cut variable x, and the type of t.
The initial (.RI) rules always remove the cut.
The commutative (.RC) rules transform the head cut into cuts on strictly smaller sub-
terms (note that this may duplicate the binding occurrence of x, but does not change its
number of bound occurrences).
The principal (.RP) rules first create new cuts, and re-applies the head cut to the resulting
term. We can first normalize the new cuts by induction hypothesis, as they are on strictly
smaller types than the head cut. We then reduce the remaining head cut, on a term with
one less occurrence of the cut variable x.
(Note that, if u was not cut-free, reducing cuts in u could duplicate subterms containing
occurrences of x.) t
Theorem 4.2.3.
(→R) is weakly normalizing into cut-free normal forms.
Proof. The innermost cut of a term t has cut-free subterms, and can thus be put in (→R)-
normal form by Lemma 4.2.2. By Lemma 4.2.1, this normal-form is cut-free, so the result
114
has strictly less cuts than t. Repeating this process gives a finite reduction sequence to a
cut-free term that is also a (→R)-normal form of t. 
Again, we could in fact prove strong normalization, but that requires a significantly
stronger proof argument.
Theorem 4.2.4 (Cut-elimination for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
Each PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) formula provable by a sequent-calculus derivation has a cut-free
sequent proof.
Proof. To obtain a cut-free sequent proof, it suffices to convert the sequent derivation in a
sequent-term of SΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0), compute a cut-free (→R)-normal form (Theorem 4.2.3),
and convert it back into a sequent-calculus derivation (by erasing the identity of variables).

We could define (as is standard) cut-elimination on derivations directly. The two notions
of cut-elimination could be put in correspondence: we have a Curry-Howard correspon-
dence, this time for the sequent-calculus instead of natural deduction. It is much less
striking than the previous correspondence, because our term calculus has been designed
specifically to study the sequent calculus. It is more interesting to exhibit a correspondence
between two separate formalisms that had been initially created for unrelated purposes.
4.2.2. Equi-provability of natural deduction and sequent calculus
We claimed that the natural deduction rules of Figure 1.2 and sequent calculus rules of
Figure 4.1 capture the same logic, in the sense that the same judgments are provable in
both systems. We now prove this, by showing that each rule of one system is admissible
in the other, so that a proof in one system can always be translated into a proof in the
other.
Because different readers will prefer different presentations, we include both the trans-
lation of inference rules and the translation of term syntaxes.
Lemma 4.2.5.
Each elimination rule of natural deduction is admissible in the sequent calculus.
Proof.
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . seq-impl-elim
Γ ` t u : B
def
= Γ ` A→ B
Γ ` A Γ, B ` B
seq-impl-left
Γ, A→ B ` B
seq-cut
Γ ` let x = t in let y = x u in y : B
Γ ` A1 ×A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . seq-conj-elim
Γ ` πi t : Ai
def
=
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ, Ai ` Ai seq-conj-left
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` Ai seq-cut
Γ ` let x = t in let y = πi x in y : Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2 Γ, A1 ` C Γ, A2 ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . seq-disj-elim
Γ ` match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 C
def
= Γ ` A1 +A2
Γ, A1 ` C Γ, A2 ` C seq-disj-left
Γ, A1 +A2 ` C seq-cut
Γ ` let x = t in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 : C
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Γ ` 0 seq-false-elim
Γ ` absurd(t) : A
def
=
Γ ` 0
seq-false-left
Γ, 0 ` A
seq-cut
Γ ` let x = t in absurd(x) : A
Notice that the translation of the sum elimination is more direct; sum-elimination is
closer to sequent calculus. 
Notation 4.2.1 Translation into sequent calculus proof terms.
If Γ ` t : A is a well-typed λ-term, let us write Γ ` Jt Kseq : A for the sequent term obtained
by this translation.
Lemma 4.2.6.
The sequent calculus cut rule seq-cut is admissible in natural deduction.
Proof. We in fact have already proved cut to be admissible in natural deduction: it is
exactly the substitution meta-operation defined in §1.3.1. This highlights that while a
cut rule is necessary in the sequent calculus for user convenience reason, it is also very
important in natural deduction when we want to understand the dynamics of proofs.
Γ ` A Γ, A ` B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nd-cut
Γ ` let x = t in u : B
def
=
Γ, A ` B Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ ` u[t/x] : B

Lemma 4.2.7.
Each left-introduction rule of the sequent calculus is admissible in natural deduction.
Proof.
Γ, Ai ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nd-conj-left
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` let y = πi x in u : B
def
=
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` A1 ×A2
nd-conj-elim
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` Ai
Γ, Ai ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A1 ×A2, Ai ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` u[πi x/y] : C
Γ ` A Γ, B ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nd-impl-left
Γ, A→ B ` let y = x t in u : C
def
=
Γ, A→ B ` A→ B
Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A→ B ` A
nd-impl-elim
Γ, A→ B ` B
Γ, B ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A→ B,B ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . subst
Γ, A→ B ` u[x t/y] : C
Γ, A1 ` C Γ, A2 ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nd-disj-left
Γ, A1 +A2 ` match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 : C
def
=
Γ, A1 +A2 ` A1 +A2
Γ, A1 ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A1 +A2, A1 ` C
Γ, A2 ` C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk
Γ, A1 +A2, A2 ` C
nd-disj-elim
Γ, A1 +A2 ` match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 : C
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nd-false-left
Γ, 0 ` absurd(x) : C
def
= Γ, 0 ` 0 nd-false-elim
Γ, 0 ` absurd(x) : C

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Notation 4.2.2 Translation into natural deduction proof terms.
If Γ ` t : A is a well-typed sequent term, let us write Γ ` Jt Knd : A for the λ-term obtained
by this translation.
Theorem 4.2.8.
Any proof in the sequent calculus for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) is admissible in natural deduction,
and conversely: the two systems of inference rules prove exactly the same judgments.
Proof. This is a direct consequences of the previous lemmas: the (right)-introduction
rules of both systems are the same, so we only need to translate the elimination rules of
natural deduction (Lemma 4.2.5), and the left-introduction (Lemma 4.2.7) and cut rules
(Lemma 4.2.6) of the sequent calculus. 
4.2.3. Non-canonicity of cut-free sequent proofs
Consider the transitivity of implication A → B,B → C ` A → C. There is exactly one
normal natural deduction proof of this judgment, but there exists two cut-free sequent
proofs. Those three proofs are given below.
A→ B,B → C,A ` B → C
A→ B,B → C,A ` A→ B B → C,A ` A
A→ B,B → C,A ` B
A→ B,B → C,A ` C
natded
A→ B,B → C ` A→ C
A→ B,B → C,A ` A
A→ B,B → C,A,B ` B A→ B,B → C,A,B,C ` C
A→ B,B → C,A,B ` C
A→ B,B → C,A ` C
seq
A→ B,B → C ` A→ C
A→ B,B → C,A ` A A→ B,B → C,A,B ` B
A→ B,B → C,A ` B A→ B,B → C,A,B,C ` C
A→ B,B → C,A ` C
seq
A→ B,B → C ` A→ C
To many the proof terms will be more informative:
f : A→ B, g : B → C ` λa. g (f a) : A→ C
f : A→ B, g : B → C ` λa. let b = f a in (let c = g b in c) : A→ C
f : A→ B, g : B → C ` λa. let c = (let b = f a in b) in c : A→ C
In term of proof search, the two sequent proofs correspond respectively to a goal-directed,
backward reasoning (second proof: we need a C, let’s bind c : C first by applying B → C)
and to hypotheses-directed, forward reasoning (first proof: we have a A, let’s build b : B
by applying A→ B).
It is easy to see that our translation of sequent calculus into natural deduction sends
both sequent terms to the same result: the respective translations are c[g b/c][f a/b] and
c[b[f a/b]/c], which are equal by commutation of substitutions.
In the case of the translation from natural deduction to sequent calculus, the two cut-free
results are a consequence of the non-confluence of the reduction system we have presented.
The translation of g (f a) is (let x = (let y = f a in y) in (let z = g x in z)). Reduc-
ing the cut on x with a (.RCll) rule gives the first cut-free term, using a (.RCrl) rule gives
the second.
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4.2.4. On canonical proof representations
Given the goal of this thesis (determining which types are inhabited by a unique program),
it would seem that the natural deduction, being more canonical, is a better fit than the
sequent calculus. This would however be a hasty jump to conclusions: natural deduction
is more canonical, but it is still not canonical: many equivalent programs have several
distinct natural deduction proofs, for example:
x : A→ B ` x : A→ B
A→ B,A ` A→ B A→ B,A ` A
A→ B,A ` B
x : A→ B ` λy. x y : A→ B
To achieve canonicity, we need to go much beyond the spatial parallelism of natural
deduction. In Chapter 7 (Focusing in sequent calculus) more powerful logical principles
(in terms of the richer structure they impose to proof terms) that were, in fact, developed
first and foremost for the sequent calculus, because it is more regular and thus more
convenient for the logicians working on proof search, who developed these tools we now
reap the benefits of.
4.2.5. Consistency (with sums) through the sequent calculus
Finally, we can use the cut-elimination result of sequent calculus to prove consistency of
the full PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) logic. The interesting aspect of this proof is its simplicity. In
natural deduction, we were only able to prove consistency of the disjunction-free fragment
PIL(→,×, 1, 0) at first (Theorem 1.4.4), and had to introduce commuting conversions to
extend the result (Theorem 3.3.9). Sequent calculus is more appropriate for consistency
proofs (in presence of sums).
Lemma 4.2.9.
There is no cut-free sequent proof of ∅ ` 0.
Proof. The proof was simple in natural deduction, it is now trivial: there is no right-
introduction rule for the succedent 0, and there is no left-introduction or axiom rule for
the context ∅. 
Theorem 4.2.10 (Consistency of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) (sequent calculus)).
Propositional intuitionistic logic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) is consistent: there is no proof of the
false judgment ∅ ` 0.
Proof. Assume we have a sequent proof of ∅ ` 0. By cut-elimination (Theorem 4.2.4
(Cut-elimination for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0))), it has a cut-free proof. This is impossible by
Lemma 4.2.9. 
4.3. Classical logic
As we have already mentioned, the logic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) is not the “classical logic” that
most mathematicians use for their metatheory. Classical logic is boolean: for any formula
we know that it is either true or false: A+¬A (excluded middle) is always true, and ¬¬A
is equivalent to A (in particular ¬¬A→ A (double-negation elimination) is true).
4.3.1. Introducing the excluded middle
We could recover the full classical logic simply by adding axioms, for example a family of
constants EMA : A+ ¬A providing the excluded-middle principle. However, uninterpreted
axioms are unsatisfying for two different reasons:
1. We want to understand the structure of proofs in a logic, and realizing important
aspects of it through arbitrary constants does not help. This is the same criticism
we made of Hilbert-style systems in Section 1.2.4.
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2. Axioms break the computational behavior of the logic, as we do not know how to
reduce them. For those that are less concerned with computation itself, this loss
can be restated as a loss of “canonicity”: the property that the normal forms of
a given type has the shape that we expect. For example, we know that the only
cut-free proof of type 1 in the empty context is (). With those extra axioms, we
get additional cut-free proofs of the form match EMA with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → t1σ2 x2 → t2 . Our proof
technique to show that the logic is consistent, by inspecting the normal forms of
0 in the empty context, would not work anymore, and we would have to resort to
non-syntactic model arguments; the horror!
There are several traditional approaches to this question of giving meaning to axioms.
The first approach is to give a computational behavior to the axiom, under the form
of reduction rule in the term syntax. For example, we can add an extra type N to
PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0), two axioms Zero : N and Succ : N → N, and a family of axioms
IterA : N → A → (A → A) → A. Then, it suffices to add the reduction rules
(IterA Z x f) .β x and (IterA Z n x f) .β (IterA n (f x) f), and we have got a reason-
able axiomatization of the natural numbers – and we can show that the normal natural
numbers in the empty context are what you would expect. In the case of classical logic,
we understand since Tim Griffin’s remark [Griffin, 1989] that classical logic can be given
an operational semantics through a “continuation capture” axiom, that captures the ex-
ecution context in which it is invoked, and is able to jump back to it later. This has
the seductive property of revealing an operation that some programmer communities were
already familiar with (call/cc), but is, however, rather delicate to define, and even more
delicate to reason about.
4.3.2. The multi-succedent sequent calculus is classical
The second approach is to change the rules of the logic, typically the structure of the
judgments, to naturally realize the axioms – as derived rules. In a sense, this corresponds
to finding a type system in which the extra computational behavior of the first approach
can be validated; but this is often done by logicians that do not manipulate term syntaxes
themselves and are not directly interested by the programming-language applications. In
the case of classical logic, this was already done in Gentzen’s original presentation of the
sequent calculus. Instead of having the form Γ ` A, with a set of formulas Γ on the left
and a single formula A on the right, Gentzen’s sequents had the form Γ ` ∆, with a set
of formula ∆ on the right, and the following rule for disjunction:
classic-disj-right
Γ ` A,B,∆
Γ ` A+B,∆
The context of intuitionistic sequents can be understood conjunctively: A1, A2, A3 ` B
means that “if A1 and A2 and A3 hold, then we can prove B”). This rule means that the
succedents on the right should be understood disjunctively: Γ ` B1, B2, B3 is understood
as “if all formulas of Γ hold, then either B1 or B2 or B3 can be proved”. We can easily
lift this other sequent structure to all other rules, just by leaving ∆ unchanged. The rules
for propositional classical logic PCL(→,×, 1,+, 0) in sequent style are given in Figure 4.4.
Note that we do not left-introduce conjunctions by projection, but by pattern-matching,
adding both hypotheses at once – we remarked on this difference in §4.1.3. This preserves
a pleasing symmetry between conjunction and disjunction, whose right-introduction rule
adds both succedents at once.
Remark 4.3.1. We could get an even more symmetrical presentation by making the
implication a derived connective, by having a primitive negation and defining A → B as
¬A+B. But the result would be harder to compare with intuitionistic logic. ∗
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Figure 4.4.: propositional classical logic PCL(→,×, 1,+, 0) in multi-succedent sequent
style
classic-axiom
Γ, A ` A,∆
classic-cut
Γ ` ∆, A A,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
classic-impl-left
Γ ` ∆, A B,Γ ` ∆
Γ, A→ B ` ∆
classic-impl-right
Γ, A ` B,∆
Γ ` A→ B,∆
classic-conj-left
Γ, A1, A2 ` ∆
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` ∆
classic-conj-right
Γ ` A1,∆ Γ ` A2,∆
Γ ` A1 ×A2,∆
classic-disj-left
Γ, A1 ` ∆ Γ, A2 ` ∆
Γ, A1 +A2 ` ∆
classic-disj-right
Γ ` A,B,∆
Γ ` A+B,∆
−
classic-true-right
Γ ` 1,∆
classic-false-left
Γ, 0 ` ∆
−
With theses rules we can easily prove the excluded middle in any context:
classic-axiom
Γ, A ` A, 0
classic-impl-right
Γ ` A,A→ 0
classic-disj-right
Γ ` A+ (A→ 0)
The crucial effect of the proof, which cannot be realized in intuitionistic logic, is the
transfer of the hypothesis A from one of the succedents, A → 0, to the other succedent
A. We promise to prove one of two things, but they “communicate” and we can use
the hypotheses introduced by one to prove the other. With the intuitionistic presentation,
because there is a single succedent, no communication happens on the right of the turnstile
`.
Remark 4.3.2. Our intuition of multi-succedent calculi is that the various formulas after
the turnstile ` correspond to types of “output doors”, or “output ports”. You can finish
your proof by throwing a value (of the expected type) into any of those doors/ports; in
intuitionistic logic, there is only one return door/port/point/adress, it is “the result”.
The (positive) disjunction corresponds to splitting a door in two; you do not know which
one you will take yet, and you will decide later. This is how the excluded middle can be
made sense of. An axiom of type A + ¬A does not guarantee that you will get, at its
invocation time, either a proof of A or a proof of ¬A. What happens instead is that
it gives you a choice of two doors to take in the future. Now the proof does something
inherently classical, which is to claim to enter one of the doors (A→ 0), introduce the A
hypothesis in the process of giving a value to that door, but then it changes its mind to
exit through the other door. ∗
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We refrain from providing a term syntax for this logic, because it would be quite heavy:
each right-introduction rule has to name explicitly the one of the succedents that is being
worked on (using co-variables), and also provide binding occurrences for the new succe-
dents added in its premises.2
Figure 4.5.: classical logic PCL(→,×, 1,+, 0) in multi-succedent natural deduction style
classic-nd-axiom
Γ, A ` A,∆
classic-nd-impl-elim
Γ ` A→ B,∆ Γ ` A,∆
Γ ` B,∆
classic-nd-impl-intro
Γ, A ` B,∆
Γ ` A→ B,∆
classic-nd-conj-elim
Γ ` ∆, A1 ×A2 A1, A2,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
classic-nd-conj-intro
Γ ` A1,∆ Γ ` A2,∆
Γ ` A1 ×A2,∆
classic-nd-disj-elim
Γ ` ∆, A1 +A2 A1,Γ ` ∆ A2,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
classic-nd-disj-intro
Γ ` A,B,∆
Γ ` A+B,∆
−
classic-nd-true-intro
Γ ` 1,∆
classic-nd-false-elim
Γ ` ∆, 0
Γ ` ∆
−
Gerhard Gentzen went through the sequent calculus to give a satisfying system of in-
ference rules for classical logic, but retrospectively we can also present it as a natural
deduction system – multi-succedents are really the key here, and the affected rule is a
right rule (classic-disj-right), which can be kept unchanged in a natural deduction sys-
tem. Figure 4.5 gives such a system.
4.3.3. Multi-succedent intuitionistic logic
It is a lesser-known fact that there is a multi-succedent presentation of intuitionistic logic,
presented in Figure 4.6, in natural deduction style (sequents would work as well, but we
will assume our readers still have more intuition with natural deduction rules).
This system has exactly one different with the classical natural deduction of Figure 4.5:
2I find it remarkable that, while inference rules and typed term syntax are equivalent formalisms, they
have extremely different aesthetics. As a system of inference rules, sequent calculus is arguably more
beautiful than natural deduction, but the term syntax we presented in Section 4.1.4 feels contrived –
there are better syntaxes, but they are for variants of the proof system with non-trivial differences. The
multi-succedent presentation is pleasing at a derivation level, but its term syntax is unpalatable to me –
even in natural deduction. I think this comes from the fact that these two notations emphasize different
computational phenomena: I read inference rules and I think of proof search (logic programming), I
read proof terms and I think of reductions (functional programming), and few systems are good at
both. When moving to term syntaxes for lower-level logics, it also helps to leave the pretense of a
syntax inspired by the λ-calculus, recognize a lower-level computational phenomenon, and design the
syntax accordingly: abstract machines, process calculi, etc.
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Figure 4.6.: intuitionistic PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) in multi-succedent natural deduction style
ms-nd-axiom
Γ, A ` A,∆
ms-nd-impl-elim
Γ ` A→ B,∆ Γ ` A,∆
Γ ` B,∆
ms-nd-impl-intro
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B,∆
ms-nd-conj-elim
Γ ` ∆, A1 ×A2 A1, A2,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
ms-nd-conj-intro
Γ ` A1,∆ Γ ` A2,∆
Γ ` A1 ×A2,∆
ms-nd-disj-elim
Γ ` ∆, A1 +A2 A1,Γ ` ∆ A2,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
ms-nd-disj-intro
Γ ` A,B,∆
Γ ` A+B,∆
∅
ms-nd-true-intro
Γ ` 1,∆
ms-nd-false-elim
Γ ` ∆, 0
Γ ` ∆
∅
the introduction/right rules for implication differ:
classic-nd-impl-intro
Γ, A ` B,∆
Γ ` A→ B,∆
ms-nd-impl-intro
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B,∆
We gave an intuition of multi-succedent systems where the hypotheses on the right
correspond to “output doors” (expecting a value of the right type). Under this view, the
intuitionistic rule has the following effect: whenever you enter an implication, you commit
to only use its door, and the others are closed. This means that the trick we used to prove
the excluded middle, namely changing our mind after choosing an implication door and
going to another door instead, cannot work anymore in this new system.
Another way to see the difference with the classical calculus is to notice that we can
prove A ` ¬¬A in the intuitionistic calculus, but that our proof of ¬¬A ` A crucially
relies on the classical implication introduction rule.
Lemma 4.3.1 (Double-negation introduction).
A ` ¬¬A in (intuitionistic) PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)
Proof.
A,A→ 0 ` A→ 0, 0 A,A→ 0 ` A, 0
A,A→ 0 ` 0
A ` (A→ 0)→ 0

Lemma 4.3.2 (Double-negation elimination).
¬¬A ` A in (classical) PCL(→,×, 1,+, 0)
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Proof.
(A→ 0)→ 0 ` (A→ 0)→ 0, A, 0
(A→ 0)→ 0, A ` A, 0, A→ 0
(A→ 0)→ 0 ` A, 0, A→ 0
(A→ 0)→ 0 ` A, 0
(A→ 0)→ 0 ` A

To convince ourselves that this indeed captures intuitionistic logic as previously pre-
sented, we provide translation between the two presentations.
Proving that the single-succedent rules are valid for the multi-succedent rules is simple,
as many of them are valid, unchanged, in the case where the right context is a singleton.
Lemma 4.3.3 (Right weakening).
The following rule is admissible:
Γ ` ∆............ wk-right
Γ ` C,∆
Proof. By induction on a complete proof of Γ ` ∆. 
Lemma 4.3.4.
The single-succedent introduction rules for sum are admissible in multi-succedent natural
deduction.
Proof.
Γ ` Ai,∆
Γ ` A1 +A2,∆
def
=
Γ ` Ai,∆.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk-right
Γ ` A1, A2,∆
Γ ` A1 +A2,∆
(We did the proof with a parameter ∆ for generality, taking ∆
def
= ∅ gives exactly the
single-succedent rule.) 
The fact that the other introduction rules are admissible does not even need a proof: the
single-succedent rules are instances of the multi-succedent rules in the case where ∆ = ∅.
Lemma 4.3.5.
The single-succedent elimination rules are admissible in the multi-succedent system.
Proof. Setting ∆
def
= ∅ as for the introduction rules does not quite work, as it gives us a
root judgment of the form Γ ` ∅ instead of the expected Γ ` C. To get the single-succedent
rule, one should instantiate ∆
def
= {C}, and then weaken the elimination premise.
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
def
=
Γ ` A→ B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk-right
Γ ` A→ B,B
Γ ` A. . . . . . . . . . . . wk-right
Γ ` A,B
Γ ` B
Γ ` A1 ×A2 Γ, A1, A2 ` C
Γ ` B
def
=
Γ ` A1 ×A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk-right
Γ ` B,A1 ×A2 Γ, A1, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
Γ ` A1 +A2 A1,Γ ` C A2,Γ ` C
Γ ` C
def
=
Γ ` A1 +A2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . wk-right
Γ ` A1 +A2, C A1,Γ ` C A2,Γ ` C
Γ ` C
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Γ ` 0
Γ ` A
def
=
Γ ` 0. . . . . . . . . . . wk-right
Γ ` 0, A
Γ ` A

Theorem 4.3.6.
Any judgment provable in single-succedent intuitionistic natural deduction is provable in
multi-succedent intuitionistic natural deduction.
The converse direction is more delicate. A first idea is to translate multi-succedent
judgments of the form Γ ` C1, C2, . . . into single-succedent judgments of the form Γ `
C1 + C2 + . . . . Translating each inference rule in this style would require to unpack and
repack this big disjunction, adding a lot of bureaucracy to the translation.
The reason why a purely-local translation of each inference step is difficult is that the
two introduction rules for disjunctions are fundamentally different: the multi-succedent
rule leaves the choice of which side of the sum to take to future proof steps, while the
single-succedent rule commits to one side. The idea to prove the equivalence is that we
can in fact know which side will be taken by looking at the leafward sub-proofs. Because
of the restriction on the introduction of implication ms-nd-impl-intro, we know that the
context at the point where this choice is made will not have grown (it cannot happen after
an implication has been introduced), so the choice can be “imported” back at the place
of the disjunction introduction. This is what happens in the lemma below.
Note that Γ ` ∆ and Γ ` ∆, 0 are inter-derivable (by weakening and elimination of 0,
respectively). In particular, for any succedent context ∆, we can assume that ∆ is not the
empty set; if it were empty we could always consider ∆, 0 instead.
Lemma 4.3.7.
We can convert any multi-succedent proof Π∆ :: Γ ` ∆ into a set of partial single-succedent
proofs {ΠC :: Γ ` C | C ∈ ∆}, such that at least one of the ΠC is a complete proof, provided
that
• ∆ is not the empty set
• Π does not contain multi-succedent disjunction eliminations,
• and its only leaves are all single-succedent sequents.
Proof. We do our proof by induction on Π∆. The rules without premises are easy to
handle:
Γ, A ` A,∆
7→
Γ, A ` A
Γ ` 1,∆
7→
Γ ` 1
Now consider a rule with a premise, such as:
Γ ` 0,∆
Γ ` ∆
Applying the induction hypothesis on the premise Γ ` 0,∆, there are two cases: either
we get a valid proof of Γ ` 0, or we get a valid proof of Γ ` C for some C ∈ ∆. In both
cases, we can conclude.
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We will keep using the Π 7→ Π′ notation for readability, with a specific notation to
indicate which of the case we are considering: we will write Γ ` ∆ 3 C in the premise of a
multi-succedent rule, to indicate that we consider the case where the valid proof obtained
by induction hypothesis is for the judgment Γ ` C. We can thus represent our two cases
above as follows:
Γ ` (0,∆) 3 0
Γ ` ∆
7→
Γ ` 0
Γ ` B
for some B ∈ ∆
Γ ` 0,∆ 3 C
Γ ` ∆
7→ Γ ` C
The first mapping reads as follows. If, by induction hypothesis, we get a proof of Γ ` 0
(a possible case because (0,∆) 3 0), then we perform an elimination of false to get a proof
of Γ ` B for some B ∈ ∆. If, by induction hypothesis, we get a proof of the judgment
Γ ` C for some arbitrary C ∈ ∆, then we return this proof.
Having clarified the notation, we can use it to prove the remaining cases.
Γ ` A→ B,∆ 3 C Γ ` A,∆
Γ ` B,∆
7→ Γ ` C
Γ ` A→ B,∆ Γ ` A,∆ 3 C
Γ ` B,∆
7→ Γ ` C
Γ ` (A→ B,∆) 3 A→ B Γ ` (A,∆) 3 A
Γ ` B,∆
7→
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A,∆
Γ ` B
Γ, A ` B 3 B
Γ ` A→ B,∆
7→
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
Γ ` A1 ×A2,∆ 3 C A1, A2,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
7→ Γ ` C
Γ ` (A1 ×A2,∆) 3 A1 ×A2 A1, A2,Γ ` ∆ 3 C
Γ ` ∆
7→
Γ ` A1 ×A2 A1, A2,Γ ` C
Γ ` C
Γ ` A1,∆ 3 C Γ ` A2,∆
Γ ` A1 ×A2,∆
7→ Γ ` C
Γ ` A1,∆ Γ ` A2,∆ 3 C
Γ ` A1 ×A2,∆
7→ Γ ` C
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Γ ` (A1,∆) 3 A1 Γ ` (A2,∆) 3 A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2,∆
7→
Γ ` A1 Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2
Γ ` (A1 +A2, B) 3 B A1,Γ ` B A2,Γ ` B
Γ ` B
7→ Γ ` B
Γ ` (A1 +A2, B) 3 A1 +A2 A1,Γ ` B A2,Γ ` B
Γ ` B
7→
Γ ` A1 +A2 A1,Γ ` B A2,Γ ` B
Γ ` B
Γ ` A1, A2,∆ 3 C
Γ ` A1 +A2,∆
7→ Γ ` C
Γ ` (A1, A2,∆) 3 Ai
Γ ` A+B,∆
7→
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2

To see the problem with multi-succedent disjunction elimination, consider the following
case:
Γ ` (A1 +A2,∆) 3 A1 +A2 A1,Γ ` ∆ 3 C A2,Γ ` ∆ 3 C ′
Γ ` ∆
If C and C ′ are the same formula of ∆ (which is always the case when ∆ is a singleton),
we can build a single-succedent proof. But if they are distinct formula, we are stuck.
Recall that our informal explanation above explained that a choice of output door could
be lifted back to the place of introduction, because the context in which the choice happens
is identical to the context of the sum introduction. It is not the case for multi-succedent
disjunction elimination – or disjunction left-introduction in sequent style – which has to
be handled specially by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3.8.
We can always permute the rules of a natural deduction proof so that the disjunction
elimination only appear either at the root of the proof, or above an implication introduction,
or above a disjunction elimination (as second or third premise).
Proof sketch. We have in fact already proved this in the context of the single-succedent
natural deduction: this is the Theorem 3.3.4 (Standardization by extrusion) of Section 3.3
(Extrusion and commuting conversions). The proof in the multi-succedent case is identical:
we only need to check that extrusion is possible in each case and give a valid proof. t
Theorem 4.3.9.
Every complete proof Π of single-succedent sequent in the multi-succedent system can be
rewritten in the single-succedent system.
Proof. By Lemma 4.3.8, we can always permute disjunction rules in a proof so that they
are all at the root of the proof, of above an implication introduction, or above a disjunction
elimination (second or third premises). The premises of implication introductions are
single-succedent sequents; by assumption, the root of Π is also a single-succedent sequent.
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This means that disjunction eliminations at the root or above implication are single-
succedent as well and, transitively, so are the disjunction eliminations above their second
and third premises. Our proof now only uses disjunction eliminations on single-succedent
sequents.
We can then apply Lemma 4.3.7, which claims that proofs without multi-succedent can
be rewritten into single-succedent proofs. Note that we use the assumption that our proof
is complete (all leaves are closed by an axiom rule); this transformation is not modular with
respect to open leaves, as we explore arbitrary far into the subproofs to resolve disjunction
introductions. 
Note that the restriction that the root judgment be single-succedent does not removes
generality from the result: a multi-succedent judgment Γ ` B1, B2, . . . is provable if and
only if the corresponding single-succedent judgment Γ ` B1 +B2 + . . . is provable.
Going further We could, in fact, go even further that this multi-succedent system. The
strategy of dropping alternative succedents when introducing an implication can be seen as
a general case of a more general labeled presentation of logic, where labels track dependen-
cies between hypotheses and succedents. See de Paiva and Pereira [2005] for more details
in the case of intuitionistic logic, and some history of its multi-succedent presentations;
this is a general construction that can be applied to many logics.
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5. The bothersome equivalence of cut-free
sequent proofs
The example in Section 4.2.3 (Non-canonicity of cut-free sequent proofs) of a cut-free
natural deduction proof that translates to two distinct cut-free sequent proofs motivates
us to look for an equivalence relation among cut-free sequent proofs – hopefully such that
all translations of a natural deduction proof are equivalent.
In this chapter, we define a notion of equivalence for sequent proofs that has this property
– yet remains sound with respect to program equivalence – using the term syntax of
Section 4.1.4 (A term syntax for the intuitionistic sequent calculus). It is very similar to
the analysis that we did in Section 3.3 (Extrusion and commuting conversions), splitting
the strong η-expansion of sums in natural deduction into a weak η-expansion principle,
and extrusion and commuting conversions.
For the sequent calculus, we first define the counterpart of extrusion and commuting
conversions, called here the permutation equivalence; this suffices to recover a form of
confluence of the reduction of cuts. Then we add weak η-expansion rules, and this recovers
the full βη-equivalence of natural deduction.
Despite this good correspondence between the equivalences in the two system, we cannot
help noticing that the permutation equivalence is a burden to define – the size of its
definition has a quadratic growth in the number of connectives in the logic or type system.
5.1. Permutation equivalence
We define a permutation equivalence relation (≈scc) as the congruent union of permutation
rules that exchange the order of two introductions, merging rules that merge two consec-
utive introductions when they are equivalent, and weakening rules that removes unused
left-introductions:
1. (≈scc:l/r), the permutation of a left- and a right-introduction rule (Figure 5.1)
2. (≈scc:l/l), the permutation of two left-introduction rules (Figures 5.2 and 5.3)
3. (≈scc:r−∅), the erasing of a rule by permutation with a premise-free right rule (Fig-
ure 5.1)
4. (≈scc:l−∅), the erasing of a rule by permutation with a premise-free left rule (Fig-
ures 5.2 and 5.3)
5. (≈scc:merge), the merge of two equivalent consecutive (left)-rules. (Figure 5.4)
6. (≈scc:weak), the erasing of unused (left)-rules. (Figure 5.5)
Remark 5.1.1. In all these figures, an implicit assumption of each equivalence is that it
preserves scoping of variables and well-typing. Consider for example the following rules:
λx. let y = z t in u ≈scc:l/r let y = z t in λx. u () ≈scc:r−∅ absurd(x)
The first rule is only well-typed if the following scoping conditions are respected. x and
y being both bound in the terms, we can assume (by α-equivalence) that they are distinct,
but other variable conflicts must be explicitly ruled out. The variable z bound under the
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Figure 5.1.: Equivalence of cut-free sequent proofs: left/right rules
λx. let y = z t in u ≈scc:l/r let y = z t in λx. u
λx. let y = πi z in u ≈scc:l/r let y = πi z in λx. u
λx. match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → t1σ2 z2 → t2 ≈scc:l/r match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → λx. t1σ2 z2 → λx. t2
λx. absurd(y) ≈scc:l−∅ absurd(y)
(r, let y = x t in u) ≈scc:l/r let y = x t in (r, u) (and symmetric)
(r, let y = πi z in u) ≈scc:l/r let y = πi z in (r, u) (and symmetric)(
r, match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → t1σ2 z2 → t2
)
≈scc:l/r
match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (r, t1)σ2 z2 → (r, t2) (and symmetric)
(r, absurd(y)) ≈scc:l−∅ absurd(y) (and symmetric)
σi (let y = z t in u) ≈scc:l/r let y = z t in σi u
σi (let y = πi z in u) ≈scc:l/r let y = πi z in σi u
σi
(
match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → t1σ2 z2 → t2
)
≈scc:l/r match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → σi t1σ2 z2 → σi t2
σi absurd(y) ≈scc:l−∅ absurd(y)
() ≈scc:r−∅ let x = y t in () () ≈scc:r−∅ let x = πi y in ()
() ≈scc:r−∅ match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → ()σ2 y2 → () () ≈scc:r−∅ absurd(x)
λx. on the left-hand side must be distinct from x, otherwise it would become free in the
right-hand side. The variable x, which scopes over t in the left-hand side, must not appear
in it (x /∈ t), as these occurrences would become free in the right-hand side.
The second rule may at first appear very surprising but makes sense thanks to our
typing assumptions. We can assume that absurd(x) is well-typed, and thus that x : 0 is
in the environment of both terms. We already know that, under a 0 assumption, all terms
should be equated, so in particular () ≈ absurd(x) is semantically correct. ∗
Permutation rules Those rules permute two independent introduction rules. The rules
of Figure 5.1 permute a left rule and a right rule, and the rules of Figures 5.2 and 5.3
permute two left rules together. Note that there are no cases of permutation of a right
rule with a right rule, as this would never preserve the type of the goal.
Erasing by permutation rules A special cases of permutation rules is when one of the two
permuted introduction rule has no premises: the other rule is erased by the permutation.
A typical such rule is () ≈scc:r−∅ let x = πi y in ().
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Figure 5.2.: Equivalence of cut-free sequent proofs: left/left rules (part 1)
let x = y (let x′ = y′ t′ in t) in u ≈scc:l/l let x′ = y′ t′ in let x = y t in u
let x = y t in (let x′ = y′ t′ in u) ≈scc:l/l let x′ = y′ t′ in let x = y t in u
let x = πi y in (let x
′ = y′ t′ in u) ≈scc:l/l let x′ = y′ t′ in let x = πi y in u
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → let x′ = y′ t′ in u1σ2 y2 → u2 ≈scc:l/l let x
′ = y′ t′ in
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 (and symmetric)
absurd(x) ≈scc:l−∅ let x′ = y′ t′ in absurd(x)
let x = y (let x′ = πi z in t) in u ≈scc:l/l let x′ = πi z in let x = y t in u
let x = y t in (let x′ = πi z in u) ≈scc:l/l let x′ = πi z in let x = y t in u
let x = πi y in (let x
′ = πi y
′ in u) ≈scc:l/l let x′ = πi y′ in let x = πi y in u
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → let x′ = πi z in u1σ2 y2 → u2 ≈scc:l/l let x
′ = πi z in
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 (and symmetric)
absurd(x) ≈scc:l−∅ let x′ = πi z in absurd(x)
One-branch and two-branches There is a discrepancy between left-left permutations
and left-right permutations, when the left rule has more than one binding premise – only
sum eliminations in our system.
λx. match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → t1σ2 z2 → t2 ≈scc:l/r match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → λx. t1σ2 z2 → λx. t2
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → let x′ = πi z in u1σ2 y2 → u2 ≈scc:l/l let x
′ = πi z in
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2 (and symmetric)
When read from right to left, these rules can be understood as extruding a syntactic
construction (right λ or left πi ) out of the branches of a match. But note the difference:
in the left-right case, we request that the right rule be present in both branches of the
match, while in the left-left case we only request that it be present in one of the branches.
Allowing the right rule to be present in one branch only would break typing preservation;
restricting the left rule to be present in both branches would remove useful generality.
Merging rules The merging rules of Figure 5.4 can be justified by the discrepancy above.
We also want the two-branches equivalence to hold for left/left permutations:
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → let x′ = πi z in u1σ2 y2 → let x′ = πi z in u2 ≈scc let x
′ = πi z in
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y → u1σ2 y → u2
To prove that this equivalence is derivable from the one-branch rule, we can extrude the
left rule of each branch separately. But then we end up with two copies of the left rule
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Figure 5.3.: Equivalence of cut-free sequent proofs: left/left rules (part 2)
let x = y
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → t1σ2 y′2 → t2 in u ≈scc:l/l
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → let x = y t1 in uσ2 y′2 → let x = y t2 in u
let x = y t in
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → u1σ2 y′2 → u2 ≈scc:l/l
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → let x = y t in u1σ2 y′2 → let x = y t in u2
let x = πi y in
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → u1σ2 y′2 → u2 ≈scc:l/l
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → let x = πi y in u1σ2 y′2 → let x = πi y in u2
match x with∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → t
σ2 y2 →
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → u1σ2 y′2 → u2
≈scc:l/l
match x′ with∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y
′
1 →
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → tσ2 y2 → u1
σ2 y
′
2 →
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → tσ2 y2 → u2
(and symmetric)
absurd(x) ≈scc:l−∅
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → absurd(x)σ2 y′2 → absurd(x)
let x = y absurd(x′) in u ≈scc:l−∅ absurd(x′)
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → tσ2 y2 → absurd(x′) ≈scc:l−∅ absurd(x
′) (and symmetric)
absurd(x) ≈scc:l−∅ absurd(x′)
Figure 5.4.: Equivalence of cut-free sequent proofs: merge rules
let y = x t in let y′ = x t in u ≈scc:merge let y = x t in u[y/y′]
let y = πi x in let y
′ = πi x in u ≈scc:merge let y = πi x in u[y/y′]
match x with∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → t
σ2 y2 →
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y′1 → u1σ2 y′2 → u2
≈scc:merge
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → tσ2 y2 → u2[y2/y′2] (and symmetric)
before the match; we need the merge rule to conclude.
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → let x′ = πi z in u1σ2 y2 → let x′ = πi z in u2
≈scc:l/l let x′ = πi z in let x′ = πi z in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2
≈scc:merge let x′ = πi z in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2
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Figure 5.5.: Equivalence of cut-free sequent proofs: weakening rules
let y = x t in z ≈scc:weak z let y = πi x in z ≈scc:weak z
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → zσ2 y2 → z ≈scc:weak z absurd(x) ≈scc:weak z
This mode of use of the merge rule does not apply to sum elimination only, but to
any term former with several subterm premises. For example we can similarly derive the
following equalities – under some scoping assumptions:
let y = x t in let z = x′ t′ in u ≈scc
let z = x′
(
let y = x t in t′
)
in (let y = x t in u)
let y = πi x in (t1, t2) ≈scc ((let y = πi x in t1), (let y = πi x in t2))
Weakening rules Merging rules let us (de)duplicate introduction rules. The weakening
rules of Figure 5.5 let us remove or introduce new rules when they do not affect the
semantics of the term. In general, if x does not appear in t, then any left-introduction of
x before t may be added or removed, for example let x = πi y in t ≈scc t.
The rules given in Figure 5.5 are more restrictive than that, as they only apply when t is
a variable, but the removal of introduction rules before arbitrary terms is directly derived
from the other permutation rules:
• As long as t starts with an introduction rule, we use permutation rules.
• If t is a premise-free constructor, we use one of the erasing permutation rules.
• The weakening rules are used if t is a variable.
5.2. Bureaucracy panic: why are there so many rules?
Describing this permutation equivalence is inherently quadratic in the number of different
constructions in our calculus; we basically have a rule for each possible combination of
two introduction rules, and sometimes several rules per combination when one of the
introduction rules has more than one term premise. Why inflict upon ourselves the writing
and the reading of those rules?
One methodological reason is that the unsettling feeling of redundancy resulting from
this definition is a strong motivation to further developments in logic aimed at giving
better presentations. It is hard to really motivate more advanced approaches when the
bureaucratic way has been omitted completely, or summarily discarded by a snarky re-
mark.
Furthermore, this formal definition of permutation equivalence is important as it serves
as a baseline to compare other, better formulations of sequent equivalence to.
Finally, one thing that is very clear when looking at those rules is that the merging and
weakening rules are intimately linked to the permutation rules: merging is necessary to
restore a certain symmetry between left-left and left-right permutation rules, and weaken-
ing is only one source of erased subterms, the other being permutation with premise-free
introductions.
Remark 5.2.1. This last point may be obvious or folklore to the people having studied
intuitionistic sequent calculus (or proof nets for exponential linear logic), but it took me
some time to realize this so I would like to emphasize it.
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When I first encountered the need for merging and weakening rules in Scherer [2015a], I
was transposing work on canonical representations in linear logic that did not have them.
My first impression was that the permutation rules were “motivated by the logic”, while
the merging and weakening rules (called at the time “redundancy elimination rules”) were
“motivated (only) by pure program equivalence”: they were extra-logical in nature, and
had to be added separately, a posteriori. One reason to doubt these rules and give them a
status of second-class citizens is that they have an irritating non-local character: to know
whether they can be applied, it does not suffice to look at subterms/subderivations up to
a fixed depth. Arbitrary comparison between subterms may be required.
It is only during my collaboration with Guillaume Munch-Maccagnoni [Munch-Maccagnoni
and Scherer, 2015] that I realized that these rules were of equal status to the permutation
rules. The reason they do not appear in previous work is not a difference in focus between
logically motivated permutations and program equivalence, but the use of linear or intu-
itionistic logic. Contraction and weakening are the signature moves of intuitionistic logic,
and those equivalence rules are their term equivalence counterpart.
This first-class status is made entirely clear by the careful (yet very simple) presentation
of permutation equivalence – sometimes it is good to do things the old way. ∗
5.3. Properties of permutation equivalence
Lemma 5.3.1 (Local confluence of sequent reduction).
If t, u1, u2 are sequent terms – not necessarily cut-free – with t .R u1 and t .R u2, then
there exists r1, r2 such that ui (→∗R)-reduces to ri in at most one step, and r1 ≈scc r2.
Proof. To prove this one need to consider all cases where a single sequent term may be
the source of two distinct head-reduction rules – that is, all pairs of overlapping reduction
rules. Such a term is necessarily a cut of the form let x = t in u.
We will not explicitly list all overlapping pairs; below are a few representative ones:
let x = y in λz. t
.RI λz. t[y/x]
let x = y in λz. t
.RCrr λz. let x = y in t
.RI λz. t[y/x]
let x = let y = πi y
′ in t in λz. u
.RCrr λz. let x = let y = πi y
′ in t in u
.RCll λz. let y = πi y
′ in let x = t in u
let x = let y = πi y
′ in t in λz. u
.RCll let y = πi y
′ in let x = t in λz. u
.RCrr let y = πi y
′ in λz. let x = t in u
λz. let y = πi y
′ in let x = t in u ≈scc let y = πi y′ in λz. let x = t in u
let x = absurd(y) in ()
.RCll absurd(y)
let x = absurd(y) in ()
.RCrr ()
absurd(y) ≈scc ()

Lemma 5.3.2 (Soundness of permutation equivalence).
If t, u are sequent terms with t ≈scc u, then the translations into natural deduction λ-terms
are βη-equivalent: Jt Knd ≈extr Ju Knd, so in particular Jt Knd ≈βη Ju Knd.
Proof. There is no permutation or merging involving right introductions only (right-right
permutations are never well-typed). We reason by case analysis on the left introductions
involved in the equivalence rule under consideration.
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Soundness is immediate for left rules over implication and product, as they get translated
to meta-level substitutions that are identical before and after permutation. Consider for
example:
λx. let y = z t in u ≈scc:l/r let y = z t in λx. u
The two translations λx. (u[z t/y]) and (λx. u)[z t/y] are equal.
The rules involving a split on a sum or empty type are included, once seen as natural
deduction equivalences, in the extrusion relation (.extr) defined in Section 3.3 (Extru-
sion and commuting conversions), which is itself sound with respect to βη-equivalence –
Lemma 3.3.1 (Soundness of (≈extr)). 
5.4. Cut-free sequent proofs are standard extruded forms
The translation from λ-term to sequent terms introduces arbitrary cuts. In the other
direction, notice that the translation of cut-free sequent terms gives β-normal λ-terms. For
functions for example, the application forms are all of the form x t, and the substitutions
performed when translating cut-free terms can never be of the form [λy. u/x] in a cut-free
term: only cuts may substitute introduction forms.
In this section, we show two more advanced results: that cut-free sequent terms corre-
spond to standard extruded forms, and that the permutation equivalence of cut-free terms
exactly corresponds to the extrusion relation of λ-terms.
Lemma 5.4.1.
If t is a cut-free sequent term, then Jt Knd is a standard extruded form.
Proof. In a sequent term, elimination forms only eliminate variables: x t, πi x, absurd(x),
(match x with | σ1 x→ t1 | σ2 x→ t2). Those variables may be substituted by λ-terms
during the translation; cuts can create substitutions by arbitrary terms, but cut-free terms
may only substitute those variables by elimination forms. In particular, a variable in
elimination position can never become an elimination of sum or empty type. Those elim-
inations may only appear at the root, or at any subterm position corresponding to a full
sequent term instead of a variable; those are exactly the non-eliminated subterms of a
left-introduction form, or any subterm of a right-introduction form. This characterizes a
standard extruded form. 
In sequent terms, let us write L [] for linear binding contexts, that is sequences of
unary left-introduction rules, as described in Figure 5.6 (Linear binding contexts). Note
that splits on sums or absurdity are not included.
Figure 5.6.: Linear binding contexts
L ::= binding contexts
| 
| let x = y t in L
| let x = πi y in L
The translation JL Knd of a linear binding context is the unique natural deduction sub-
stitution ρ such that JL [t] Knd = Jt Knd[ρ] for any t.
Conversely, linear binding contexts are the subset of cut-free sequent term contexts
whose translation is a pure substitution. This let us reason without loss of generality on
the inverse image of J Knd. If the head construction of the λ-term Jt Knd also exists as a
sequent-term term former (everything but pair projection and function applications), then
t must be of the form L [t′], where t′ starts with this head construction. If it does not (it
is a pair projection or a function application), then t is of the form L [x], and a let-form
inside L corresponds to it.
135
Theorem 5.4.2 (Translation into standard extruded form is surjective).
Any extruded normal form t in standard extruded form is the translation of some cut-free
sequent term t′.
Proof. By induction on t, we build a pair of a linear binding context L and a sequent
term t′ such that JL [t′] Knd =α t.
In the variable case (t is x), we return the pair (, x).
If t starts with an introduction form, for example λx. u or (u1, u2), we inductively build
sequent terms for its subterms and compose them using the same introduction form.
The interesting cases are the elimination forms, that must be translated into left-
introduction rules in the sequent terms. For πi u for example, we can inductively build L
and u′ such that JL [u′] Knd = u, but L [let x = πi u
′ in x] might not be a valid sequent
term; it is only valid if u′ is in fact a variable.
We thus strengthen our induction hypothesis as follows: if t is an elimination rule of
negative type, we guarantee that in the pair L, t′, t′ is in fact a variable x′.
In the πi u case, remark that u cannot be an introduction form: by typing it would be
a pair construction, but this would form a β-redex and we assume that t is a normal form.
It cannot be a positive elimination either, as t is in standard normal form. It must be a
negative elimination or a variable, and we can thus assume a decomposition into (L [], y′)
such that JL [y′] Knd = u, and we return the pair (L [let x
′ = πi y
′ in ], x′) that satisfies
our goal
q
L
[
let x′ = πi y
′ in x′
] y
nd
= πi u
The reasoning is similar for other elimination forms, using both hypotheses of being in
β-normal form and in standard extruded form. 
Lemma 5.4.3.
All cut-free sequent terms corresponding to the same λ-term are permutatively equivalent:
if t, u are cut-free and Jt Knd =α Ju Knd then t ≈scc u.
Proof. We do the proof by well-founded simultaneous induction on t, u, performing a case
analysis on the head construction of their (common) λ-term translation. We will detail
one case of head-construction common to λ-terms and sequent terms (pair construction)
and one case of term former of λ-term that becomes a linear let-binding in sequent terms
(pair project); the other cases inside each category are similar.
Case (r1, r2) If Jt Knd = (r1, r2) = Ju Knd, then we know that t and u must be of the form
L [(t′1, t
′
2)] and L
′ [(u′1, u
′
2)] with JL [t′i] Knd = ri = JL
′ [u′i] Knd for any i ∈ {1, 2}. Notice
that L [t′i] and L
′ [u′i] are strictly smaller terms than t, u: by well-fouded induction we
can conclude that L [t′i] ≈scc L′ [u′i] for any i. We can then conclude with
t
= L [(t′1, t
′
2)]
≈scc:merge (L [t′1], L [t′2])
(hyp. ind.)
≈scc (L′ [u′1], L′ [u′2])
≈scc:merge L′ [(u′1, u′2)]
= u
Case πi r If Jt Knd = πi r = Ju Knd, then we know that t, umust be of the form L [let x = πi t
′ in L0 [x]]
and L′ [let x = πi u
′ in L′0 [x]] with L [t
′] = r = L′ [u′]. By well-fouded induction we thus
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have that L [t′] ≈scc L′ [u′], and we can conclude with
t
= L [let x = πi t
′ in L0 [x]]
≈scc:weak L [let x = πi t′ in x]
≈scc:l/l let x = πi L [t′] in x
(hyp. ind.)
≈scc let x = πi L′ [u′] in x
≈scc:l/l L′ [let x = πi u′ in x]
≈scc:weak L′ [let x = πi u′ in L′0 [x]]
= u

Theorem 5.4.4 (Permutation equivalence is complete for cut-free sequent terms).
If t, u are cut-free sequent terms with Jt Knd ≈extr Ju Knd then t ≈scc u.
Proof. We can rephrase the goal as follows: if t′, u′ are λ-terms such that t′ ≈extr u′ then
for any cut-free sequent terms t, u such that Jt Knd = t
′ and Ju Knd = u
′ we have t ≈scc u.
From Lemma 5.4.3 we know that two cut-free sequent terms translating to the same
natural deduction term are permutatively equivalent. Thus it suffices to prove our goal
for some cut-free sequent terms t, u that translate to t′, u′, and it will hold for all others.
The proof is by case analysis on each extrusion rule. We will detail three representative
cases.
An extrusion of sum elimination
σj
(
match t′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u′1σ2 x2 → u′2
)
.extr match t
′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → σj u′1σ2 x2 → σj u′2
Using the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5.4.2 (Translation into standard
extruded form is surjective), we may assume that t′ is the translation of a term of the
form L [x], and each u′i of an arbytrary sequent term u. We thus have, writing Jt′ K−1nd for
the set of sequent terms that translate to t′:
s
σj
(
match t′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u′1σ2 x2 → u′2
){−1
nd
3 L
[
σj
(
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2
)]
→scc:l/r L
[
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → σj u1σ2 x2 → σj u2
]
∈
s
match t′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → σj u′1σ2 x2 → σj u′2
{−1
nd
An extrusion of absurdity
t′ absurd(u′) .extr absurd(u
′)
We can assume pre-images for t′ and u′ of the form L [x] and L′ [y], and then we have
Jt′ absurd(u′) K−1nd
3 L [L′ [let z = x absurd(y) in z]]
→scc:l−∅ L [L′ [absurd(y)]]
∈ Jabsurd(u) K−1nd
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A merging rule
match t′ with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → u′
σ2 y2 → match t′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r′1σ2 z2 → r′2
.extr match t
′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u′σ2 y2 → r′2[y2/z2]
We can assume pre-images for t′, u′ and the r′i of the form L [x], u and ri. Then we have
u
vmatch t′ with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → u′
σ2 y2 → match t′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r′1σ2 z2 → r′2
}
~
−1
nd
3 L
match x with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → u
σ2 y2 → match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r1σ2 z2 → r2

→∗scc:merge L
[
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → uσ2 y2 → r2[y2/z2]
]
∈
s
match t′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u′σ2 y2 → r′2[y2/z2]
{−1
nd

5.5. η-rules for the sequent calculus
We define in Figure 5.7 (η-expansion rules for the sequent calculus) η-equivalence rules
(≈sη) for variables (not arbitrary terms) in our sequent calculus terms. As usual, the
rules are restricted to the well-typed cases, and we will use extra type annotations for
readability.
Figure 5.7.: η-expansion rules for the sequent calculus
(x : A→ B) .sη λ(y : A). let (z : B) = x y in z
(x : A1 ×A2) .sη ((let y1 = π1 x in y1), (let y2 = π2 x in y2)) (x : 1) .sη ()
(x : A1 +A2) .sη match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2 (x : 0) .sη absurd(x)
The η-expansion rules are the direct counterpart of the weak η-expansion rules of natural
deduction. Note that the variable occurrences (x : A) on the left do not denote any
occurrence of the variable x in a term, only the occurrences of this variable in term position
(the axiom rules in the sequent derivation) – not occurrences in variable position, in left-
introduction rules. For example, in the term expression let z = x y in t, the variable
(x : A→ B) cannot be η-expanded. That would not be syntactically correct anyway, as
the post-expansion term cannot be used in this position.
Lemma 5.5.1 (Soundness of sη-expansion).
If t and u are sequent terms with t ≈sη u, then their translations into λ-terms are η-
equivalent: Jt Knd ≈weak η Ju Knd.
Proof. Immediate: the translations of the sequent η-expansions are exactly the weak
η-equivalences of Figure 3.5. 
In the other direction, it is not quite true that t ≈η u implies Jt Kseq ≈sη Ju Kseq, because
the translation to the sequent calculus adds cuts. We would need an equivalence that
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contains both ≈sη and ≈R to be able to reason on cuts, this is done in the next section.
We can still prove an easy result on units.
Definition 5.5.1 (≈sccη).
We define the strong η-equivalence for sequent calculus terms (≈sccη) as the congruent
union of permutation equivalence (≈scc) and η-equivalence (≈sη).
Lemma 5.5.2 (Strong unit η-equivalence).
If Γ ` t : 1 and t is cut-free then t ≈sccη (). If Γ, x : 0 ` t : A and t is cut-free then
t ≈sccη absurd(x).
Proof. The two cases have the same proof, by induction on t’s term structure. We show
that the leaves of a term can always be rewritten under the desired form, () or absurd(x).
Then we can use permutation equivalences to push this desired form “up” the term, until
we have proved the whole term equivalent to them.
The leaves of a sequent term are either a variable, a () or some absurd(y). In the variable
case, we use sη-equivalence to rewrite it into the desired form. If it is an introduction or
elimination of the other unit form, we use the left-right permutation () ≈scc:r−∅ absurd(y)
to swap them.
In the non-leaf case, our term is cut-free so it starts with either a left-introduction or a
right-introduction rule – in the 1 case it cannot be a right-introduction rule as () is a leaf
case and any other would be ill-typed. Consider for example the case let y = πi z in u;
by induction hypothesis we can rewrite u to the desired form () or absurd(x), and then
use the corresponding (≈scc:l−∅) permutation rule to rewrite the whole term under this
form. 
5.6. Equivalence of equivalences
Definition 5.6.1 (≈sccβη).
We define the βη-equivalence for sequent calculus terms (≈sccβη) as the congruent union
of reduction equivalence (≈R), permutation equivalence (≈scc) and η-equivalence (≈sη).
Lemma 5.6.1 (Cut commutation).
let x = t in let y = u in r ≈R let y = (let x = t in u) in let x = t in r
Proof. By simultaneous induction on u and r. Some representative cases are listed below.
let x = t in let y = u in σi r
→RCrr let x = t in σi (let y = u in r)
.RCrr σi (let x = t in let y = u in r)
≈R σi (let y = (let x = t in u) in let x = t in r) (hyp. ind.)
←RCrr let y = (let x = t in u) in σi (let x = t in r)
/RCrr let y = (let x = t in u) in let x = t in σi r
let x = t in let y = (let y′ = πi z in u) in r
→RCll let x = t in let y′ = πi z in let y = u in r
→RCll let y′ = πi z in let x = t in let y = u in r
≈R let y′ = πi z in let y = (let x = t in u) in let x = t in r (hyp. ind.)
←RCll let y = (let y′ = πi z in let x = t in u) in let x = t in r
/RCll let y = (let x = t in let y
′ = πi z in u) in let x = t in r

Lemma 5.6.2 (Substitution).
let x = Jt Kseq in Ju Kseq ≈R Ju[t/x] Kseq
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Proof. By induction on the λ-term u. Some representative cases are shown below.
let x = Jt Kseq in J(u1, u2) Kseq
= let x = Jt Kseq in
(
Ju1 Kseq, Ju2 Kseq
)
.R
(
let x = Jt Kseq in Ju1 Kseq, let x = Jt Kseq in Ju2 Kseq
)
≈R
(
Ju1[t/x] Kseq, Ju2[t/x] Kseq
)
(hyp. ind.)
let x = Jt Kseq in Jπi u Kseq
= let x = Jt Kseq in let y = Ju Kseq in let z = πi y in z
≈R let y = (let x = Jt Kseq in Ju Kseq) in let x = Jt Kseq in let z = πi y in z (Lemma 5.6.1)
→R let y = (let x = Jt Kseq in Ju Kseq) in let z = πi y in let x = Jt Kseq in z
→R let y = (let x = Jt Kseq in Ju Kseq) in let z = πi y in z
→R let y = Ju[t/x] Kseq in let z = πi y in z (hyp. ind.)
= Jπi u[t/x] Kseq

Corollary 5.6.3 (Cut merging).
let x = Jt Kseq in let x
′ = Jt Kseq in Ju Kseq ≈R let x = Jt Kseq in
q
u[x/x′]
y
seq
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 5.6.2 (Substitution): both sides are
(≈R)-related to Ju[t/x′][t/x] Kseq. 
We could prove, by induction on t, the stronger result that
let x = t in let x′ = t in u ≈R let x = t in u[x/x′]
but in this section we only need the specific case where subterms are in the image of the
translation, and this allows use to reuse the substitution proof directly.
Lemma 5.6.4.
If t .β u, then we have Jt Kseq ≈R Ju Kseq
Proof. By case analysis on the head redex of t. For example:
J(λx. t) u Kseq
= let y = λx. Jt Kseq in let z = y Ju Kseq in z
.R let y = λx. Jt Kseq in let z = (let x = Ju Kseq in Jt Kseq) in z
→R let y = λx. Jt Kseq in let x = Ju Kseq in Jt Kseq
≈R let y = λx. Jt Kseq in Jt[u/x] Kseq (Lemma 5.6.2)
≈R Jt[u/x][λx. t/y] Kseq (Lemma 5.6.2)
= Jt[u/x] Kseq (y /∈ t, u)

Lemma 5.6.5 (Soundness of sequent reduction).
If t .RC u or t .RI u then Jt Knd = Ju Knd. If t .RP u then Jt Knd .
∗
β Ju Knd.
Proof. Remark that one R-reduction step is mapped to zero, one or several β-reduction
steps: the sequent terms express more sharing than natural deduction λ-terms, and the
translation can thus duplicate or erase redexes. For example:
Jlet x = (t1, t2) in let y = πi x in r Knd
= Jr Knd[πi x/y][J(t1, t2) Knd/x]
= Jr Knd[πi J(t1, t2) Knd/y][J(t1, t2) Knd/x]
= Jr Knd[πi (Jt1 Knd, Jt2 Knd)/y][J(t1, t2) Knd/x]
≈βη Jr Knd[Jti Knd/y][J(t1, t2) Knd/x]
= Jlet x = (t1, t2) in let y = ti in r Knd

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Theorem 5.6.6 (Equi-equivalence of sequent terms and λ-terms).
If t and u are sequent terms with t ≈sccβη u, then Jt Knd ≈βη Ju Knd.
Conversely, if t and u are λ-terms with t ≈βη u, then Jt Kseq ≈sccβη Ju Kseq.
Proof. The first direction, proving sequent equivalence sound relatively to natural deduc-
tion equivalence, is immediately proved by the soundness results of sequent equivalence
with respect to βη-equivalence:
• (≈scc) was proved sound in Lemma 5.3.2 (Soundness of permutation equivalence).
• (≈sη) was proved sound in Lemma 5.5.1 (Soundness of sη-expansion).
• (≈R) was proved sound in Lemma 5.6.5 (Soundness of sequent reduction).
The second direction, proving natural deduction equivalence sound relatively to sequent
equivalence, requires more work. We have proved in Lemma 5.6.4 that (.β) is included
in (≈R), but it remains to show that strong η-equivalence (≈η) is included in sequent
equivalence (≈sccβη) – it is not included in (≈sη) or (≈sccη) alone. We prove this by doing
a case analysis on the η-expansion.
Function case The natural deduction expansion (t : A→ B) .η λx. t x is proved sound
as follows:
Jt Kseq
/RI let y = Jt Kseq in (y : A→ B)
→sη let y = Jt Kseq in λx. let z = y x in z
.RCrl λx. let y = Jt Kseq in let z = y x in z
= Jλx. t x Kseq
Pair case The natural deduction expansion (t : A1 ×A2) .η (π1 t, π2 t) is proved sound
similarly:
Jt Kseq
/RI let x = Jt Kseq in (y : A1 ×A2)
→sη let x = Jt Kseq in ((let y1 = π1 x in y1), (let y2 = π2 x in y2))
.RCrl
 let x = Jt Kseq in let y1 = π1 x in y1,
let x = Jt Kseq in let y2 = π2 x in y2

= J(π1 t, π2 t) Kseq
Remark 5.6.1. Note that the proof would not work if we had made a slightly different
choice of η-expansion of pairs, namely from (x : A1 ×A2) to
let y1 = π1 x in let y2 = π2 x in (y1, y2)
In the proof it is important that the η-expansion of pairs starts with a right rule, under
which we can push the cut, instead of the left rule.
This difference between those two choices is not arbitrary: it can be explained using the
concepts of Chapter 7 (Focusing in sequent calculus). Our product is the so-called negative
product, whose right rule is invertible and whose left rule is not. η-expansion corresponds
to the “identity expansion” property in focused systems, which always expands invertible
rules first. ∗
Unit cases The cases for 0 and 1 were already proved by Lemma 5.5.2 (Strong unit
η-equivalence).
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Sum case In the sum case, we use the decomposition of Section 3.3 (Extrusion and
commuting conversions) of the strong η-rule for sums (in natural deduction) into the weak
η-rule and extrusion and commutation rules.
The weak η-rule t .weak η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → σ1 x1σ2 x2 → σ2 x2 is included in (sccβη) using a
very direct argument.
Jt Kseq
/RI let x = Jt Kseq in (x : A1 +A2)
→sη let x = Jt Kseq in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
=
s
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
{
seq
The extrusion rules (≈extr) directly correspond to the permutation rule (≈scc). Below
are a few representative examples:
σj
(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
)
.extr match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σj r1σ2 y2 → σj r2
s
σj
(
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → r1σ2 y2 → r2
){
seq
= σj
(
let x = Jt Kseq in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → Jr1 Kseqσ2 y2 → Jr2 Kseq
)
/RCrl let x = Jt Kseq in σj
(
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → Jr1 Kseqσ2 y2 → Jr2 Kseq
)
≈scc let x = Jt Kseq in
(
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σj Jr1 Kseqσ2 y2 → σj Jr2 Kseq
)
=
s
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σj r1σ2 y2 → σj r2
{
seq
match t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → u
σ2 y2 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r1σ2 z2 → r2 .extr
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → uσ2 y2 → r2[y2/z2]
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u
vmatch t with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → u
σ2 y2 → match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → r1σ2 z2 → r2
}
~
seq
= let x = Jt Kseq in match x with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → Ju Kseq
σ2 y2 → let x′ = Jt Kseq in
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → Jr1 Kseqσ2 z2 → Jr2 Kseq
≈scc let x = Jt Kseq in let x′ = Jt Kseq in match x with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → Ju Kseq
σ2 y2 →
match x′ with∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → Jr1 Kseqσ2 z2 → Jr2 Kseq
≈R
(Corollary 5.6.3 (Cut merging))
let x = Jt Kseq in match x with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → Ju Kseq
σ2 y2 →
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → Jr1 Kseqσ2 z2 → Jr2 Kseq
≈scc:merge let x = Jt Kseq in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → Ju Kseqσ2 y2 → Jr2 Kseq[y2/z2]
=
s
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → uσ2 y2 → r2[y2/z2]
{
seq

We can strengthen this result slightly by using the following roundtrip lemmas.
Lemma 5.6.7 (Natural deduction roundtrip).
q
Jt Kseq
y
nd
=α t
Proof. Immediate by induction on t. For example,
q
Jt u Kseq
y
nd
=
q
let x = Jt Kseq in let y = x Ju Kseq in y
y
nd
=
q
Jt Kseq
y
nd
[
q
x Ju Kseq
y
nd
/x]
=
q
Jt Kseq
y
nd
q
Ju Kseq
y
nd
hyp. ind.
=α t u

Lemma 5.6.8 (Sequent calculus roundtrip).
JJt Knd Kseq ≈sccβη t
Proof. By induction on t. For example:
JJlet y = πi x in u Knd Kseq
= JJu Knd[πi x/y] Kseq
(Lemma 5.6.2 (Substitution))
≈R let y = Jπi x Kseq in JJu Knd Kseq
≈scc let y = πi x in JJu Knd Kseq
hyp.ind.
≈sccβη let y = πi x in u

Corollary 5.6.9 (Equi-equivalence of sequent terms and λ-terms).
t ≈sccβη u ⇐⇒ Jt Knd ≈βη Ju Knd
Jt Kseq ≈sccβη Ju Kseq ⇐⇒ t ≈βη u
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Proof. We already have from Theorem 5.6.6 (Equi-equivalence of sequent terms and λ-
terms) that t ≈scc u implies Jt Knd ≈βη Ju Knd. Conversely, from Jt Knd ≈βη Ju Knd the
theorem implies that JJt Knd Kseq ≈sccβη JJu Knd Kseq. We can conclude that t ≈sccβη u by
using the roundtrip lemma for sequent calculus on both sides of the (transitive) equiva-
lence.
The other equality is proved similarly, using the roundtrip lemma for λ-terms. 
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6. Proof and type systems, in general
So far we have discussed many proofs systems for two logics (intuitionistic and classical
propositional logic), and some type systems for programming languages.
In this chapter, we will discuss a few notions that do not depend on a particular system
(of proofs or types). They make sense in any system defined by a set of inference rules plus
a set of restrictions on valid proofs (or programs), equipped with a notion of equivalence
between proofs (or programs).
As an application, we use some of those generic concepts to prove decidability of prov-
ability in our logic – provide algorithms that decide whether any judgment is provable or
not.
6.1. Notions of proof and type systems
We define general systems and some properties of them. We try to be precise but we are
not formal, and in particular will not do formal proofs on those abstract notions. They
are just here to help precise description of the various systems manipulated in this thesis.
Definition 6.1.1 System.
Given a language of judgments, a proof of type system S, T is given by:
• A (finite) set of inference rules that determine a notion of derivations (trees of
inference rules)
• A possible set of (decidable) restrictions on the valid derivations (for example, “have
no elimination-introduction pairs”)
• A notion of equivalence between valid derivations (for type systems, this is uniquely
determined by the equivalence between well-typed programs).
Notation 6.1.1.
We write Π ::S J when the derivation Π of the judgment J is valid in the system S.
Definition 6.1.2 Decidability.
A system S is decidable if there exists a decision algorithm that, given any judgment J
for S, tells in finite time whether there exists a derivation for J valid in S.
Definition 6.1.3 Finiteness.
A system S is finite if, for any judgment J , the set of partial derivations (with some open
leaves) of conclusion J in S is finite.
Notice that finiteness implies decidability.
Definition 6.1.4 Canonicity.
A system is canonical if its equivalence is trivial: two derivations are equivalent exactly if
they are the same derivation.
The notion same derivation is a bit imprecise; if the judgments themselves have a notion
of equivalence, two derivations that are equal upto equivalence of judgments are considered
the same. For example, in a type system, typing derivations for α-equivalent programs
are the same if they have the same tree of inference rules modulo α-equivalence.
Subsystems
Definition 6.1.5 Subsystem.
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A system S is a subsystem of T if there exists a mapping from the valid proofs of S to
valid proofs of T that is injective for equivalence: two proofs are equivalent in S if and
only if their mapping is equivalent in T .
A common way to define a subsystem is to add a restriction to an existing system (the
natural deduction proofs without elimination-introduction pairs), or to remove inference
rules (the cut-free sequent calculus).
In general there may be several ways to build such a mapping between proof systems.
The choice of the mapping φ : S → T (which we call the inclusion mapping) is relevant:
when we speak of the subsystem S of T , we are actually speaking of the pair (S, φ). We
would give distinct names to two subsystems that are the same proof system mapped in
different way to another system, and consider them different subsystems.
Remark 6.1.1. The erasure of well-typed ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0) programs into valid PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)
proofs does not define a subsystem, as it is not injective; for example, λx. λy. x and
λx. λy. y are distinct programs of A→ A→ A, but erase to the same proof.
We may speak of system morphism for mappings between systems that preserve equiv-
alence but not non-equivalence; but we will not need this generality. ∗
Definition 6.1.6 Completeness for provability.
A subsystem S of T is complete for provability, or provability complete, if any judgment
provable in T is provable in the subsystem S.
In particular, if a system admits a decidable subsystem, then it is decidable.
Definition 6.1.7 Computational completeness.
A subsystem S of T is complete for equivalence, or computationally complete, if for any
proof Π ::T J , there is a proof Π′ ::S J such that Π′, seen as a proof of T , is equivalent
to Π.
Computational completeness is a stronger requirement than completeness for provabil-
ity: we require not only that provable judgments are preserved, but also that the identity
of their derivation is preserved.
Example 6.1.1. Natural deduction for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) may be seen as a subsystem
of ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0). They correspond to an amusing syntactic restriction on well-typed
programs where, among the variables available at some type A, only the most recently
introduced one may be used. (Asking to use only the oldest one would also give a valid
mapping.)
Under this view, PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) is complete for provability with respect to ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
(inhabited types are provable formulas), but it is not computationally complete: no proof
derivation is mapped to a program equivalent to λx. λy. x : A→ A→ A. ♦
Finally, recall that our main goal is to decide whether a type has a unique inhabitant.
This calls for a notion of completeness that is weaker than computational completeness,
but stronger than completeness for provability.
Definition 6.1.8 Completeness for unicity.
A subsystem S of T is complete for unicity, or unicity complete if, whenever there ex-
ists two distinct (non equivalent) derivations of J in T , then there exists two distinct
derivations of J in S.
In Chapter 12 (From the logic to the algorithm: deciding unicity), we decide unique
inhabitation of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) by providing a subsystem that is both complete for
unicity and finite.
We will sometimes say that a system is more canonical than another. The intuitive idea
is that the representation of proof is closer to a canonical representation: there are less
pairs of proofs that are equivalent but syntactically distinct – but there may still be some
of them, to it is not necessarily canonical in the sense of Definition 6.1.4. We can in fact
define this notion formally, as done below.
Notice that if S is a subsystem of T , the inclusion mapping from S to T can be defined
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independently on each equivalence class of proofs in S (maximal set of proofs that are
equivalent to each other): the condition of being injective for equivalence exactly means
that the image of an equivalence class in S is included in an equivalence class in T .
Definition 6.1.9 More canonical subsystem.
A subsystem S of T is weakly more canonical than T if the mapping from S to T is
injective for strict equality of proofs (two syntactically distinct proofs of S are mapped to
syntactically distinct proofs of T ).
A subsystem S of T is (strictly) more canonical if it is weakly more canonical and,
furthermore, for some equivalence class in S the restricted mapping is injective but not
surjective (some proofs in T have no counterpart in S).
For example, the subsystem of (→R)-normal natural deduction proofs is more canonical
than the space of all natural deduction proofs, because the set of normal proofs equivalent
to some normal proof Π is strictly included in the set of non-normal proofs equivalent to
Π. On the contrary, the subsystem of normal disjunction-free proofs is not more canonical
than the system of normal proofs. The mapping from one to another is injective but not
subjective (proofs of formulas with disjunctions are not reached by the mapping), but for
each equivalence class in the image the mapping is surjective: all equivalent disjunction-
free proofs are present in both systems.
6.2. Rudiments of proof search
In this section, we show that provability in propositional logics (intuitionistic or classical)
is decidable and equivalently, that the inhabitation problem for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0) (given a
typing (Γ, A), does there exists a t such that Γ ` t : A?) is decidable.
These decidability results are obtained by providing a subsystem that is both complete
for provability and finite.
6.2.1. The subformula property
Consider any introduction rule of a sequent calculus, for example:
Γ ` A,∆ Γ, B ` ∆
Γ, A→ B ` ∆
A remarkable property of these introduction rules is that the formulas present in the
premises are also present in the conclusion, or are “included” in one of the conclusion
formulas (in the sense that A is included in A→ B). Let us make this observation precise.
Definition 6.2.1.
A formula A is a subformula of another formula B, written (A subformula B), if A appears
(syntactically) inside B. For example, A is a subformula of A and of B → A× C.
Definition 6.2.2.
A proof Π :: J has the subformula property if all the formulas appearing inside Π are
subformulas of the formulas of the conclusion judgment J .
A proof system has the subformula property if all its valid proof derivations have the
subformula property.
As sequent calculi are based on introduction rules (left and right), with the property
that the premise formulas are subformulas of the conclusion formulas, it is very easy to
reason on the subformulas of a sequent proof. The only exception is the cut rule:
Γ ` A,∆ Γ, A ` ∆
Γ ` ∆
In this rule, the formula A is arbitrary, and in particular it may not be a subformula of
any of the conclusion formulas Γ ∪∆. The other structural rule, namely the axiom rule,
does not have this issue as it has no premises.
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Theorem 6.2.1 (Subformula property for cut-free sequent calculi).
The cut-free proofs of the single- or multi-succedent sequent calculus have the subformula
property.
Proof. Immediate by inspection of the inference rules. 
The property that subformulas in the premises are subformulas of the formulas in the
conclusion does not hold for the elimination rules of natural deduction:
Γ ` A→ B,∆ Γ ` A,∆
Γ ` B,∆
However, if you consider proofs without elimination-introduction pairs (the analogue
of the cut-free proofs of sequent calculus), the subformula property may still hold. The
intuition is the following: if you inspect the proof of the large formula A→ B that appears
in a premise of the rule above, you cannot find an introduction rule (that would make an
elimination-introduction pair), so you will only find elimination rules, building larger and
larger formulas (C× (A→ B) for example), and eventually an axiom rule. But the axiom
rule means that this large formula (of which A → B is a subformula) is a hypothesis of
the context Γ, and Γ is already in the conclusion of the judgment; so A→ B is actually a
subformula of Γ.
Lemma 6.2.2.
Normal, disjunction-free natural deduction proofs have the subformula property.
Proof. The proof goes exactly as explained above: we prove inductively, for any normal
proof concluded by an elimination rule on a formula A in context Γ, the invariant that A
is a subformula of Γ. 
We need to exclude disjunctions to get the property that formula proved by an elim-
ination rule is a sub-formula of the formula eliminated by this rule. This is true of the
implication-elimination rule above (B subformula A→ B), but false for general disjunction
eliminations: C need not be a subformula of A1 +A2 in
Γ ` A1 +A2 Γ, A1 ` C Γ, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
However, we have proved by studying commuting conversions the Theorem 3.3.4 (Stan-
dardization by extrusion), which let us rewrite any natural deduction proof into a proof
where disjunction eliminations never appear above an elimination on another connective,
or as first premise of another disjunction elimination. This defines a subsystem which has
of natural deduction which has the subformula property.
Theorem 6.2.3 (Subformula property for natural deduction).
For any normal natural deduction proof, there exists a sequence of commuting conversions
giving a proof of the same judgment satisfying the subformula property.
Proof. By induction on the simplified proof, again with the invariant that eliminated
premises are subformula of the context. 
Theorem 6.2.4.
For any provable judgment J of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) or PCL(→,×, 1,+, 0), there exists a
proof (both in natural deduction and sequent calculus style) of J satisfying the subformula
property.
Lemma 6.2.5.
The set of judgments formed of subformulas of some root judgment J is finite.
Proof. A judgment J has only finitely many subformulas, and in particular there are
finitely many distinct sets of those formulas. This means that a judgment Γ ` A or Γ ` ∆
is formed of finitely many possible succedents and finitely many hypotheses. 
If a proof of some judgment J has the subformula property, the judgments appearing
148
in the proof are formed of a finite number of possible formulas. This suggests that proof
search should be decidable, as the search space of the subformula judgments is finite.
However, a given judgment may occur many times inside a proof, and we need to control
this to bound the search space.
6.2.2. Recurrent ancestors in derivations
The idea that we formalize here is that a given judgment need not occur twice along a
path from the root of a proof to any of its leaves. The reasoning depends only on the
notion of derivation tree of a judgment: it is generic over the system used.
Definition 6.2.3 Path in a derivation.
If Π :: J has a sub-derivation Π′ :: J ′, we call path from Π to Π′ the ordered list of
sub-derivations (Π first, Π′ last) that occur along the path in the derivation tree from the
root of Π to the sub-derivation Π′, included.
We call path in Π a path from Π to one of its leaves. It is an open or closed path
depending on whether the leaf is an open or closed leaf.
Notation 6.2.1 Path notations.
We use the names P,Q for paths. We write P : Π Π′ when P is a path from Π to Π′,
and Π′@P :: J ′ when a sub-derivation Π′ is at the end of the path P. Finally, we write
P < Q when P is a strict prefix of the path Q, and P ≤ Q when it is a strict prefix or Q.
Definition 6.2.4 Occurence substitution.
Given a proof Π :: J with sub-proof Π1@P :: J ′ and another proof of the sub-judgment
Π2 :: J ′, we write Π[P ← Π2] for the proof of J where the sub-proof Π1 is replaced by
Π2. In particular, we have P : Π[P ← Π2] Π2, and all paths that are not suffixes of P
are identical in Π and Π[P ← Π2].
Definition 6.2.5 Recurrent ancestor.
In a proof Π, a recurrent ancestor of Π′@P :: J is any sub-derivation of the same judgment
Π′′@Q :: J strictly before Π′ in its path from Π (Q < P).
Definition 6.2.6 Recurrence-free.
A proof Π is recurrence-free if no subproof has a recurrent ancestor.
Theorem 6.2.6 (Provability completeness of recurrence-free subsystems).
If J is provable, then it has a recurrence-free proof.
Proof. Suppose we have a complete proof Π :: J where a subproof Π1@P has a recurrent
ancestor Π2@Q. We can rewrite Π into Π′
def
= Π[Q ← Π1]. This is a valid proof of J and
Π1 has strictly less recurrent ancestors in Π
′ than in Π.
Π′ is measurably strictly smaller than Π: for example, its (multi)set of subderivations
is a strict sub(multi)set of the subderivations of Π. This means that iterating this rewrite
process leads, after a finite number of steps, to a recurrence-free proof of J . 
Remark 6.2.1. Recurrent-free subsystems are in general neither computationally com-
plete nor unicity complete. For example, a type of church integers A→ (A→ A)→ A is
inhabited by infinitely many well-typed λ-terms, but it has only one recurrent-free proof:
the only possible term is λz. λs. z, as trying to apply a successor function s : A → A
generates a subgoal with the same judgment as the root judgment. ∗
6.2.3. Decidability of provability in propositional logics
Lemma 6.2.7.
Given any proof system, the subsystem of its proofs that are recurrence-free and have the
subformula property is finite.
Proof sketch. A complete search procedure in this subsystem (enumerating all partial
proofs in finite time) is the following: given a judgment to prove, look for any applicable
inference rules whose premises respect the subformula property – there are finitely many
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possible such instances of each rule. For any such inference rule, recursively search for
proofs of the premises – or fail if no rule applies.
To make this algorithm terminating, it suffices to remember during the recursive search
the list of judgments along the partial path upto the current search goal. Thanks to the
occurrence-freeness assumption, we can cut the search on any subgoal that already appears
in this list. By the subformula property, the set of possible judgments in this list is finite,
so recursion always stops after a finite number of sub-calls. If each path along the tree of
recursive calls is finite, then the tree itself is finite, and the algorithm terminates. t
Theorem 6.2.8 (Propositional logic is decidable).
Provability is decidable in PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0) and PCL(→,×, 1,+, 0).
Proof. Both the natural deduction or sequent calculus proof systems for those logics have
a complete for provability subsystem with the subformula property (Theorem 6.2.4). The
sub-sub-system of recurrence-free proofs with the subformula property is thus complete for
provability (Theorem 6.2.6). This subsystem is also finite (Lemma 6.2.7): we can decide
if a judgment J has any proof in this subsystem, and thus (by completeness) in the whole
logic. 
Note that this proof of decidability is very simple because our logic is very simple: it is
quantifier-free. In presence of quantifiers, the subformula property does not hold as stated
here, and decidability may become much harder to prove or even false – provability in
second-order logic (with System-F-style polymorphism) is undecidable.
6.2.4. Positive and negative positions in a formula
Using the subformula property and the very regular structure of the sequent calculus, this
section gives a very simple sufficient criterion to determine that a formula is not provable.
The idea is to assign a polarity (a sign) to parts of formula, characterizing their role:
positive positions correspond to sub-formulas that are “outputs” of the formula (they are
provided by certain proofs of the formula), while negative positions correspond to sub-
formulas that are “inputs” of the formula (they are assumed by certain proofs of the
formula).1 For example, in the formula (A1×A2)→ (B1 +B2), the Ai are negative (they
are assumptions of any proof of the formula), and the Bi are positive (a proof of a formula
contains a proof of either one).
More precisely, we say that the parameters A1, A2 of disjunctions A1 + A2 and con-
junctions A1 × A2 are in positive position. For an implication A → B, we say that A is
in negative position, while B is in positive position. Finally, if a sub-formula is in nega-
tive position inside a connective, its positive positions in the subformula become negative
positions in the whole formula, and conversely its negative positions become positive. If
the sub-formula appears in positive position, its polarities are unchanged in the whole
formula.
Formally, if we write p, q for polarities among {−1,+1} (often simply written {−,+},
and −p for the polarity opposite to p, we can define the following inference rules for a
judgment A
p7→ A′:
X
p7→ Xp
A
p7→ A′ B p7→ B′
A+B
p7→ (A′ +B′)p
A
p7→ A′ B p7→ B′
A×B p7→ (A′ ×B′)p
A
−p7→ A′ B p7→ B′
A→ B p7→ (A′ → B′)p
This judgment translates a formula A into a “polarity-annotated formula A′”, that has a
polarity p attached to each position in A. A position in A has polarity p if it is annotated
with p in the translation A′ uniquely defined by A
+17→ A′.
We can extend our notion of polarity to judgments Γ ` A, by saying that A is in
positive position in the judgment, while the formulas of Γ are in negative positions. This
1Note that the notion of polarity here, positive or negative positions in formulas, is orthogonal to the one
used by focusing (Chapter 7 (Focusing in sequent calculus)), of positive or negative connectives.
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is consistent with our idea that negative means “input” while positive means “output”.
What make polarities an interesting notion is that polarities are preserved by sequent
calculus proofs, in the following sense.
Lemma 6.2.9 (Preservation of signs).
For any rule
J1 . . . Jn
J
of the sequent calculus, if a subformula of J appears in one of the Ji, then it appears in
a position of the same polarity.
(Note that in general it is an abuse of notation to confuse subformulas and the positions
at which they appear, as two distinct positions may contain the same subformula. In
the case of inference rules, that are schemas using formulas as meta-variable, there is no
confusion as the conclusion of sequent calculus rules only mention each formula once.)
Proof. By inspection of each inference rule of the sequent calculus. Consider for example
(the most interesting cases):
Γ ` A Γ, B ` C
Γ, A→ B ` C
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
In the left-introduction proof, the formula A → B appears in negative position in
the conclusion judgment, and thus its subformula A appears positively, while B appears
negatively. A appears positively in the left premise, and B appears negatively in the right
premise. The polarities of Γ (negative) and C (positive) are similarly preserved.
In the right-introduction rule, Γ and A appear negatively and B appears positively,
both in the conclusion and in the premise.
Note that this result also holds in presence of the cut rules (in contrast to many results
proved first on cut-free proofs):
Γ ` B Γ, B ` A
Γ ` A
The formula B does not appear in the conclusion, but the formulas of the conclusion have
their polarity preserved. 
Remark 6.2.2. Establishing a corresponding result for natural deduction appears more
difficult. In the elimination of implication, A appears negatively in the premise Γ ` A→ B,
and positively in the other premise Γ ` A. To have a robust notion of polarities, we would
need to assign polarities to the positions of premises in each inference rule. The right
premise of an implication elimination would be negatively polarized, as it is “consumed”
by the proof to produce its conclusion. ∗
While it seems trivial, the result of Lemma 6.2.9 (Preservation of signs) has deep con-
sequences when combined with the subformula property. Let us consider the polarities in
the three rules without premises, that are necessarily at the leaves of complete proofs:
Γ, A ` A Γ ` 1 Γ, 0 ` 1
In the axiom rule, some formula occurs in both positive and negative positions. In the
other rules we have a 0 in negative position or a 1 in positive position. Remark that the
axiom formula A contains either an atomic formula X,Y, Z . . . , or a 0, or a 1. This means
that in all three rules we have either a negative 0, or a positive 1, or an atom X appearing
both negatively or positively.
Theorem 6.2.10.
Any provable judgment J necessarily has either a 1 in positive position, a 0 in negative
position, or an atom X appearing both in positive and negative position.
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Proof. This is immediately proved by combining the remark above (either case holds of the
subformulas at each closed leaf of the proof), the subformula property (the leaf subformulas
are among the conclusion subformulas), and the preservation of signs of subformulas. 
This very simple syntactic criterion directly rejects some formulas as unprovable – the
polarity invariant embeds some partial information on all possible applications of rules.
For example, (X → Y )→ X is not provable. Of course, this particular result would also
be obtained by doing a direct analysis of all possible proofs of the formula; our generic
result does nothing more than describe the structure of a family of cases where the same
form of case analysis (corresponding to the polarity invariant) always succeeds.
On the other hand, we know nothing of the provability of (X → 0) → 0: it has a 0 in
negative positions, so it may be provable. Indeed, the criterion applies to all the sequent
calculi seen so far, intuitionistic or classical.
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7. Focusing in sequent calculus
Focusing is a discipline to create a subsystem of any proof system by studying the invert-
ibility properties of its connectives. In some restricted cases, the resulting subsystem is
canonical, which makes focusing an interesting starting point for our question of unique
inhabitation. In the general case, the focused subsystem is complete for provability, and
in fact computationally complete as well.
7.1. Focused proofs as a subset of non-focused proofs
We here introduce the focusing discipline as a set of conditions that make a (sequent) proof
a valid focused proof. In Section 7.2 (Structural presentations of focusing: a panorama of
design choices), we will present different judgment structures that structurally enforce the
focusing discipline.
7.1.1. Invertible rules
Definition 7.1.1 Invertible rule.
J1 J2 . . . Jn
J
is invertible when the following property holds: if J is provable, then all of the J1, . . .Jn
are provable as well.
Example 7.1.1 (Invertible rule).
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
is invertible, as witnessed by the following “inverse derivation”:
Γ ` A→ B
Γ, A ` A→ B Γ, A ` A
Γ, A ` B
. ♦
Example 7.1.2 (Non-invertible rule).
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2
i ∈ {1, 2}
is not invertible. For example, the judgment A1 + A2 ` A1 + A2 is provable, but none of
the A1 +A2 ` Ai are. ♦
Invertibility is an interesting notion for goal-directed proof search: by definition, the
invertible rules are those can always be used without risk of “getting stuck”. This suggests
that we may study a sub-system of the proofs that always apply invertible rules whenever
possible, and only try non-invertible rules once no invertible rule can be applied – focusing
generalizes this idea.
On the contrary, applying non-invertible rules corresponds to making a choice: if the
rule is wrongly applied, the proof attempt may fail whereas another rule would have led
to a solution. In a sense, non-invertible rules are the “important” rules in a proof – and
in fact, we could reconstruct a proof from only the tree of its non-invertible rules.
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7.1.2. Focus
Definition 7.1.2 focus.
We define the focus of a non-invertible introduction rule to be the formula introduced by
the rule – it is also often called the principal formula of the rule. To help readability, we
often underline the foci in a proof:
Aj ` Bi
A1 ×A2 ` Bi
A1 ×A2 ` B1 +B2
7.1.3. Positive and negative connectives
Given a proof system in sequent calculus style, a connective whose right-introduction rule
is non-invertible (“important”) is called positive, and a connective whose left-introduction
rule is non-invertible is called negative.
(This naming is consistent with the positive and negative positions in a judgment (Sec-
tion 6.2.4): a connective is positive if its important rules introduce the connective in
positive position.)
In the single-succedent sequent calculus for intuitionistic logic given in Figure 4.1 (Sec-
tion 4.1.3), the implication and the conjunction are negative connectives, and the disjunc-
tion is a positive connective:
Γ ` A Γ, B ` C
Γ, A→ B ` C
Γ, Ai ` C
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` C
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2
It is immediate that the conjunction and disjunction rules are non-invertible: using them
removes some information from the judgment to prove. For the left-introduction of im-
plication, non-invertibility comes from the fact that Γ ` A may not be provable, when C
would have been provable by using another rule.
In some proof systems, both introduction rules may be invertible for some connective.
This would be the case, for example, of the following single-succedent presentation of
conjunction:
Γ, A1, A2 ` C
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` C
Γ ` A1 Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2
In this case, we may claim the connective to be of either polarity. Some choices are more
reasonable than others; we claim that this product is positive because, first we already have
rules for a negative product (the ones of Figure 4.1) and, second, those rules are strongly
related to the rules of the positive product in linear logic, where the right-introduction rule
is slightly different and not invertible anymore. We discuss this further in Section 7.2.2
(Connectives invertible on both sides).
The multi-succedent presentation of intuitionistic logic (Section 4.3.3) could be given in
sequent style; in this case, the right-introduction rule of the disjunction becomes invertible
(both sides are, but we say this is the negative disjunction), and the right-introduction
rule of the implication is not invertible anymore, so we have a positive implication.
Γ ` A1, A2,∆
Γ ` A1 +A2,∆
Γ ` A,∆ Γ, A ` B,∆
Γ, A→ B ` ∆
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B,∆
In the rest of this thesis, we will always refer to the polarities suggested by the single-
succedent presentation of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0): implication will always be negative, disjunc-
tion will always be positive, and the product will be either positive or negative depend-
ing on our needs – it would even make sense to have both as distinct but equiprovable
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connectives, distinguished in the syntax of formulas. Note that, in particular, our pre-
sentations have the non-invertible rules be exactly the left-introduction of negatives and
right-introduction of positives – this would not be the case with a product invertible on
both sides.
7.1.4. Invertibility and side-conditions
One difficulty with the definition of invertibility given above is that it is sensitive to the
way rules are presented. Consider these two different definitions of the axiom rule:
Γ, A ` A
A ∈ Γ
Γ ` A
The rule on the left is premise-free, so in particular it should be invertible by the
definition above: its conclusion is always provable, and its premises are always provable
(there are none). The rule on the right is not invertible: it may be the case that A /∈ Γ,
yet that the conclusion be provable by a different rule – for example if 0 ∈ Γ.
The problem with the rule on the left is the use of non-linear pattern-matching: we use
A twice in the conclusion, and this hides an implicit side-condition. Invertibility makes
perfect sense for the left- and right-introduction rules of logical connectives, which do not
have such non-linear patterns: each meta-variable is used exactly once.
The same subtlety occurs in multi-succedent linear logic, where the definition of the
positive right unit 1 requires the context and succedent to be empty.
∅ ` 1, ∅
Γ = ∅ ∆ = ∅
Γ ` 1,∆
The solution to this subtlety is to always consider rules with their side-conditions (equal-
ity and emptiness checks) made explicit.
Note that the axiom rule for Γ, A ` A could be reformulated in two different presenta-
tions with a simple conclusion pattern:
A = B
Γ, A ` B
A ∈ Γ
Γ ` A
Both rules are non-invertible and equi-provable, but they do not have the same focus.
For now, let us make an arbitrary choice and choose the formulation on the right : we
consider that the focus of the axiom rule is the succedent occurrence of the formula. We
revisit this choice using finer-grained rules that make both options useful and interesting
in Section 7.1.7 (Polarized atoms).
Credits This clarification is the outcome of a discussion with Taus Brock-Nannestad,
who vehemently disagreed with my definition of invertibility and pointed out that, with
a direct reading, it would make the linear positive unit 1 invertible on the right. Zakaria
Chihani and myself proposed the reformulation with explicit side-conditions as a way to
reveal the inherent non-invertibility of the rule.
7.1.5. The focusing phase discipline
The focusing discipline relies on exposing a structure of consecutive phases of a proof, and
verifying that they verify certain conditions.
Definition 7.1.3 phase.
Phases are sets of consecutive rules of the same polarity (invertible or non-invertible),
defined as the maximal sets satisfying the following properties:
• two consecutive invertible rules are part of the same invertible phase
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• two consecutive non-invertible rules are part of the same non-invertible phase if the
focus of the leafward phase is a subformula occurrence of the focus of the rootward
phase
When two consecutive non-invertible rules are in the same phase, we say that they have
the same focus (the focused subformula of one is a subformula occurrence of the other).
For example, we have labeled each rule of the proof below with a phase indication, using
different indices for distinct phases. The two most leafward non-invertible rules (in n2)
have the same focus, the third one is part of a distinct phase (n1).
i
0 ` 0 +X
n2
X ` X
n2
X ` 0 +X
n1
1×X ` 0 +X
i
0 + (1×X) ` 0 +X
i` 0 + (1×X)→ 0 +X
Remark 7.1.1. In the literature, invertible phases are called negative phases, and non-
invertible phases positive phases; this comes from one-sided presentations of linear logic
judgments ` ∆ with only succedents and no hypotheses, in which the non-invertible phases
always manipulate positive connectives and invertible phases always manipulate negative
connectives.
The adjectives synchronous and asynchronous are also in common usage since Andreoli
[1992b], but I never remember which is which. (One idea would be that asynchronous
rules “have more freedom”, they can be applied freely, they are the invertible rules.) ∗
Definition 7.1.4 Focusing conditions.
To be a valid focused proof, a sequent proof must respect the following conditions. In the
rest of this section, we give several examples to explain and motivate those restrictions.
1. Invertible phases must be as long as possible: if the premise of a rule in an invertible
phase matches the conclusion of an invertible rule, then it must be the conclusion of
a rule in this invertible phase.
2. Non-invertible phases must be as long as possible: if the premise of a rule in a non-
invertible phase matches a non-invertible rule of the same focus, then it must be the
conclusion of a non-invertible rule in this phase.
Example 7.1.3 (Long invertible phases). Consider the two following, equivalent proofs
of ` X × Y → 1×X.
i
X ` 1
n2
X ` X
i
X ` 1×X n1
X × Y ` 1×X
i` X × Y → 1×X
i
X × Y ` 1
n2
X ` X
n1
X × Y ` X
i
X × Y ` 1×X
i` X × Y → 1×X
The first proof breaks the focusing discipline: a (non-invertible) left-introduction of
the pair X × Y happens at a place where an invertible rule could have been used – the
right-introduction rule for the pair 1×X. The second proof is a valid focused proof. ♦
This restriction allows us to reason on the polarity of connectives at the beginning of
a non-invertible phase. In the particular proof system we chose, the invertible rules are
exactly the left-introduction of positive connectives and right-introduction of a negative
connective. At the start of a non-invertible phase, no invertible rule is applicable; this
means that the formulas in the hypotheses are all negative or atomic, and the formula in
succedent is positive or atomic.
Example 7.1.4 (Long non-invertible phases). Consider the two following proofs of 1 ×
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(X + Y ) ` 0 + (Y +X).
n4
X ` X
n4
X ` Y +X
n3
Y ` Y
n3
Y ` Y +X
i
X + Y ` Y +X n2
1× (X + Y ) ` Y +X
n1
1× (X + Y ) ` 0 + (Y +X)
n3
X ` X n3
X ` Y +X
n3
X ` 0 + (Y +X)
n2
Y ` Y n2
Y ` Y +X
n2
Y ` 0 + (Y +X)
i
X + Y ` 0 + (Y +X)
n1
1× (X + Y ) ` 0 + (Y +X)
The first proof starts with a non-invertible phase on the focused formula 0+(X+Y ), but
then stops to perform an invertible rule. But a non-invertible rule matches the introduced
subformula Y + X, as it is a positive on the right of the sequent; the focusing discipline
is not respected. To respect the focusing discipline, one would have to introduce either X
or Y , but there is not enough information in the context to know which one is provable.
In the second proof, the corresponding non-invertible rule on the goal is applied later in
the proof, after the formula X+Y in the context has been decomposed. It is performed in
the two branches of the case analysis, with either X or Y in context, and in each branch
the focused phase is complete. This proof respects the focusing discipline. ♦
An important early result about the focusing discipline is that it is complete for prov-
ability: all provable judgments have a valid focused proof.
Theorem from previous works 1 (Liang and Miller [2007]). The subsystem of propo-
sitional intuitionistic sequent proofs which respect the focusing discipline is complete for
provability.
This is a strong result. It is rather simple to see that imposing invertible rules to be
applied as easy as possible is complete – this is essentially the definition of invertibility
– but imposing that the non-invertible phases be as long as possible is a much stronger
restriction, and it is not at all obvious that it is complete.
We do not provide a proof of this theorem here, but we later develop completeness proofs
for other focused systems – Section 10.3 (Focusing completeness by big-step translation).
7.1.6. The atomic axiom rule
Among a given class of proofs (or programs) that are equivalent to each other, some will
respect the focusing discipline above and some will not. Formally, a focused subsystem is
more canonical than the original, non-focused system. This selectivity is an advantage of
focusing: it brings us closer to the dream land of canonical proof systems.
A common source of non-canonicity in proofs is the axiom rule:
Γ, A ` A
For example, there are two η-equivalent proofs of ` (X → Y )→ X → Y :
X → Y ` X → Y
` λx. x : (X → Y )→ X → Y
X → Y,X ` X X → Y,X, Y ` Y
X → Y,X ` Y
X → Y ` X → Y
` λx. λy. let z = x y in z : (X → Y )→ X → Y
However, notice that the left proof above is not a valid focused proof. Indeed, the
axiom rule is non-invertible – see Section 7.1.4 (Invertibility and side-conditions). This
non-invertible rule cannot be applied while invertible rules are still applicable, and in this
proof X → Y can still be (invertibly) introduced on the right.
For the same reason, the axiom rule cannot be used when the formula A starts with
a positive connective, as it is then its occurrence in the context that could be invertibly
introduced.
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In our logic, all connectives are either positive or negative. This means that the axiom
rule can only be used for formulas that do not start with a head connective, that is with
atoms. It is thus exactly equivalent, under the focusing discipline, to the following atomic
axiom rule:
Γ, X ` X
7.1.7. Polarized atoms
To understand that it is non-invertible, the atomic axiom rule above can be expressed
using side-conditions in two different ways:
X = A
Γ, X ` A
X ∈ Γ
Γ ` X
The rule on the left resembles a (non-invertible) left-introduction rule, and the rule on
the right resembles a (non-invertible) right-introduction rule. We could informally say
that the atom X is treated as a negative connective by the left rule, and as a positive
connective by the right rule.
In Section 7.1.4 (Invertibility and side-conditions) we made the arbitrary choice of using
the axiom rule only when an atom is in focus on the right – we have used negative atoms. It
is more interesting, however, to consider both options. Let us assume a given atom polarity
function mapping any atom to a sign {+,−}. We will write X+ when X is mapped to
the positive sign, and Y − when Y is mapped to the negative sign. We can then refine the
axiom rule in two polarized axiom rules as follows:
X− = A
Γ, X− ` A
X+ ∈ Γ
Γ ` X+
The left rule is associated to the negative polarity as it resembles a non-inversion left-
introduction for a (negative) connective.
Those choices of atom polarity do not endanger the completeness theorem.
Theorem from previous works 2. Any choice of atom polarity function preserves
completeness for provability of the focused sequent-calculus.
This formulation is not generality for the sake of generality: changing the polarity
function actually enforces interesting phenomena, in particular when studying the behavior
of proof search in the focused system. In particular, forcing all atoms to be negatively
polarized corresponds to backward search, while forcing all atoms to be positively polarized
corresponds to forward search [Chaudhuri, Pfenning, and Price, 2008b]. To understand
this, let us consider the proofs of the sequent (X → Y ), (Y → Z), X ` Z.
There are two ways to start proving this sequent. We may start from our assumption
X (forward search), decide to use the implication X → Y , and then we have deduced the
new assumption Y . Or we may start from the goal (backward search), decide to use the
implication Y → Z, and then it suffices to prove Y .
X ` X
?
X → Y, Y → Z,X, Y ` Z
X → Y , Y → Z,X ` Z
?
X → Y, Y → Z,X ` Y Z ` Z
X → Y, Y → Z,X ` Z
In both cases this first part of the proof finishes with Y under focus, and at this point
no axiom rule can be used to discharge Y , so the proof can only proceed by ending the
non-invertible phase and choosing a different focus. In the left case, Y is under focus on
the left; if it was a negatively polarized axiom Y −, then the focusing discipline would
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not allow us to end the non-invertible phase while a negative formula is still under focus,
and the proof attempt would fail. In other words, the forward-search approach can only
succeed if Y is positively polarized Y +. Conversely, the backward-search approach can
only succeed with a negatively polarized Y −.
More generally, when a non-invertible phase reaches a positive atom focused on the
right (in the succedent), this atom must be in the context (have already been deduced)
or the proof attempt fails. A positive atom must first be deduced from the assumptions
in context, and only then proved in the goal. This is the essence of forward search; if all
atoms are positive, then focused proofs are pure forward-search proofs.
Conversely, when a non-invertible phase reaches a negative atom focused on the left, (in
the context), this atom must be in the succedent, so a deduction in the context can only
start when it is the goal of the proof. If all atoms are negative, then focused proofs are
pure backward-search (goal-directed, demand-driven) proofs.
Remark 7.1.2. In Section 4.2.3 (Non-canonicity of cut-free sequent proofs), we gave
an example of cut-free natural deduction proof that corresponds to two distinct cut-free
sequent proofs. This example relied in an essential way on the trace, in the sequent calculus
proof structure, of a “backward” or “forward” search process.
In a focused sequent system with polarized atoms, only one of these two cut-free sequent
proof is valid – for any choice of atom polarization. In particular, cut-free focused sequent
proofs in the purely negative fragment (only negative connectives and negative atoms)
correspond closely to cut-free natural deduction proofs, and this enabled Herbelin [1994]
to propose a term syntax for the negative fragment of sequent calculus that is very close to
the λ-calculus – although this result was not presented in terms of focusing at the time. ∗
7.2. Structural presentations of focusing: a panorama of design
choices
7.2.1. A first structural presentation
The restrictions of Section 7.1.5 (The focusing phase discipline) define a focused subsystem
of the sequent calculus for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0).
In this section, we define an isomorphic subsystem, not as a subset of the valid sequent
proofs, but by giving a new proof system that enforces the invariant. We call this a “struc-
tural” presentation of focusing as it relies on the structure of specific focused inference
rules.
The key idea is to separate sequent judgments Γ ` A into four distinct judgments:
• Γ `inv A proves Γ ` A by starting with an invertible phase
• Γ `foc B proves Γ ` B by starting with a non-invertible phase – it will choose to
focus either on the left or on the right
• Γ, [A] `foc.l B proves Γ, A ` B by focusing on A (on the left)
• Γ `foc.r [B] proves Γ ` B by focusing on B (on the right)
The full rules are given in Figure 7.1. In Section 7.3.1 (Explicit shifts) we give a better,
more regular system, so we do not give a name to the present system which is mostly for
exposition purposes.
The rules allowing to transition between judgments use explicit requirements on the
polarity of formulas to enforce phases to be as long as possible. We cannot transition
from the invertible judgment to the non-invertible one (ending an invertible phase) if there
remain a positive on the left or an atomic on the right, that is if we could apply an invertible
rule. We cannot transition from the non-invertible to the invertible judgment (ending a
non-invertible phase) if the formula under focus can still be non-invertibly introduced
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Figure 7.1.: Focused sequent calculus (single-succedent, without shifts)
seq-inv-impl-right
Γ, A `inv B
Γ `inv A→ B
seq-inv-disj-left
Γ, A1 `inv B Γ, A2 `inv B
Γ, A1 +A2 `inv B
seq-inv-conj-right
Γ `inv B1 Γ `inv B2
Γ `inv B1 ×B2
seq-inv-false
Γ, 0 `inv B
seq-inv-true
Γ `inv 1
seq-inv-foc
Γ negative or atomic Γ `foc B B positive or atomic
Γ `inv B
seq-inv-foc-right
Γ `foc.r [B]
Γ `foc B
seq-inv-foc-left
Γ, [A] `foc.l B
Γ, A `foc B
seq-foc-disj-right
Γ `foc.r [Bi]
Γ `foc.r [B1 +B2]
seq-foc-conj-left
Γ, [Ai] `foc.l B
Γ, [A1 ×A2] `foc.l B
seq-foc-impl-left
Γ `foc.r [B] Γ, [A] `foc.l C
Γ, [B → A] `foc.l C
seq-foc-axiom-left
Γ, [X−] `foc.l X−
seq-foc-axiom-right
Γ, X+ `foc.r [X+]
seq-foc-inv-left
A positive Γ, A `inv B
Γ, [A] `foc.l B
seq-foc-inv-right
B negative Γ `inv B
Γ `foc.r [B]
(positive on the right, or negative on the left).
As an example, consider the following sequent derivation that follows the focused disci-
pline:
X1, Y1 ` X1 X1, Y1 ` Y1
i
X1, Y1 ` X1 × Y1 n3
X1, Y1 ` 0 +X1 × Y1
n2
X1, Y1 × Y2 ` 0 +X1 × Y1
n1
X1 ×X2, Y1 × Y2 ` 0 +X1 × Y1
n1
(X1 ×X2)×X3, Y1 × Y2 ` 0 + (X1 × Y1)
It corresponds to the following proof in the structural presentation, with explicit rules
corresponding to phase transitions.
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X1, Y1 `foc.r [X1]
X1, Y1 `foc X1
X1, Y1 `inv X1
X1, Y1 `foc.r [Y1]
X1, Y1 `foc Y1
X1, Y1 `inv Y1
X1, Y1 `inv X1 × Y1
X1, Y1 `foc.r [X1 × Y1]
X1, Y1 `foc.r [0 +X1 × Y1]
X1, Y1 `foc 0 +X1 × Y1
X1, Y1 `inv 0 +X1 × Y1
X1, [Y1] `foc.l 0 +X1 × Y1
X1, [Y1 × Y2] `foc.l 0 +X1 × Y1
Y1 × Y2, X1 `foc 0 +X1 × Y1
Y1 × Y2, X1 `inv 0 +X1 × Y1
Y1 × Y2, [X1] `foc.l 0 +X1 × Y1
Y1 × Y2, [X1 ×X2] `foc.l 0 +X1 × Y1
Y1 × Y2, [(X1 ×X2)×X3] `foc.l 0 + (X1 × Y1)
Y1 × Y2, (X1 ×X2)×X3 `foc 0 + (X1 × Y1)
It is possible to erase such structural proofs into sequent proofs in the restricted sub-
system; the phase transition rules seq-inv-foc, seq-inv-foc-left, seq-inv-foc-right,
seq-foc-inv-left, and seq-foc-inv-right are erased in the process, but it is still a one-to-
one mapping: the focusing structure, explicit in the structural presentation, is implicit in
the restricted presentation: it is present in the justification of why a given proof is “valid”,
and a given proof is valid in a unique way.
In the rest of this chapter, we study several variations on the theme of focused subsys-
tems, exploring various parts of the design space, before settling on a formulation we like
and proving its completeness – the other formulations are also complete, but we do not
care for re-doing the proofs each time.
On negative contraction We define contexts as sets of hypotheses, and the comma
notation Γ, A as non-disjoint union: it does not prevent Γ from containing A, and its
use in a conclusion of a rule in fact corresponds (when doing leafward proof search) to
a non-deterministic choice: we may implicitly keep A in Γ (implicit contraction) or not
(disjoint union). In other words, the two rules below are equi-expressive:
seq-inv-foc-left
Γ, [A] `foc.l B
Γ, A `foc B
equiv-seq-inv-foc-left
Γ, A, [A] `foc.l B
Γ, A `foc B
One remarkable property of the focusing discipline is that it gives a much finer-grained
control on contraction. It is possible to define a computationally complete subsystem
where the comma Γ, A always means a (contraction-free) disjoint union, except in the rule
that introduces left focusing: this rule really copies a hypothesis from the usual context to
the focused position. In particular, as only negative formulas can be put under left focus,
focused proofs only ever use contractions on negatives.
7.2.2. Connectives invertible on both sides
In the structural presentation, the following rules would naturally correspond to what we
called the positive product in Section 7.1.3, written here A⊗B:
Γ, A1, A2 `inv B
Γ, A1 ⊗A2 `inv B
Γ `foc.r [B1] Γ `foc.r [B2]
Γ `foc.r [B1 ⊗B2]
161
In contrast to the negative product, this product connective has an invertible left-
introduction rule, which is rightly part of the rules for the invertible judgment Γ `inv B.
It is more troubling that the right-introduction rule, whose erasure in the usual sequent-
calculus is also invertible, is part of the right-focused non-invertible judgment, which was
designed for non-invertible right-introduction rules.
In presence of these rules, there is a mismatch between the “restricted subsystem” pre-
sentation of focusing, which only depends on the invertibility of rules, and would thus
allow right-introduction of ⊗ in invertible phases only, and the “structural subsystem”
presentation of focusing, which, with these rules, makes them part of the negative connec-
tives.
Which of the subsystems should we listen to? It depends on the application we have in
mind. A nice thing with this structural presentation is that it is closer to the presentation of
the positive product of linear logic (the tensor), and let us build an intuition of systems with
both “negative” and “positive” products without otherwise leaving the familiar setting of
intuitionistic logic.
Note that it would also be possible to present a substructural system with a connective
with both rules in the invertible phase, if we are willing to abandon the invariant that
connective always have a focused introduction rule (left or right):
Γ, A1, A2 `inv B
Γ, A1 ⊗A2 `inv B
Γ `inv B1 Γ `inv B2
Γ `inv B1 ⊗B2
This corresponds to abandoning the idea, coming from linear logic, that just a {+,−}
polarity suffices to determine the invertibility of both sides.
We stay clear of this subtlety by not having a positive product in our system.
7.2.3. Polarity invariants and explicit positive contexts
In any derivation Π of an invertible sequent Γ `inv A we have strong invariants on the
polarity of the head connective of formulas in a focused proof. Indeed, a focused judgment
Γ, [A] `foc.l B or Γ `foc.r [C] can only be introduced, from an invertible phase, by a rule
that enforces that Γ is negative or atomic, and C (in the right-focus case) positive or
atomic – otherwise the invertible phase could be continued. Those non-focused formulas
are not touched by the non-invertible introduction rules of the focused judgment, so this
invariant is preserved throughout the non-invertible phase.
In fact, we will only consider focused judgments where this invariant hold. This is
a consequence of considering derivations starting with an invertible phase (the common
case), but even when considering derivations starting with non-invertible phases we will
always assume the non-focused context (Γ above) is negative or atomic, and that the
non-focused conclusion (when it exists, C above) is positive or atomic.
With this restriction, when we get to the end of a left-focused non-invertible phase,
A positive Γ, A `inv B
Γ, [A] `foc.l B
we know that Γ is negative or atomic, and B is negative or atomic. In particular, in the
invertible phase that follows, leafward from Γ, A `inv B, neither a formula of Γ nor B can
be invertibly introduced. The only invertible introductions that can follow are from A
(when it is positive).
It is common to express this invariant structurally in the syntax, by making the invertible
judgment three-places: Γ; ∆ `inv B, where Γ may contain only negative or atomic formulas,
while ∆ may contain any formula. The rules with invertible judgments would be changed
as described in Figure 7.2.
This more complex presentation guarantees structurally, for example, that no left-
introduction rule is present in an invertible phase at the leaf of a right-focusing phase.
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Figure 7.2.: Focused rules with three-places invertible judgment (Γ; ∆ `inv B)
Γ; ∆, A `inv B
Γ; ∆ `inv A→ B
Γ; ∆, A1 `inv B Γ; ∆, A2 `inv B
Γ; ∆, A1 +A2 `inv B
Γ; ∆ `inv B1 Γ; ∆ `inv B2
Γ; ∆ `inv B1 ×B2 Γ; 0,∆ `inv B Γ; ∆ `inv 1
∆ negative or atomic Γ,∆ `foc B B positive or atomic
Γ; ∆ `inv B
A positive Γ;A `inv B
Γ, [A] `foc.l B
Γ; ∅ `inv B B negative
Γ `foc.r [B]
This invariant was true of previous focused systems, but not apparent in the syntax of
derivations.
Remark 7.2.1. My intuition with this presentation is that, in the judgment Γ; ∆ `inv B,
the general context ∆ describes the “new stuff” that has been produced by the last non-
invertible phase (rootward), and is being processed by applying invertible rules, while Γ is
the “old stuff” that comes from before the last non-invertible phase, and is already known
to be of the expected polarity (negative or atomic). ∗
Note that this is only a point in the design space. In particular, it would be a natural
extension of this idea to also distinguish two succedent places B | C, with the invariant
that the position B is either empty (∅) or has an arbitrary formula, while C is either
empty or has a positive or atomic formula; and that exactly one of B or C is non-empty.
We provide such a system in Figure 7.3.
At the transition from the invertible to the focused judgment, we use the notation
(B | C) to describe the union of the optional formulas at these two places; as only one of
them is non-empty, we know that this represents exactly one formula.
Figure 7.3.: Focused rules with four-places invertible judgment (Γ; ∆ `inv B | C)
Γ; ∆, A `inv B | ∅
Γ; ∆ `inv A→ B | ∅
Γ; ∆, A1 `inv B | C Γ; ∆, A2 `inv B | C
Γ; ∆, A1 +A2 `inv B | C
Γ; ∆ `inv B1 | ∅ Γ; ∆ `inv B2 | ∅
Γ; ∆ `inv B1 ×B2 | ∅ Γ; 0,∆ `inv B | C Γ; ∆ `inv 1 | ∅
∆ negative or atomic Γ,∆ `foc (B | C) B positive or atomic or empty
Γ; ∆ `inv B | C
A positive Γ;A `inv ∅ | C
Γ, [A] `foc.l C
Γ; ∅ `inv B | ∅ B negative
Γ `foc.r [B]
In the judgment Γ; ∆ `inv B | C, the place B is non-empty if we come (rootward)
from a right-focused phase: it describes the “new goal” that may need to be processed
by applying invertible right-introduction rule. On the other hand, if we come from a
left-focused phase, the goal has already been processed, it is kept in the “old goal” place
C.
Note that this discipline does not force you to conclude with an hypothesis matching
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the goal as soon as it appears in the new context. An atomic hypothesis can still be used
after being moved to the old context, even if the goal itself is old, by focusing on this
atomic formula again.
Remark 7.2.2. This (A | B) notation is admittedly not canonical and potentially confus-
ing to newcomers – one-sided systems, or classical logics with a context of succedents do
not have this issue. I used to write (A,B) instead of (A | B), and it was even more confus-
ing. Another option is to explicitly mark the formula-or-empty positions with a question
mark, for example (A? | B?), but I suspect that it makes the rule even harder to read for
newcomers. Finally, one could always use two separate rules instead of a single rule, but
I consider that this would obfuscate the real structure of the logic, and this unnecessary
duplication, if it became an established design choice, would later creep into many other
rules and definitions as well. ∗
7.2.4. Batch or incremental validation of non-polarized contexts
With any of the systems seen so far, the start of a non-invertible phase is conditioned over
a polarity condition on a whole context:
∆ negative or atomic Γ,∆ `foc (B,C) B positive or atomic or empty
Γ; ∆ `inv B | C
Another approach is to check the polarity of individual formulas of ∆, and move them
incrementally to the known-polarity context Γ. Phase transition can then happen when
the non-polarized context ∆ becomes empty.
incremental-move-left
A negative or atomic Γ, A; ∆ `inv B | C
Γ;A,∆ `inv B | C
incremental-move-right
Γ; ∆ `inv ∅ | B B positive or atomic
Γ; ∆ `inv B | ∅
Γ `foc B
Γ; ∅ `inv ∅ | B
Note that the rule incremental-move-left does not make much sense when A,∆ de-
notes a non-disjoint union (if ∆ still contains A). It is thus common in the focusing
literature to use multisets and/or disjoint union for the context in this position – indepen-
dently of the context structure of Γ.
Remark 7.2.3. I personally prefer the “batch validation” rule (the whole context at a
time), because I like to preserve a close correspondence between derivations and a term
syntax I would like to use. Note that it is possible to have a light term syntax for a system
with incremental validation of contexts, just by not marking the use of this rule in the
term syntax:
incremental-move-left
A negative or atomic Γ, A; ∆ `inv t : B
Γ;A,∆ `inv t : B
This (rightly) assumes that the notion of equivalence we want for our proofs and proof
terms quotients over where those specific incremental-move rules are placed in the proof
derivation, and over their ordering. The derivation equivalence should not be finer-grained
than the term syntax. ∗
7.2.5. Forced inversion ordering
An advantage of the incremental validation of the non-polarized context is that it gives
us a structural way to enforce a particular application order for invertible rules. This is
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done by restricting some rules to only be applicable when the non-polarized context ∆ is
empty – just as we only allow phase transition when this context is empty.
Consider for example the judgment Γ;A1 +A2 `inv B → C | ∅. We have a choice of two
invertible rules, one on the right and one of the left. We can enforce left introduction to
happen first by using the following rules:
Γ; ∆, A1 `inv B | C Γ; ∆, A2 `inv B | C
Γ; ∆, A1 +A2 `inv B | C
Γ;A `inv B | ∅
Γ; ∅ `inv A→ B | ∅
The rule on the left is the usual rule for left-introduction of disjunctions, but the rule
on the right enforces that the non-polarized context be empty for right-introduction of
implication to be allowed. In our example Γ;A1 + A2 `inv B → C | ∅, this forces us to
introduce the sum, keep introducing the Ai until we get negative or atoms in the context,
use incremental-move to put them in the negative context Γ, and only then introduce
A→ B.
Conversely, we could enforce right-introductions to happen first using the following rules:
Γ; ∆, A1 `inv ∅ | B Γ; ∆, A2 `inv ∅ | B
Γ; ∆, A1 +A2 `inv ∅ | B
Γ; ∆, A `inv B | ∅
Γ; ∆ `inv A→ B | ∅
Finally, we can even enforce the ordering of left-introduction rules by making ∆ an
ordered list (ordered multiset), where only the left-most assumption can be introduced (or
moved to the negative or atomic context). We give in Figure 7.4 a description of invertible
rules in this style, built on top of the four-places judgment of the system of Figure 7.3.
To emphasize that ∆ is an ordered list, we use [] for the empty list and A :: ∆ for adding
a formula A to the left of a list ∆.
Figure 7.4.: Focused rules with unique invertible ordering
Γ;A1 :: ∆ `inv B | C Γ;A2 :: ∆ `inv B | C
Γ; (A1 +A2) :: ∆ `inv B | C
Γ;A `inv B | ∅
Γ; [] `inv A→ B | ∅
Γ; [] `inv B1 | ∅ Γ; [] `inv B2 | ∅
Γ; [] `inv B1 ×B2 | ∅ Γ; 0 :: ∆ `inv B | C Γ; [] `inv 1 | ∅
A negative or atomic Γ, A; ∆ `inv B | C
Γ;A :: ∆ `inv B | C
Γ; [] `inv ∅ | C B positive or atomic
Γ; [] `inv B | ∅
Γ `foc C
Γ; [] `inv ∅ | C
The system of Figure 7.4 has a strong left-to-right slant: left-introduction rules are
always preferred to right-introduction rules, which are blocked until the non-polarized left
context is emptied. In fact, the invertible rules of this system are syntax-directed, in the
sense that for any invertible judgment there is exactly one applicable rule. This implies
that each invertible phase is uniquely determined by its rootwardmost judgment.
This is a very interesting property because, in all the systems we are interested in,
permuting the order of invertible rules preserves equivalence. In particular, a subsystem
that structurally enforces a unique order can be computationally complete, and is strictly
more canonical.
It is also convenient for a software implementation of focused proof search, as it in-
terleaves the processing of invertibly-introducible formulas with the check that all such
formulas have been introduced, instead of having to repeatedly traverse the new context.
The software prototypes developed during this thesis used this approach.
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However, I personally dislike the fact that arbitrary choices had to be made to give such
a definition. There are many different ways to restrict the order of invertible rules to make
it canonical, and no good reason to prefer one over another.
Remark 7.2.4. Arguably, the left-to-right order presented in Figure 7.4 would be natural
in a dependently typed system (as the type of the right-hand side may depend on the shape
of a value of the context, and left-introduction may thus expose new right-introduction
opportunities). However there are deep, difficult obstacles to the combination of sequent
calculus and dependent types in presence of connectives of both polarities [Herbelin, 2005].
Focusing Π-types is well-understood, see Lengrand, Dyckhoff, and McKinna [2011]. On
the contrary, at the time of writing, no satisfactory sequent calculus with strong dependent
Σ-types has been proposed. ∗
7.2.6. Invertible commuting conversions
The equivalence induced by permuting the ordering of invertible rules is a form of commut-
ing conversion as we discussed in Section 3.3. Note that general commuting conversions
allow other commutations, typically extruding a sum elimination (or elimination of absur-
dity) out of a non-invertible rule.
We call invertible commuting conversions, noted by the relation (≈icc), the equivalence
relation generated by reordering two consecutive invertible rules. Note that when a rule
with premises is reordered was rootward of a rule without premises (0-left or 1-right),
reordering it leafward makes it disappear. For the sequent calculus, it is generated by the
equality schemes of Figure 7.5 (Invertible commuting conversions for the sequent calculus)
(restricted to well-typed instances), which are a restriction of (the sequent-calculus equiv-
alent of) the equivalence relation corresponding to the extrusion relation of Section 3.3
(Extrusion and commuting conversions).
Note that there are rules permuting invertible left-introduction and right-introduction
rules, and rules that permute two left-introduction rules, but no rules permuting two
right-introduction rules. There is no right-right permutation that would preserve typing;
this is a consequence of the fact that this presentation of (focused) intuitionistic logic is
single-succedent, in a multi-succedent system we could have right-right permutations.
This equivalence relation, which is entirely local to invertible phases, captures the “don’t
care” non-determinism that is present in formulations of focusing that do not enforce an
ordering on invertible rules, and is removed in forced-ordering presentations.
Fact 7.2.1.
All subsystems of focused sequent calculus (as defined in Figure 7.1 (Focused sequent cal-
culus (single-succedent, without shifts))) with unique invertible ordering, such as the one
defined in Figure 7.4 (Focused rules with unique invertible ordering), are isomorphic to
the quotient of focused sequent calculus by the invertible commuting conversion relation
(≈icc) defined in Figure 7.5 (Invertible commuting conversions for the sequent calculus).
Remark 7.2.5. Some authors of focused systems criticize commuting conversions, or
more precisely their use to prove completeness of focusing, for requiring definitions and
proofs whose sizes are quadratic in the number of logical connective of the systems. Other
completeness proof techniques [Chaudhuri, 2008, Simmons, 2011] do not rely directly on
commuting invertible rules, and only manipulate objects and proofs that scale linearly
with respect to the number of connectives of the system.
This is a good argument, but I still believe that describing commuting conversions is
important. Proving completeness of a focused system with unique inversion ordering may
be simpler, but it is also an arguably weaker result, as it does not explicitly account for
the “don’t care non-determinism” inherent in invertible rules.
∗
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Figure 7.5.: Invertible commuting conversions for the sequent calculus
λy. match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → u1σ2 z2 → u2 ≈icc match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → λy. u1σ2 z2 → λy. u2(
t, match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → u1σ2 z2 → u2
)
≈icc match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (t, u1)σ2 z2 → (t, u2)(
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → u1σ2 z2 → u2 , t
)
≈icc match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → (u1, t)σ2 z2 → (u2, t)
() ≈icc match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → ()σ2 z2 → ()
λy. absurd(x) ≈icc absurd(x)
(t, absurd(x)) ≈icc absurd(x)
(absurd(x), t) ≈icc absurd(x)
() ≈icc absurd(x)
match x′ with
∣∣∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2
σ2 z2 → t
≈icc match x with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match x′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → u1σ2 z2 → t
σ2 y2 → match x′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → u2σ2 z2 → t
match x′ with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 z1 → t
σ2 z2 → match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → u1σ2 y2 → u2
≈icc match x with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y1 → match x′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → tσ2 z2 → u1
σ2 y2 → match x′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → tσ2 z2 → u2
match x′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → tσ2 z2 → absurd(x) ≈icc absurd(x)
match x′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → absurd(x)σ2 z2 → t ≈icc absurd(x)
7.3. Polarized formulas
Once a choice of polarization has been made for atoms, all formulas are either positive
or negative, and can thus be split in two grammatical categories. Recent presentations
of focused systems often make the transitions from one grammatical category to another
explicit by placing shifts in the syntax.
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7.3.1. Explicit shifts
We write 〈N〉+ for a negative formula embedded into the set of positive formulas, and
conversely 〈P 〉− for a positive formula seen as a negative formula. The complete grammar
of those polarized formulas is defined in Figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6.: Polarized propositional formulas
P,Q ::= positive formulas
| X+ positive atom
| P +Q sum
| 0 false
| 〈N〉+ shift
N,M ::= negative formulas
| X− negative atom
| P → N implication
| N ×M product
| 1 true
| 〈P 〉− shift
P at, Qat ::= P | X− positive or atomic
Nat,Mat ::= N | X+ negative or atomic
Σ ::= ∅ | Σ, P positive context
Γat ::= ∅ | Γat, Nat negative or atomic context
Notice that, while the (positive) sum expects positive subformulas and (negative) prod-
uct expects negative subformula, the (negative) implication expects a positive subformula
on its left-hand side. The polarity of this sub-formula gets reversed because it is in “nega-
tive position” in the sense of Section 6.2.4 (Positive and negative positions in a formula).
The rules for this calculus, readily adapted from the previous presentations, are given
in Figure 7.7 (Focused sequent calculus for polarized propositional intuitionistic logic).
Remark 7.3.1. This notation for shifts is not standard in the focusing literature. The
standard notation is to write ↓N for 〈N〉+, and ↑P for 〈P 〉−. I strongly dislike this
standard notation because I can never, ever remember which is which. (This is not quite
true: an effective mnemonic is that ↓ looks somewhat like the bang (!) of linear logic,
and bang is isomorphic to a tensor (!A ' !A ⊗ !A) so it is positive, and thus ↓ returns
a positive formula. I suffered months of head-scratching before I got this tip, and I still
resent the notation and refuse to inflict it on innocent bystanders.). The notation used
here emphasizes the polarity of the result of the shift: 〈A〉− is negative because the minus
sign is outside the box, 〈B〉+ is positive. In fact we could even use 〈+A〉− and 〈−B〉+ to
be heavily explicit on the inside-outside polarity shift. ∗
While this may seem a minor grammatical difference, adding explicit shifts is in fact a
radical idea, because it let us make distinction between formulas that we couldn’t distin-
guish before: a formula can be shifted to the other polarity, and then shifted back to its
original polarity, and we obtain a different formula!
Example 7.3.1. The formulas P → Q → N and P →
〈
〈Q→ N〉+
〉−
have proofs that
differ in very interesting ways: a focused proof of the first formula necessarily starts by
invertibly introducing both P and Q in context; but for the second formula, the invertible
phase stops after introducing P in context, as the formula 〈Q→ N〉+ is positive and
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Figure 7.7.: Focused sequent calculus for polarized propositional intuitionistic logic
Γat, X+; Σ `inv N | P at
Γat;X+,Σ `inv N | P at
Γat,M ; Σ `inv N | P at
Γat; 〈M〉+ ,Σ `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ `inv| X−
Γat; Σ `inv X− |
Γat; Σ `inv| P
Γat; Σ `inv 〈P 〉− |
Γat; Σ, P `inv N |
Γat; Σ `inv P → N |
Γat; Σ `inv N1 |
Γat; Σ `inv N2 |
Γat; Σ `inv N1 ×N2 |
Γat; Σ, Q1 `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ, Q2 `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ, Q1 +Q2 `inv N | P at Γat; Σ, 0 `inv N | P at Γat; Σ `inv 1 |
Γat `foc P at
Γat;`inv| P at
Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at
Γat, N `foc P at
Γat `foc.r [P ]
Γat `foc P
Γat, [Ni] `foc.l P at
Γat, [N1 ×N2] `foc.l P at
Γat `foc.r [Q] Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at
Γat, [Q→ N ] `foc.l P at
Γat;Q `inv| P at
Γat, [〈Q〉−] `foc.l P at
Γat, [X−] `foc.l X− Γat, X+ `foc.r [X+]
Γat `foc.r [Pi]
Γat `foc.r [P1 + P2]
Γat; ∅ `inv N |
Γat `foc.r [〈N〉+]
may thus not be invertibly introduced. A focused proof may thus perform arbitrary left-
focusing phases on the context at this point, before focusing on this positive formula,
unboxing its negative content, and then introducing the second function type. ♦
Remark 7.3.2. This is again an instance of the general trick that introducing finer-
grained distinctions reveals interesting phenomena. This happened when moving from
un-polarized to polarized axioms, and it is also an argument for viewing intuitionistic
logic as a refinement of classical logic – through the double-negation translations. For a
development of this argument, see Noam Zeilberger’s lecture notes [Zeilberger, 2013]. ∗
All the proof and type systems so far were defined over the same grammar of formulas,
the formulas of propositional logic. We are now going to define a proof system on the
distinct grammar of formulas of polarized propositional logic. In particular, we should be
careful about the relation between the proof systems so defined. For example, if I know
that a formula is provable on one side, are there formulas that I know are provable on the
other?
We study the direct relations between polarized and non-polarized formulas in Sec-
tion 7.4 (Direct relations between focused and non-focused systems), and prove a stronger
completeness result in Section 10.3 (Focusing completeness by big-step translation).
7.3.2. Batch validation of polarized contexts
In Section 7.2.4 (Batch or incremental validation of non-polarized contexts) we pointed
out that, in focusing systems with no explicit shifts, we can choose between “batch” or
“incremental” moving of decomposed formulas from the general invertible context to the
negative-or-atomic context necessary for the non-invertible phase.
The explicit shift syntax favors incremental move rules. In the invertible judgment
Γat; Σ `inv N | P at, first it is natural to separate two left contexts, one Γat for negative
or atomic formulas that are the main context of non-invertible phases, and the other Σ
for positive formulas. Then, it is again a natural choice to inspect each positive formula
P ∈ Σ in turn, and handle all possible cases: if it starts with a positive connective, we
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apply an introduction rule, otherwise we move it into the context Γat. Same thing with
the two succedent places on the right.
Γat, X+; Σ `inv N | P at
Γat;X+,Σ `inv N | P at
Γat,M ; Σ `inv N | P at
Γat; 〈M〉+ ,Σ `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ `inv| X−
Γat; Σ `inv X− |
Γat; Σ `inv| P
Γat; Σ `inv 〈P 〉− |
Γat `foc P at
Γat; ∅ `inv ∅ | P at
It is, however, still possible to present this system with a “batch” move rule. This makes
derivation trees more concise, closer to the program terms we will eventually write, and
also reflects in the system design the fact that our notion of identity will be oblivious to the
placement and ordering of incremental move rules. (And it does not require manipulating
a context mixing formulas of both polarities, which would have been an unpalatable design
choice.)
To do this, we first define two partial shifting functions 〈Nat〉+at (respectively 〈P at〉−at)
that take a negative or atomic (respectively positive or atomic) formula and turns it into
a positive or atomic (respectively negative or atomic) formula.〈
X+
〉+at def
= X+ 〈N〉+at def= 〈N〉+
〈
X−
〉−at def
= X− 〈P 〉−at def= 〈P 〉−
Then, with a natural extension of this notation to whole contexts 〈Γat〉+at, 〈Σat〉−at,
it is easy to capture the notion that a positive context only has “negative or atomic”
formulas left: then it must be equal to 〈Γat〉+at for some negative or atomic Γat. We can
remove incremental move rules and have a single rule transitioning from the invertible to
the non-invertible judgment as follows:
Σ =
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
Γat,Γat
′ `foc P at N =
〈
P at
〉−at
Γat; Σ `inv N
Note that there is still considerable flexibility in the choice of presentation. Here we
have chosen to have two places for contexts, but go back to a single-succedent presentation
– which incurs a minor loss of information in the rules ending right focusing. We could
keep the two-succedent presentation, or even have a single context on the left. A minor
detail we will change is to use a more implicit presentation of the side-conditions:
Γat,Γat
′ `foc P at
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`inv
〈
P at
〉−at
In our experience, the incremental move rules are a better choice when focusing on the
logical aspects of the system (they are more systematic), and the batch presentation is
more convenient when manipulating proof terms – which will come, in time, to focused
systems.
In Figure 7.8 we give the full focused proof system with batch context validation, to
reference it more easily in later sections.
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Figure 7.8.: Focused sequent calculus with polarized formulas and batch context validation
Γat; Σ, P `inv N |
Γat; Σ `inv P → N |
Γat; Σ `inv N1 |
Γat; Σ `inv N2 |
Γat; Σ `inv N1 ×N2 |
Γat; Σ, Q1 `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ, Q2 `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ, Q1 +Q2 `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ, 0 `inv N | P at Γat; Σ `inv 1 |
Γat,Γat
′ `foc (P at | Qat)
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`inv
〈
P at
〉−at | Qat
Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at
Γat, N `foc P at
Γat `foc.r [P ]
Γat `foc P
Γat, [Ni] `foc.l P at
Γat, [N1 ×N2] `foc.l P at
Γat `foc.r [Q] Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at
Γat, [Q→ N ] `foc.l P at
Γat;Q `inv| P at
Γat, [〈Q〉−] `foc.l P at
Γat, [X−] `foc.l X− Γat, X+ `foc.r [X+]
Γat `foc.r [Pi]
Γat `foc.r [P1 + P2]
Γat; ∅ `inv N |
Γat `foc.r [〈N〉+]
7.4. Direct relations between focused and non-focused systems
7.4.1. Defocusing
When relating non-focused proof systems with focused systems with polarized formulas,
the most direct result is that focused proofs are also valid non-focused proofs. This is self-
evident when focused proofs are defined as the subset of non-focused proofs that satisfy the
focusing discipline, but requires an erasure step for the structural presentations of focusing,
in particular when using explicit shifts (that is, a different structure for formulas).
In Figure 7.9 (Polarity erasure), we define the polarity erasure operations bP c± and
bNc± that return a formula without explicit shifts. It is readily extended to contexts.
Figure 7.9.: Polarity erasure
bX+c±
def
= X
bP +Qc±
def
= bP c± + bQc±
b0c±
def
= 0⌊
〈N〉+
⌋
±
def
= bNc±
bY −c±
def
= Y
bP → Nc±
def
= bP c± → bNc±
bN ×Mc±
def
= bNc± × bMc±
b1c±
def
= 1⌊
〈P 〉−
⌋
±
def
= bP c±
We can then erase any proof derivation from a focused proof to a non-focused proof.
Theorem 7.4.1 (Polarity erasure).
The following provability implications hold:
Γat; Σ `inv N | P at =⇒ bΓatc± , bΣc± ` bNc± , bP atc±
Γat `foc P at =⇒ bΓatc± ` bP atc±
Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at =⇒ bΓatc± , bNc± ` bP atc±
Γat `foc.r [P ] =⇒ bΓatc± ` bP c±
Proof. Remember that we use the notation Π :: J to say that Π is a proof derivation for
the judgment J ; for example, Π :: Γ `foc A means that Π is a derivation whose conclusion
is the judgment Γ `foc A.
171
The proof is by direct induction, by erasing the focusing information from the proof –
the proof structure is unchanged. For example:⌊
ΠP :: Γ
at `foc.r [P ] ΠN :: Γat, [N ] `foc.l Qat
Γat, [P → N ] `foc.l Qat
⌋
±
def
=
bΠP c± ::
⌊
Γat
⌋
± ` bP c± bΠNc± ::
⌊
Γat
⌋
± , bNc± `
⌊
Qat
⌋
±⌊
Γat
⌋
± , bP → Nc± `
⌊
Qat
⌋
±
Because bP → Nc± is equal (by definition) to bP c± → bNc±, this is the (valid) left-
introduction rule for implication in the non-focused sequent calculus.
The rules that are solely concerned with the focusing structure are erased in the process.
For example:⌊
Π :: Γat `foc P at
Γat; ∅ `inv ∅ | P at
⌋
±
def
= bΠc± ::
⌊
Γat
⌋
± `
⌊
P at
⌋
±
⌊
Π :: Γat; ∅ `inv N | ∅
Γat `foc.r [〈N〉+]
⌋
±
def
= bΠc± ::
⌊
Γat
⌋
± ` bNc±

In particular, this means that our structural focused system is sound with respect to
propositional intuitionistic logic: the (defocused erasing of) formulas it proves are all
provable in our reference proof system.
Furthermore, one can easily check that proofs obtained in this way remain valid focused
proof – they are in the restricted subsystem defined by the focusing restrictions.
7.4.2. The minimal-shift translation
Conversely, valid focused proofs on non-polarized formulas correspond to valid focused
proofs for polarized formulas obtained through the expected “minimal shift” translation
described in Figure 7.10 (Minimal shift translation), that inserts shifts exactly at the
boundary between positive and negative connectives. We also define this translation on
formulas that are “positive or atomic” or “negative or atomic”, preserving the atomic
structure.
Theorem 7.4.2.
Proofs of a formula in the focused system without shifts of Figure 7.1 (Focused sequent
calculus (single-succedent, without shifts)), when equipped with the incremental move rules
of Section 7.2.4 (Batch or incremental validation of non-polarized contexts), are in one-
to-one correspondence with the proofs of minimally-shifted formulas in the focused system
with shifts of Figure 7.7 (Focused sequent calculus for polarized propositional intuitionistic
logic).
Γ; ∆ `inv A | B ←→ LΓM−atmin ; L∆M
+
min `inv LAM
−
min | LBM
+at
min
Γ `foc A ←→ LΓM−atmin `foc LAM
+at
min
Γ, [A] `foc.l B ←→ LΓM−atmin , [LAM
−
min] `foc.l LBM
+at
min
Γ `foc.r [A] ←→ LΓM−atmin `foc.r [LAM
+
min]
Proof. The proof is again by direct induction on the derivations, exactly preserving the
structure. The only notable cases are those where a shift appears in the rules with explicit
shifts, which corresponds to a polarity test in rules without shifts.
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Figure 7.10.: Minimal shift translation
LA→ BM+atmin
def
=
〈
LAM+atmin → LBM
−at
min
〉+
LA1 ×A2M+atmin
def
=
〈
LA1M−atmin × LA2M
−at
min
〉+
L1M+atmin
def
= 〈1〉+
LA1 +A2M+atmin
def
= LA1M+atmin + LA2M
+at
min
L0M+atmin
def
= 0
LXM+atmin
def
= X
LA→ BM−atmin
def
= LAM+atmin → LBM
−at
min
LA1 ×A2M−atmin
def
= LA1M−atmin × LA2M
−at
min
L1M−atmin
def
= 1
LA1 +A2M−atmin
def
=
〈
LA1M−atmin + LA2M
−at
min
〉−
L0M−atmin
def
= 〈〉−
LXM−atmin
def
= X
Consider for example:
Γ; ∅ `inv A | A negative
Γ `foc.r [A]
←→
Γat; ∅ `inv N |
Γat `foc.r [〈N〉+]
A formula A is negative if and only if there is a polarized negative formula N such that
LAM−min = N and A = bNc±. But then we have LAM
+
min = 〈N〉
+. Similarly, a context Γ has
only negative or atomic formulas if and only if there is a Γat such that LΓM+atmin = Γ
at and
Γ = bΓatc±. This gives the two-way correspondence:
Γ; ∅ `inv A | A negative
Γ `foc.r [A]
−→
LΓM+atmin ; ∅ `inv LAM
−
min |
LΓM+atmin `foc.r [LAM
+
min]
=
Γat; ∅ `inv N |
Γat `foc.r [〈N〉+]
Γ; ∅ `inv A | A negative
Γ `foc.r [A]
=
⌊
Γat
⌋
± ; ∅ `inv bNc± |⌊
Γat
⌋
± `foc.r [
⌊
〈N〉+
⌋
±]
←−
Γat; ∅ `inv N |
Γat `foc.r [〈N〉+]
“Negative or atomic” rules get translated in two different rules with explicit shifts. For
example:
A negative Γ, A; ∆ `inv B | C
Γ;A,∆ `inv B | C
←→
Γat, N ; Σ `inv M | Qat
Γat; 〈N〉+ ,Σ `inv M | Qat
A atomic Γ, A; ∆ `inv B | C
Γ;A,∆ `inv B | C
←→
Γat, X+; Σ `inv M | Qat
Γat;X+,Σ `inv M | Qat
Note that the same correspond holds between the versions of the two systems that use
batch context validation instead of incremental move rules.
∆ negative or atomic
Γ,∆ `foc (B,C)
B positive or atomic or empty
Γ; ∆ `inv B | C
←→
Γat,Γat
′ `foc P at
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`inv
〈
P at
〉−at
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If ∆ is positive or atomic, then its minimal shift is of the first
〈
Γat′
〉+at
. If B is positive
or atomic, its minimal shift is of the form 〈P at〉−at, otherwise is empty and C is strictly
positive. 
7.4.3. The double-shift translation
We have observed in Section 7.3.1 (Explicit shifts) that making transitions between po-
larities explicit as shifts allowed to consider double-shifted formula of the form
〈
〈P 〉−
〉+
and
〈
〈N〉+
〉−
, which give more flexibility to the proof by allowing to stop a focusing phase
early.
This suggests a double-formula translation of non-polarized formulas into polarized for-
mulas, that adds a double shift to each subformula of the translated formula. We define
this translation in Figure 7.11 (Double shift translation); it follows the structure of Fig-
ure 7.10 (Minimal shift translation), but inserts more shifts: sub-formulas of the same
polarity as the outer polarity are double-shifted, sub-formulas of the opposite polarity are
simply shifted.1
Figure 7.11.: Double shift translation
〈〈P 〉〉+ def=
〈
〈P 〉−
〉+ 〈〈N〉〉− def= 〈〈N〉+〉−
LA→ BM+atdouble
def
=
〈〈
LAM−atdouble
〉+ → 〈LBM+atdouble〉−〉+
LA1 ×A2M+atdouble
def
=
〈〈
LA1M+atdouble
〉− × 〈LA2M+atdouble〉−〉+
L1M+atdouble
def
= 〈1〉+
LA1 +A2M+atdouble
def
= 〈〈LA1M+atdouble〉〉
+ + 〈〈LA2M+atdouble〉〉
+
L0M+atdouble
def
= 0
LXM+atdouble
def
= X
LA→ BM−atdouble
def
= 〈〈LAM+atdouble〉〉
+ → 〈〈LBM−atdouble〉〉
−
LA1 ×A2M−atdouble
def
= 〈〈LA1M−atdouble〉〉
− × 〈〈LA2M−atdouble〉〉
−
L1M−atdouble
def
= 1
LA1 +A2M−atdouble
def
=
〈〈
LA1M+atdouble
〉+
+
〈
LA2M+atdouble
〉+〉−
L0M−atdouble
def
= 〈〉−
LXM−atdouble
def
= X
This translation has the key property that each argument of a logical connective starts
with a shift: if this connective is chosen as focus, the focused phase will stop immediately
after the first introduction rule.
Note that it is not unique in this regard, in particular this property is preserved by
adding more double-shifts on any subformula. But the one-to-one correspondence result
below depends on the fact that we did not add more shifts than necessary.
Theorem 7.4.3.
Cut-free proofs of a formula in the non-focused sequent calculus with atomic axioms are in
one-to-one correspondence with the focused proofs of double-shifted formulas, modulo the
1This is reminiscent of the realizability models that use single- and bi-orthogonal constructions to turn
sets of “value witnesses” into general sets of realizability witnesses. See for example Munch-Maccagnoni
[2009], Brunel [2014]. In terms of game semantics, the double-translation would ensure that we let our
opponent play after each of our moves.
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ordering of incremental move rules.
Γ ` A ←→ LΓM−atdouble `foc LAM
+at
double
Proof. A complete derivation of Γ ` A is characterized by the choice of a formula in Γ, A,
an introduction or axiom rule applied to this formula, and complete derivations for its
premises.
A complete derivation of LΓM−atdouble `foc LAM
+at
double is characterized by a choice of focus, that
is a formula in LΓM−atdouble, LAM
+at
double, a complete focused phase on this focus, the invertible
phase following it, and complete derivations for the focused premises of this invertible
phase.
To establish the one-to-one correspondence between non-focused derivations and focused
double-shifted derivations, we show a one-to-one correspondence between each inference
rule in the unfocused derivation, and each focused phase followed by its invertible phase
in the focused double-shifted derivation.
For example, for the right-introduction rule for implication we have
Γ, A ` B
Γ ` A→ B
←→
LΓM−atdouble, LAM
−at
double `foc LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble, LAM
−at
double; ∅ `inv ∅ | LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble;
〈
LAM−atdouble
〉+ `inv ∅ | LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble;
〈
LAM−atdouble
〉+ `inv 〈LBM+atdouble〉− | ∅
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv
〈
LAM−atdouble
〉+ → 〈LBM+atdouble〉− | ∅
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [
〈〈
LAM−atdouble
〉+ → 〈LBM+atdouble〉−〉+]
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [LA→ BM
+at
double]
The double bar in the right derivation indicates that this reasoning step is not the ap-
plication of an inference rule, but merely the unfolding of a definition: the root and leaf
judgments of the double bar are equal.
In the left-to-right direction, we have an easy provability result; in a sense we are showing
that the unfocused rule is admissible in the focused double-shifted system. In the right-
to-left direction, it is important to point out that the derivation is uniquely determined
once the focus has been selected: we have not made choices – except on the ordering of
incremental move rules, over which we quotiented explicitly. Any derivation focusing on a
formula of the form LA→ BM+atdouble will have this root prefix. This, plus the fact that there
is no other case of focused judgment being mapped to the sequent Γ ` A→ B, establishes
the one-to-one nature of the bidirectional correspondence.
For the right-introduction rule for conjunction we have:
Γ ` A1 Γ ` A2
Γ ` A1 ×A2
←→
LΓM−atdouble `foc LA1M
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv ∅ | LA1M
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv
〈
LA1M+atdouble
〉− | ∅
LΓM−atdouble `foc LA2M
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv ∅ | LA2M
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv
〈
LA2M+atdouble
〉− | ∅
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv
〈
LA1M+atdouble
〉− × 〈LA2M+atdouble〉− | ∅
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [
〈〈
LA1M+atdouble
〉− × 〈LA2M+atdouble〉−〉+]
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [LA1 ×A2M
+at
double]
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For the right-introduction rule for disjunction we have:
Γ ` Ai
Γ ` A1 +A2
←→
LΓM−atdouble `foc LAiM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv ∅ | LAiM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv
〈
LAiM+atdouble
〉− | ∅
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [
〈〈
LAiM+atdouble
〉−〉+
]
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [〈〈LA1M
+at
double〉〉
+ + 〈〈LA2M+atdouble〉〉
+]
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [LA1 +A2M
+at
double]
For the right-introduction rule for truth we have:
Γ ` 1 ←→
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv 1 | ∅
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [〈1〉
+]
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [L1M
+at
double]
For the left-introduction rule for implication we have:
Γ ` A Γ, B ` C
Γ, A→ B ` C
←→
LΓM−atdouble `foc LAM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv ∅ | LAM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble; ∅ `inv
〈
LAM+atdouble
〉− | ∅
LΓM−atdouble `foc.r [
〈〈
LAM+atdouble
〉−〉+
]
LΓM−atdouble, LBM
−at
double `foc LCM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble, LBM
−at
double; ∅ `inv ∅ | LCM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble;
〈
LBM−atdouble
〉+ `inv ∅ | LCM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [
〈〈
LBM−atdouble
〉+〉−
] `foc.l LCM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [〈〈LAM
+at
double〉〉
+ → 〈〈LBM−atdouble〉〉
−] `foc.l LCM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [LA→ BM
−at
double] `foc.l LCM
+at
double
For the left-introduction rule for conjunction we have:
Γ, Ai ` B
Γ, A1 ×A2 ` B
←→
LΓM−atdouble, LAiM
−at
double `foc LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble, LAiM
−at
double; ∅ `inv ∅ | LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble;
〈
LAiM−atdouble
〉+ `inv ∅ | LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [
〈〈
LAiM−atdouble
〉+〉−
] `foc.l LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [〈〈LA1M
−at
double〉〉
− × 〈〈LA2M−atdouble〉〉
−] `foc.l LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [LA1 ×A2M
−at
double] `foc.l LBM
+at
double
For the left-introduction rule for disjunction we have:
Γ, A1 ` B Γ, A2 ` B
Γ, A1 +A2 ` B
←→
LΓM−atdouble, LA1M
−at
double `foc LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble, LA1M
−at
double; ∅ `inv ∅ | LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble;
〈
LA1M−atdouble
〉+ `inv ∅ | LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, LA2M
−at
double `foc LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble, LA2M
−at
double; ∅ `inv ∅ | LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble;
〈
LA2M−atdouble
〉+ `inv ∅ | LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble;
〈
LA1M−atdouble
〉+
+
〈
LA2M−atdouble
〉+ `inv ∅ | LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [
〈〈
LA1M−atdouble
〉+
+
〈
LA2M−atdouble
〉+〉−
] `foc.l LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [LA1 +A2M
−at
double] `foc.l LBM
+at
double
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For the left-introduction rule for falsity we have:
Γ, 0 ` B ←→
LΓM−atdouble; 0 `inv ∅ | LBM
+at
double
LΓM−atdouble, [〈0〉
−] `foc.l LBM+atdouble
LΓM−atdouble, [L0M
−at
double] `foc.l LBM
+at
double
Finally, for the atomic axiom rules we have:
Γ, X− ` X− ←→
LΓM−atdouble, [X
−] `foc.l X−
LΓM−atdouble, [LX
−M−atdouble] `foc.l LX
−M+atdouble
Γ, X+ ` X+ ←→
LΓM−atdouble, X
+ `foc.r [X+]
LΓM−atdouble, LX
+M−atdouble `foc.r [LX
+M+atdouble]

An important consequence of this result is that we can reformulate any statement about
the relation between focused and non-focused systems (in particular completeness for
provability or computation) as a relation between a focused system and the double-shifted
focused system. This justifies, after the fact, existing approaches to prove completeness
of focusing that start from a fully-focused system and prove completeness “internally”,
by showing that the non-focused principles (identity expansion, cut-elimination, and non-
focused introduction rules) are admissible in the focused system.
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8. Semantics
In this chapter we give another justification for the choice of (≈βη) as our notion of program
equivalence: it is sound with respect to observational equivalence. If two programs are
βη-equivalent, then no context can distinguish them.
8.1. Strong normalization for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
By lack of time and space, we will omit the proof of strong normalization of our λ-calculus
ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0). This is a classic result on which there is no doubt, but the details are
actually interesting.
It is possible to prove strong normalization by embedding ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0) into a
stronger known-normalizing calculus, in particular System F. There is a classic trans-
lation of sum types and the empty type in term of polymorphic function, which is thus a
negative encoding:
A+B
def
= ∀γ. (A→ γ)→ (B → γ)→ γ
0
def
= ∀γ. γ
β-reductions are preserved by the translation, and strong normalization of the source
language can thus be deduced from strong normalization of the target. Interestingly,
the strong η-rule for the translation of sums or the empty type cannot be derived from
βη-equivalence of functions in the translation domain. The internal equivalence between
translated terms are weaker than those between source terms. To recover those equality
principle, one need to use meta-theoretic results of parametricity instead.
Of course, using a very strong normalization result for System F to deduce strong
normalization of a simply-typed calculus is somewhat disappointing. It is natural to look
for a direct proof instead, using the reducibility method as is classic for simply-typed
calculi. This amounts to defining a type-directed predicate “t normalizes at type A”,
by induction on A, that is stronger than just strong normalization at higher types, and
allows an inductive proof of strong normalization to go through. For example, the classic
definition of “t normalizes at type A → B” is “for any u that normalizes at A, the
application t u normalizes at B” – notice that we use the definition of normalization at
the subformulas A and B to define normalization at A→ B.
However, it is not immediate to apply this proof technique to ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0), which
has positive types. The naive extension of this idea is to define “t normalizes at A + B”
would be something like “for any C, the elimination (match t with | σ1 x→ u1 | σ2 x→ u2)
normalizes at C assuming that the ui normalize at C”, but this is not well-founded – we
use the definition of the normalization predicate for an arbitrary formula C that may be
A+B itself.
One interesting solution to this problem is the use of a different term syntax that
has a more modular approach to reduction. In the unpublished note Munch-Maccagnoni
[2012], Guillaume Munch-Maccagnoni uses a sequent-based term system that has just the
right structural properties to let the definition of a normalization candidate go through.
Interestingly, the reduction relation in this system does not correspond to β-reduction
alone, but to reduction modulo extrusion; we obtain a proof of strong normalization to a
normal form modulo extrusion, which is an even stronger result.
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A side-result of strong normalization that we will also assume is confluence of β-
reduction: each term has a unique β-normal form.
8.2. Contextual equivalence for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
For a given programming language, the observational equivalence for this language relates
two programs if they have the same observable behavior. Defining this relation requires
to find, for each language, the appropriate notion of “observable behavior”
A typical notion of observation for programs at some type A is the following: a context
C [] that expects a hole of type A and, when applied, returns a term of type 1 + 1 in
the empty context – the type of booleans, whose closed inhabitant are σ1 () and σ2 (). If
two terms t, u of type A are such that, for any such context C, C [t] and C [u] are always
equal (to either σ1 () or σ2 ()), then they are equivalent in a very strong sense.
However, this definition is disappointing in presence of atomic types; for example, if
x 6= y are two distinct variables at some atomic type X, we would like to say that x and y
are observably inequivalent. But in an empty environment, we do not have any operation
available on this unknown type X, so there is no way to use an element of type X in a
context. A closed context that takes a hole of type X and returns a boolean is always a
constant context; the previous definition would thus suggest that x and y are observably
equivalent, which is unsatisfying.
We thus propose the following strengthening of the definition. An atomic type X is
“unknown”, in the sense that we have not assumed anything about it; it could be replaced
by any other type A, and the programs written using the type X would still type-check.
We will say that programs of type X are equivalent if, for any possible replacement A of
X, those two programs are still observably equivalent. For example, if we choose to replace
X by the type of booleans () + (), we can use the context (λx. λy.) (σ1 ()) (σ2 ()), which
distinguishes the variables x and y.
Definition 8.2.1 ground type.
A ground type is a type that does not contain any atom.
Definition 8.2.2 model.
A model M is a mapping from atoms to ground types.
Notation 8.2.1 M( ).
If x is some syntactic object containing types, we write M(x) for the result of replacing
each atom in x by its image in the modelM. For example,M(A) is a ground type,M(Γ)
is a context of ground types, and if Γ ` t : A then we also have M(Γ) ` M(t) :M(A).
Definition 8.2.3 Contextual equivalence.
If Γ ` t, u : A and for a given modelM, we say that t and u are contextually equivalent in
M, written t ≈ctx(M) u, if
∀C, ∅ ` C [M(Γ) `  :M(A)] : 1 + 1 =⇒ C [M(t)] ≈β C [M(u)]
We say that t and u are contextually equivalent, written t ≈ctx u, if they are contextually
equivalent in any model.
8.3. Semantic equivalence for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)
Another natural way to give a meaning to program equivalence is to give a naive set-
theoretic model of types and their inhabitants; equality of programs should then coincide
with the mathematical equality of their interpretations.
In this section, we will provide such a definition, and show that it is equivalent to
contextual equivalence. We will also show that βη-equivalence is sound with respect to
those new equivalence relation. This gives us a new way to prove that two terms are not
βη-equivalent: it suffices, by contraposition, to provide a context that distinguishes them.
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Definition 8.3.1 Semantics of types.
For a ground type A we define the set of semantic values of A, written JA K, by induction
on A as follows:
JA→ B K def= total functions from JA K to JB K
JA×B K def= {(v, w) | v ∈ JA K, w ∈ JB K}
J1 K def= {?}
JA+B K def= {(1, v) | v ∈ JA K} ] {(2, w) | w ∈ JB K}
J0 K def= ∅
Given a type A and a modelM, we define the set of semantic values of A inM, written
JA KM, by
JA KM
def
= JM(A) K
Fact 8.3.1.
JA KM is always a finite type whose inhabitants can be (decidably) enumerated.
Definition 8.3.2 Semantics of environments.
For a typing environment Γ and a modelM, we define the set of semantic valuations of Γ
in M, written JΓ KM, as the set of functions G,H from variables to semantic values such
that, for any variable x : P of Γ, G(x) is a semantic value of A in M.
JΓ KM
def
= {G | ∀x : P ∈ Γ, G(x) ∈ JA KM}
Definition 8.3.3 Semantics of typing judgments.
We write JΓ ` A KM for the set of function from semantic valuations of Γ to semantic
values in A:
JΓ ` A KM
def
= JΓ KM → JA KM
Definition 8.3.4 Semantics of term formers.
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We define the following naive semantics for term formers:
varx : JΓ, x : A ` A KM
varx(G)
def
= G(x)
pair : JΓ ` A1 KM × JΓ ` A2 KM → JΓ ` A1 ×A2 KM
pair(f1, f2)(G)
def
= (f1(G), f2(G))
proji : JΓ ` A1 ×A2 KM → JΓ ` Ai KM
proji(f)(G)
def
= vi
where f(G) = (v1, v2)
lam : JΓ, x : A ` B KM → JΓ ` A→ B KM
lam(f)(G)
def
= (v ∈ JA KM) 7→ f(G, x 7→ v)
app : JΓ ` A→ B KM × JΓ ` A KM → JΓ ` B KM
app(f, g)(G)
def
= f(G)(g(G))
unit : JΓ ` 1 KM
unit(G)
def
= ?
inji : JΓ ` Ai KM → JΓ ` A1 +A2 KM
inji(f)(G)
def
= (i, f(G))
match : JΓ ` A1 +A2 KM × JΓ, x : A1 ` B KM × JΓ, x : A2 ` B KM → JΓ ` B KM
match(f, g1, g2)(G)
def
= gi(G, x 7→ v)
where f(G) = (i, v)
absurd : JΓ ` ∅ KM → JΓ ` A KM
absurd
def
= ∅
Definition 8.3.5 Semantics of terms and contexts.
By composing together the semantics of the term formers in the obvious way, we obtain
semantics for terms t and one-hole contexts C:
JΓ ` t : A KM ∈ JΓ ` A KM
q
Γ ` C
[
Γ′ `  : A′
]
: A′
y
M ∈
q
Γ,Γ′ ` A′
y
M → JΓ ` A KM
For example we have J(t1, t2) KM = pair(Jt1 KM, Jt2 KM) and J(t,) KM(f) = pair(Jt1 KM, f).
In particular, J KM is the identity function.
The interest of this sophisticated definition – as opposed to a direct definition of the
semantics of terms, and of the semantics of contexts is that it is obviously compositional. In
particular we have the following compositional semantics of terms plugged into a context.
Fact 8.3.2 (Semantics of context plugging).
JC [t] KM = JC KM(Jt KM)
Definition 8.3.6 Equality on semantics values.
If v, w are semantic values of the same semantic type, we write v = w for the usual
mathematical equality. For example, if v, v′ are (total) functions from JA KM to JB KM,
they are equal if they are pointwise equal:
v = v′ ∈ JA→ B KM ⇐⇒ ∀w ∈ JA KM, v(w) = v
′(w) ∈ JB KM
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Because the intepretation of types in each models are finite sets, equality of semantic
values is always decidable – in particular, there is nothing fishy in assuming that either
two semantic values are equal, or we have a tangible evidence of their difference. If we
have v 6= v′ ∈ JA→ B KM, then we have a w ∈ JA KM such that v(w) 6= v′(w).
Definition 8.3.7 Semantic equivalence.
For any terms Γ ` t, t′ : A and modelM, we say that t and t′ are semantically equivalent in
M, written t ≈sem(M) t′, if their semantics are equal – pointwise, equal on any valuation.
t ≈sem(M) t′
def
= ∀G ∈ JΓ KM, Jt KM(G) = Ju KM(G) ∈ JA KM
We say that t and u are semantically equivalent, written t ≈sem u, if they are semantically
equivalent in any model M.
8.4. βη implies semantic implies contextual
Lemma 8.4.1 (Semantic equivalence is a congruence).
For any terms t, t′ and context Γ such that
Γ,Γ′ ` t, t′ : A Γ ` C
[
Γ′ `  : A′
]
: A t ≈sem(M) t′
we have C [t] ≈sem C [t′].
Proof. This is immediately proved by compositationality: for any model M we have
JC [t] KM = JC KM(Jt KM) = JC KM(
q
t′
y
M) =
q
C
[
t′
] y
M

Lemma 8.4.2 (Semantic soundness of substitution).
Jt[u/x] KM(G) = Jt KM(G, x 7→ Ju KM(G))
Proof. By induction on t. 
Theorem 8.4.3 (Semantic soundness of βη-equivalence).
If t ≈βη t′ then t ≈sem t′.
Proof. We first remark that the semantic equivalence (≈sem) is an equivalence relation.
Reflexivity, transitivity and symmetry are immediate from the definition. It is also a
congruence (it goes under any context), this is Fact 8.3.2 (Semantics of context plugging).
To prove that (≈βη) is included in (≈sem), it thus suffices to prove that each atomic β or η-
step is included: the reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, and congruence rules are included
in any congruence.
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β cases
Jλx. t u KM(G)
= app(lam(Jt KM), Ju KM)(G)
= (v 7→ Jt KM(G, x 7→ v)) (Ju KM(G))
= Jt KM(G, x 7→ Ju KM(G))
= (by Lemma 8.4.2 (Semantic soundness of substitution))
Jt[u/x] KM(G)
Jπi (t1, t2) KM(G)
= proji(pair(Jt1 KM, Jt2 KM))(G)
= Jt1 KM(G)
s
match σi t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2
{
M
(G)
= match(inji(Jt KM), Ju1 KM, Ju2 KM)(G)
= Jui KM(G, x 7→ Jt KM(G))
= (by Lemma 8.4.2 (Semantic soundness of substitution))
Jui[t/x] KM(G)
Negative η cases
Jλx. t x KM(G)
= lam(app(Jt KM, var))(G)
= v 7→ (app(Jt KM, varx))(G, x 7→ v)
= v 7→ Jt KM(G)(varx(G, x 7→ v))
= v 7→ Jt KM(G)(v)
= Jt KMG
J(π1 t, π2 t) KM(G)
= pair(proj1Jt KM, proj2Jt KM)(G)
= (v1, v2)
where Jt KM(G) = (v1, v2)
= Jt KMG
JΓ ` t() KM(G)
= unit(G)
= ?
= J() KM(G)
Positive η case: sum Suppose we have Γ ` t : A1 +A2 and G ∈ JΓ KM with Jt KM(G) =
(i, v).
Then for any C [∅ `  : A1 +A2] we have
s
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C [σi x]σ2 x→ C [σi x]
{
M
(G)
= match(Jt KM, JC [σ1 x] KM, JC [σ2 x] KM)(G)
= (as Jt KM(G) = (i, v))
JC [σi x] KM(G, x 7→ v)
= (by Lemma 8.4.2 (Semantic soundness of substitution))
JC [y] KM(G, x 7→ v, y 7→ Jσi x KM(G, x 7→ v)
= JC [y] KM(G, x 7→ v, y 7→ (i, v))
= JC [y] KM(G, x 7→ v, y 7→ Jt KM(G))
= (by Lemma 8.4.2 (Semantic soundness of substitution))
JC [t] KM(G)
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Positive η case: empty Suppose we have Γ ` t : 0. We know that the set JΓ ` 0 KM
is inhabited by Jt KM; but this set is the set of functions from JΓ KM to the empty set
J0 KM = ∅. It can only be inhabited if JΓ KM is also the empty set.
Then it is the case that
∀G ∈ JΓ KM, Ju1 KM(G) = Ju2 KMG
as no such G may exist. 
Theorem 8.4.4 (Semantic equivalence implies contextual equivalence).
If t and t′ are semantically equivalent, then they are contextually equivalent.
Proof. Suppose t ≈sem t′. For a given model M and boolean context C, we have to show
that C [t] ≈β C [t′].
As semantic equivalence is a congruence – Lemma 8.4.1 (Semantic equivalence is a
congruence) – we have C [t] ≈sem C [t′]. Now, suppose the closed β-normal form of C [t]
is σi () for some i ∈ {1, 2}, and the closed β-normal form of C [t′] is σj (). Semantics is
preserved by βη-equivalence – Theorem 8.4.3 (Semantic soundness of βη-equivalence) –
so in particular by β-normalization. Thus we have Jσi () KM = JC [t] KM = JC [t
′] KM =
Jσj () KM. It cannot be the case that i 6= j, as those semantics would then differ. We have
proved that C [t] ≈β C [t′]. 
Corollary 8.4.5 (βη-equivalence implies contextual equivalence).
If t ≈βη t′, then t ≈ctx t′.
8.5. Contextual equivalence implies semantic equivalence
Our proof shall proceed by contraposition: given two terms with distinct semantics, we
build a context that distinguishes them. A key ingredient to do this is a reification result:
we need a way to build closed syntactic terms from semantic values. For example, two
functions have distinct semantics if they differ on one input, which is a semantic value v;
if we could obtain a syntactic term t corresponding to v, we could build the context ( t)
to distinguish the two functions.
Reification results of this kind are key to the proof technique known as “normalization
by evaluation”. It is fairly easy to prove in a purely negative type system, but the addition
of sums makes it very difficult to prove in the general case – this is the purpose of the
advanced techniques developed in Altenkirch, Dybjer, Hofmann, and Scott [2001], Balat,
Di Cosmo, and Fiore [2004], and will also be made possible by the saturation technique
presented in the later chapters of this thesis.
The reification of sum, product and the unit type are straightforward. The difficulties
come from function types. Intuively, to reify a semantic function, it suffices to build a
decision tree on its input type as a term. Such a decision tree is, again, straightforward
to build if the input type is a sum, product or unit type; but what if we have a function?
Building a decision tree on a function corresponds to tabulating this function, enumerating
all its possible inputs and composing decision trees on each corresponding output. Again,
enumerating all possible inputs of sum, product or unit type is straightforward, but what
if the input is a function? Enumerating a function corresponds to building the composition
of the enumeration of all its possible outputs on the leaves of a decision tree on its inputs.
Definifing the construction in this way is delicate – see Altenkirch and Uustalu [2004]
for example. Giving a definition that respects the type structure and is thus correct by
construction is even more challenging. This is done in Altenkirch, Dybjer, Hofmann,
and Scott [2001] using more advanced semantic structures, in Balat, Di Cosmo, and Fiore
[2004] by using control operators (to control the interleaving of enumeration and decision),
and in Ahmad, Licata, and Harper [2010] using focusing.
In the present case, however, we can make use of the absence of atomic types to give
a very easy solution to this challenge: if all types are finitely inhabited, we can actually
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get rid of the function types by converting them, through repeated application of type
isomorphisms, to positive datatypes.
Remark 8.5.1. A similar idea is used in Ilik [2015], with a different form of type normal-
ization that aims to remove sum types rather than function types. In presence of atomic
or infinite types, neither sum nor function types can be fully removed. In the absence
of atoms, function types can be fully removed, but sum types cannot – there is no type
isomorphic to 1 + 1 in PIL(→,×, 1). ∗
In Figure 8.1 (Fun-less data types) we define a function b c from arbitrary ground
types to ground types without functions. Because it is a recursive function whose well-
foundedness is not immediate, we split it in one function b c that recurses structurally on
its argument, and one function T → U that expects a function type whose type arguments
contain no arrows, and recurses structurally on its left hand side argument.
Figure 8.1.: Fun-less data types
bA→ Bc def= TbAc → bBcU
bA1 ×A2c
def
= bA1c × bA2c
b1c def= 1
bA1 +A2c
def
= bA1c+ bA2c
b0c def= 0
T(A1 ×A2)→ CU
def
= TA1 → TA2 → CUU
T1→ BU def= B
T(A1 +A2)→ BU
def
= TA1 → BU× TA2 → BU
T0→ BU def= 1
In Figure 8.2 (Isomorphisms for fun-less types) we define isomorphism from and to these
fun-less types, for closed terms and for semantic values: if v has type A, then bvcA has
type bAc, and conversely if v has type bAc then dveA has type A.
Lemma 8.5.1 (Isomorphism).
dbvcAeA = v
dbtcAeA ≈βη t
Proof. By case analysis. 
Lemma 8.5.2 (Commutation of isomorphisms).
bJt KMcA = JbtcA KM
dJt KMeA = JdteA KM
Proof. By case analysis. 
Theorem 8.5.3 (Reification).
For each value v in JA KM we can define a term reifyM(v) in M(A) such that
JreifyM(v) KM = v
Proof. We define reifyM(v) on general ground types as
dreify′M(bvcA)eA
where reify′M(v) is only defined on types without functions. The definition of reify
′
M(v)
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Figure 8.2.: Isomorphisms for fun-less types
b(v1, v2)c
def
= (bv1c, bv2c)
b(i, v)c def= (i, bvc)
b?c def= ?
bv ∈ JA→ B Kc def= Tw 7→ bv(dwe)cU
d(v1, v2)e
def
= (dv1e, dv2e)
d(i, v)e def= (i, dve)
d?e def= ?
dveTbAc→bBcU
def
= Vw 7→ dv(bwc)eW
b(t1, t2)c
def
= (bt1c, bt2c)
bσi tc
def
= σi btc
b()c def= ()
bt : A→ Bc def= Tλx. bt dxecU
d(t1, t2)e
def
= (dt1e, dt2e)
dσi te
def
= σi dte
d()e def= ()
dtebAc→bBc
def
= Vλx. dt bxceW
TtUA1×A2→B
def
= Tλx1.Tλx2. t (x1, x2)UA2→BUA1→TA2→BU
TtU1→B
def
= t ()
TtUA1+A2→B
def
= (Tλx. t (σ1 t)UA1→B,Tλx. t (σ2 t)UA2→B)
TtU0→B
def
= ()
VtWA1×A2→B
def
= λx. VVtWA1→TA2→BU (π1 x)WA2→B (π2 x)
VtW1→B
def
= λx. t
VtWA1+A2→B
def
= λx. match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → Vπ1 tWA1→B x1σ2 x2 → Vπ2 tWA2→B x2
VtW0→B
def
= λx. absurd(x)
TvUA1×A2→B
def
= Tw1 7→ Tw2 7→ v((w1, w2))UA2→BUA1→TA2→BU
TvU1→B
def
= v(?)
TvUA1+A2→B
def
= (Tw 7→ v(((1, v)))UA1→B,Tw 7→ v(((2, v)))UA2→B)
TvU0→B
def
= ?
VvWA1×A2→B
def
= (w1, w2) 7→ VVvWA1→TA2→BU(w1)WA2→B(w2)
VvW1→B
def
= ? 7→ v
V(v1, v2)WA1+A2→B
def
= (i, w) 7→ VviWAi→B(w)
VvW0→B
def
= ∅
is given below:
reify′M((v1, v2))
def
= (reify′M(vi), reify
′
M(vi))
reify′M((i, v))
def
= σi reify
′
M(v)
reify′M(?)
def
= ()
and we can immediately check that Jreify′M(v) KM = v.
It then remains to check that
JreifyM(v) KM = v
which is proved as follows, using Lemma 8.5.1 (Isomorphism) and Lemma 8.5.2 (Commu-
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tation of isomorphisms).
JreifyM(v) KM
= Jdreify′M(bvcA)eA KM
= dJreify′M(bvcA) KMeA
= dbvcAeA
= v

Corollary 8.5.4 (Reification of typings).
JΓ ` A KM 6= ∅ =⇒ M(Γ) ` M(A)
Proof. If JΓ ` A KM is inhabited, then so is the isomorphic JΓ→ A KM, where Γ → A is
understood as a function type abstracting over all types of Γ. Let v ∈ JΓ→ A KM; by
reification we then have reifyM(v) :M(Γ→ A), and thus
M(Γ) ` reifyM(v) x1 . . . xn :M(A)
where x1, . . . , xn are the variables of Γ. 
Lemma 8.5.5.
Reification is an inverse modulo βη-equivalence For any closed term of ground type ∅ ` t :
A we have
reifyM(Jt KM) ≈βη t
Proof. We first check that, for types A without function types, reify′M( ) is the inverse
of J KM modulo β:
reify′M(Jt KM) ≈β t
Let t′ be the β-normal form of t. By Theorem 8.4.3 (Semantic soundness of βη-equivalence),
we have Jt KM = Jt
′ KM, and of course t ≈βη t′. It thus suffice to check that reify′M(Jt′ KM) ≈βη
t′ holds for all β-normal forms t′. This is easily done by inversion on the possible well-
typed normal forms in an empty context: a closed normal-form of type A1 + A2 must be
of the form σi t, a closed normal-form of type A1 × A2 must be of the form (t1, t2), and
a closed normal-form of type 1 must be (). The fact that A contains no function type
ensures that we never have to go under a binder, and thus that the context remains empty
– preserving our induction hypothesis.
It then remains to check that
reifyM(Jt KM) ≈βη t
holds in the general case of a type A with function types, which is proved as follows, using
Lemma 8.5.2 (Commutation of isomorphisms) and Lemma 8.5.1 (Isomorphism):
reifyM(Jt KM)
= dreify′M(bJt KMcA)eA
= dreify′M(JbtcA KM)eA
= dreify′M(JbtcA KM)eA
≈β dbtcAeA
≈βη t

Theorem 8.5.6 (Contextual equivalence implies semantic equivalence).
If t and t′ are contextually equivalent, then they are semantically equivalent.
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Proof. By contraposition, let us assume that for Γ ` t, t′ : A we have a model M and
a semantic valuation G ∈ JΓ KM such that Jt KM(G) 6= Jt′ KM(G), and build a context
∅ ` C [M(Γ) `  :M(A)] : 1 + 1 such that C [t] ≈β C [t′].
We reason by induction on A, with a slightly stronger induction hypothesis. For a fixed
model M, we assume a pair t, t′ of terms typed in the ground types of M, M(Γ) ` t, t′ :
M(A), such that Jt KM 6= Jt′ KM, and we build a context C inM such that C [t] ≈β C [t′].
This stronger induction hypothesis let us use “non-standard terms” to build our con-
texts, terms that are well-typed in M(A) but not in A.
If A is 1, the assumption Jt KM(G) 6= Jt′ KM(G) is absurd, as those two values live in the
same one-element set {?}.
If A is B → C, we have w ∈ JB KM such that Jt KM(G)(w) 6= Jt′ KM(G)(w), that is,
Jt reifyM(w) KM(G) 6= Jt′ reifyM(w) KM(G). By induction hypothesis on B, we thus
have a closed context C such that C [t reifyM(w)] ≈β C [t′ reifyM(w)] – notice the use
of the non-standard term reifyM(w) to invoke our induction hypothesis here. We can
thus conclude with the context C [ reifyM(w)].
If A is A1×A2, we know that the semantic value of t is some pair (v1, v2), similarly the
one of t′ is some (v′1, v
′
2). Our inequality assumption gives us a i ∈ {1, 2} such that vi 6= v′i,
in other words, Jπi t KM(G) 6= Jπi t′ KM(G). By induction hypothesis on Ai we have some
C that distinguishes πi t from πi t
′, and we can conclude with the context C [πi ].
If A is A1 +A2, the value Jt KM(G) is a pair (i, v), and the value Jt
′ KM(G) a pair (j, v
′).
Our inequivalence assumption tells us that either i 6= j or v 6= v′ ∈ JAi KM.
In the first case, we can use the context C
def
= (match  with | σ1 x→ σ1 () | σ2 x→ σ2 ()).
We have JC [t] KM(G) = (i, ?) and JC [t
′] KM(G) = (j, ?), so in particular C [t] ≈sem C [t′];
by the contrapositive of Theorem 8.4.3 (Semantic soundness of βη-equivalence) we can
then deduce that C [t] ≈βη C [t′], so a fortiori C [t] ≈β C [t′].
In the second case, let us assume without loss of generality that i = j = 1; we have that
JreifyM(v) KM = v 6= v′ = JreifyM(v′) KM, so by induction hypothesis on A1 we have
a context C1 [M(Γ) `  :M(A1)] such that C1 [reifyM(v)] ≈β C1 [reifyM(v′)]. Let
us define the context C
def
= (match  with | σ1 x→ C1 [x] | σ2 y → σk ()), for k ∈ {1, 2}
arbitrary. We have
JC [t] KM(G)
= match(Jt KM, JC1 [x] KM, Jσk () KM)
= JC1 [x] KM(G, x 7→ v)
= JC1 [reifyM(v)] KM(G)
and likewise JC [t′] KM(G) = JC1 [reifyM(v
′)] KM(G), so the two interpretations are dis-
tinct, and thus C [t] ≈β C [t′]. 
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Part II.
Focusing for program equivalence
and unique inhabitation
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9. Counting terms and proofs
9.1. Introduction
In Section 3.1.2 (The Curry-Howard isomorphism, technically) we presented a correspon-
dence between natural-deduction proofs of propositional intuitionistic logic, usually writ-
ten as (logic) derivations for judgments of the form Γ ` A, and well-typed terms in the
simply-typed lambda-calculus, with (typing) derivations for the judgment Γ ` t : A. This
correspondence is not one-to-one. In typing judgments Γ ` t : A, the context Γ is a
mapping from free variables to their type. In logic derivations, the context Γ is a set of
hypotheses; there is no notion of variable, and at most one hypothesis of each type in the
set. This means, for example, that the following logic derivation
A ` A
A ` A→ A
∅ ` A→ A→ A
corresponds to two distinct programs, namely λx. λy. x and λx. λy. y. We say that those
programs have the same shape, in the sense that the erasure of their typing derivation
gives the same logic derivation – and they are the only programs of this shape.
Despite, or because, not being one-to-one, this correspondence is very helpful to answer
questions about type systems. For example, the question of whether, in a given typing
environment Γ, the type A is inhabited, can be answered by looking instead for a valid
logic derivation of bΓc ` A, where bΓc denotes the erasure of the mapping Γ into a set
of hypotheses. In Section 6.2 (Rudiments of proof search) we have proved that only a
finite number of different types need to be considered to find a valid proof (this is the
case for propositional logic because of the subformula property). As a consequence, there
are finitely many set-of-hypothesis ∆, and the search space of sequents ∆ ` B to consider
during proof search is finite. This property is key to the termination of proof search
algorithm for propositional logic – Theorem 6.2.8 (Propositional logic is decidable). Note
that it would not work if we searched typing derivations Γ ` t : A directly: even if there
are finitely many types of interest, the set of mappings from variables to such types is
infinite.
In the present thesis, we are interested in a different problem. Instead of knowing
whether there exists a term t such that Γ ` t : A, we want to know whether this term is
unique – modulo a given notion of program equivalence. Intuitively, this can be formulated
as a search problem where search does not stop at the first candidate, but tries to find
whether a second one (that is nonequivalent as a program) exists. In this setting, the
technique of searching for logic derivations bΓc ` A instead is not enough, because a unique
logic derivation may correspond to several distinct programs of this shape: summarizing
typing environments as set-of-hypotheses loses information about (non)-unicity, it is not
complete for unicity.
To better preserve this information, one could keep track of the number of times a
hypothesis has been added to the context, representing contexts as multisets of hypothe-
ses; given a logic derivation annotated with such counts in the context, we can precisely
compute the number of programs of this shape. However, even for a finite number of type-
s/formulas, the space of such multisets is infinite; this breaks termination arguments. A
natural idea is then to approximate multisets by labeling hypotheses with 0 (not available
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in the context), 1 (added exactly once), or 2̄ (available two times or more); this two-or-
more approximation has three possible states, and there are thus finitely many contexts
annotated in this way.
The question we answer in this chapter is the following: is the two-or-more approxima-
tion correct? By correct, we mean that if the precise number of times a given hypothesis
is available varies, but remains in the same approximation class, then the total number
of programs of this shape may vary, but will itself remain in the same approximation
class. A possible counter-example would be a logic derivation ∆ ` B such that, if a given
hypothesis A ∈ ∆ is present exactly twice in the context (or has two free variables of
this type), there is one possible program of this shape, but having three copies of this
hypothesis would lead to several distinct programs.
Is this approximation correct? We found it surprisingly difficult to have an intuition
on this question (guessing what the answer should be), and discussions with colleagues
indicate that there is no obvious guess – people have contradictory intuitions on this. We
show (Corollary 9.3.6 (Two-or-more approximation)) that this approximation is in fact
correct.
9.2. Terms, types and derivations
We will manipulate several different systems of inference rules and discuss the relations
between them: the type system, the logic, and inference systems annotated with counts
(precise and approximated). To work uniformly over those various judgments, we will
re-define their context structure as a mapping from types to some set. A set of hypothesis
is now seen as a mapping from types to booleans, a multiset is a mapping to natural
number, and typing judgment is a mapping from types to sets of free variables (we inverse
the usual association order).
In this chapter, we shall write T for the set of formulas or types of PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0)
defined in Figure 1.1 (Formulas of the propositional intuitionistic logic). Besides the set
of types T, we will write V for the set of term variables x, y, . . . , B for the set of booleans
{1, 0}, N for the (non-negative) natural numbers, and 2̄ for the set {0, 1, 2̄} used by the
two-or-more approximation – note the bar on 2̄ to indicate the extra element 2̄ and avoid
confusion with other notations for the booleans.
We write E → F for the set of functions from the set E to the set F , and cardinal(E)
for the cardinal of the set E.
To make our discussion of shapes (of propositional judgments) precise and notationally
convenient, we give a syntax for them in Figure 9.1 (Syntax of propositional shapes),
instead of manipulating derivation trees directly. A shape is a variable-less proof-term;
we will manipulate explicitly typed shapes, where variables have been replaced with their
typing information.
Figure 9.1.: Syntax of propositional shapes
S, T := typed shapes
| A,B,C axioms
| λA. S λ-abstraction
| S T application
| (S, T ) pair
| πi S projection
| () unit
| σi S sum injection
| match S with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 A1 → T1σ2 A2 → T2 sum destruction
| absurd(S) absurdity
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Shapes correspond to logic derivations, that is, proof term without variables. Instead
of a variable x : A, we just use the shape A. Similarly, the term λx. t, where the bound
variable x has type A, becomes the shape λA. S, where S is the shape of t.
There is an immediate mapping from valid derivations of the usual logic judgment Γ ` A
into shapes, which suggests reformulating the judgment as S :: Γ ` A. Valid judgments
are then in direct one-to-one mapping with their valid derivations – a principle all our
different judgments will satisfy. A gramatically correct shape S may be invalid, that is,
not correspond to any valid logic derivation S :: Γ ` A – for example π1 (λA.B) is an
invalid shape. We will only consider valid shapes, classified by the provability judgment
Γ ` A, in the rest of this document.
We will manipulate the following judgments, each annotated with a propositional shape
S:
• the provability judgment S :: Γ ` A, where the context Γ is in T→ B – isomorphic
to sets of types;
• the typing judgment S :: E ` t : A, where the context E is in T→ P(V) – isomorphic
to mappings from term variables to types;
• various counting judgments of the form S :: Φ `K A : a for a set K, where Φ is in
T → K – mapping from types to a multiplicity in K – and a, in K, represents the
output count of the derivation.
The context annotations of all those judgments each have a (commutative) monoid
structure ((+M ), 0M ) of a binary operation and its unit/neutral element: ((∨), 0) for B
and ((∪), ∅) for P(V). Our counting sets K will even have the stronger algebraic structure
of a semiring, we detail this in Section 9.3 (Counting terms in semirings). This is used to
define common notations as follows.
The binary operation of the monoid can be lifted to whole context, and we will write Γ,∆
for the addition of contexts: (Γ,∆)(A) = Γ(A) +M ∆(A). We will also routinely specify a
context as a partial mapping from types to annotations, for example the singleton mapping
[A 7→ a] (for some a in the codomain of the mapping); by this, we mean that the value for
any other element of the domain is the neutral element 0M . In particular, the notation Γ, A
on sets of hypotheses corresponds to the addition Γ, [A 7→ 1] in T → B, and the notation
Γ, x : A on mapping from variables to types corresponds to the addition Γ, [A 7→ {x}] in
T→ P(V).
Finally, for any function f : E → F , we will write b cf : T → E → T → F the
pointwise lifting of f on contexts: bΦcf (A)
def
= f(Φ(A)). In particular, b c6=∅ erases typing
environments T → P(V) into logic contexts T → B, b c6=0 erases multiplicity-annotated
contexts T → N into logic context T → B, and b ccardinal() erases typing environments
T→ P(V) into multiplicity-annotated contexts T→ N.
The logic and typing judgments are defined in Figure 9.2 (Shaped provability judgment)
and Figure 9.3 (Shaped typing judgment). In logic derivations we will simply write A for
the singleton mapping [A 7→ 1]. In typing derivations, we write x : A for the singleton
mapping [A 7→ {x}]. Similarly, the variable freshness condition x /∈ E means (∀A ∈ T, x /∈
E(A)).
Note that while changing the logic judgment from Γ ` A to S :: Γ ` A has the clear
notational benefit of making valid judgments equivalent to derivations, this argument does
not apply to changing the typing judgment from E ` t : A to S :: E ` t : A, as the valid
judgments E ` t : A are already in one-to-one correspondence with their derivations; S
adds some extra redundancy and could be computed from the triple (E, t, A) (or directly
from t if we had used explicitly typed λ-terms). The benefit of S :: E ` t : A is to let us
talk very simply of the logical shape of a program, without having to define an additional
erasure function from typing derivation to logical derivations: the set of programs of shape
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Figure 9.2.: Shaped provability judgment
Γ(A) = 1
A :: Γ ` A
S :: Γ, A ` B
λA. S :: Γ ` A→ B
S :: Γ ` A→ B T :: Γ ` A
S T :: Γ ` B
S :: Γ ` A T :: Γ ` B
(S, T ) :: Γ ` A×B
S :: Γ ` A1 ×A2
πi S :: Γ ` Ai
S :: Γ ` Ai
σi S :: Γ ` A1 +A2
S :: Γ ` A+B T1 :: Γ, A1 ` C T2 :: Γ, A2 ` C
match S with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 A1 → T1σ2 A2 → T2 :: Γ ` C
() :: Γ ` 1
S :: Γ ` 0
absurd(S) :: Γ ` A
Figure 9.3.: Shaped typing judgment
x ∈ E(A)
A :: E ` x : A
x /∈ E S :: E, x : A ` t : B
λA. S :: E ` λx. t : A→ B
S :: E ` t : A→ B T :: E ` u : A
S T :: E ` t u : B
S :: E ` t : A T :: E ` u : B
(S, T ) :: E ` (t, u) : A×B
S :: E ` t : A1 ×A2
πi S :: E ` πi t : Ai
S :: E ` t : Ai
σi S :: E ` σi t : A1 +A2
S :: E ` t : A+B x /∈ E, y /∈ E T1 :: E, x1 : A1 ` u1 : C T2 :: E, x2 : A2 ` u2 : C
match S with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 A1 → T1σ2 A2 → T2 :: E ` match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u1 : C
() :: E ` () : 1
S :: E ` t : 0
absurd(S) :: E ` absurd(t) : A
S and type A in the environment E is simply defined as:
{t | S :: E ` t : A}
9.3. Counting terms in semirings
We are trying to connect two distinct ways of “counting” things about a logic derivation
S :: Γ ` A. One is precise, it counts the number of distinct programs of shape S, and the
other is the two-or-more approximation.
We generalize those two ways of counting as instances of a generic counting scheme that
works for any semiring (K, 0K , 1K ,+K ,×K). A semiring is defined as a two-operation
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structure where (0K ,+K) and (1K ,×K) are monoids, (+K) commutes and distributes
over (×K) (which may or may not commute), 0K is a zero/absorbing element for (×K),
but (+K) and (×K) need not have inverses1
The usual semiring is (N, 0, 1,+, ∗), and it will give the precise counting scheme. The
2-or-more semiring, which we will call 2̄, will correspond to the approximated scheme:
• its support is 2̄ = {0, 1, 2̄}; 0K is 0, 1K is 1
• we define the addition by 1 +K 1 = 2̄ and 2̄ +K 1 = 2̄ +K 2̄ = 2̄.
• we define the (commutative) multiplication by 2̄×K 2̄ = 2̄.
Definition 9.3.1 Semiring notations.
Addition and multiplication can be lifted pointwise from K to T→ K: for any A ∈ T we
define (Φ +K Ψ)(A)
def
= Φ(A) +K Ψ(A) and (Φ×K Ψ)(A)
def
= Φ(A)×K Ψ(A).
Finally, we define a morphism from the semiring N to the semiring 2̄. Recall that ϕ :
K → K ′ is a semiring morphism if ϕ(0K) = 0K′ , ϕ(1K) = 1K′ , ϕ(a+K b) = ϕ(a) +K′ ϕ(b)
and ϕ(a×K b) = ϕ(a)×K′ ϕ(b).
Definition 9.3.2 The 2-or-more morphism ϕ2̄.
We define ϕ2̄ : N→ 2̄ as follows:
ϕ2̄(0) = 0
ϕ2̄(1) = 1
ϕ2̄(n) = 2̄ if n ≥ 2
ϕ2̄ is a semiring morphism.
Note that (B, 0, 1,∨,∧) is also a semiring. For any semiring K, the function ( 6= 0K) :
K → B (which we may also write ( 6= 0)) is a semiring morphism.
9.3.1. Semiring-annotated derivations
Given a semiring K, we now define derivations S :: Φ `K A : a where Φ is a set of types
labeled with counts in K (that is, an element of the product T→ K for some set Γ), and
a is itself in K.
We construct those inference rules such that, when K is instantiated with the semiring
of natural numbers N, they really count the different programs of the same shape. For
example, consider a logic derivation S :: Γ ` B starting with a function elimination rule
S1 :: Γ ` A→ B S2 :: Γ ` A
S1 S2 :: Γ ` B
A program of this shape is of the form t u, at type B; it can be obtained by pairing any
possible program t (of shape S1) at type A→ B with any possible program u at type A (of
shape S2), so the number of possible applications is the product of the number of possible
functions and possible arguments. Formally, we have that, for any typing environment E,
writing cardinal(S) for the cardinal of the set S:
{t0 | S1 S2 :: E ` B} =
{
(t u) | S1 :: E ` t : A→ B,
S2 :: E ` u : A
}
cardinal({t0 | S1 S2 :: E `
B}) = cardinal({t | S1 :: E ` t : A→ B})× cardinal({u | S2 :: E ` u : A})
This suggests the following semiring-annotated inference rule:
S1 :: Φ `K A→ B : a1 S2 :: Φ `K B : a2
S1 S2 :: Φ `K B : a1 ×K a2
1For a ring (K, 0K , 1K ,+K ,×K), (+K) must be invertible, so Z is a ring while N is only a semiring.
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The other rules are constructed in the same way, and the full inference system is given
in Figure 9.4 (Shaped counting judgment). We write A : a for the singleton mapping
[A 7→ a].
Figure 9.4.: Shaped counting judgment
A :: Φ `K A : Φ(A)
S :: Φ, A : 1 `K B : a
λA. S :: Φ `K A→ B : a
S1 :: Φ `K A→ B : a1 S2 :: Φ `K A : a2
S1 S2 :: Φ `K B : a1 × a2
S1 :: Φ `K A : a1 S2 :: Φ `K B : a2
(S1, S2) :: Φ `K A×B : a1 × a2
S :: Φ `K A1 ×A2 : a
πi S :: Φ `K Ai : a
S :: Φ `K Ai : a
σi S :: Φ `K A1 +A2 : a
S :: Φ `K A1 +A2 : a1 T1 :: Φ, A1 : 1 `K C : a2 T2 :: Φ, A2 : 1 `K C : a3
match S with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 A1 → T1σ2 A2 → T2 :: Φ `K C : a1 × a2 × a3
() :: Φ `K 1 : 1
S :: Φ `K 0 : a
absurd(S) :: Φ `K A : a
The identity rule says that if we have a different program variables of type A in our
context, then using the variable rule of our typing judgment we can form a different
programs. In particular, if A is absent from the context Φ, we have A :: Φ ` A : 0.
In the function-introduction rule, the number of programs of the form λx. t : A → B
is the number of programs t : B in a context enriched with one extra variable of type
A. The most complex rule is the sum elimination rule: the number of case-eliminations
(match t with | σ1 x1 → u1 | σ2 x2 → u2) : C is the product of the number of possible
scrutinees t : A + B and cases u1 : C and u2 : C, with u1 and u2 built from one extra
formal variable of type A or B accordingly.
We now precisely formulate the fact that the system `N really counts the number of
programs of a given shape. Recall that b ccardinal() : (T → P(V)) → (T → N) erases a
typing environment into a multiplicity-annotated context.
Lemma 9.3.1 (Cardinality count).
For any typing environment E ∈ T→ P(V), shape S and type A, the following is derivable:
S :: bEccardinal() `N A : cardinal({t | S :: E ` t : A})
Proof. By induction on the shape S, using the following equalities (obtained by inversion
of the shape-directed typing judgment):
{t0 | A :: E ` t0 : A} = {x ∈ E(A)}
{t0 | λA. S :: E ` t0 : A→ B} = {λx. t | S :: E, x : A ` t : A}
{t0 | S T :: E ` t0 : B} =
{
t u | S :: E ` t : A→ B
T :: E ` u : A
}
{t0 | (S, T ) :: E ` t0 : A} =
{
(t, u) | S :: E ` t : A
T :: E ` u : B
}
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{t0 | πi S :: E ` t0 : A} = {πi t | S :: E ` t : A}
{t0 | σi S :: E ` t0 : A} = {σi t | S :: E ` t : A}
{t0 | match S with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 A1 → T1σ2 A2 → T2 :: E ` t0 : C}
=
match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2 |
S :: E ` t : A1 +A2
T1 :: E, x1 : A1 ` u1 : C
T2 :: E, x2 : A2 ` u2 : C

{t | () :: E ` t : 1} = {()}
{t | absurd(S) :: E ` absurd(t) : A} = {t | S :: E ` t : 0}

While the inference system `N corresponds to counting programs of a given shape (we
formally claim and prove it below), other semirings indeed correspond to counting schemes
of interest. The system `2̄ corresponds to the “two-or-more” approximation, as can be
exemplified by the following derivations:
(A) :: A : 2̄ `2̄ A : 2̄
(λA.A) :: A : 1 `2̄ A→ A : 2̄
(λA. λA.A) :: ∅ `2̄ A→ A→ A : 2̄
(A) :: A : 2̄ `2̄ A : 2̄
(λA.A) :: A : 2̄ `2̄ A→ A : 2̄
(λA. λA.A) :: A : 1 `2̄ A→ A→ A : 2̄
(λA. λA. λA.A) :: ∅ `2̄ A→ A→ A→ A : 2̄
When adding the hypothesis in the context in the context, its count goes from 0 to 1 – we
have ∅(A) = 0 by definition. When adding it the second time, its count goes from 1 to 2̄.
But on the third addition on the right, the count remains 2̄, as in the semiring 2̄ we have
2̄ + 1 = 2̄.
The `B system intuitively corresponds to a system where the two possible counts are
“zero” and “one-or-more”, that is, it only counts inhabitation. There is a precise corre-
spondence between this system and the logic derivation we formulated: derivations of the
form S :: Γ ` A : 1 are in one-to-one correspondence with valid logic derivations S :: Γ ` A,
and derivations S :: Γ ` A : 0 correspond to invalid logic derivations, where the shape S is
valid but the context Γ lacks some hypothesis used in S. In particular, ∅ ` A : 0 is always
provable by immediate application of the variable rule.
Lemma 9.3.2 (Provability count).
There is a one-to-one correspondence between logic derivations of S :: Γ ` A and B-
counting derivations of S :: Γ `B A : 1.
Proof. Immediate by induction on the shape S. 
9.3.2. Semiring morphisms determine correct approximations
The key reason why the two-or-more approximation is correct is that the mapping from N
to 2̄ is a semiring morphism and, as such, preserves the annotation structure of counting
derivations.
Theorem 9.3.3 (Morphism of derivations).
If ϕ : K → K ′ is a semiring morphism and S :: Φ ` A : a holds, then S :: bΦcϕ ` A : ϕ(a)
also holds.
Proof. By induction on S.
A :: Φ `K A : Φ(A) ⇒ A :: bΦcϕ `K′ A : ϕ(Φ(A))
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S :: Φ, A : 1K `K B : a
λA. S :: Φ `K A→ B : a
⇒
S :: bΦcϕ, A : 1
′
K `K′ B : ϕ(a)
λA. S :: bΦcϕ `K′ A→ B : ϕ(a)
To use our induction hypothesis, we needed the fact that bΦcϕ, A : 1′K is equal to
bΦ, A : 1Kcϕ; this comes from the fact that ϕ is a semiring morphism: ϕ(1K) = ϕ(1′K)
and ϕ(a+K b) = ϕ(a) +
′
K ϕ(b), thus bΦ,Ψcϕ = bΦcϕ, bΨcϕ.
S1 :: Φ `K A→ B : a1 S2 :: Φ `K A : a2
S1 S2 :: Φ `K B : a1 × a2
⇒
S1 :: bΦcϕ `K′ A→ B : ϕ(a1) S2 :: bΦcϕ `K′ A : ϕ(a2)
S1 S2 :: bΦcϕ `K′ B : ϕ(a1)× ϕ(a2)
To conclude we then use the fact that ϕ(a1)× ϕ(a2) = ϕ(a1 × a2).
S1 :: Φ `K A : a1 S2 :: Φ `K B : a2
(S1, S2) :: Φ `K A×B : a1 × a2
⇒
S1 :: bΦcϕ `K′ A : ϕ(a1) S2 :: bΦcϕ `K′ B : ϕ(a2)
(S1, S2) :: bΦcϕ `K′ A×B : ϕ(a1)× ϕ(a2)
S :: Φ `K A1 ×A2 : a
πi S :: Φ `K Ai : a
⇒
S :: bΦcϕ `K′ A1 ×A2 : ϕ(a)
πi S :: bΦcϕ `K′ Ai : ϕ(a)
S :: Φ `K Ai : a
σi S :: Φ `K A1 +A2 : a
⇒
S :: bΦcϕ `K′ Ai : ϕ(a)
σi S :: bΦcϕ `K′ A1 +A2 : ϕ(a)
S :: Φ `K A+B : a1 T1 :: Φ, A1 : 1K `K C : a2 T2 :: Φ, A2 : 1K `K C : a3
match S with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 A1 → T1σ2 A2 → T2 :: Φ `K C : a1 × a2 × a3
⇒
S :: bΦcϕ `K′ A+B : ϕ(a1) T1 :: bΦcϕ, A1 : 1
′
K `K′ C : ϕ(a2) T2 :: bΦcϕ, A2 : 1
′
K `K′ C : ϕ(a3)
match S with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 A1 → T1σ2 A2 → T2 :: bΦcϕ `K′ C : ϕ(a1)× ϕ(a2)× ϕ(a3)
() :: Φ `K 1 : 1K
⇒
() :: bΦcϕ `K′ 1 : 1
′
K
S :: Φ `K 0 : a
absurd(S) :: Φ `K A : a
⇒
S :: Φ `K′ 0 : ϕ(a)
absurd(S) :: bΦcϕ `K′ A : ϕ(a)

From there, it remains to point out that the right-hand side count is uniquely determined
by the context multiplicity.
Lemma 9.3.4 (Determinism).
If S :: Φ `K A : a and S :: Φ `K A : b then a = b.
Proof. Immediate by induction on derivations. Note that the fact that the judgments are
indexed by the same shape S is essential here. 
Corollary 9.3.5 (Relation under morphism).
If ϕ : K → K ′ is a semiring morphism and bΦ1cϕ = bΦ2cϕ, then S :: Φ1 `K A : a1 and
S :: Φ2 `K A : a2 imply ϕ(a1) = ϕ(a2)
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Proof. By Theorem 9.3.3 (Morphism of derivations), we have S :: bΦ1cϕ `K′ A : ϕ(a1)
and S :: bΦ2cϕ `K′ A : ϕ(a2). If bΦ1cϕ = bΦ2cϕ we can conclude by Lemma 9.3.4
(Determinism) that ϕ(a1) = ϕ(a2). 
Corollary 9.3.6 (Two-or-more approximation).
The 2-or-more approximation is correct to decide unicity of inhabitants of a given shape
S. If bE1cϕ2̄·cardinal() = bE2cϕ2̄·cardinal(), then
ϕ2̄(cardinal({t | S :: E1 ` t : A})) = ϕ2̄(cardinal({t | S :: E2 ` t : A}))
Proof. By Lemma 9.3.1 (Cardinality count), counting the inhabitants corresponds to the
system `N, so we have
S :: bE1ccardinal() `N A : cardinal({t | S :: E1 ` t : A})
S :: bE2ccardinal() `N A : cardinal({t | S :: E2 ` t : A})
The result then directly comes from the previous corollary, given that ϕ2̄ is a semiring
morphism. 
9.4. n-or-more logics
The result can be extended to any “n-or-more” approximation scheme given by the semir-
ing n̄ and semiring morphism ϕn̄ : N→ n̄ defined as follows (assuming n > 1):
n̄
def
= {0, 1, . . . , n− 1, n} 0n̄
def
= 0 1n̄
def
= 1
(a+n̄ b)
def
= min(a+N b, n) (a×n̄ b)
def
= min(a×N b, n)
To check that ϕn̄ is indeed a morphism, one needs to remark that having either a > n
or b > n implies (a+N b) > n and, if a and b are non-null, (a ∗N b) > n.
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10. Focused λ-calculus
Term syntaxes for focused sequent calculi appear relatively exotic to the user of strongly-
typed functional languages that is familiar with λ-calculus.
In this chapter we build this presentation of “focused λ-terms”, which will be useful for
the results of the latter chapters, when they are formulated in natural deduction style. We
find interesting that it is possible to describe their syntax in a fairly non-invasive way, that
should be familiar to people used to λ-calculi. It is mostly a refinement of the distinction,
on β-normal forms, between constructors and neutral terms.
10.1. Intuitionistic natural deduction, focused
There are two paths to focused natural deduction.
• We could start from the usual natural deduction, convert non-invertible rules into
rules with an explicit focus, and check that the resulting system has the properties
we expect of a focusing system.
• We could start from focused sequent calculus, and apply the simple transformation of
writing all elimination rules “upside down” to get a subsystem of natural deduction
that is equivalent, by construction, to the focused sequent calculus we started from.
The good news is that those two paths bring us to the same end point, that we are
going to present now.
The right-introduction rules of natural deduction and sequent calculus coincide, so we
should expect that, in a structural presentation of focused natural deduction, the same
right-introduction rule can be reused. The only change concerns the left-introduction and
elimination rules.
10.1.1. Invertibility of elimination rules
Consider for example:
seq-impl-left
Γ ` A Γ, B ` C
Γ, A→ B ` C
nd-impl-elim
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
seq-disj-left
Γ, A1 ` C
Γ, A2 ` C
Γ, A1 +A2 ` C
nd-disj-elim
Γ ` A1 +A2
Γ, A1 ` C
Γ, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
The definition of invertibility that we used for introduction rules (the conclusion is
invertible if and only if all premises are) is not suited for elimination rules.
For nd-impl-elim for example, the first question is the status of the formula A appear-
ing in the premises but not in the conclusion – this situation arises from the fact that
elimination rules do not have the subformula property. It makes little sense to wonder
whether Γ ` A → B is provable for all formulas A: it is almost never the case that
(∀A, Γ ` A → B), consider the case where B is 0. Another choice would be the existen-
tial quantification: is it the case that (∃A, (Γ ` A → B) ∧ (Γ ` A)) holds if and only
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if (Γ ` B) holds? Unfortunately, this existentially-quantified proposition is trivially true
(take A
def
= 1).
We do not quite know how to give an interesting interpretation of invertibility for this
elimination rule for implications. Furthermore, we would expect any reasonable definition
to make implication-elimination non-invertible, and disjunction-elimination non-invertible,
and this seems incompatible with using (a variant of) the definition opposing conclusions
and premises.
Instead, we will rely on the rootward reading of elimination rules: the elimination of
implications let us deduce Γ ` B from Γ ` A → B – whenever Γ ` A is provable. This
suggests that we could reason about the invertibility of this rule by starting from the
eliminated premise, rather than from the conclusion. We propose the following notion of
invertibility for elimination rules.
Definition 10.1.1 Invertible elimination rule.
An elimination rule is invertible if, whenever its eliminated premise is provable, then its
conclusion is provable if and only if it is provable using this elimination rule.
The definition captures the intuition that an invertible rule “can always be applied”,
but in a situation where we do not decide which rule to apply by looking at the conclusion
judgment, but by looking at the eliminated premise. Let us highlight the eliminated
premise in both elimination rules:
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A
Γ ` B
Γ ` A1 +A2 Γ, A1 ` C Γ, A2 ` C
Γ ` C
We can check that, with this definition, the elimination of implication is non-invertible
and the elimination of disjunction is invertible, as expected. Invertibility fails when one of
the non-eliminated premises is non-provable, while the conclusion would be – by applying
another rule. For implication: if B is 1, both the eliminated premise and conclusion are
provable but Γ ` A may be non-provable. For disjunction: if Γ ` C is provable, then we
can build premises Γ, Ai ` C by weakening, so the rule is applicable.
10.1.2. Intercalation syntax
For non-invertible rules, sequent calculus has a construction on each side of the sequent: a
left-introduction judgment Γ, [A] `foc.l B and a right-introduction judgment Γ `foc.r [A]. In
natural deduction, both sorts of non-invertible rules (elimination or introduction) happen
on the right. If we used a syntax such as Γ `foc.elim [A] for non-invertible elimination rules,
there would thus be a risk of confusion with non-invertible introduction rules:
nat-foc-elim-impl-bad-notation
Γ `foc.elim [A→ B] Γ `foc.intro [A]
Γ `foc.elim [B]
nat-foc-intro-disj-bad-notation
Γ `foc.intro [Ai]
Γ `foc.intro [A1 +A2]
Instead, we use the following syntax from Brock-Nannestad and Schürmann [2010], itself
inspired by the “intercalation calculus”:
nat-foc-elim-impl
Γ ⇓ A→ B Γ ⇑ A
Γ ⇓ B
nat-foc-intro-disj
Γ ⇑ Ai
Γ ⇑ A1 +A2
This notation is a good notation: there is a good way to reconstruct which direction
is associated with which rule. During proof search, elimination rules read rootward, they
tell us how to go from the eliminated premise to its conclusion, so it is natural that they
use the leafward arrow ⇓. Introduction rule read rootward, just as in the sequent calculus.
Remark 10.1.1. This notation also makes it visually obvious that implication elimination
implies a “change of polarity” but remains focused. It is even better than the sequent
calculus notation (touted for its visual symmetry) in this respect. ∗
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10.1.3. Structural focusing for natural deduction
We give the full rules of our focused natural deduction in Figure 10.1 (Focused natural
deduction, with explicit shifts), using explicit shifts in the style of Figure 7.7 (Focused
sequent calculus for polarized propositional intuitionistic logic), but a batch move rule for
invertible contexts as proposed in Section 7.3.2.
Figure 10.1.: Focused natural deduction, with explicit shifts
nat-inv-impl-intro
Γat; Σ, P `inv N |
Γat; Σ `inv P → N |
nat-inv-conj-intro
Γat; Σ `inv N1 |
Γat; Σ `inv N2 |
Γat; Σ `inv N1 ×N2 |
nat-inv-disj-elim
Γat; Σ, Q1 `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ, Q2 `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ, Q1 +Q2 `inv N | P at
nat-inv-false-elim
Γat; Σ, 0 `inv N | P at
nat-inv-true-intro
Γat; Σ `inv 1 |
nat-inv-foc
Γat,Γat
′ `foc (P at | Qat)
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`inv
〈
P at
〉−at | Qat
nat-foc-left-release-atom
Γat ⇓ X−
Γat `foc X−
nat-foc-left-release-shift
Γat ⇓ 〈P 〉− Γat;P `inv ∅ | Qat
Γat `foc Qat
nat-foc-contraction
Γat, N ⇓ N
nat-foc-right-release-atom
Γat, X+ ⇑ X+
nat-foc-right-release-shift
Γat; ∅ `inv N | ∅
Γat ⇑ 〈N〉+
nat-foc-right
Γat ⇑ P
Γat `foc P
nat-foc-conj-elim
Γat ⇓ N1 ×N2
Γat ⇓ Ni
nat-foc-impl-elim
Γat ⇓ P → N Γat ⇑ P
Γat ⇓ N
nat-foc-sum-intro
Γat ⇑ Pi
Γat ⇑ P1 + P2
The involved judgments are as follows:
• Γat; Σ `inv N | P at, the invertible judgment, with the same structure as a sequent-
calculus judgment Γat; Σ `inv N | P at
• Γat `foc P at, the judgment starting the focusing phase (a focus has not been chosen
yet), with the same structure as the sequent-calculus judgment Γat `foc P at
• Γat ⇑ P , the focused introduction judgment, corresponding to the right-focusing
sequent judgment Γat `foc.r [P ]
• Γat ⇓ N , the focused elimination judgment, corresponding to the left-focusing se-
quent judgment Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at.
The mapping between the various judgments is direct, except for the focused elimination
judgment whose proofs, compared to left-focusing proofs, are turned upside down. For
example, the “release” rules that explain how the focused phase stops (on an atom or a
shift) are now the rootwardmost rule of the elimination phase. Conversely, the counterpart
of the sequent rule that started a left-focusing phase (Γat, N), [N ] `foc.l P at now becomes
the leaf rule concluding Γat, N ⇓ N .
Remark 10.1.2. Let us compare the rules of left-introduction and elimination focusing
phases, in the case where they end up on a shifted positive formula – rather than a negative
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atom.
Γat, [N ] `foc.l Qat
Γat, N `foc Qat
seq
Γat;P `inv ∅ | Qat
Γat, [〈P 〉−] `foc.l Qat
seq
Γat ⇓ 〈P 〉− Γat;P `inv ∅ | Qat
Γat `foc Qat
nd
Γ, N ⇓ N
nd
In the sequent presentation, the left-focusing judgment remembers the goal Qat that
had to be proved at the beginning of the focusing phase. The focusing phase finishes at
the leafwardmost rule of the left-focusing sequence; in the shift case, the final positive
formula P is the “result” of this focused phase, and proof search starts again (with the
result in context) on Qat.
On the contrary, the elimination judgment Γat ⇓ N does not depend on the current goal
Qat at all, and its leafwardmost rule is a leaf rule of conclusion Γat, N ⇓ N . The result
formula P is not present in the leafwardmost rule, but in the rootwardmost rule (reversed
order); it is as this level that a new premise is added that tries again to prove Qat from
the result P .
This difference captures the essence of why some elimination rules in sequent calculus
are understood as a form of “continuation passing style”. We can think of a subgoal as a
recursive process called during proof search. The natural deduction rule that decides to
focus on eliminations calls the subgoal Γat ⇓ ? and inspects the results; when it is of the
form 〈P 〉−, it then calls the invertible judgment. On the contrary, the sequent rule that
decides left-focusing includes the current goal in the recursive call Γat, [N ] `foc.l Qat, and if
the left-introduction phase succeeds it directly continues with this goal, without returning
to its caller. ∗
10.1.4. Elimination or left-introduction rules for positives?
While we claim that the system of Figure 10.1 (Focused natural deduction, with explicit
shifts) is in natural deduction style, one cannot help noticing that the invertible rules are
actually sequent calculus rules; in particular, we have left-introduction rules for positives,
rather than elimination rules as expected. Is this system really natural deduction? We
have three different angles of answer.
First, we should point out that positive eliminations do not really fit natural deduction
in the first place. Even though they do have a formulation that is different from the
sequent calculus one, they stand out of the rest of the system and are the source of various
difficulties when studying the meta-theory of the mixed-polarity system. We are making
them more sequent-like than they were before, but the worm was already in the fruit. The
negative elimination rules are the usual one, and this is what makes a system distinctively
natural deduction in style.
Second, in a focused system, invertible rules do not really matter, because they are
automatically applied in an irrelevant order. As this process is deterministic, they could
in fact be removed from the term syntax, and reconstructed (in an irrelevant order) at
type-checking time. Again, what really matters are the non-invertible elimination rules.
Third and finally, we tried to look for a formulation of the invertible positive rules that
would be closer to the natural deduction rule, and didn’t find any. In particular, it is
interesting to see why the obvious idea does not work:
Γat; Σ `inv 〈P1 + P2〉− |
Γat; Σ, P1 `inv N | Qat
Γat; Σ, P2 `inv N | Qat
Γat; Σ `inv N | Qat
Γat; Σ `inv 〈0〉− |
Γat; Σ `inv N |
Those would be sensible invertible rule if we could always choose them without having
to make choices – choice is the privilege of non-invertible rules. They are not, because
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we cannot know locally whether 0 would be provable (in the right rule), or even which
P1 +P2 to attempt to prove (in the left rule). Furthermore, these invertible premises may
incur arbitrary proof search, including non-invertible rules.
One idea would be to restrict this unbounded-search premise to a more specific judg-
ment: instead of allowing any proofs of the positives to eliminate, could we allow only
“simple” proofs? Using the focused elimination judgment Γat ⇓ 〈P1 + P2〉− resembles the
restriction on normal natural proofs (the eliminated premise cannot be a constructor, so it
should start with an elimination or axiom rule), but it is still not invertible, as the focused
elimination judgment has to make choice.
There remain an even simpler notion of “being provable”: hypotheses are immediately
provable if they are in the assumption context. Due to the polarity invariants, we know
that positives are in Σ if they are in Γat,Σ. This suggests the following restriction of those
rules:
Σ 3 (P1 + P2)
Γat; Σ, P1 `inv N | Qat
Γat; Σ, P2 `inv N | Qat
Γat; Σ `inv N | Qat
0 3 Σ
Γat; Σ `inv N | Qat
These rules are (less convenient variants of) the sequent left-introduction rules that we
use.
10.1.5. Equivalence with the focused sequent calculus
Comparing arbitrary natural deduction and sequent-calculus proofs is delicate, and in
particular there is no one-to-one correspondence between cut-free proofs in either system.
The restrictions of focusing give more structure to cut-free proofs, which allow to get a
good correspondence.
Theorem 10.1.1 (Bijection between focused sequent calculus and focused natural deduc-
tion).
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the cut-free focused sequent calculus proofs
of Figure 10.1 (Focused natural deduction, with explicit shifts) and the cut-free focused nat-
ural deduction proofs of Figure 7.7 (Focused sequent calculus for polarized propositional
intuitionistic logic).
Proof. The general idea of the proof is that the difference between the two focused sys-
tems is a stylistic choice of direction: elimination rules in natural deduction are written
“rootward”, while the corresponding left-introduction rules of sequent calculus are written
“leafward”. To translate between the two systems, it thus suffices to reverse the direction
of these parts of the proof.
For example, consider the sequent proof:
Γat, [Z−] `foc.l Z−
Γat, [Y × Z−] `foc.l Z−
Γat, [X × (Y × Z−)] `foc.l Z−
Γat 3 X × (Y × Z−) `foc Z−
It corresponds to the following natural deduction proof, which is a direct reversal:
Γat ⇓ X × (Y × Z−)
Γat ⇓ Y × Z−
Γat ⇓ Z−
Γat 3 X × (Y × Z−) `foc Z−
In the general case, remark that there is a direct correspondence between:
• invertible sequent judgments Γat; Σ `inv N | P at and invertible natural deduction
judgments Γat; Σ `inv N | P at
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• right-focused sequent judgments Γat `foc.r [P ] and introduction-focused natural de-
duction judgments Γat ⇑ P
To complete our correspondence, we give a one-to-one mapping between:
• choice-of-focusing sequent judgments Γat `foc P at and focused natural deduction
judgments Γat `foc P
• partial left-focused and elimination-focused phases, which is the reversal we described
informally; it is a correspondence between partial proof derivations of the form
Γat, [N ′] `foc.l P at
Π
Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at
←→
Γat ⇓ N
Π′
Γat ⇓ N ′
We write Π←→ Π′ when this correspondence holds.
The correspondence on the choice-of-focusing judgments is as follows:
Γat `foc.r [P ]
Γat `foc P
←→
Γat ⇑ P
Γat `foc P
Γat, [X−] `foc.l X−
Π
Γat, [N ] `foc.l X−
Γat 3 N `foc X−
←→
Γat ⇓ N
Π′
Γat ⇓ X−
Γat 3 N `foc X−
when Π←→ Π′
Γat;Q `inv ∅ | P at
Γat, [〈Q〉−] `foc.l P at
Π
Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at
Γat 3 N `foc P at
←→
Γat ⇓ N
Π′
Γat ⇓ 〈Q〉− Γat;Q `inv ∅ | P at
Γat 3 N `foc P at
when
Π←→ Π′
The correspondence between the partial left-focused and elimination-focused phases is
as follows. First, we describe the correspondence between any inference rules (that is,
partial proofs of height 2):
Γat, [Ni] `foc.l P at
Γat, [N1 ×N2] `foc.l P at
←→
Γat ⇓ N×
Γat ⇓ Ni
Γat `foc.r [Q] Γat, [N ] `foc.l P at
Γat, [Q→ N ] `foc.l P at
←→
Γat ⇓ Q→ N Γat ⇑ Q
Γat ⇓ N
Then we can reverse longer proof by simply concatenating the reverses:
Γat, [N3] `foc.l P at
Π2
Γat, [N2] `foc.l P at
Π1
Γat, [N1] `foc.l P at
←→
Γat ⇓ N1
Π′1
Γat ⇓ N2
Π′2
Γat ⇓ N3
when Π1 ↔ Π′1, Π′2 ↔ Π′2

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10.2. A focused term syntax: focused λ-calculus
We propose a term syntax for this focused natural deduction that is as close as reasonably
possible to the λ-calculus – as we did for our term syntax for the sequent calculus in
Section 4.1.4 (A term syntax for the intuitionistic sequent calculus), we would like to
think of it as mostly a subset of λ-terms with minor additions.
Looking at the four judgments of our focused system, we propose the following classes
of terms:
• Terms for the invertible judgments Γat; Σ `inv N | P at contain a mix of constructors
and destructors and have subterms of arbitrary judgments; we will simply use the
class of arbitrary (cut-free) terms, with meta-variable t. We will sometimes call these
invertible terms to insist that they come from an invertible phase.
• Terms for the focused elimination judgment Γat ⇓ N are variables, to which a series
of elimination forms (function application or pair projection) are applied. This
corresponds to the usual class (in the purely negative fragment) of neutral terms,
often written with the meta-variable n. We call them negative neutral terms.
• Terms for the focused introduction judgment Γat ⇑ P are series of introduction forms,
eventually followed by an invertible proof term. We call them positive neutral terms,
and use the meta-variable p.
• The choice-of-focusing judgment Γat `foc Qat has no interesting structure of its own,
but it can become either an introduction-focused or elimination-focused phase, and
we use the meta-variable f where this choice occurs. We call them focusing terms.
The grammar is described in Figure 10.2 (Term grammar for the focused λ-calculus),
and the corresponding typing system (using mappings from term variables to types as
contexts, instead of sets) is given in Figure 10.3 (Typing rules for the focused λ-calculus).
We call this system the focused λ-calculus.
This grammar is designed to described well-typed terms, and we have used some typing
annotations, which are not actually part of the term syntax, but describe the expected
types of various subterms or variables – for the whole term to be well-typed. For example,
the class p of positive neutral terms includes the whole class η of invertible terms (which
itself includes f , in particular n and p), so as a grammar of untyped terms positive neutrals
and invertible terms seem to be equivalent. However, because we will only allow the use
of an invertible term inside a positive neutral at a negative type (and not in arbitrary
positions), the two classes are very different for well-typed terms and expose interesting
structure.
We could have a more explicit syntax, with term markers to indicate the various phase
transitions that would remove the ambiguities, but we suspect that it would be much less
pleasant to work with. In practice we will always manipulate typed terms, associated to
their typing derivation, from which all necessary structural information can be obtained.
Remark 10.2.1. Our focused sequent calculus was cut-free in the literal sense of not
having a cut rule. It is interesting to check that this focused natural deduction, and the
focused λ-calculus, are also “cut-free” in the sense that the terms are irreducible. At first
sight, this seems to come from the restriction on the elimination judgment Γ ` n ⇓ N ,
that elimination forms are only applied to neutrals and thus never create redexes. But this
omits an important subtlety of the system, namely the use of a let-binding to represent
(some) left focusing phases, let (x : P ) = n in t.
We think that this construction should not be considered as a cut; in particular, we
remark that if you substitute away all those let-bindings, the substituted term remains
irreducible: a variable (x : P ) of strictly positive type will always be matched-upon by
the next invertible phase, but it will always be substituted with a neutral term n so the
209
Figure 10.2.: Term grammar for the focused λ-calculus
t, u, r ::= (invertible) terms
| λx. t λ-abstraction
| (t, u) pair
| match x with | σ1 x→ u1 | σ2 x→ u2 variable case split
| () trivial
| absurd(x) absurd variable
| (f : P at) focusing term
f, g ::= focusing terms
| (n : X−) negative conclusion
| let (x : P ) = n in t positive binding
| (p : P ) positive conclusion
n,m ::= negative neutral terms
| πi n projection
| n p application
| (x : N) negative head variable
p, q ::= positive neutral terms
| σi p injection
| (x : X+) positive head variable
| (t : N) invertible conclusion
resulting elimination will never become a redex. One can talk of this let-binding as an
“irreducible cut”.
Another way to describe this would be to have a typing rule of the form
foclc-subst-pos
Γat ` n ⇓ 〈P 〉− Γat;x : P `inv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat `foc t[n/x] : Qat
so that proof terms are pure λ-terms (without let-bindings), but I personally dislike
having a typing rule that cannot at all be reconstructed from the syntactic structure of
its proof term. If necessary for precision and clarity, we should rather define an erasure
function from our focused λ-terms to usual λ-terms (substituting the let away), and
explicitly reason on the image of the erasure. ∗
10.2.1. Defocusing into non-focused λ-terms
We have glossed over the fact that focused λ-terms are not quite λ-terms as defined in
Figure 3.1 (Full simply-typed lambda-calculus ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)), because they use the
let x = t in u form that is not formally part of the syntax – it was only in our term
system for the sequent calculus drafted in Figure 4.2 (Terms of the sequent-form λ-calculus
SΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)).
In Figure 10.4 (Erasure of focusing btcfoc) we define the erasure of focusing operation
b cfoc that, for any focused λ-term t, gives its erasure as a simple λ-term btcfoc, obtained
by replacing each let x = t in u form by the substitution u[t/x].
In Chapter 7 (Focusing in sequent calculus), Section 7.4 (Direct relations between fo-
cused and non-focused systems), we established a translation from each focused sequent
proof of a judgment on polarized formulas A into a non-focused sequent proof of a judgment
on the corresponding depolarized formulas bAc±. We can now state a similar result for
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Figure 10.3.: Typing rules for the focused λ-calculus
foclc-lam
Γat; Σ, x : P `inv t : N |
Γat; Σ `inv λx. t : P → N |
foclc-pair
Γat; Σ `inv t1 : N1 |
Γat; Σ `inv t2 : N2 |
Γat; Σ `inv (t1, t2) : N1 ×N2 |
foclc-case
Γat; Σ, x : Q1 `inv t1 : N | P at
Γat; Σ, x : Q2 `inv t2 : N | P at
Γat; Σ, x : Q1 +Q2 `inv match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t1σ2 x→ t2 : N | P at
foclc-absurd
Γat;x : Σ, 0 `inv absurd(x) : N | P at
foclc-trivial
Γat; Σ `inv () : 1 |
foclc-inv-foc
Γat,Γat
′ `foc f : (P at | Qat)
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`inv f :
〈
P at
〉−at | Qat
foclc-concl-neg
Γat ` n ⇓ X−
Γat `foc n : X−
foclc-let-pos
Γat ` n ⇓ 〈P 〉− Γat;x : P `inv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat `foc let x = n in t : Qat
foclc-var-neg
Γat, x : N ` x ⇓ N
foclc-var-pos
Γat, x : X+ ` x ⇑ X+
foclc-foc-inv
Γat; ∅ `inv t : N |
Γat ` t ⇑ 〈N〉+
foclc-concl-pos
Γat ` p ⇑ P
Γat `foc p : P
foclc-proj
Γat ` n ⇓ N1 ×N2
Γat ` πi n ⇓ Ni
foclc-app
Γat ` n ⇓ P → N Γat ` p ⇑ P
Γat ` n p ⇓ N
foclc-inj
Γat ` p ⇑ Pi
Γat ` σi p ⇑ P1 + P2
Figure 10.4.: Erasure of focusing btcfoc
bλx. tcfoc
def
= λx. btcfoc
b(t1, t2)cfoc
def
= (bt1cfoc, bt2cfoc)⌊
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2
⌋
foc
def
= match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ bu1cfocσ2 x→ bu2cfoc
b()cfoc
def
= ()
babsurd(x)cfoc
def
= absurd(x)
blet x = n in tcfoc
def
= btcfoc[bncfoc/x]
bπi tcfoc
def
= πi btcfoc
bn pcfoc
def
= bncfoc bpcfoc
bxcfoc
def
= x
bσi tcfoc
def
= σi btcfoc
focused natural deduction, strengthened with a correspondence between the proof terms
themselves.
Lemma 10.2.1 (Type soundness of defocusing).
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The following implications hold:
Γat; Σ `inv t : N | P at =⇒ bΓatc± , bΣc± ` btcfoc : (bNc± | bP atc±)
Γat `foc f : P at =⇒ bΓatc± ` bfcfoc : bP atc±
Γat ` n ⇓ N =⇒ bΓatc± ` bncfoc : bNc±
Γat ` p ⇑ P =⇒ bΓatc± ` bpcfoc : bP c±
Proof. By direct mutual induction on the premises. 
The following technical lemma gives a specification of defocusing translations will be
useful to establish later results.
Lemma 10.2.2 (Composability of defocusing).
Any subterm of btcfoc is of the form
bucfoc[bn1cfoc/x1][bn2cfoc/x2] . . . [bnncfoc/xn]
where u is a subterm of t, and the let xi = ni are the let-bindings in t that scope over
u.
Proof. By induction on (the subterms of) t. 
10.2.2. Correspondence with focused sequent terms
Another natural translation for focused λ-terms is to translate them into proof terms
for the sequent calculus. We established a bijection between proof derivations in the two
system in Theorem 10.1.1 (Bijection between focused sequent calculus and focused natural
deduction), and this result naturally lifts into a bijection t ←→ t′ between well-typed
focused λ-terms and sequent terms well-typed in the focused sequent calculus.
We define in Figure 10.5 the translation Jt Kfocseq from focused λ-terms to sequent terms –
as defined in Section 4.1.4 (A term syntax for the intuitionistic sequent calculus). Negative
neutrals n are translated into linear binding contexts (see Figure 5.6), that is sequences of
let-bindings; more precisely, the translation of a negative neutral n binds some variable
x in a body t′, which is a sequent term. We write Jn Kxfocseq(t
′) for this translation.
In this document we use the notation Π :: Γ ` A to say that Π is a valid derivation of
the judgment Γ ` A. In the result below, we use the notation t :: J , where t is a sequent
term as defined in Section 4.1.4 (A term syntax for the intuitionistic sequent calculus), and
J is a judgment of the focused sequent calculus of Figure 7.8 (Focused sequent calculus
with polarized formulas and batch context validation), to say that t is a valid proof term
for the judgment J .
Lemma 10.2.3 (Type soundness of sequent translation).
The following implications hold:
Γat; Σ `inv t : N | P at =⇒ Jt Kfocseq :: Γat; Σ `inv N | P at
Γat `foc f : P at =⇒ Jf Kfocseq :: Γat `foc P at
Γat ` n ⇓ N =⇒ ∀x, t′, P at, t′ :: Γat, [x : N ] `foc.l P at =⇒ Jn Kxfocseq(t′) :: Γat `foc P at
Γat ` p ⇑ P =⇒ Jt′ Kfocseq :: Γat `foc.r [P ]
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation. 
Theorem 10.2.4 (Bijection between focused λ-terms and focused sequent terms).
The translation Jt Kfocseq is bijective: it establishes a one-to-one correspondence (for α-
equivalence) between well-typed focused λ-terms and well-typed focused sequent terms.
Proof. This is proved by exhibiting an inverse function, from focused typing derivations
for sequent terms to well-typed focused λ-terms, such that composing the two functions
gives the identity in either domains.
Most typing rules for focused sequent calculus correspond to exactly one case in the
definition of Jt Kfocseq, so the proof in these cases is immediate: there is exactly one possible
shape of the inverse λ-term, and this is the only translation rule for this shape.
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Figure 10.5.: Translating focused λ-terms into sequent term syntax
Jλx. t Kfocseq
def
= λx. Jt Kfocseq
J(t1, t2) Kfocseq
def
=
(
Jt1 Kfocseq, Jt2 Kfocseq
)
u
v
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2
}
~
focseq
def
=
match x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ Ju1 Kfocseqσ2 x→ Ju2 Kfocseq
J() Kfocseq
def
= ()
Jabsurd(x) Kfocseq
def
= absurd(x)
J(f : P at) Kfocseq
def
= Jf Kfocseq
J(n : X−) Kfocseq
def
= Jn Kxfocseq(x) for x fresh
Jlet x = n in t Kfocseq
def
= Jn Kxfocseq(Jt Kfocseq)
J(p : P ) Kfocseq
def
= Jp Kfocseq
Jπi n Kxfocseq(t
′)
def
= Jn Kyfocseq(let x = πi y in t
′) for y fresh
Jn p Kxfocseq(t
′)
def
= Jn Kyfocseq(let x = y p in t
′) for y fresh
J(y : N) Kxfocseq(t
′)
def
= t′[y/x]
Jσi p Kfocseq
def
= σi Jp Kfocseq
J(x : X+) Kfocseq
def
= x
J(t : N) Kfocseq
def
= Jt Kfocseq
The only exception, of course, concerns negative neutrals. When we have a sequent
derivation of the general form
u′ :: Γat, [y : N ] `foc.l P at
u′ :: Γat 3 y : N `foc P at
we do not know whether a term of the form (n : X−) or (let x = n in t) should be chosen
for the inverse translation.
This is solved by proving a stronger recursion hypothesis for the left-focusing case. We
present it as a nested lemma below. The proof of the theorem and the lemma are done
by mutual induction, but we prove them separately for readability.
Lemma 10.2.5 (Decomposition of left-focused phases).
For any well-typed left-focused sequent term u′ of the general form
u′ :: Γat, [y : N ] `foc.l P at
and a variable x, there is a unique pair of a negative neutral n and a subterm t′ of u′
Γat ` n ⇓ N t′ :: Γat, [x :
〈
Qat
〉−at
] `foc.l P at
such that
u′ =α Jn Kxfocseq(t
′)
Note that the uniqueness of the pair crucially depends on the hypothesis that x has a
shifted positive or atomic type 〈Qat〉−at, and thus corresponds to the end of the focusing
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phase. Without this constraint, if x could have any negative type M , then for example
the pair (x, u′) would also be a valid choice.
This lemma suffices to conclude the proof of the theorem: if the unique pair is of the
form (n, x), then the inverse λ-term is n, if it is of the form (n, t′) where t′ is not a variable,
then it is of the form let x = n in t, where t is the inverse of t′ – assuming inductively
that t′ has an inverse is correct as we know that t′ is a subterm of the term u′ we are
currently inverting. 
Proof (Lemma 10.2.5 (Decomposition of left-focused phases)). By induction on u′.
If it is of the form
x :: Γat, [x : X−] `foc.l X−
then the pair is just (x, x).
If it is of the form
t′ :: Γat;x : Q `inv P at |
t′ :: Γat, [x : 〈Q〉−] `foc.l P at
then the pair is (x, t′).
In the hereditary cases, we assume that u′ is built by applying a left-focused infer-
ence rule to some left-focused term r′, which is itself (by induction hypothesis) uniquely
decomposed through the variable y into a pair (n, t′). There are two such cases. If we
have
r′ :: Γat, [y : Ni] `foc.l P at
let y = πi x in r
′ :: Γat, [x : N1 ×N2] `foc.l P at
then the pair is (πi n, t
′), and if we have
p′ :: Γat `foc.r [P ] r′ :: Γat, [y : N ] `foc.l P at
let y = x p′ in r′ :: Γat, [x : P → N ] `foc.l P at
then the pair is (n p, t′), where p is the unique inverse image of p′: Jp Kfocseq =α p
′. 
After translating a focused λ-term into a focused sequent term, we could forget about the
focusing structure of this sequent term, and apply the general (not one-to-one) translation
J Knd of Lemma 4.2.7, from non-focused sequent terms to non-focused λ-terms. This is in
fact equivalent to the defocusing translation of Figure 10.4 (Erasure of focusing btcfoc).
Lemma 10.2.6 (Translation commutation).
r
Jt Kfocseq
z
nd
=α btcfoc
Proof. By induction on t. For neutral decomposition Jt Kxfocseq(t
′) we prove, by induction
on n,
∀n, t, t′,
q
t′
y
nd
=α btcfoc =⇒
r
Jn Kxfocseq(t
′)
z
nd
=α bncfoc[btcfoc/x]

10.3. Focusing completeness by big-step translation
Reference The present section is extracted from Scherer and Rémy [2015].
Theorem 10.3.1 (Completeness of focusing).
The focused intuitionistic logic is complete with respect to intuitionistic logic. It is also
computationally complete: any well-typed lambda-term is βη-equivalent to (the let-substitution
of) a proof witness of the focused logic.
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Proof (Logical completeness). This system naturally embeds into the system LJF of Liang
and Miller [2007] (by polarizing the products negatively), which is proved sound, and
complete for any polarization choice. 
Computational completeness could be argued to be folklore, or a direct adaptation of
previous work on completeness of focusing: a careful reading of the elegant presentation of
Simmons [2011] (or Laurent [2004] for linear logic) would show that its logical completeness
argument in fact proves computational correctness. Without sums, it exactly corresponds
to the fact that β-short η-long normal forms are computable for well-typed lambda-terms
of the simply-typed calculus.
We introduce an explicit η-expanding, let-introducing transformation from β-normal
forms to valid focused proofs for our system. Detailing this transformation also serves by
building intuition for the computational completeness proof of the saturating focused logic
in Figure 11.2 (Saturation translation), Section 11.4 (Canonicity of saturated proofs).
Proof (Computational completeness). Let us remark that simply-typed lambda-calculus
without fixpoints is strongly normalizing (Section 8.1 (Strong normalization for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0))),
and write NFβ(t) for the (full) β-normal form of t.
We define in Figure 10.6 an expansion relation Γat; Σ `inv t t′ : N | Qat that turns any
well-typed β-normal form bΓatc± , bΣc± ` t : b(N | Qat)c± into a valid focused derivation
Γat; Σ `inv t′ : N | Qat.
We use four mutually recursive judgments, one for each judgment in the focused λ-
calculus of Figure 10.3 (Typing rules for the focused λ-calculus): the invertible and focusing
translations Γat; Σ `inv t t′ : N | Qat and Γat `foc t t′ : Qat, and the negative and
positive neutral translations Γat ` n n′ ⇓ N and Γat ` t t′ ⇑ P . For the two first
judgments, the inputs are the context(s), source term, and translation type, and the output
is the translated term. For the neutral judgments the translation type is an output – this
reversal follows the usual bidirectional typing of normal forms.
Three distinct aspects of the translation need to be discussed:
1. Finiteness. It is not obvious that a translation derivation Γat; Σ `inv t t′ : N | Qat
exists for any bΓatc± , bΣc± ` t : b(N | Qat)c±, because subderivations of invertible
rules perform β-normalization of their source term, which may a priori make it grow
without bounds. It could be the case that for certain source terms, there does not
exist any finite derivation.
2. Partiality. As the rules are neither type- nor syntax-directed, it is not obvious
that any input term, for example match t1 t2 with | σ1 x1 → u1 | σ2 x2 → u2, has a
matching translation rule.
3. Non-determinism. The invertible rules are not quite typed-directed, and the rew-foc-elim
rule is deeply non-deterministic, as it applies for any neutral subterm of the term
being translated – that is valid in the current typing environment. This non-
determinism allows the translation to accept any valid focused derivation for an
input term, reflecting the large choice space of when to apply the foc-elim rule in
backward focused proof search.
Totality The use of β-normalization inside subderivations precisely corresponds to the
“unfocused admissibility rules” of Simmons [2011]. To control the growth of subterms in
the premises of rules, we will use as a measure (or accessibility relation) the three following
structures, from the less to the more important in lexicographic order:
• The (measure of the) types in the context(s) of the rewriting relation. This measure
is strictly decreasing in the invertible elimination rule for sums, but increasing for
the arrow introduction rule.
• The (measure of the) type of the goal of the rewriting relation. This measure is
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Figure 10.6.: Translation into focused terms
rew-inv-sum
Γat; Σ, x : P1 `inv NFβ(t[σ1 x/x]) t′1 : N | Qat
Γat; Σ, x : P2 `inv NFβ(t[σ2 x/x]) t′2 : N | Qat
Γat; Σ, x : A1 +A2 `inv t match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t′1σ2 x→ t′2 : N | Qat
rew-inv-arrow
Γat; Σ, x : P `inv NFβ(t x) u′ : N |
Γat; Σ `inv t λx. u′ : P → N |
rew-inv-prod
Γat; Σ `inv NFβ(π1 t) u′1 : N1 | Γat; Σ `inv NFβ(π2 t) u′2 : N2 |
Γat; Σ `inv t 
(
u′1, u
′
2
)
: N1 ×N2 |
rew-inv-foc
Γat,Γat
′ `foc t t′ : (P at | Qat)
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`inv t t′ :
〈
P at
〉−at | Qat
rew-foc-atom
Γat ` n n′ ⇓ X−
Γat `foc n n′ : X−
rew-foc-intro
Γat ` t t′ ⇑ P
Γat `foc t t′ : P
rew-foc-elim
Γat, x : P ` C[x] : Qat Γat ` n n′ ⇓ 〈P 〉− Γat;x : P `inv C[x] t′ : ∅ | Qat
Γat `foc C[n] let x = n′ in t′ : Qat
rew-up-sum
Γat ` t t′ ⇑ Pi
Γat ` σi t σi t′ ⇑ P1 + P2
rew-up-inv
Γat; ∅ `inv t t′ : N | ∅
Γat ` t t′ ⇑ 〈N〉+
rew-up-var
(x : X+) ∈ X+
Γat ` x x ⇑ X+
rew-down-var
(x : N) ∈ Γat
Γat ` x x ⇓ N
rew-down-pair
Γat ` n n′ ⇓ N1 ×N2
Γat ` πi n πi n′ ⇓ Ni
rew-down-arrow
Γat ` t : P
Γat ` n n′ ⇓ P → N Γat ` t t′ ⇑ P
Γat ` n t n′ t′ ⇓ N
strictly decreasing in the introduction rules for arrow, products and sums, but in-
creasing in rew-foc-elim or neutral rules.
• The set of (measures of) translation judgments Γat ` n n′ ⇓ N for well-typed
neutral subterms n of the translated term whose type N is of maximal mesaure.
Note that while that complexity seems to increase in the premises of the judgment
Γat ` n n′ ⇓ N , this judgment should be read top-down: all the sub-neutrals
of n already appear as subterms of the source t in the rew-foc-elim application
Γat `foc t ? : Qat that called Γat ` n ? ⇓ N .
This measure is non-increasing in all non-neutral rules other than rew-foc-elim, in
particular the rules that require re-normalization (β-reduction or η-reduction may
at best duplicate the occurrences of the neutral of maximal type, but not create
new neutrals at higher types). In the sum-elimination rule, the neutral x of type
P1 + P2 is shadowed by another neutral x of smaller type (P1 or P2). In the arrow
rule, a new neutral t x is introduced if t is already neutral, but then t x : N is at a
strictly smaller type than t : P → N . In the product rule, new neutral πi t : Ni are
introduced if t : N1 ×N2 is neutral, but again at strictly smaller types.
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Finally, this measure is strictly decreasing when applying rew-foc-elim. Note that
by typing we know that n, of shifted positive type 〈P 〉−, is not the whole term t, of
positive or atomic type Qat – ruling this case out is an advantage of using explicit
shifts, compared to the presentation of Scherer and Rémy [2015].
This three-fold measures proves termination of Γat; Σ `inv t ? : N | Qat seen as
an algorithm: we have proved that there are no infinite derivations for the translation
judgments.
Partiality The invertible translation rules are type-directed; the neutral translation rules
are directed by the syntax of the neutral source term. But the focusing translation rules
are neither type- nor source-directed. We have to prove that one of those three rule applies
for any term – assuming that the context is negative or atomic, and the goal type positive
or atomic.
The term t either starts with a constructor (introduction form), a destructor (elimination
form), or it is a variable; a constructor may be neither a λ or a pair, as we assumed the
type is positive or atomic. It starts with a non-empty series of sum injections, followed
by a negative or atomic term, we can use rew-foc-intro. Otherwise it contains (possibly
after some sum injections) a positive subterm that does not start with a constructor.
If it starts with an elimination form or a variable, it may or may not be a neutral term. If
it is neutral, then one of the rules rew-foc-atom (if the goal is atomic) or rew-foc-intro
(if the goal is strictly positive) applies. If it is not neutral (in particular not a variable),
it has an elimination form applied to a subterm of the form match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → u1σ2 x2 → u2 ;
but then (recursively) either t is a (strictly positive) neutral, or of the same form, and the
rule rew-foc-elim is eventually applicable.
We have proved that for any well-typed bΓatc± , bΣc± ` t : b(N | Qat)c±, there exists a
translation derivation Γat; Γ `inv t t′ : N | Qat for some t′.
Non-determinism The invertible rules may be applied in any order; this means that for
any t′ such that Γat; Γ ` t  t′ : A, for any t′′ =icc t′ we also have Γat; Γ ` t  t′′ : A: a
non-focused term translates to a full equivalence class of commutative conversions.
The rule rew-foc-elim may be applied at will (as soon as the let-extruded neutral n is
well-typed in the current context). Applying this rule eagerly would give a valid saturated
focused deduction. Not enforcing its eager application allows (but we need not formally
prove it) any βη-equivalent focused proof to be a target of the translation.
Validity We prove by immediate (mutual) induction that, if bΓatc± , bΓc± ` t : b(N | Qat)c±
holds, then the focusing translations are type-preserving:
• if Γat; Σ; t `inv t′  N : Qat | then Γat; Σ `inv t′ : N | Qat
• if Γ = ∅ and Γat `foc t t′ : Qat then Γat `foc t′ : Qat
• if Γ = ∅ and Γat ` n n′ ⇓ N then Γat ` n′ ⇓ N
• if Γ = ∅ and Γat ` t t′ ⇑ P then Γat ` t′ ⇑ P
Soundness Finally, we prove that the translation preserves βη-equivalence. If bΓatc± , bΣc± `
t : b(N | Qat)c± and Γat; Σ `inv t t′ : N | Qat, then t ≈βη t′, that is, t ≈βη bt′cfoc.
As for validity, this is proved by mutual induction on all judgments. The interesting
cases are the invertible rules and the focusing elimination rule; all other cases are discarded
by immediate induction.
The invertible rules correspond to an η-expansion step. For rew-inv-prod, we have that
t ≈η (π1 t, π2 t), and can thus deduce by induction hypothesis that t ≈βη (u′1, u′2). For
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rew-inv-arrow, we have that t ≈η λx. t, and can thus deduce by induction hypothesis
that t ≈βη λx. t′. For rew-inv-sum, let us write t as C[x] with x /∈ C, we have that
t = C [x : A+B]
≈η match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C [σ1 x]σ2 x→ C [σ2 x]
= match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t[σ1 x/x]σ2 x→ t[σ2 x/x]
≈βη match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t′1σ2 x→ t′2 (by induction hypothesis)
In the case of the rule rew-foc-elim, the fundamental transformation is the let-binding
that preserves βη-equivalence.
t = t[x/n][n/x]
≈βη let x = n in t[x/n]
≈βη let x = n′ in t′ (by induction hypothesis)
Conclusion We have proved computational completeness of the focused logic: for any
bΓatc± , bΓc± ` t : b(N | Qat)c±, there exists some Γat; Σ `inv t′ : N | Qat, such that
Γat; Σ `inv NFβ(t) t′ : N | Qat, with t ≈βη bt′cfoc. 
10.4. Focused phases are focused contexts
Now that we have a term syntax, we can use term contexts as a convenient concept and
notation to capture whole focused phases.
10.4.1. Invertible multi-contexts
Consider an invertible term for the invertible judgment Γat; Σ `inv t : N | Qat. We know
that t starts with some invertible rules decomposing the formulas of Σ, and N if it is
non-empty. Those rules form a prefix of the term, after which may be found zero, one or
several focused terms (f i)
i∈I . The purely invertible part of t can thus be represented as
a context into which the focused terms (f i)
i∈I are plugged. We will write Ein for such
“invertible contexts”.
Those invertible contexts have a family of holes (i)
i∈I , so they may also be written
Ein [i]
i∈I . Each hole i occurs in the typing environment that characterizes the end of
the invertible phase: it is of the form Γat; Γat′i `inv i : P at
′
i | P at for some context Γat
′
i
and optional type P at′i.
Notice that such invertible contexts do not use any variable of the negative context Γat
(none of the invertible term formers use a variable from the context), nor do they depend
on the formula P at if it exists: those are only relevant to the focused terms f i plugged in
the holes. We can thus define a new typing judgment for invertible contexts, giving only
the necessary information: the types to decompose at the start of the invertible phase,
and for each hole the post-decomposition types at the end of the invertible phase. We
will use the dense notation Σ `inv Ein [Γati `foc i : P ati ]
i∈I : N for this; the typing rules
for this judgment are directly derived from the focused system, but we repeated them
in Figure 10.7 (Typing rules for focused invertible contexts) for explicitness. This is a
multi-hole but linear context: each hole i should appear exactly once in the term – we
use disjoint union ] to combine the families of indices that the holes of two sub-contexts
range over, rather than the usual non-disjoint set union.
The validity of this judgment is characterized by two easy lemmas, formalizing the
decomposition and recomposition of invertible contexts Ein from invertible terms t.
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Figure 10.7.: Typing rules for focused invertible contexts
foc-ctx-hole-foc〈
Γat
〉+at `inv  [Γat `foc  : P at] : 〈P at〉−at
foc-ctx-absurd
Σ, x : 0 `inv absurd(x) : N
foc-ctx-trivial
Σ `inv () : 1
foc-ctx-lam
Σ, x : P `inv Ein
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I
: N
Σ `inv (λx.Ein
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I
) : P → N
foc-ctx-pair
Σ `inv Ein
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I
: N Σ `inv Fin
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈J
: M
Σ `inv (Ein, Fin)
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I]J
: N ×M
foc-ctx-case
Σ, x : Q1 `inv Ein1
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I1 : N
Σ, x : Q2 `inv Ein2
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I2 : N
Σ, x : Q1 +Q2 `inv
(
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ Ein1σ2 x→ Ein2
)[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I1]I2 : N
Lemma 10.4.1 (Plugging invertible contexts).
If we have
Σ `inv Ein
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I
: N
with N possibly empty and, for all i ∈ I, we have
Γat,Γati `foc f i : (P ati | Qat)
then plugging the (f i)
i∈I in the invertible context Ein produces a valid invertible derivation
Γat `inv Σ : Ein [f i]
i∈INQat
Proof sketch. By construction of the invertible context judgment. t
Lemma 10.4.2 (Unique decomposition of invertible terms).
For any invertible term t such that
Γat; Σ `inv t : N | Qat
there is a unique pair of a context Ein and a family of focused terms (f i)
i∈I such that we
have families (Γati , P
at
i )
i∈I such that
t = Ein [f i]
i∈I
Σ `inv Ein
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I
: N
∀i ∈ I, Γat,Γati `foc f i : (P ati | Qat)
Proof sketch. The decomposition is immediate by following the invertible rules until
the end of the invertible phase. The unicity condition comes from the fact that the hole-
typing rule foc-ctx-hole-foc only accepts shifted contexts and formula 〈Σat〉+at , 〈P at〉−at,
forcing the holes to be placed only at the very end of the invertible phases – which are as
long as possible. t
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10.4.2. Non-invertible multi-contexts
Similarly, we can decompose focused terms Γat `foc f : P at into a non-invertible context
Eni [i]
i∈I , containing only non-invertible rules, and a family of invertible terms (ti)
i∈I .
We decompose this in three judgments, given in Figure 10.8 (Typing rules for focused non-
invertible contexts), corresponding to the syntactic categories of focused terms f , positive
neutrals p and negative neutrals n:
• Γat `foc Eni [Σi `inv i : Ni | Qati ]
i∈I : P at
• Γat ` P [`inv i : Ni]i∈I ⇑ P
• Γat ` N [`inv i : Ni]i∈I ⇓ N
Figure 10.8.: Typing rules for focused non-invertible contexts
foc-ctx-foc-left
Γat ` N [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J ⇓ X−
Γat `foc N [∅ `inv j : Nj | ∅]j∈J : X−
foc-ctx-foc-right
Γat ` P [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J ⇑ P
Γat `foc P [∅ `inv j : Nj | ∅]j∈J : P
foc-ctx-let
Γat ` N [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J ⇓ 〈P 〉−
Γat `foc (let x = N in ) [∅ `inv j : Nj | ∅]j∈J
[
x : P `inv  : ∅ | Qat
]
: Qat
foc-ctx-app
Γat ` N [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J1 ⇓ P →M Γat ` P [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J2 ⇑ P
Γat ` (N P ) [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J1]J2 ⇓M
foc-ctx-var-neg
Γat, x : N ` x ⇓ N
foc-ctx-proj
Γat ` N [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J ⇓ N1 ×N2
Γat ` (πi N) [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J ⇓ Ni
foc-ctx-inj
Γat ` P [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J ⇑ Pi
Γat ` (σi P ) [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J ⇑ P1 + P2
foc-ctx-var-pos
Γat, x : X+ ` x ⇑ X+
foc-ctx-hole-inv
Γat `  [`inv  : N ] ⇑ 〈N〉+
The holes of the judgments for neutral terms (positive or negative) are not typed by
a context: there is no context that grows during the application of the non-invertible
rules that would be available to the terms in the holes. On the contrary, the holes of the
multi-focusing judgment do have a context that varies: the holes inside the left-focusing
phases have an empty context (no additional variable is added in scope), but the hole
corresponding to the right-hand side of a let binding is in the scope of the formula resulting
from the left foci. More precisely, in the rule
foc-ctx-let
Γat ` N [`inv j : Nj ]j∈J ⇓ 〈P 〉−
Γat `foc (let x = N in ) [∅ `inv j : Nj | ∅]j∈J
[
x : P `inv  : ∅ | Qat
]
: Qat
The non-invertible context (let x = N in ) has a family of holes ((j)
j∈J ,) ranging
over the indices J + 1: all the holes of N , which do not have any extra variable in scope,
plus the right-hand side hole which lives in a context extended with the binding {x : P}.
Finally, the ambient context Γat is necessary to type-check variables occurring in neutral
terms.
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Lemma 10.4.3 (Plugging non-invertible contexts).
If we have
Γat ` P [`inv i : Ni]i∈I ⇑ P ∀i ∈ I, Γat; Σ `inv ti : Ni | ∅
then we have Γat ` Σ ⇑ P [ti]i∈IP .
If we have
Γat ` N [`inv i : Ni]i∈I ⇓M ∀i ∈ I, Γat; ∅ `inv ti : Ni | ∅
then we have Γat ` N [ti]i∈I ⇓M .
If we have
Γat `foc Eni
[
Σi `inv i : Ni | Qati
]i∈I
: P at ∀i ∈ I, Γat; Σi `inv ti : Ni | Qati
then we have Γat `foc Eni [ti]i∈I : P at
Proof sketch. By construction of the non-invertible context judgments. t
Lemma 10.4.4 (Unique decomposition of non-invertible terms).
For any positive neutral p, negative neutral n or, respectively, multi-focused term f such
that
Γat ` p ⇑ P Γat ` n ⇓ N Γat `foc f : P at
there is a unique pair of a context P , N or Eni respectively and a family of invertible terms
(ti)
i∈I such that we have Γat `inv Σi : tiNiQati for any i ∈ I and
p = P [ti]
i∈I Γat ` P [`inv i : Ni]i∈I ⇑ P Σi = ∅ Qati = ∅
or
n = N [ti]
i∈I Γat ` N [`inv i : Ni]i∈I ⇓ N Σi = ∅ Qati = ∅
or
f = Eni [ti]
i∈I Γat `foc Eni [`inv i : Ni]i∈I : P at
respectively.
Proof sketch. This is the same principle as invertible decomposition – Lemma 10.4.2.
Unicity comes from the fact that the only rule adding new holes to the derivation,
foc-ctx-hole-inv (end of positive phase) and foc-ctx-multi-let-hole, only apply when
the non-invertible phases are as long as possible. t
10.5. Strong positive phases
Informally, it is interesting to contrast three different ways to prove a formula A in a given
context Γ:
• The most general judgment is the unfocused notion of proof Γ ` A; in a focused
system, it would correspond to first performing an invertible phase (on the positives
of Γ and A if negative), then looking for an arbitrary focused proof.
• The elimination judgment Γ ⇓ A corresponds to a kind of “simple proof”, or a single
“deduction step”; we see its derivations as direct deductions. We make progress by
taking a variable from the context and using it to deduce a formula A. But this is
more restrictive than the general notion of provability Γ ` A; informally, the general
case corresponds to being able to consecutively perform many single deduction steps
as desired – thanks to the left-focusing rule.
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• One can think of the introduction judgment Γ ⇑ A as an even simpler notion of
proof, a construction that was already “in” the context. If we think of proving as
the discovery of new fact, we could describe Γ ⇓ A as the atomic step of deducing a
new fact, while Γ ⇑ A is the even simpler step of retrieving a fact already known by
the system.
Consider the left-focusing rule and right-focusing rules in focused natural deduction:
nat-foc-left-release-shift
Γat ⇓ 〈Q〉− Γat;Q `inv ∅ | P
Γat `foc P
nat-foc-right
Γat ⇑ P
Γat `foc P
One can think of these rules as expressing the idea that, to do a general proof Γat `foc P ,
we can perform an arbitrary sequence of direct deductions of the form Γat ⇓ 〈Q〉− with
nat-foc-left-release-shift; eventually the desired goal has been deduced, and we can
end by retrieving it from the context with nat-foc-right – or by proving 0 in the invertible
phase, or with a left-focusing on a negative atom.
In particular, if we replaced the premise Γat ⇓ 〈Q〉− of the left-focusing rule by Γat ⇑ Q,
this would radically stifle the expressivity of the logic – we would lose completeness.
Instead of performing a new direct deduction and building upon it, this rule would only
allow to build on facts already retrievable from the context. In fact, we can prove –
Lemma 10.5.1 (Strong positive neutral substitution) – that this weaker rule is derivable
without using the left-focusing rule.
In fact, the judgment Γat ⇑ P is still a bit too flexible to capture our notion of “context
retrieval”, as it may end the positive phase and continue with an invertible phase followed
by arbitrary proof search:
sat-up-sinv
Γat; ∅ `sinv t : N | ∅
Γat `s t ⇑ 〈N〉+
In Figure 10.9 (Strong positive neutral judgment Γat ` p V P ), we define a restricted
Γat ` p V P that is less expressive: shifted negatives have to be found in the context
directly, satisfying our intuition of context retrieval. Note that the grammar of those
“strong positive neutrals” p is thus slightly different from the usual positive neutrals p, as
it may contain variables of negative type – we will reuse the notation p.
Figure 10.9.: Strong positive neutral judgment Γat ` p V P
sat-strong-up-neg
Γat, x : N ` x V 〈N〉
+
sat-strong-up-atom
Γat, x : X+ ` x V X+
sat-strong-up-inj
Γat ` p V Pi
Γat ` σi p V P1 + P2
Remark 10.5.1. The two rules sat-strong-up-neg and sat-strong-up-atom could be
compressed in a single rule
Γat, x : Nat ` x V
〈
Nat
〉+at
be we preferred having two rules for easier comparison with the usual Γat ` p ⇑ P judg-
ment. ∗
Besides capturing our intuition of “context retrieval”, this restricted judgment has in-
teresting provability properties.
Lemma 10.5.1 (Strong positive neutral substitution).
The following rule is admissible
Γat V P Γ
at;P `inv ∅ | Qat..................................... subst-expand
Γat `foc Qat
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Furthermore, the proof derivation returned by the admissibility procedure is a focused sub-
derivation of the derivation of Γat;P `inv ∅ | Qat.
Proof. By induction on the proof of Γat V P . This is immediate in the two variable cases.
In the sum case, we have
Γat V Pi
Γat V P1 + P2
Π1 :: Γ
at;P1 `inv ∅ | Qat
Π2 :: Γ
at;P2 `inv ∅ | Qat
Γat;P1 + P2 `inv ∅ | Qat
and we conclude by induction hypothesis on Πi. 
The name of the following theorem is a reference to a difference presentation of invertible
phase in so-called “higher-order” focused systems, as found in Zeilberger [2009].
Lemma 10.5.2 (Higher-order invertible phase).
If we have
Σ `inv Ein
[
Γatj `foc j : Qati
]j∈J
: Qat
then the
(
Γatj
)j∈J
are exactly the contexts such that
∀P ∈ Σ, Γatj V P
Proof. By induction on Ein.
Sum case
foc-ctx-case
Σ, x : Q1 `inv Ein1
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I1 : N
Σ, x : Q2 `inv Ein2
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I2 : N
Σ, x : Q1 +Q2 `inv
(
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ Ein1σ2 x→ Ein2
)[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I1]I2 : N
Suppose we have Γati with i ∈ Ik for k ∈ {1, 2}. For P ∈ Σ we have Γati V P by induction
hypothesis; if P is Q1 +Q2, then we have Γ
at
i V Qk by induction hypothesis, and thus
Γati V Qk
Γati V Q1 +Q2
Empty or unit cases
foc-ctx-absurd
Σ, x : 0 `inv absurd(x) : N
foc-ctx-trivial
Σ `inv () : 1
We have I = ∅: there is no Γati so the property is vacuously true.
Function or product cases
foc-ctx-lam
Σ, x : P `inv Ein
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I
: N
Σ `inv (λx.Ein
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I
) : P → N
foc-ctx-pair
Σ `inv Ein
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I
: N Σ `inv Fin
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈J
: M
Σ `inv (Ein, Fin)
[
Γati `foc i : P ati
]i∈I]J
: N ×M
The invertible context is equal or larger in the premises, so the result is immediate by
induction hypothesis.
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Release case
foc-ctx-hole-foc〈
Γat
〉+at `inv  [Γat `foc  : P at] : 〈P at〉−at
There is exactly one Γati , and it is Γ
at, which is exactly the context which proves all
Γat V N
at for Nat ∈ Γat. 
Remark 10.5.2. The fact that Γat V P implies Γ
at ⇑ P is true, but not trivial to prove:
in the release case, we need to build a focused proof of Γat, x : N ; ? `sinv N : ∅ |. This
property is direct in logics with arbitrary axiom rules, but not in focused logics with
atomic axioms, where it is known as axiom expansion. It is a consequence of the focusing
completeness result – Theorem 10.3.1 (Completeness of focusing). ∗
10.6. (Non)-canonicity of focused λ-terms
Is focusing enough to capture the commuting conversions in general? Are focused systems
canonical with respect to η-equivalence? The answer to this question is no, as soon as
we are in a type system that mixes connectives of different polarities. In the more often
studied purely-negative fragment (with just functions and products), then focusing does
capture satisfying βη-normal forms; same for the purely-positive fragment. However, as
we will show by discussing a counter-example, focused proofs are not canonical in our
systems with both (negative) functions and (positive) sums.
The erasure operation btcfoc of Section 10.2.1 let us talk about canonicity. A subsystem
of focused proofs is canonical with respect to the λ-calculus if, for any t, u in the subsystem,
we had btcfoc ≈βη bucfoc if and only if t and u are the same proof in the subsystem;
because we quotient over the ordering of invertible phases (≈icc), this means t ≈icc u.
If, furthermore, we have that for any non-focused term t there is a focused term u in the
subsystem such that t ≈βη bucfoc, then the subsystem is computationally complete.
10.6.1. Equivalence of focused λ-terms
Given that focused λ-terms are not, in the general case, a canonical representation, it is
interesting to study their equivalence classes.
In Section 10.1.5 (Equivalence with the focused sequent calculus) we have shown that,
unlike in the non-focused setting, there is a one-to-one correspondence between proofs in
the sequent calculus and focused natural deduction.
We may thus consider two natural notions of equivalence are their equivalence as λ-
terms (through a defocusing transformation), as sequent-calculus derivations). In fact,
those notions coincide.
Lemma 10.6.1.
If t, u are focused λ-terms for the same judgment, then
Jt Kfocseq ≈sccβη Ju Kfocseq ⇐⇒ btcfoc ≈βη bucfoc
Proof. Going from left to right is a direct consequence of Lemma 10.2.6 (Translation
commutation), giving btcfoc =
r
Jt Kfocseq
z
nd
, followed by Lemma 5.3.2 (Soundness of
permutation equivalence), which let us deduce Jt′ Knd ≈βη Ju′ Knd from t′ ≈scc u′.
In the other direction, we have that
r
Jt Kfocseq
z
nd
≈βη
r
Ju Kfocseq
z
nd
, which by Corol-
lary 5.6.9 (Equi-equivalence of sequent terms and λ-terms) implies that Jt Kfocseq ≈sccβη
Ju Kfocseq. 
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10.6.2. Focused terms are β-short normal forms
As a first step towards understanding the (non)-canonicity of focused λ-terms, we can
easily prove that focused λ-terms are normal forms for reduction/computation relations
– either when seen as their corresponding sequent terms, or erased to usual λ-terms.
Remember that (R) is the reduction relation for sequent terms defined in Section 4.2.1
(Normal sequent proofs: cut-elimination).
Fact 10.6.2 (Focused λ-terms are R-normal forms).
If t is a well-typed focused λ-term, then its sequent-equivalent Jt Kfocseq (defined in Fig-
ure 10.5) is cut-free, a R-normal form.
Theorem 10.6.3 (Focused λ-terms are β-normal forms).
If t is a well-typed focused λ-term, then btcfoc is a β-normal form.
Proof. For each type connective, we consider each elimination form in a term of the foc
btcfoc, and prove that its eliminated subterm is not a constructor of the corresponding
type.
In the function case, consider the subterms of btcfoc that are applications. By Lemma 10.2.2
(Composability of defocusing), we know that any such terms are the translation of a sub-
term of t, to which a series of substitutions is applied. The only subterms of t that may
translate to applications are the neutral subterms n p. Their translation is of the form
(bncfoc bpcfoc)[ρ], that is (bncfoc[ρ]) (bpcfoc[ρ]) where ρ is a sequence of substitutions of
the form [bmicfoc/xi], for bindings let xi = mi appearing in t. This could only be a
β-redex if bncfoc[ρ] was of the form λx. , which is impossible as:
• if n is not a variable, it starts (and its substitution starts) with an elimination form
for a negative type, not a λ-abstraction
• if n is a variable x, it cannot be transformed into a λ-abstraction by substitution:
by the focusing discipline, the substituted bnicfoc come from a neutral subterm ni
of strictly positive type, so it cannot start with a λ-abstraction.
The exact same reasoning applies to the product case: in the translation of a πi n, n
cannot be a pair construction ( , ).
For sums, the elimination forms in btcfoc come from the translation of an invertible step
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ uiσ2 x→ ui . Again, x cannot be substituted into an introduction form
σi , as negative neutrals only ever start with elimination forms. 
Note in particular that performing invertible commuting conversions on a focused term
preserves the focusing discipline, and thus the fact that its defocused form is β-normal.
This is not true of arbitrary λ-terms, where extruding a sum elimination may reveal new
β-redexes.
10.6.3. Focused terms are weak η-long forms
When we say that a λ-term is in β-short η-long normal form, we mean that it is in β-
normal form, but not that it is in η-normal form. Indeed, η-expansion can be performed
indefinitely, it is not a terminating reduction: if y is of type X → Y , we have
y .η λx1. y x1 .η λx2. (λx1. y x1) x2 .η . . .
The term η-long refers to the fact that additional η-expansions are possible, but that
they are in a sense “useless”: performing an additional η-expansion results in a term that
is β-equivalent to the previous one. This is what happens in our example above: the first
expansion from y to λx1. y x1 is useful, in the sense that the terms are not β-equivalent.
The second expansion is useless, as λx2. (λx1. y x1) x2 reduces to λx2. y x2, which is α-
equivalent to the term λx1. y x1 we started from.
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Definition 10.6.1 Head weak η-long form.
A λ-term t is in head weak η-long form if we have
∀u, t .weak η u =⇒ u→β t
However, in presence of sums, this notion of weak η-long or weak η-long normal form
is not sufficient. Indeed, weak η-expansion on sums generates infinite sequences whose
elements are not β-reducible to each other: if y is of type X + Y , we have
y .weak η match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → σ1 x1σ2 x1 → σ2 x1 .weak η
match
(
match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → σ1 x1σ2 x1 → σ2 x1
)
with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x2 → σ1 x2σ2 x2 → σ2 x2 .weak η . . .
While the third term does not β-reduce to the second one, note that extruding the inner
matching would give a term that does:
match
(
match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → σ1 x1σ2 x1 → σ2 x1
)
with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x2 → σ1 x2σ2 x2 → σ2 x2
≈extr match y with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 x1 → match σ1 x1 with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x2 → σ1 x2σ2 x2 → σ2 x2
σ2 x1 → match σ2 x1 with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x2 → σ1 x2σ2 x2 → σ2 x2
→β match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x1 → σ1 x1σ2 x1 → σ2 x1
Focused λ-terms are weak η-long in this sense: if we perform weak η-expansions on them,
we obtain terms that are β-equivalent, modulo invertible commuting conversion.
This suggests the notion of weak η-long normal form modulo extrusions.
Definition 10.6.2 Head weak η-long form modulo extrusion.
A λ-term t is in head weak η-long form modulo extrusion if we have
∀u, t .weak η u =⇒ ∃r, u ≈extr r →β t
Definition 10.6.3 weak η-long form modulo extrusion.
A term t is in weak η-long form modulo extrusion if any of its subterms is in head weak η-
long form modulo extrusion, or equivalently if
∀u, t→weak η u =⇒ ∃r, u ≈extr r →β t
Theorem 10.6.4 (Focused λ-terms are weak η-long forms modulo extrusion).
If t is a well-typed focused λ-term, then it is in weak η-long form modulo extrusion.
Proof. We consider each connective in turn.
In the function case, we consider a subterm u : A→ B of t and the expansion u .η
λx. u x. If u is proved by the invertible judgment, then it is equal, modulo a commuting
conversion, to a term of the form λy. u′, and λx. λy. u′ x is β-reducible. If u is proved by
the non-invertible judgment, then it is inside an elimination form for functions  p, and
(λx. u x) p is β-reducible.
The product case is similar – simpler.
In the sum case, we consider a subterm u : A1 +A2 of t and the expansion
u .weak η match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ σ1 xσ2 x→ σ2 x
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a focused term of sum type can only appear as a variable y in the invertible judgment or
as a constructor σi u
′ in the non-invertible judgment. In the first case, we have
match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y → r1σ2 y → r2
→η match
(
match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ σ1 xσ2 x→ σ2 x
)
with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y → r1σ2 y → r2
≈extr match y with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 x→
match σ1 x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y → r1σ2 y → r2
σ2 x→
match σ2 x with∣∣∣∣ σ1 y → r1σ2 y → r2
→∗β match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y → r1σ2 y → r2
and in the second case, we simply have
σi u
′ .η match σi u
′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ σ1 xσ2 x→ σ2 x .β σi u′

10.6.4. Non-canonicity of the full focused system
Consider the following judgment:
x : 1→ (X +X) `inv ? : 0 + (X ×X)
There are two distinct focused λ-terms for this judgment. The first is
t1
def
= let y = x () in match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → σ2 (z, z)σ2 z → σ2 (z, z)
and the second is
t2
def
= σ2

let y1 = x () in match y1 with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → zσ2 z → z
,
let y2 = x () in match y2 with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → zσ2 z → z

These two terms t1, t2 are βη-equivalent. To see it, let us define the (non-focused) context
E []
def
= σ2

match  with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → zσ2 z → z
,
match  with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → zσ2 z → z

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Then we have
bt1cfoc = E [x ()]
.η
(
match x () with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y → E [σ1 y]σ2 y → E [σ2 y]
)
=

match x () with
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 y → σ2

match σ1 y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → zσ2 z → z
,
match σ1 y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → zσ2 z → z

σ2 y → σ2

match σ2 y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → zσ2 z → z
,
match σ2 y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z → zσ2 z → z


.∗β
(
match x () with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y → σ2 (y, y)σ2 y → σ2 (y, y)
)
= bt2cfoc
We can see in this example that non-canonicity is caused by a redundant choice of
ordering of the non-invertible phase. In t1, we decided to perform the right-focused phase
first σ2 , and the left-focused phases let y = x () in later. In t2, we decided to perform
a left-focusing phase first, and the right-focused phases later. This choice introduces
a redundancy because both options are βη-equivalent: informally, those non-invertible
phases are independent, they do not depend on each other and could have one before the
other, or even simultaneously.
To get a more canonical calculus, we will introduce in Chapter 11 (Saturation logic for
canonicity) an extension of focusing that focuses on several independent non-invertible
phases in parallel, which removes this source of redundancy.
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11. Saturation logic for canonicity
Reference The work that resulted in this chapter has been previously presented in the
article Scherer and Rémy [2015], which gives a more compact presentation of the main
result. In this chapter, we have improved the presentations in the following ways:
• We use an explicitly focused syntax for types/formulas, which gives a system that is
hopefully closer to what focusing experts expect. Note that non-experts need not be
frightened by the notational overhead: it is possible to ignore the shifts and polarities
and the content should still make sense, at a simpler level of reading. In fact, we
may ourselves use the non-polarized syntax in some examples, assuming minimal
shift insertion.
• We explain the construction of the saturation rule, giving examples for each of the
potential difficulties, in more details than a conference article allows.
Equipped with the understanding of program equivalence acquired through our study of
focusing (Chapter 10), it is now time to go back to our original question: which types have
a unique inhabitant? In this chapter, we provide a decision algorithm for this question
in the context of simply-typed lambda-calculus with products and unit types, sums and
empty types.
With the technical ideas that we have built throughout this document, the idea can
be described in a concise way: we define a variant of focusing for intuitionistic natural
deduction that is canonical and has a structural presentation which makes goal-directed
proof search possible in this subsystem. The key idea is to use saturation in non-invertible
phases, that is a complete forward search for left focused phases, until reaching a saturated
state (all deducible strict positives have been deduced), then doing right focus and con-
tinuing with goal-directed (backward) search. We also need a precise notion of saturation
to ensure both completeness and termination.
However, we also wish this chapter to be accessible to readers jumping to it in isola-
tion, with little background on ((maximal) multi-)focusing and more programming-driven
intuitions. We will thus start in Section 11.1 (Introduction to saturation for unique
inhabitation) by a motivation with programming examples and an informal introduction
of the saturation process.
In Section 11.2 (A saturating focused type system), we will present the typing rule
of our saturated focused type system, which can be understood as a variant of multi-
focused λ-calculus. This system serves as a declarative specification of saturation, but
it does not suffice to obtain an algorithm as its goal-directed proof search process is not
always terminating. It Chapter 12 (From the logic to the algorithm: deciding unicity)
we introduce an algorithmic restriction of the system in which proof search is terminating
and gives a deduction procedure for unicity – and prove its correctness.
Re-introduction to canonical and complete type systems
Our approach to decide unique inhabitation is to design a generic term enumeration pro-
cedure that only enumerates distinct terms (no duplicates) and enumerate distinct terms
lazily. Given such a procedure, it suffices to enumerate at most two term to decide unicity.
How can we enumerate all distinct values of type (A1 × A2)? Well, we know from the
η-equivalence of products (t : A1 × A2) = (π1 t, π2 t) that any term of type A1 × A2 is
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equivalent to some pair (t, u) of some t : A1 and u : B2, and it thus suffices to enumerate
all distinct values of A1, of A2, and take their (lazily enumerated) cartesian product.
Similarly, to enumerate all distinct values of type (A→ B), it suffices to enumerate B in
an environment extended with a formal variable x : A, and return λx. t for each distinct t
in B.
A similar reasoning cannot be applied to enumerate the terms of some atomic type X,
on which no constructor form is known; we then need to look at all the ways to produce
a X by combining variables from the current environment (and those are the only way
to obtain a X). In the purely negative fragment of the λ-calculus (no sums or empty
type), this corresponds to the (negative) neutrals n, defined as series of pair projections
or function applications applied to a head variable of the context.
By now, the reader familiar with focusing, and in particular the focused λ-calculus as
described in Section 10.2 (A focused term syntax: focused λ-calculus), may have recognized
that this is an informal description of a process enumerating the values in the focused
lambda-calculus, restricted to negative types. We decide to generalize this idea to any
type system (for example in presence of sums and empty types, where simple focusing is
not enough). Enumerating all distinct values at a type should be formulated as a proof
search problem, of enumerating all the proofs accepted by a well-chosen proof system,
or equivalently all the programs accepted by a well-chosen type system, classifying some
strong notion of “normal form”. Instead of an enumeration procedure that may be defined
in arbitrary ways, we are restricting the scope to the search processes following a specific
structure, namely goal-directed search in a type system defined as a set of inference rules.
Given a type system Γ ` t : A, and a notion of program equivalence Γ ` t ≈ u : A, we
are looking for a type sub-system for “normal forms” Γ `nf v : A that is:
• canonical: If Γ `nf v : A and Γ `nf w : B, then v and w are syntactically equal
(v =α w if and only if they are semantically equivalent (Γ ` v ≈ w : A). This
guarantees that proof search does not enumerate duplicates.
• computationally complete: If a program t is well-typed in the original type system
(Γ ` t : A), then there exists an equivalent normal-form v (Γ `nf v : A and Γ `
t ≈ v : A). This guarantees that we do not count strictly less distinct terms, in our
enumerations, than there are programs at this type in the original system. In the
limit case, a sub-system of normal forms that would reject all programs as invalid
normal forms would be canonical, but quite incomplete.
Furthermore, we also need goal-directed search Γ `nf ? : A to be feasible in practice.
We do not have a formal definition of this last criterion, but we can make two remarks
about it.
First, sub-systems defined by refinement (all the proofs of the original system that
satisfy condition P ) can have no natural goal-directed search process, if the condition
P is highly non-local and thus prevents working with partial proofs with missing leaves.
Reformulating such a sub-system into a structural presentation with no validity condition
– that is, doing the work of expressing the validity condition as local invariants that can
be encoded structurally in the various judgments and their transitions – makes it easier
to define a goal-directed search process.
Second, even purely structural system may have no good search implementation, if
finding a valid proof may not terminate. (A proof enumeration process may not terminate
because it enumerates infinitely many distinct proofs, but we need it to be productive
in the sense that the next proof is always found after a finite number of search steps.)
Having the subformula property can help build a termination argument, but is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for termination.
The subformula property (see Section 6.2.1 (The subformula property)) guarantees that
the formulas appearing in a cut-free proof are all subformulas present in the judgment
we are trying to prove; in particular, there is a finite number of possible formulas. Thus,
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in a logic where contexts are sets of formulas, there is only a finite number of possible
contexts in a proof, hence a finite number of judgments. In a type system where contexts
are mappings from program variables to types, that is multi-sets of formulas, the finiteness
argument goes away: we could have arbitrarily many distinct formal variables at the same
type. Using the results of Chapter 9 (Counting terms and proofs) we show that, in order
to decide unicity, it suffices to consider contexts with at most two variables of each type.
In the purely negative fragment of λ-calculus ΛC(→,×, 1), focused values Γ `inv t : A
form a canonical, computationally complete sub-system. It also has productive goal-
directed proof search, but proving this requires some work. Instead of doing our termi-
nation proof for the purely negative fragment now, and extending to support sums and
empty types later, we directly work on the full type system; but our full system has the
nice property that, when used on formulas that are in fact in the purely negative frag-
ment, then it degrades to what is easily recognized as simply focused proof search. The
termination arguments are given in Chapter 12 (From the logic to the algorithm: deciding
unicity).
11.1. Introduction to saturation for unique inhabitation
The rules of program equivalence for the full, pure simply-typed λ-calculus ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)
are given in Figure 3.4 (Typed program equivalence for ΛC(→,×, 1,+, 0)). Of particular
interest is the distinction between the weak eta-rule (≈weak η) and the strong η-rule (≈η)
for sums
(t : A1 +A2) .weak η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → σ1 y1σ2 y2 → σ2 y2
∀C [x], C [t : A1 +A2] .η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 y1 → C [σ1 y1]σ2 y2 → C [σ2 y2]
Another source of difficulty, which we discuss in Section 11.1.5 (Saturation and the empty
type), is the equivalence rule for the empty type (everything is equivalent under an incon-
sistent context):
Γ ` t : 0 Γ ` u1, u2 : A
Γ ` u1 ≈η u2 : A
11.1.1. Non-canonicity of simple focusing: splitting points
Simple focusing, as described in Chapter 10 (Focused λ-calculus), classifies terms that
are also called β-short η-long normal forms, but they in fact correspond to weak β-short
weak η-long normal forms. In the purely negative fragment (no sums and empty types),
the weak and strong η-rules coincide, so focusing captures the right notion of normal form
and is a canonical system.
Focusing fails to be canonical when positives are added; consider for example the fol-
lowing goal:
f : 1→ X+ +X+, g : X+ → Y − ` ? : 0 + (Y − × Y −)
The three following programs are equivalent, yet are syntactically distinct valid focused
terms (normal forms). Note that there are other possible ways to write a well-typed
β-short weak η-long normal form at this type – but they are all equivalent.
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σ1

let y = f () in match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → g z1σ2 z2 → g z2
,
let y = f () in match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → g z1σ2 z2 → g z2

let y = f () in match y with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z1 → σ1 (g z1, g z1)σ2 z2 → σ1 (g z2, g z2)
let y = f () in match y with
∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 z1 → σ1 (g z1, g z1)
σ2 z2 → let y′ = f () in
(
match y′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 z′ → (g z2, g z′1)σ2 z′ → (g z2, g z′2)
)
We can prove that these three terms are βη-equivalent, but an informal explanation also
helps following these examples.
The first two terms perform the same splitting (binding then pattern-matching) of f (),
but one does it once before building the pair, and the other does it separately in each
branch of the pair. Because we assume that f is a pure function1, it must returns the
same thing in each element of the pair, and the final results are thus identical. To prove
that the two terms are identical, it suffices to extrude the binding let y = f () in ? from
the pair elements in the second case, and extrude the pattern-matching as well. (In terms
of focusing, we are suggesting to permute two independent non-invertible phases, the let
binding and the sum injection; pair construction and variable case-split are implicitly
moved around as well, being the invertible phases that systematically follow each non-
invertible phase.)
The third term is slightly different, as instead of performing two splits in two parallel
branches (as the first term), it performs two splits in sequence, with the second split being
in scope of the (right branch of) the first split. The reasoning to informally justify the
equivalence with the second term is that, at the time when y′ (that is f ()) is matched
over, we already know the value of f (): if this branch has been taken, it is because f () is
equal to σ2 z2 for some z2 that is currently in scope. We can thus replace y
′ with σ2 z2 in
the nested pattern-matching. Performing a β-reduction step then gives exactly the second
term.
Remark 11.1.1. Note that this example of non-canonicity of the focusing discipline would
break if we replaced the context hypothesis f : 1→ X++X+ by a mere sum x0 : X++X+.
Indeed, the focusing discipline would recognize it as a positive in context, to be split before
the start of the first non-invertible phase, and this would give a unique focused derivation.
By wrapping this positive under a (negative) function type, we make it out of reach
from the simple focusing discipline2. In a system with explicit shifts (here we assumed
minimal shifts), see Section 7.3.1 (Explicit shifts), we could also simply put the sum under
a double-shift delay. ∗
1Note that non-termination plus lazy pairs would already allow to observe a difference between those two
terms.
2Another, more positive way of understanding this is that simple focusing is agnostic of the effectfulness
of the calculus. It does not allow to perform reordering which may be invalid in presence of effects.
This is only partly convincing, however, given that the idea of always performing invertible steps first
may change the observational behavior of effectful terms under weak evaluation strategies. Typically,
η-expanding t into λx. t x may delay (and duplicate) side-effects from definition-site to call-site. To
discuss effects and purity, we recommend looking at program terms directly, using System L or CPBV
for example.
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11.1.2. Canonicity for term equivalence: extrusion
These examples allow to understand where non-canonicity comes from. We have (focused)
terms that are syntactically distinct but semantically equivalent. They differ by the place,
and the number of times, on which a particular subterm (here g ()) of sum type is bound
and matched over. We need to quotient over this source of difference, by imposing a unique
place at which those subterms should be bound and matched, that can be decided during
goal-directed proof search.
Definition 11.1.1 Splitting.
Splitting a (sub)term is pattern-matching over it, possibly after having bound it to a
variable name. We call splitting point the place where the term is bound and pattern-
matched.
In the work on deciding equivalence of λ-terms with sums, the solution is to move each
subterm of sum type as high/early as possible in the term, to split them there – and merge
equal subterms that end up being split at the same place. This is clearly visible in the
rewriting-based work of Ghani [1995b] and Lindley [2007], but it is also perceptible in the
normalization-by-evaluation work [Balat, Di Cosmo, and Fiore, 2004, Altenkirch, Dybjer,
Hofmann, and Scott, 2001]. For example, Balat, Di Cosmo, and Fiore [2004] define a
notion of quasi-normal form for terms with sums, with a side-condition (Condition (B),
page 5) says that a split term must become ill-typed if we move it before the latest series
of variable bindings (in fact, the latest invertible phase). This is a way to guarantee that
subterms of sum type are split as early as possible in the term.
We have shown in Scherer [2015a] that this “as early as possible” split criterion can be
logically justified as maximal multi-focusing, and that the normalization procedures are
turning an arbitrary term into its canonical maximally multi-focused equivalent. Those
procedures proceed by moving subterms (invertible and non-invertible phases) around, so
in particular they rely on the presence of one initial term to normalize, or two initial terms
to compare: it makes sense to search, for example, for all neutral subterms n of the initial
term that are valid at some possible splitting point (the start of a non-invertible phase)
and extrude them.
11.1.3. Canonicity for term enumeration: saturation
On the contrary, the problem of unique inhabitation requires enumerating proof terms out
of the blue, without starting from a pre-existing proof term to transform. When reaching
a potential splitting point (the start of a non-invertible phase) during term enumeration
(goal-directed proof search), there are no subterms to collect and extrude, only recursive
sub-goals that have not yet be filled. This crucial difference leads us to taking a quite
different (yet related) approach.
Another way to see the situation of term normalization or equivalence is that the initial
term serves as an oracle to answer the following question: “which terms should we split
now, that will be useful to the rest of the proof?”. Useful sub-terms are those that it is
necessary to bind now to build a term equivalent (computationally) to the initial term.
We can also see them as an over-approximation of a set of terms that we must split to find
a proof at all; we use the initial term as a base of “hints” (its subterms) to find a proof
of the desired judgment – a proof with the particular property of being equivalent to the
initial term we started from.
To move from term normalization or comparison to term enumeration, our idea is to
drop the usefulness criterion. We cannot know in advance, at this stage of the proof search,
without having searched for the sub-goals, which terms of positive types will actually be
used by the proof(s) that we will find, but we can split all of them. Then we start again
enumerating terms of the desired type, in a context extended with (the decomposition
of) all those freshly split sums. Some splits will prove useful to build all terms of our
enumeration, some will only be used by some of those distinct terms, and some will not
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be used at all. This is the idea of saturation.
What exactly do we mean by “all terms of positive types”? It is easy to see that, even in
the empty context, we can build infinitely many terms of sum types: σ1 (), σ2 (), σ1 (σ1 ()),
etc. But pattern-matching on those would be silly, as we already know their value. We
are only interested in the terms of positive type whose value is unknown, because they
come from the (unknown) formal variables in the typing context of the search. Those
are the neutral terms n,m that are obtained by taking a variable x of the context, and
applying pair projections πi n or function applications n p on it until we reach a result of
sum type. One can think of a neutral term n : A1 +A2 as a specific “observation” of the
richly-typed value of its head variable x; saturation, which splits all those neutral terms,
is the process of learning everything we can learn from our context by these observations,
before continuing the proof search.
Saturation should come before any committing choice. If we delay these observations,
and first perform a non-invertible introduction step, we can get in a dead search branch,
because we do not have enough information at hand to know which choice to make (con-
sider again the proofs of f : ()→ X+Y ` ? : Y +X). This justifies performing saturation
“as early as possible”, or at least before making any mistake, that is before the start of
each non-invertible (right) introduction phase.
In the rest of this chapter, we will see
• A structural presentation of a focused saturating type system, which encapsulates
this idea of saturation as a typing rule.
• A simple mechanism to avoid splitting the same neutral of positive type during
two successive saturation phases, to preserve canonicity; Section 11.2 (A saturating
focused type system).
• Various methods to avoid saturating on infinitely many distinct neutrals, or repeating
saturation infinitely long before reaching a stable state, to preserve termination;
Chapter 12 (From the logic to the algorithm: deciding unicity).
11.1.4. An example of saturation
Let us consider our previous example showing that focusing alone is not canonical:
f : 1→ X+ +X+, g : X+ → Y − ` ? : 0 + (Y − × Y −)
The context Γat is negative or atomic, and the goal is positive. In our focused logic, we
would start by looking for all n of positive type such that Γat ` n ⇓ P . There is exactly
one such (n : P ) in this context, it is (f () : X+ +X+). Saturation would thus start with
the following phase:
let x = f () in ?
and the following invertible phase would be
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ ?σ2 x→ ?
leaving us with two subgoals, each with a context of the form
f : 1→ X+ +X+, g : X+ → Y −, x : X+
As the two goals are identical, we will focus here on one of them, the other proceeds in
the exact same way.
At this point, a new focusing phase begins, looking for all negative neutrals with a
positive type. But the addition of a X+ in the context did not give us any way to deduce
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a new neutral: we can still build f (), but we have already saturated over it. At this point,
saturation stops, and our algorithm tries all possible (non-invertible) rules to prove our
goal.
In our case the goal is a strict positive (rather than a negative atom) so we look for all
possible positive neutrals p at this type. Proof search will thus attempt to use a term of
the form σ1 ?, and prove the remaining goal 0, and also to use a term of the form σ2 ?
and prove the remaining goal 〈Y − × Y −〉+. In the first case 0, search fails immediately
as there is no strictly positive neutral of this type. In the second case, 〈Y − × Y −〉+, the
focused introduction phase stops at the shift, and a new invertible phase starts.
The invertible phase for Y −×Y − creates two identical goals, so we can focus on any of
them, trying to prove Y −. A new saturation phase start, but there is still no new negative
neutral of positive type in sight. The search algorithm then tries to prove the goal, and
because we have a negative atom it looks for a negative neutral at this type. All negative
neutrals of type Y − in this context are of the form g ?, with a subgoal of type X+, to be
filled by a positive neutral; there is exactly one positive neutral at this type, namely x;
because there is only one choice, we know that this goal has a unique inhabitant.
This leaves us with a unique program of this type, namely
let x = f () in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ (g x, g x)σ2 x→ (g x, g x)
Positive variant We could also consider a variant of this goal with a different choice of
atom polarities – there are other possible choices but this one is interesting.
f : 1→ X+ +X+, g : X+ → Y + ` ? : 0 + (Y + × Y +)
As before, the first saturation step has exactly one neutral to introduce, let x = f () in ?,
with x : X+ +X+. But, after the following invertible phase match x with | σ1 x→ ? | σ2 x→ ?,
saturated proof search differs from the previous one as a new positive becomes provable,
(g x : Y +). This judgment is still uniquely inhabited, but with a different saturated proof
term:
let x = f () in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ let y = g x in (y, y)σ2 x→ let y = g x in (y, y)
11.1.5. Saturation and the empty type
This idea of canonical enumeration through saturation extends seamlessly to the empty
type . Recall the equivalence rule for the empty type:
Γ ` t : 0 Γ ` u1, u2 : A
Γ ` u1 ≈η u2 : A
To integrate this rule in a saturating focused type system, it suffices to split, during
the saturation phase, all neutral terms n of positive type, including 0, instead of just sum
types. The saturation process will then, in particular, look for any possible way to obtain a
proof of 0 from the variables in the context. If the context is inconsistent, a proof of 0 will
be bound and eliminated, cutting the proof search: a single term of the form absurd( )
will be returned, as all possible terms under this inconsistent context are equivalent by
rule above.
In particular, out of the proof that this saturating focused type system is canonical, we
can in fact extract an equivalence algorithm that decides equivalence of terms in presence
of sums and empty types.
Remark 11.1.2. Equivalence in presence of empty types was previously perceived to be
a delicate problem, while it here falls of as a simple consequence of our work on unique
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inhabitation. It is interesting to look at the difference between this and past approaches
to proof equivalence that makes it simpler in our setting.
Among the existing work on program equivalence, the more algorithmically-flavored
proposal work by moving around portions of the terms to normalize or compare, typically
extruding certain subterms them out of certain contexts – a notable exception is the
type-directed partial evaluation approach of Balat, Di Cosmo, and Fiore [2004].
On the contrary, checking equivalence in presence of the empty type requires looking
for arbitrary terms that may prove the current typing context inconsistent, but may be
entirely unrelated to the terms being compared – the term t : 0 in the rule above, to
compare to the inputs of the algorithms u1, u2 : A. In particular, t may be unreachable by
just combining subterms of the terms to compare, or otherwise reasoning on their syntactic
shape. In other words, adding 0 requires to have a part of the algorithm that performs
arbitrary proof search, and this is given for free by saturation.
Of course, this only works in type systems in which testing for inhabitation of 0 is
decidable (a test implicitly done by our saturation process), which is the case in the
simply-lambda calculus, as it corresponds to propositional (quantifier-free) intuitionistic
logic.
The idea that checking equivalence in presence of 0 requires arbitrary proof search is not
new. It was already suggested, informally, in Neil Ghani’s 1995 PhD thesis [Ghani, 1995a],
that is in the first work giving a positive answer for decidability in equivalence in presence
of sums.3 However, going after this intuition would have required a potentially invasive
change to the structure of the equivalence algorithms, which we suppose is probably why
the problem remained open for so long. The contribution of our saturating focused system
is not the idea of introducing proof search in equivalence algorithms, but the creation of
a setting where this behavior occurs naturally. ∗
11.2. A saturating focused type system
As for the focused λ-calculus, the types in our system make an explicit distinction between
“positive” types P,Q (we have to make choices to build their values: sums) and “negative”
types N,M (we have to make choices to use their values: functions and products). For
example, a function type P → N expects a positive type on the left and a negative type
on the right. If you want the function to return a positive type such as X+ +Y + it has to
be wrapped in an explicit marker 〈 〉−, converting it into a negative type. The full type
would be, for example, Z+ → 〈X+ + Y +〉−.
We introduced these explicit shifts in Chapter 7 (Focusing in sequent calculus), Sec-
tion 7.3.1 (Explicit shifts), but a reader not familiar with focusing could just read Figure 7.6
(Polarized propositional formulas) to know the grammar, and just ignore the plusses and
minusses from now on. In the article version of this chapter [Scherer and Rémy, 2015], we
used the usual (non-polarized) syntax of simple types, and the saturating type system is
essentially the same – using polarized types is not essential, it just gives more structure
to the presentation.
In Figure 11.1 (Cut-free saturating focused type system (in natural deduction style))
we give the full typing rules for our saturating focused λ-calculus. They share many
similarities with the focused λ-calculus of Chapter 10 (Focused λ-calculus), with several
changes that we will describe in detail. The calculus is described by four mutually recursive
judgments, whose role we will detail in this section.
• The invertible judgment Γat; Σ `sinv t : N | Qat, which is very close to the invertible
judgment Γat; Σ `inv t : N | Qat of the focused λ-calculus.
3The discussion of eventual extension to the empty type is at pages 99, 100 and 101 of the manuscript
version I could find.
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• The saturating judgment Γat; Γat′ `sat f : Qat is where most of the novelty lies,
in particular the sat rule that enforces saturating. It is inspired by the “choice of
focusing” judgment Γat `foc f : Qat of the simple focused λ-calculus, but behaves in
a different way.
• The focused introduction and elimination judgments Γat `s p ⇑ P and Γat `s n ⇓ N ,
which are identical to the corresponding judgments of the focused λ-calculus.
In addition, the type system is parametrized by a family of selection functions SelectΓat( );
for any negative or atomic context Γat and positive or atomic goal type P at, it takes as
input a (potentially infinite) set of neutrals of positive type (n, P ) and returns a finite
subset of its input. This parameter represents choices that can be made by an algorithm
derived from this logic. We do impose a requirement on the possible choice of selection
function: it has to satisfy the requirement of select-specif, which we will explain in this
section.
11.2.1. Invertible phase
The invertible judgment Γat; Σ `sinv t : N | Qat corresponds to the reasoning that we used
in Chapter 11 (Re-introduction to canonical and complete type systems) to informally
describe enumeration of distinct terms, at type that have a “generic” constructor: to
enumerate A → B, it suffices to look for terms of the form λx. . In term of focusing,
we say that the λ-introduction rule is “invertible”, which means here that we can always
assume terms of function types are built using it, without losing any generality. Same
things for product – and unit, obviously.
A novelty of the focusing-based point of view is that this “without loss of generality”
reasoning not only applies to terms with an invertible constructor (the negative types),
but also terms that can be destructed without any loss of generality (the positive types).
If we have a variable of sum type in the context, any possible well-typed term can be
rewritten to begin with a case-split on this variable.
sinv-case
Γat; Σ, x : P1 `sinv t1 : N | Qat
Γat; Σ, x : P2 `sinv t2 : N | Qat
Γat; Σ, x : P1 + P2 `sinv match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t1σ2 x→ t2 : N | Qat
When reading this rule, one should first read the rule without the terms, or with the
terms replaced by not-yet-filled holes, and think of the goal-directed search process: when-
ever we want to enumerate all terms at this typing judgment, it suffices to enumerate the
possible terms t1 and t2 in the premises, and for each pair of such terms (in the cartesian
product of the enumeration) return the term (match x with | σ1 x→ t1 | σ2 x→ t2). In
other words, all distinct terms are (equivalent to a term) of the shape (match x with | σ1 x→ ?1 | σ2 x→ ?2),
with the holes ?i filled as per the premise judgments.
Remark 11.2.1. This arguably distinguishes focusing from other approaches such as
bidirectional type-checking, which are essentially identical on the purely negative fragment.
Focusing is justified in a general enough setting to easily extend to sum types. It predicts
that some type-directed transformations should be guided by the typing context, rather
than the goal type. ∗
The negative types are those whose construction (introduction) rule is invertible, and the
positive types are those whose destruction (elimination) rule is invertible. This means that
while the goal is negative, or while there remains a negative in the context, an invertible
rule can be applied. The structure of our judgments forces us to apply these invertible rules
as long as possible; we only leave the invertible judgment in the transition rule sinv-sat,
237
Figure 11.1.: Cut-free saturating focused type system (in natural deduction style)
sinv-lam
Γat; Σ, x : P `sinv t : N |
Γat; Σ `sinv λx. t : P → N |
sinv-pair
Γat; Σ `sinv t1 : N1 |
Γat; Σ `sinv t2 : N2 |
Γat; Σ `sinv (t1, t2) : N1 ×N2 |
sinv-trivial
Γat; Σ `sinv () : 1 |
sinv-absurd
Γat; Σ, x : 0 `sinv absurd(x) : N | Qat
sinv-case
Γat; Σ, x : P1 `sinv t1 : N | Qat
Γat; Σ, x : P2 `sinv t2 : N | Qat
Γat; Σ, x : P1 + P2 `sinv match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t1σ2 x→ t2 : N | Qat
sinv-sat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat f : (P at | Qat)
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`sinv f :
〈
P at
〉−at | Qat
sat
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= SelectΓat,Γat′({(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat
′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−) ∧ ∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n})
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
sat-up
Γat `s p ⇑ P
Γat; ∅ `sat p : P
sat-down
Γat `s n ⇓ X−
Γat; ∅ `sat n : X−
sat-up-sinv
Γat; ∅ `sinv t : N | ∅
Γat `s t ⇑ 〈N〉+
sat-up-atom
Γat, x : X+ `s x ⇑ X+
sat-down-var
Γat, x : N `s x ⇓ N
sat-down-proj
Γat `s n ⇓ N1 ×N2
Γat `s πi n ⇓ Ni
sat-down-app
Γat `s n ⇓ P → N Γat `s p ⇑ P
Γat `s n p ⇓ N
sat-up-inj
Γat `s p ⇑ Pi
Γat `s σi p ⇑ P1 + P2
select-specif
∀P, n : P ∈ S =⇒ Γat V P ∨ ∃n′, n′ : P ∈ SelectΓat(S)
Select ( ) is a valid selection function
which is only available when the context has only negative or atomic formulas, and the
goal is positive or atomic:
sinv-sat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat f : (P at | Qat)
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`sinv t :
〈
P at
〉−at | Qat
More precisely, the polarity constraint is enforced by the fact that the function 〈 〉+at
takes a negative formula, and returns a positive formula (by shifting) or a negative atom
(atoms are preserved); so the judgment context is in the image of this function only if all
its formulas are shifted positive formulas or negative atoms. Same thing for 〈 〉−at in the
goal.
On the goal side, let us recall that a convention of the (A | B) notation is that exactly
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one of the sides is empty, and the other is a formula. The invertible judgment maintains
two different formula positions,
Finally, let us comment on the role of the two contexts Γat and Γat′ appearing in this
rule, and in general Γat (a context of negative or atomic formulas) and the second context
Σ (a context of positive formulas). Γat never evolves when applying rules of the invertible
phase: it is the “old” context, in which the invertible phase started, unchanged. On the
contrary, Σ is the context of formulas that are added to the context during the phase (by
introducing a λ-abstraction, or by decomposing a formula already in Σ). It contains the
“new” formulas that were unknown at the beginning of the invertible phase.
11.2.2. Saturation phase – a first look
The saturation phase only starts where all possible invertible rules have been applied. Any
rule we can apply now is non-invertible: it requires making a choice, and it may be the
wrong choice – going to a dead end.
There are two kinds of non-invertible rules: the ones that try to use variables from the
context (for example choosing to call a function from the context, which may fail if we
can’t build a value of the argument’s type), and the ones that try to construct values at
the goal type (if the goal is a sum A1 + A2, it would be an injection constructor σi ,
representing the choice to either build a A1 or a A2). In the (asymmetric) intuitionistic
logic, using the context is better choice, as failure there does not require backtracking (at
worst we do not manage to call the function, and we continue the proof with something
else); thus, we try to deduce everything we can from the context first, and do a choice on
the goal type only later – this is saturation, done by the sat rule.
sat
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= SelectΓat,Γat′({(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat
′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−) ∧ ∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n})
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
The sat rule is the central and most complex rule of our saturated calculus. I do not
know how to explain it in one go – the current definition evolved by refinement. Instead
of trying to dissect it now, we will use a two-step approach: first describe informally what
it does, assume that it does it correctly to understand the rest of the rules and the big
picture of how the whole type system works, and then go back to its definition once the
general mechanics is in place.
What the sat rule does is the following: it looks for all the way that a positive formula
can be deduced from the context, that is, proved by a neutral term n : 〈P 〉−. It adds
all these deductions to the current context, and goes to the invertible judgments again
– where these positive formulas are decomposed by the invertible rules, before starting
another step of saturation. Note that the goal type is not changed by saturation, it is still
positive or atomic, and is thus not decomposed by the following invertible phase. Only
the types just deduced by saturation change during inversion.
With this description, it looks like the saturation process would never stop. This is
where the separation, in the invertible judgment, between the “old” context and the “new”
context come in. Eventually, it will become the case that all positive formulas deducible
from the context have been deduced, and the next saturation phase will not split on any
new formula. The invertible phase will start, but stop immediately after (no positive
formula from the context to decompose), and call the saturation judgment again with Γat′
being the empty set ∅. When the “new” context is empty, we know that saturation has
reached a stable state, and we allow saturation to stop: instead of the sat rule, the proof
may continue with either sat-up or sat-down, that escape the saturation judgment by
finally trying to construct a term/proof of the goal type. At this point, we have done all
possible deductions from the context, so we can make arbitrary choices (in fact, try all
those choices), as there is nothing more to learn to help us making those choices.
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The rules sat-up and sat-down do not overlap, only one of them is usable depending on
the goal type. If it is a positive formula, we try to prove by a series of introduction rules
(in terms of focusing, this is a right focusing phase). If it is a negative atom, we try to
prove it by a series of elimination rules (in terms of focusing, this is a left focusing phase
that ends on a negative atom).
sat-up
Γat `s p ⇑ P
Γat; ∅ `sat p : 〈P 〉−
sat-down
Γat `s n ⇓ X−
Γat; ∅ `sat n : X−
11.2.3. Focused introduction and elimination phases
The judgment Γat `s p ⇑ P , entered from the sat-up rule, tries to prove a positive formula
by a series of introduction rules, by building a term out of value constructors. At each
step of this judgment we need to make a non-invertible choice; to enumerate all possible
proofs, we just backtrace on each of those choices. When we reach a (shifted) negative
formula 〈N〉+ in the rule sat-up-sinv, there are no non-invertible constructors to apply
anymore, so we revert to the invertible judgment.
sat-up-inj
Γat `s p ⇑ Pi
Γat `s σi p ⇑ P1 + P2
sat-up-sinv
Γat; ∅ `sinv t : N | ∅
Γat `s t ⇑ 〈N〉+
The judgment Γat `s n ⇓ N , entered from the sat-down rule, describes a series of
elimination steps (function application or pair projection) applied to a head variable taken
in the context. Unlike all other judgments of natural deduction or sequent calculus, the
rules of this judgment should be read from leaf to root. A proof start from a variable
chosen from the context, in the rule sat-down-var, that is of negative type, and applies
a series of non-invertible elimination rules, passing an argument (if the negative type is a
function) or projecting one component (if the negative type is a product).
sat-down-var
Γat, x : N `s x ⇓ N
sat-down-app
Γat `s n ⇓ P → N Γat `s p ⇑ P
Γat `s n p ⇓ N
sat-down-proj
Γat `s n ⇓ N1 ×N2
Γat `s πi n ⇓ Ni
Notice that the input type of function is a positive type, and that we look for an argument
as a positive neutral term p by typing it with the non-invertible introduction judgment
Γat `s p ⇑ P . Some proof systems are “less focused”, in that they allow function arguments
to start with a more general invertible phase.
The ending rule of the introduction judgment Γat `s p ⇑ P enforces the fact that an
introduction phase ends only when the formula becomes negative (or, in the sat-up-atom
rule, when we reach a positive axiom). The elimination judgment goes in the other direc-
tion, so it is the “caller” of this judgment (the rule who has the elimination judgment as a
premise) that decides when it can end. In the sat-down rule, we only consider elimination
phases that end on a negative atom, and in the sat rule we only consider elimination
phases that end of a (shifted) positive formula.
sat
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= SelectΓat,Γat′({(n, P ) | ( Γat,Γat
′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉− ) ∧ ∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n})
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
sat-down
Γat `s n ⇓ X−
Γat; ∅ `sat n : X−
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11.2.4. The saturation rule – a deeper look
A naive attempt at defining the sat rule would look as follows:
sat-1
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= {(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−)} Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
This definition looks for all ways to deduce (by a neutral proof term) a positive from
the current context, adds it to the context, and continues with an invertible phase that
will decompose those positives. It has two independent problems:
1. A single neutral term n will be introduced many times, by all saturation steps where
it is typable – by monotonicity, subsequent saturation steps will introduce all the
proofs of the previous iteration steps, plus some more. This breaks canonicity, which
relies on the fact that each possible neutral (each possible observation of the formal
context) is given a unique name. Consider for example the judgment
x : 1→
〈
X+
〉−
; ∅ `sinv ? : ∅ | X+
The first saturation phase will deduce X+ by introducing the proof y1
def
= x () of
type X−. It is followed by an invertible phase that will stop immediately, as there
is no connective to decompose in the context or the goal. Then a new saturation
phase starts; because there is no provision in sat-1 against performing the same
deduction again, the term could introduce y2
def
= x () of type X+. This could go on
indefinitely, but forgetting about the termination aspect for a moment, we have a
canonicity problem: it now appear that there are two distinct ways to build the goal
X+, using either y1 or y2 – formal variables in the context are considered distinct.
We need a way to remember which neutrals have been introduced in previous satu-
ration step, not to re-introduce them again; not doing so would break canonicity of
the proof system, and thus soundness of the unicity-deciding algorithm.
2. The present definition introduces, at each saturation steps, all the neutrals of positive
types. Even without taking the previously introduced ones into account, there may
be too much new neutrals, leading saturated proof search into an infinite loop. There
are two different sources of non-termination:
• A single saturation step may, with this definition, introduce infinitely many
positives. Consider for example a variable in context x : N → P , where N is
a type of natural numbers, defined as N def= (X− → X−) → X− → X− for
example, and P is some positive type. With such a variable x in the context
Γat,Γat′, the set
{(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−)}
is infinite (it contains x 0, x 1, x 2, etc., with the definition of natural constants
of Section 2.1.7). Even if we extended our syntax to accommodate infinitely-
wide let-bindings let x̄ = n̄ in , the following invertible phase would have to
deconstruct infinitely many copies of the type P in context, so there would
be no finite proof (term) in this type system for any goal with x : N → P in
context.
• Even if each saturation step is finite, saturation may keep going on indefinitely
if each step introduces a new variable to use. Consider for example that for
some “stream state” type X+ we have in the typing environment a state value
x0 : X
+ and a “next” function y : X+ → 1+X+ that returns the next state if it
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exists, or 1 if there is no next state – we reached the end of the stream. The first
saturation step can use x0 to deduce a new value y x0 of positive type 1 +X
+;
the invertible phase will pattern-match on this new value, and in the right
branch we will have a new variable x1 : X
+ in context. The second saturation
phase can deduce a new value y x1 of positive type, and the second invertible
phase will decompose it and (in the right case) bind a new variable x2 : X
+
in context. This saturation process can continue indefinitely, even though each
saturation step only introduces finitely many positives. This corresponds to the
incremental construction of an infinite term spine, matching over an unbounded
stream:
let x1 = y x0 in
match x1 with∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
σ1 x1 → . . .
σ2 x1 → let x2 = y x1 in
match x2 with∣∣∣∣ σ1 x2 → . . .σ2 x2 → let x3 = y x2 in . . .
In particular, the “new context” Γat′ will always contain at least one new vari-
able xn of type X
+; it will never be empty, and the rules exiting the saturation
cycle, sat-up and sat-down, will never be applicable. No matter what the goal
type is (as long as it is positive, that is there is at least one saturation step), a
system using the rule sat-1 would have no (finite) proof term as soon as those
“state” and “next” variables are in context.
Those are not canonicity issues (we are not enumerating duplicates), but termination
and completeness issues. If some judgments that should be provable have no finite
proofs, it means that our system is incomplete (even for provability), and also that
proof search and enumeration will not terminate. To prevent this, we must somehow
allow the logic to “drop” some new variables produced by saturation (when it is
correct to do so), so that no single saturation step binds infinitely many variables,
and so that repeated saturation steps eventually reach a stable state with an empty
“new” context. This is done by keeping at most two variables of each type, using
the Corollary 9.3.6 (Two-or-more approximation) of Chapter 9 (Counting terms and
proofs).
Avoiding redundant splits An idea to solve the first problem (not splitting on the same
neutral terms in several saturation processes) is to simply index all judgments will the
set of all neutrals split so far, and to remove those neutrals from any following saturation
step. This is, in fact, not necessary, thanks to our structural separation of the context
between an “old” context Γat and a “new” context Γat′. The new context contains exactly
the variables that were split by the last invertible phase, and the old context the older
ones, that were already available during the previous saturation step.
There is thus a very simple characterization of which neutrals n were already split in
a previous saturation step, and should not be split again. They are the neutrals that are
already typable in the old context Γat, or conversely the neutrals that do not use any
variable from the new context Γat′. This is the simplification that justifies keeping the
static separation between the old and new context in the invertible rules.
An improved (but still unsatisfying) reformulation of the preliminary sat-1 rule, that
avoids redundant splits, is as follows:
sat-2
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= {(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−) and (∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n)}
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
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This new rule forces us to introduce only (and all) the terms that are “new”, in the sense
that they use the new context Γat′ – this is checked by the condition (∃x ∈ Γat′, x ∈ t).
Finite saturation proofs As we have seen with a few examples, some contexts have
saturation processes that split infinitely many new neutrals, either during a single step or
through infinitely many steps never reaching a fixpoint. This is not surprising or wrong:
some types are inhabited by infinitely many distinct programs. However, while we expect
that enumerating all those programs would require infinitely many steps, we would like
to be able to have finite proofs for each of those programs, which our current saturation
rules does not allow.
To have finite proofs even during an infinite saturation process, it suffices to allow some
proofs to use only a subset of the split subterms. Instead of sat-2, consider the following
rule, which only replaces the (
def
=) in the first premise by a (⊆):
sat-2-sub
(n̄, P̄ ) ⊆ {(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−) and (∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n)}
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
It may seem that this definition of the saturation rule allow the goal-directed proof
enumeration process to stop the saturation earlier than it should (in particular if we
select n̄
def
= ∅, then saturation stops) and thus make the search incomplete. But as the
enumeration process is looking for all possible proof terms of the judgment, it may consider
all possible subsets, and thus not miss a single term; note that each finite term uses only
a finite subset of the split neutrals, so we can always assume n̄ finite.
Unfortunately, this weaker condition also causes a loss of canonicity: two proof terms
may be essentially the same, but differ by the fact that one saturates on a few additional
neutrals – otherwise unused.
Canonicity by deterministic restriction This gets us to the final version of our rule:
sat
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= SelectΓat,Γat′({(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat
′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−) ∧ ∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n})
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
In this version, the choice of which subset of neutrals to saturate on is fixed once and for
all by the saturation function SelectΓat,Γat′( ). For a given choice of saturation function,
all proof search processes for a given judgment will select the same set of neutrals. This
avoids the previous canonicity issue: two terms cannot differ merely by the choice of which
neutrals to saturate over.
Comparison with the previous approach of Scherer and Rémy [2015] In the previ-
ous presentation of Scherer and Rémy [2015], we did not use a fixed saturation-selection
function; instead, the saturation rule had one extra requirement that all the neutrals
introduced by saturation where “useful” in some sense.
sat
(n̄, P̄ ) ⊆ {(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−) ∧ ∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n}
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat ∀x ∈ x̄, t uses x
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
The (t uses x) judgment, which we have not defined here, corresponds to the fact that the
introduced variable x is used after the first invertible phase.
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This condition did not affect proof search, as it is expressed on the proof term t that is
only known after the search for this recursive subgoal has taken place. The set of useful
neutrals was obtained by filtering the saturating neutrals after the fact. This mean that
each possible outcome of the proof search (the term t) was uniquely associated with a
“minimal” saturating set, avoiding any canonicity issue.
Unfortunately, this simplification would not scale to a richer setting with the empty
type 0. It may be that there are, in a particular typing environment, two syntactically
distinct neutrals of empty type. Saturation will find these two distinct neutrals, but it
will then make of choice of eliminating the empty type on either one of those, creating an
artifical choice of which of the two is really “useful”.
For example under the typing environment {x : 1→ 0, y : 1→ 0}, we can prove 0 by in-
troducing either x () or y (). This gives two proof terms, let z1 = x () in absurd(z1) and
let z2 = y () in absurd(z2) that are both minimal for the refinement relation, syntacti-
cally distinct from each other, yet semantically equivalent. The formula of the saturation
rule using this usefulness condition would accept both as separate proof terms, losing
canonicity.
Note that the search algorithm of Scherer and Rémy [2015] gave the correct answer on
this example, or in fact any query involving the empty type: upon deducing either or
both of these ways to deduce 0, it would correctly conclude during the following invertible
phase that the goal is uniquely inhabited. The implementation was correct, but the logic
in which it was specified did not scale to the empty type.
Our more flexible current definition allows the SelectΓat,Γat′( ) filter to select either one,
or both of these proofs of 0; in any case, all proof search in this context will use the same
saturating set, so canonicity is not lost for this reason. This is also closer to what the
unicity algorithm actually does, as the choice of the saturating set is made one and for all,
before the t is recursively searched for.
On the other hand, we would be in trouble if the saturation selection function picked
none of the possible proofs of 0 that can be made in the context – or, in general, missed a
positive that reveals an absurdity after decomposition, for example 0 + 0. In the absence
of the empty type, “not deducing enough” can only lead to a loss of completeness; in
presence of the empty type, missing an incoherence deduction could lead an algorithm to
falsely believe that there are several terms, while they are in fact all equivalent.
Completeness condition on the selection function As we noted, canonicity would be
endangered by a selection function that is too incomplete. Consider for example the goal
∅; f : 〈1〉+ → 〈0〉−, x : X−, y : X− `sat ? : X−
If our selection function Select ( ) always returned the empty set (selecting none of
the potential neutrals), saturation would stop at the next phase and we would have two
distinct proof terms for this goal, namely x and y. This is wrong, as saturating more
would have let us discover the proof (f () : 0) that the context is inconsistent, and that
only one proof (let x = f () in absurd(x)) is possible.
To guarantee that all possible proofs of 0 are found, it suffices to demand that the
selection function drops no provable type: if some (n : P ) belongs to the set S of new
neutrals deducible at this step, then there must exists some proof of P in the returned
selection:
∃n′, n′ : P ∈ SelectΓat(S)
Note that while we may have infinitely many new neutral terms n, the subformula
property guarantees that there are only finitely many new types P deducible by elimination
rules. In particular, a selection function can respect this requirement and still return finite
sets.
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This requirement is correct, but it is a bit too strong. Intuitively, it is not necessary
to force P to be part of the returned set if has already been added to the context Γat
by a previous saturation phase. Of course, P is a strictly positive formula, while Γat is a
context of positive or atomic types, so it does not make sense to check P ∈ Γat in general;
but we can instead check for whether the formula P can be retrieved from the types in
Γat, if Γat V P holds – we use the strong positive phase introduced in Section 10.5 (Strong
positive phases). In this case, we need not require P to be part of the selected types.
This gives us the full criterion given in select-specif:
select-specif
∀P, n : P ∈ S =⇒ Γat V P ∨ ∃n′, n′ : P ∈ SelectΓat(S)
Select ( ) is a valid selection function
11.2.5. The roles of forward and backward search in a saturated logic
Focusing is a fruitful theoretical tool to propose a more logical understanding of proof
search strategies – see for example Chaudhuri, Pfenning, and Price [2008b], Chaudhuri
[2010], Farooque, Graham-Lengrand, and Mahboubi [2013]. This flexibility is built out
of two components whose interaction can be subtle. On one hand, the way formulas
are polarized prevents or enforce certain shapes of proof terms, for example forward- or
backward-chaining, as we detailed in Section 7.1.7 (Polarized atoms). On the other hand,
there are several distinct strategies for proof search, notably the rather natural judgment-
directed or goal-directed backward search, and the inverse method, a form of saturation-
based forward search. The strength of focusing is to move a lot of the sophistication from
the search strategy into the logic itself: a lot of subtle operational ideas on good proof
strategies can be obtained by using one of those two simple strategies with a subtle logic
or polarisation of formulas.
To prove a judgment of the form ∆ ` A, the natural intuition for goal-directed search
procedure is to look at A and search for all possible ways to introduce its head connective.
A focused system has a richer behavior, in that it will also decompose the positives of
∆, but this reliance on the context remains “superficial” in the sense that only the first
positive layer of those formulas will be peeled of by the invertible phase. The “real” work
happens at the end of the invertible phase, where choices must be made, and typically
various attempts will be made, with a backtracking discipline to roll back the wrong
choices, for example the right introduction on a sum that happened too early.
On the contrary, on a judgment of the form ∆ ` A, an inverse method will, in rough
terms, look as the subformulas of ∆, A as the “search space” of facts to prove. It will try
to build proofs in a leafward-rootward fashion, from elementary deduction in this search
space to more elaborated facts, until maybe a deduction implying the original goal ∆ ` A :
happens.
I would now like to discuss the operational search behavior of this saturated logic when
using a simple judgment-directed backward search implementation.
Goal-directed proof search in our saturated logic starts in a state where all of the context
is “new”, it has not been saturated over: ∅; ∆ ` A. During the invertible phase, it behaves
like others goal-directed procedures, and extract a negative or atomic context Γat of “new”
formulas, and a refined goal Qat, and start the saturation phase ∅; Γat `sat ? : Qat.
The saturation phase does not behave like a goal-directed backward procedure, it is
a phase of forward search. However, there is an important difference with the inverse
method or other approaches that are “full” forward search: the “search space” of the
saturation is not the complete goal Γat ` Qat, it is only Γat. We are not trying to discover
arbitrary facts that will help us in eventually proving our goal Qat, we are restricting the
set of deductions to subformulas of the context Γat. So it is a forward search phase, but
it is “localized” by the use of only a part of the judgment.
After this local saturation phase ends, goal-directed search starts over with non-invertible
steps attempting to prove the goal formula, and the corresponding backtracking behavior
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of backward search. The right rules that happen during this right focusing phase will
change the goal formula to a negative subformula of Qat. This creates opportunities for
the following invertible to move parts of the goal into the context, expanding the “horizon”
of the following saturation phases.
This would be my understanding of the operation behavior of saturated proof search.
There is an alternation of backward and forward search phases. The forward search is
bounded by the context, while the backward search is directed by the goal formula, and
transmits new hypothesis to the context, expanding the reach of the subsequent forward
phases.
Interestingly, this mixture of backward and forward search exists in some seemingly
unrelated work on logic programming, in particular in Lollimon López, Pfenning, Polakow,
and Watkins [2005]; we give a detailed comparison in Section 13.3.2 (Lollimon: backward
and forward search together).
11.3. Saturation theorem
In Chapter 10 (Focused λ-calculus), Section 10.5 (Strong positive phases), we proposed a
judgment Γat ` p V P that corresponds to the intuition of “retrieving” a positive P from
the context Γat. In this section, we build upon this intuition to state and prove a formal
statement that captures the essence of the saturation process.
This informal view of the different ways to deduce a positive formula gives a specification
of what saturation is doing. From a high-level or big-step point of view, saturation is trying
all possible new deductions iteratively, until all positives deductible from the context have
been added to it. The following characterization is more fine-grained, as it describes the
state of an intermediary saturation judgment Γat; Γat′ `sat f : P at, and makes precise what
we mean by “old context” (Γat) and “new context” (Γat′).
The characterization is as follows: any formula that can be “simply deduced” from the
old context Γat is “retrievable” in the larger context Γat,Γat′. In other words, if Γat ⇓ 〈P 〉−,
then Γat,Γat′ V P – either it has already been saturated over in Γ
at, or it is part of the
new deductions Γat′. This gives a precise meaning to the intuition that Γat is “old”; what
we mean by “new” can be deduced negatively: it is the part of the context that is still
fresh, its deductions have not been stored in the knowledge base yet.
Remark 11.3.1. This notion of the context as a “knowledge base”, which is useful when
thinking of saturation, is fairly specific to our setting of intuitionistic logic, where all
facts are duplicable and the context grows monotonically. It is unclear whether a form of
saturation would work for linear logic. ∗
Theorem 11.3.1 (Saturation).
If a saturated proof starts from a judgment of the form
∅; Γat0 `sat f : Qat or ∅; Σ0 `sinv t : N | Qat
then for any sub-derivation of the form
Γat; Γat
′ `sat f : Qat
we have the following property:
∀P, Γat ⇓ 〈P 〉− =⇒ Γat,Γat′ V P
Proof. By induction on the derivation.
This is immediately true in the initial case of a judgment of the form ∅; Γat0 `sat f : Qat
or ∅; Σ0 `sinv t : N | Qat, as no direct deductions can be made from the empty set: ∅ ⇓ N
for any N .
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The induction case is the saturation rule
sat
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= SelectΓat,Γat′({(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat
′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−) ∧ ∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n})
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t : ∅ | Qat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat let x̄ = n̄ in t : Qat
Let us assume that we have
t ≈icc Ein
[
f j
]j∈J
P̄ `inv Ein
[
Γat
′′
j `foc j : ∅
]j∈J
: ∅
(
Γat,Γat
′
; Γat
′′
j `sat f j : Qat
)j∈J
We have to prove that for any P such that Γat,Γat′ ⇓ P , we have Γat,Γat′,Γat′′j V P for all
j ∈ J .
If Γat,Γat′ ⇓ P holds, it may be the case that Γat ⇓ P already holds. In this case we
have Γat V P by induction hypothesis, as desired. In the other case, P is not provable
without using variables from the new context Γat′; so there must be a proof of it in the set
{(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat′ `s n ⇓ 〈P 〉−) ∧ ∃x ∈ Γat
′
, x ∈ n}
By the condition on selection functions select-specif, we thus know that either Γat,Γat′ V
P , as desired, or there is a proof n : P among the selected bindings n̄ : P̄ . By Lemma 10.5.2
(Higher-order invertible phase), we can then deduce that Γat′′j V P , as desired. 
11.3.1. Saturated contexts
From this characterization of arbitrary saturation judgments Γat; Γat′ `sat f : Qat, we can
easily deduce a characteristic property of the environments appearing at the end of the
saturation phase, that is in judgments of the form Γat′′; ∅ `sat f : Qat.
Definition 11.3.1 Saturated environment.
We say that Γat is saturated if Γat ⇓ 〈P 〉− implies Γat V P .
Corollary 11.3.2 (Saturation).
If a saturated proof starts from a judgment of the form
∅; Γat0 `sat f : Qat or ∅; Σ0 `sinv t : N | Qat
then for any sub-derivation of the form
Γat; ∅ `sat f : Qat
the environment Γat is saturated.
11.3.2. Saturated consistency
In particular, Theorem 11.3.1 (Saturation) lets us deduce that the context at the end of a
saturation phase are always consistent: if there was a proof of 0 deducible from the initial
context, it would have been found during saturation, and the proof would have ended on
the following invertible phase.
Lemma 11.3.3 (Saturated consistency).
If Γat is saturated, then Γat 0 0.
Proof. Let us consider the shape of contradiction proofs Γat ` 0 – this context has only
negative or atomic formulas. By completeness of focusing, if a proof of 0 exists, then a
focused proof exist. We call such proofs contradiction proofs. Focused proofs Figure 10.1
(Focused natural deduction, with explicit shifts) of 0 have a particular structure: an
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inversion phase on this typing stops immediately, then no right-focused phase is possible
(0 has no constructor), so the only possible proof step is of the form
nat-foc-left-release-shift
Γat ⇓ 〈Q〉− Γat;Q `inv ∅ | 0
Γat `foc 0
We know that the following invertible proof, in the right premise, may have zero, one or
more non-invertible subproofs, and those will all be of the form Γat,Γat′ `foc 0 for some
new context Γat′. In particular, all immediate non-invertible subproofs on the right-hand
side are themselves proofs of 0.
From our hypothesis that Γat is saturated we know that Γat ⇓ 〈Qat〉− implies Γat V
〈Qat〉−. By Lemma 10.5.1 (Strong positive neutral substitution), we know that Γat `foc 0
is admissible, and that one of the focused subproofs of our derivation of Γat;Q `inv ∅ | 0
proves this statement. In other words, any focused proof of Γat′ `foc 0 can be reduced
to a strictly smaller subproof, also of the form Γat `foc 0. There cannot exist a proof of
Γat′ `foc 0. 
In particular, we can prove that the saturated logic is canonical for inconsistent contexts.
Theorem 11.3.4 (Inconsistent canonicity).
If Γat ` 0, then for any f, f ′ such that ∅; Γat `sat f, f ′ : Qat we have f ≈icc f ′.
Proof. This result is simply proved by simultaneous induction on f and f ′.
The invertible rules are purely type-directed, so we can assume modulo (≈icc) that both
terms start with the same invertible constructors.
The saturation step is purely type-directed: two terms under the same contexts will
saturate on the exact same set of neutrals.
The only rules on which the head of f, f ′ may differ syntactically are sat-up and
sat-down, but those cannot be used in those terms as the assumption that Γat is in-
consistent would contradict Lemma 11.3.3 (Saturated consistency). 
11.4. Canonicity of saturated proofs
To prove the main theorems on saturating focused logic, we describe how to convert a
focused λ-term into a valid saturated proof derivation. This can be done either as a
small-step rewrite process, or as a big-step transformation. The small-step rewrite would
be very similar to the preemptive rewriting relation of Scherer [2015a]; we will here use
a big-step transformation, as in Scherer and Rémy [2015], by defining in Figure 11.2 a
type-preserving translation judgments of the form Γ; Σ `sinv t t′ : N | Qat, which turns
a focused term t into a valid saturating focused term t′.
Backward search for saturated proofs corresponds to enumerating the canonical inhab-
itants of a given type. Our translation can be seen as a restriction of this proof search
process, searching inside the βη-equivalence class of t. Because saturating proof terms
are canonical (to be shown), the restricted search is deterministic – modulo invertible
commuting conversions.
Compared to the focusing translation of Figure 10.6 used to prove completeness of
focusing with respect to the non-focused λ-calculus in Section 10.3 (Focusing completeness
by big-step translation), this rewriting is simpler as it starts from an already-focused proof
whose overall structure is not modified. The only real change is moving from the left-
focusing rule rew-foc-elim to the saturating rule rew-sat. Instead of allowing to cut on
any neutral subterm, we enforce a maximal cut on exactly all the neutrals of t that can
be typed in the current environment. Because we know that “old” neutrals have already
been cut and replaced with free variables earlier in the translation, this is fact respects
the saturation condition.
Compared to the focusing translation, the termination of this translation is immedate
induction: thanks to the focused structure of the input, every recursive call happens on a
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Figure 11.2.: Saturation translation
rew-sinv-lam
Γat; Σ, x : P `sinv t t′ : N |
Γat; Σ `sinv λx. t λx. t′ : P → A |
rew-sinv-pair
Γat; Σ `sinv t1  t′1 : N1 |
Γat; Σ `sinv t2  t′2 : N2 |
Γat; Σ `sinv (t1, t2) 
(
t′1, t
′
2
)
: N1 ×N2 |
rew-sinv-case
Γat; Γ, x : P1 `sinv t1  t′1 : N | Qat
Γat; Γ, x : P2 `sinv t2  t′2 : N | Qat
Γat; Γ, x : P1 + P2 `sinv match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t1σ2 x→ t2  match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t′1σ2 x→ t′2 : N | Qat
rew-sinv-trivial
Γat; Σ `sinv () () : 1 |
rew-sinv-absurd
Γat; Σ, x : 0 `sinv absurd(x) absurd(x) : N | Qat
rew-sinv-sat
Γat; Γat
′ `sat f  f ′ : (P at | Qat)
Γat;
〈
Γat
′
〉+at
`sinv f  f ′ :
〈
P at
〉−at | Qat
rew-sat-intro
Γat ` p p′ ⇑ P
Γat; ∅ `sat p p′ : P
rew-sat-atom
Γat ` n n′ ⇓ X
Γat; ∅ `sat n n′ : X
rew-sat
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= SelectΓat,Γat′({(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat
′ ` n ⇓ P )})
∀n ∈ t, (Γat,Γat′ ` n ⇓ P ) =⇒ n ∈ n̄
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t[x̄/n̄] t′ : Qat |
Γat; Γat
′ `sat t let x̄ = n̄ in t′ : Qat
rew-sintro-sum
Γat ` p p′ ⇑ Ai
Γat ` σi p σi p′ ⇑ A1 +A2
rew-sintro-end
Γat; ∅ `sinv t t′ : N |
Γat ` t t′ ⇑ 〈N〉+
rew-sintro-axiom
(x : X+) ∈ Γat
Γat ` x x ⇑ X+
rew-selim-pair
Γat ` n n′ ⇓ A1 ×A2
Γat ` πi n πi n′ ⇓ Ai
rew-selim-arr
Γat ` n n′ ⇓ P → N Γat ` p p′ ⇑ P
Γat ` n p n′ p′ ⇓ N
rew-selim-start
(x : N) ∈ Γat
Γat ` x x ⇓ N
(let x = n in t)[y/n]
def
= t[y/x][y/n]
strictly smaller term. In the rew-sat rule, the recusive call is on t[x̄/n̄], which is not be
strictly smaller if the n̄ are variables, which can happen for x : 〈P 〉−. But this case is only
possible when x is in the “new” context, as this neutral uses no other variable that could
be in the new context; and this variable gets replaced by a variable in the post-saturation
new context at the strictly smaller type P , so it can only happen finitely many times.
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Assumptions on the selection function The rew-sat rule makes an interesting assump-
tion on the selection function:
rew-sat
(n̄, P̄ )
def
= SelectΓat,Γat′({(n, P ) | (Γat,Γat
′ ` n ⇓ P )})
∀n ∈ t, (Γat,Γat′ ` n ⇓ P ) =⇒ n ∈ n̄
Γat,Γat
′
; x̄ : P̄ `sinv t[x̄/n̄] t′ : Qat |
Γat; Γat
′ `sat t let x̄ = n̄ in t′ : Qat
This rule can only be applied if all the neutrals of the translated n that are typeable
in the present context happen to be part of the neutrals selected for saturation. This
is a requirement that most selection functions will not meet: for any choice of selection
functions there are many t such that no valid derivation of the form Γat; Σ `inv t t′ :
N | Qat exist for any t′.
However, for any t we can construct some – and in fact many – valuation functions for
which such a Γat; Σ `inv t t′ : N | Qat exists for some t′. If we start from an arbitrary
selection function satisfying select-specif, we can build another selection function that
meets this requirement by simply adding all the neutral subterms that happen during
this translation. As we are only adding new neutrals, the resulting selection still satisfies
select-specif. Any finite derivation of the translation judgment will only add finitely
many new neutrals this way, which means that the returned selection function still returns
finite sets of neutrals for each context.
We say that a selection function is adequate for some term Γat; Σ `inv t : N | Qat if it
does select all neutrals of t, in the sense that there exists a derivation Γat; Σ `inv t t′ :
N | Qat for some t′. Note that different adequate selection functions will result in different
translations t′. In general we will implictly assume that the selection function is adequate
for the terms considered.
Lemma 11.4.1 (Translation soundness).
If Γat; Σ `inv t : N | Qat and Γat; Σ `sinv t t′ : N | Qat then t ≈βη t′.
Proof. By immediate induction. 
Lemma 11.4.2 (Translation validity).
Suppose that Γat; Σ `inv t : N | Qat holds in the focused logic, and that t has no “old”
neutral: for no n ∈ t do we have Γat ` n ⇓ 〈P 〉−. Then, Γat; Σ `sinv t t′ : N | Qat
implies that Γat; Σ `sinv t′ : N | Qat in the saturated focusing logic.
Proof. The restriction on “old” neutrals is necessary because the rew-sat rule would not
know what to do on such old neutrals – it assumes that they were all substituted away for
fresh variable in previous inference steps.
With this additional invariant the proof goes by immediate induction. In the rew-sat
rule, this invariant tells us that the bindings satisfy the freshness condition of the sat rule
of saturated logic, and because we select all such fresh bindings we preserve the property
that the extended context Γat,Γat′ has no old neutrals either. 
Lemma 11.4.3 (Translation determinism).
If the selection function is adequate for Γat; Σ `inv t : N | Qat, then there exists a unique
t′ such that Γat; Σ `sinv t t′ : N | Qat.
Proof. By immediate induction. 
Note that the indeterminacy of invertible step ordering is still present in saturating
focused logic: a non-focused term t may have several saturated translations that only equal
upto commuting conversions (≈icc). However, there is no more variability than in the
focused proof of the non-saturating focused logic; because we translate from those, we can
respect the ordering choices that are made, and the translation is thus fully deterministic.
Theorem 11.4.4 (Computational completeness of saturating focused logic).
If we have ∅; Σ `inv t : N | Qat in the non-saturating focused logic, then for an adequate
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saturation function and some t′ ≈βη t we have ∅; Σ `sinv t′ : N | Qat in the saturating
focused logic.
Proof. This is an immediate corollary of the previous results. For an adequate selection
function, there is a unique t′ such that ∅; Σ `sinv t t′ : N | Qat. By Lemma 11.4.2
(Translation validity) we have that ∅; Σ `sinv t′ : N | Qat in the saturating focused calculus
– the condition that there be no old neutrals is trivially true for the empty context ∅.
Finally, by Lemma 11.4.1 (Translation soundness) we have that btcfoc ≈βη bucfoc. 
Lemma 11.4.5 (Determinacy of saturated translation).
For any u1, u2, if we have Γ
at; Σ `inv t u1 : N | Qat and Γat; Σ `inv t u2 : N | Qat then
we have Γat; Σ `sinv u1  r1 : N | Qat and Γat; Σ `sinv u2  r2 : N | Qat with r1 ≈icc r2.
Proof sketch. There are only two sources of non-determinism in the focused translation:
• an arbitrary choice of the order in which to apply the invertible rules
• a neutral let-extrusion may happen at any point between the first scope where it is
well-defined to the lowest common ancestors of all uses of the neutral in the term.
The first source of non-determinism gives (≈icc)-equivalent derivations. The second
disappears when doing the saturating translation, which enforces a unique placement of
let-extrusions at the first scope where the strictly positive neutrals are well-defined.
As a result, two focused translations of the same term may differ in both aspect, but
their saturated translations differ at most by (≈icc). t
Definition 11.4.1 Normalization by saturation.
For a well-typed (non-focused) λ-term bΓatc± , bΣc± ` t : b(N | Qat)c±, we write NFsat(t)
for any saturated term t′′ such that
Γat; Σ `inv NFβ(t) t′ : N | Qat Γat; Σ `sinv t′  t′′ : N | Qat
Note that all possible t′′ are equal modulo (≈icc), by Lemma 11.4.5 (Determinacy of
saturated translation).
Lemma 11.4.6 (Saturation congruence).
For any context C[] and term t we have
NFsat(C[t]) ≈icc NFsat(C[NFsat(t)])
Proof. We reason by induction on C[]. Without loss of generality we will assume C[]
atomic. It is either a redex-forming context
 u πk  match  with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2
or a non-redex forming context
u  σi 
(u,) (, u)
match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ σ2 x→ u2 match u with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ 
If it is a non-context-forming redex, then we have NFβ(C[t]) = C[NFβ(t)]. The focused
and saturated translations then work over C[NFβ(t)]] just as they work with NFβ(t),
possibly adding bindings before C[] instead of directly on the (translations of) NFβ(t).
The results are in the (≈icc) relation.
The interesting case is when C[] is a redex-forming context: a reduction may overlap
the frontier between C[] and the plugged term. In that case, we will reason on the
saturated normal form NFsat(t). Thanks to the strongly restricted structure of focused
and saturated normal form, we have precise control over the possible reductions.
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Application case C[]
def
=  u. We prove that there exist t′ such that Γat; Σ `inv t t′ :
P → N |, and a r such that both Γat; Σ `inv t u r : N | and Γat; Σ `inv t′ u r : N |
hold. This implies the desired result – after translation of r into a saturated term. The
proof proceeds by induction on the derivation Γat; Σ `inv t u r : N | (we know that all
possible such translations have finite derivations).
To make the proof easier to follow, we introduce the notation NFfoc(Γ
at; Σ ` t) to denote
a focused translation t′ of NFβ(t) (that is, Γ
at; Σ `inv t t′ : N | Qat, where N , Qat are
uniquely defined by Γat; Σ `inv t′ : N | Qat)). This notation should be used with care
because it is not well-determined: there are many such possible translations. Statements
using the notation should be interpreted existentially: P (NFfoc(Γ
at; Σ ` t)) means that
there exists a translation t′ of t such that P (t′) holds. The current goal (whose statement
took the full previous paragraph) can be rephrased as follows:
NFfoc(Γ
at; Σ ` t u) = NFfoc(Γat; Σ ` NFfoc(Γat; Σ ` t) u)
We will simply write NFfoc(t) when the typing environment of the translation is clear from
the context.
If Σ contains a sum type, it is of the form (Σ′, x : C1 +C2) and we can get by induction
hypothesis that
NFfoc(Γ
at; Σ′, x : Ci ` t u) = NFfoc(Γat; Σ′, x : Ci ` NFfoc(t) u)
for i in {1, 2}, from which we can conclude with
NFfoc(Γ
at; Γ′, x : C1 + C2 ` t u)
= match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ NFfoc(Γat; Γ′, x : C1 ` t u)σ2 x→ . . . C2 . . .
= match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ NFfoc(Γat; Γ′, x : C1 ` NFfoc(t) u)σ2 x→ . . . C2 . . .
= NFfoc(Γ
at; Γ′, x : C1 + C2 ` NFfoc(t) u)
If Σ contains the empty type x : 0 then, for any t, NFfoc(X
−; Σ 3 x : 0 ` t) is equal
(modulo (≈icc)) to absurd(x) and the result is immediate.
Otherwise Σ is of the form
〈
Γat′
〉+at
.
Any focused translation of t at type N → P is thus necessarily of the form λx.NFfoc(t x).
In particular, any NFfoc(NFfoc(t) u), that is, any NFfoc((λx.NFfoc(t x)) u), is equal by
stability of the translation to β-reduction to a term of the form NFfoc(NFfoc(t x)[u/x]).
On the other hand, NFfoc(t u) can be of several different forms.
Note that t u is translated at the same type as t x. In particular, if this is a negative
type, they both begin with a suitable η-expansion (of a product or function type); in
the product case for example, we have NFfoc(t u) = (NFfoc(π1 (t u)),NFfoc(π2 (t u))), and
similarly NFfoc(t x) = (NFfoc(π1 (t x)),NFfoc(π2 (t x))): we can then conclude by induction
hypothesis on those smaller pairs of terms πi (t u) and πi (t x) for i in {1, 2}. We can thus
assume that t u is of positive or atomic type, and will reason by case analysis on the
β-normal form of t.
If NFβ(t) is of the form λx. t
′ for some t′, then NFfoc(t u) is equal to NFfoc((λx. t
′) u),
that is, NFfoc(t
′[u/x]). Finally, we have NFfoc(t x) = NFfoc((λx. t
′) x) = NFfoc(t
′), which
let us conclude from our assertion that NFfoc(NFfoc(t) u) is equal to NFfoc(NFfoc(t x)[u/x]).
If NFβ(t) contains a strictly positive neutral subterm n : P (this is in particular always
the case when it is of the form match t′ with . . . , we can let-extrude it to get
NFfoc(Γ
at; Γat
′ ` t) = let x = NFfoc(n) in NFfoc(Γat,Γat
′
;x : P ` t[x/n])
But then NFfoc(n) : P is also a strictly positive neutral subterm of (let x = NFfoc(n) in . . . ),
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so we have
NFfoc(NFfoc(t) u)
= NFfoc((let x = NFfoc(n) in NFfoc(t[x/n])) u)
= let x = NFfoc(n) in NFfoc(NFfoc(t[x/n]) u[x/n])
= let x = NFfoc(n) in NFfoc((t u)[x/n])
= NFfoc(t u)
Finally, if NFβ(t) contains no strictly positive neutral subterm, the rule rew-up-arrow
applies: NFfoc(t u) is of the form n NFfoc(u), where n
def
= NFfoc(t). In this case we also
have NFfoc(t x) = n x, and thus
NFfoc(NFfoc(t)x )
= NFfoc(NFfoc(t x)[u/x])
= NFfoc(n u)
= NFfoc(t u)
Projection case C[]
def
= πi  This case is proved in the same way as the application
case: after some sum eliminations, the translation of t is an η-expansion of the product,
which is related to the translations NFfoc(πi t), which either reduce the product or build
a neutral term πi n after introducing some let-bindings.
Sum elimination case Reusing the notations of the application case, show that
NFfoc(match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2 ) = NFfoc(match NFfoc(t) with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2 )
In the case of the function application or pair projection, the congruence proof uses
the fact that the translation of t (of function or product type) necessarily starts with a
λ-abstraction or pair construction – in fact, we follow the incremental construction of the
first invertible phase, in particular we start by eliminating sums from the context.
In the case of the sum elimination, we must follow the translation into focused form
further: we know the first invertible phase of NFfoc(t) may only have sum-eliminations
(pair or function introductions would be ill-typed as t has a sum type A+B).
As in the application case, we can then extrude neutrals from t, and the extrusion can be
mirrored in both NFfoc(match t with . . . ) and NFfoc(match NFfoc(t) with . . . ). Finally,
we reason by case analysis on NFβ(t).
If NFβ(t) is of the form σi t
′, then we have
NFfoc(match NFfoc(t) with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2 )
= NFfoc(match σi NFfoc(t
′) with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2 )
= NFfoc(ui[NFfoc(t
′)/x])
and
NFfoc(match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2 )
= NFfoc(match NFβ(t) with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2 )
= NFfoc(match σi t
′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ u1σ2 x→ u2 )
= NFfoc(ui[t
′/x])
What is left to prove is that NFfoc(ui[NFfoc(t
′)/x]) = NFfoc(ui[t
′/x]) but that is equivalent
(by stability of the focusing translation by β-reduction) to NFfoc((λx. ui) NFfoc(t
′)) =
NFfoc((λx. ui) t
′), which is exactly the application case proved previously.
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This is in fact the only possible case: when all strictly positive neutrals have been
extruded, then NFβ(t) is necessarily an injection σi t
′ (already handled) or a variable x
(this corresponds to the case where t itself reduces to a strictly positive neutral), but
this variable would be in the context and of strictly positive type, so this case is already
handled as well.
Absurd case absurd(x) The normal-form of (t : 0) cannot start with a constructor, as
there are none at this type. After neutral extrusion, it is thus necessarily a variable x : 0;
both sides are thus immediately equated with absurd(x) during the invertible translation
phase following normalization. 
Theorem 11.4.7 (Canonicity of saturating focused logic).
If we have Γat; Σ `sinv t : N | Qat and Γat; Σ `sinv u : N | Qat in saturating focused logic
with t≈icc u, then t≈βη u.
Proof. By contrapositive: if t ≈βη u (that is, if btcfoc ≈βη bucfoc) then t ≈icc u.
The difficulty to prove this statement is that βη-equivalence does not preserve the
structure of saturated proofs: an equivalence proof may go through intermediate steps
that are neither saturated nor focused or in β-normal form.
We will thus go through an intermediate relation, which we will write (≈sat), defined
as follows on arbitrary well-typed lambda-terms:
∅; Σ `inv t : A ∅; Σ `inv u : A ∅ `inv Σ : NFβ(t) t′A
∅ `inv Σ : NFβ(u) u′A ∅; Σ `sinv t′  t′′ : A | ∅; Σ `sinv u′  u′′ : A |
t′′ ≈icc u′′
Σ ` t ≈sat u : A
It follows from the previous results that if t ≈sat u, then t ≈βη u. We will now prove
the converse inclusion: if t ≈βη u (and they have the same type), then t ≈sat u holds. In
the particular case of terms that happen to be (let-expansions of) valid saturated focused
derivations, this will tell us in particular that t ≈icc u holds – the desired result.
The computational content of this canonicity proof is an equivalence algorithm: (≈sat)
is a decidable way to check for βη-equality, by normalizing terms to their saturated (or
maximally multi-focused) structure.
β-reductions It is immediate that (≈β) is included in (≈sat). Indeed, if t ≈β u then
NFβ(t) = NFβ(u) and t ≈sat u is trivially satisfied.
Negative η-expansions We can prove that if t ≈η u through one of the equations
(t : A→ B) ≈η λx. t x (t : A×B) ≈η (π1 t, π2 t)
then both t and u are rewritten in the same focused proof r. We have both ∅; Σ `inv
t r : N | and ∅; Σ `inv u r : N |, and thus t ≈sat u. Indeed we have:
∅; Σ, x : P `inv NFβ(t x) r : N |
∅; Σ `inv t λx. r : P → N |
NFβ((λx. t x) x) = NFβ(t x) ∅; Σ, x : P `inv NFβ((λx. t x) x) r : N |
∅; Σ `inv λx. t x λx. r : P → N |
and
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ∅; Σ `inv NFβ(πi t) ri : Ni |
∅; Σ `inv t (r1, r2) : (N1, N2) |
πi (π1 t, π2 t) = t ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ∅; Σ `inv NFβ(πi (π1 t, π2 t)) ri : Ni |
∅; Σ `inv (π1 t, π2 t) (r1, r2) : N1 ×N2 |
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Positive η-expansion: sum type The interesting case is the positive η-expansion
∀C[ : bP1c± + bP2c±], C[t] ≈η match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C[σ1 x]σ2 x→ C[σ2 x]
We do a case analysis on the (weak head) β-normal form of t. If it is an injection of the
form σi t
′, then the equation becomes true by a simple β-reduction:
match σi t
′ with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C[σ1 x]σ2 x→ C[σ2 x]  β C[σi t′]
Otherwise the β-normal form of t is a term of sum type that does not start with an
injection. In particular, NFβ(t) is not reduced when reducing the whole term C[t] (only
possibly duplicated): for some multi-hole context C ′[x] we have NFβ(C[t]) = C
′[NFβ(t)]
and
NFβ(match t with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C[σ1 x]σ2 x→ C[σ2 x] ) = match NFβ(t) with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C ′[σ1 x]σ2 x→ C ′[σ2 x]
Without loss of generality, we can assume that NFβ(t) is a neutral term. Indeed, if it
is not, it starts with a (possibly empty) series of non-invertible elimination forms, applied
to a positive elimination – which is itself either a neutral or of this form. It eventually
contains a neutral strict subterm of strictly positive type valid in the current scope. The
focused translation can then cut on this strictly positive neutral. If this neutral is of empty
type 0, both terms get translated to an absurd( ) construction so they are (≈icc)-related.
If it is a sum type, the translation splits on it, and replace occurrences of this neutral
with either σ1 z or σ2 z for some fresh z. This can be done on both terms equated by
the η-equivalence for sums, and returns (two pairs of) η-equivalent terms with one less
possible neutral strict subterm.
Let n
def
= NFβ(t). It remains to show that the translations of C
′[n] is equal modulo
(≈icc) to the translation of match n with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C ′[σ1 x]σ2 x→ C ′[σ2 x] . In fact, we show that they
translate to the same focused proof:
Γat ` n : P1 + P2 Γat ` n n′ ⇓ P1 + P2
Γat;x : P1 `inv C ′[σ1 x] r1 : ∅ | Qat Γat;x : P2 `inv C ′[σ2 x] r2 : ∅ | Qat
Γat;x : P1 + P2 `inv C ′[x] match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ r1σ2 x→ r2 : ∅ | Qat
Γat `foc C ′[n] let x = n in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ r1σ2 x→ r2 : Qat
Γat ` n : P1 + P2
Γat ` n n′ ⇓ P1 + P2 NFβ(match σi x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C ′[σ1 x]σ2 x→ C ′[σ2 x] ) = C ′[σi x]
Γat;x : P1 `inv C ′[σ1 x] r1 : ∅ | Qat Γat;x : P2 `inv C ′[σ2 x] r2 : ∅ | Qat
Γat;x : P1 + P2 `inv match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C ′[σ1 x]σ2 x→ C ′[σ2 x]  match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ r1σ2 x→ r2 : ∅ | Qat
Γat `foc match n with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ C ′[σ1 x]σ2 x→ C ′[σ2 x]  let x = n in match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ r1σ2 x→ r2 : Qat
Positive η-expansion: empty type This case cannot happen by Theorem 11.3.4 (Incon-
sistent canonicity); in an inconsistent context, saturation always finds a proof of 0, and
thus all saturated proof terms are of the form absurd( ) and are thus (≈icc)-equivalent.
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Transitivity Given t ≈sat u and u ≈sat r, do we have t ≈sat r? In the general case we
have
∅; Σ `inv t : A | ∅ ∅; Σ `inv u : A | ∅
∅; Σ `inv NFβ(t) t′ : A | ∅ ∅; Σ `inv NFβ(u) u′1 : A | ∅
∅; Σ `sinv t′  t′′ : A | ∅ ∅; Σ `sinv u′1  u′′1 : A | ∅
t′′ ≈icc u′′1
Σ ` t ≈sat u : A
∅; Σ `inv u : A | ∅ ∅; Σ `inv r : A | ∅
∅; Σ `inv NFβ(u) u′2 : A | ∅ ∅; Σ `inv NFβ(r) r′ : A | ∅
∅; Σ `sinv u′2  u′′2 : A | ∅ ∅; Σ `sinv r′  r′′ : A | ∅
u′′2 ≈icc r′′
Σ ` u ≈sat r : A
By Lemma 11.4.5 (Determinacy of saturated translation) we have that u′′1 ≈icc u′′2.
Then, by transitivity of (≈icc):
t′′ ≈icc u′′1 ≈icc u′′2 ≈icc r′′
Congruence If Σ ` t1 ≈sat t2 : A, do we have that C[t1] ≈sat C[t2] for any term context
C?
This is an immediate application of Lemma 11.4.6 (Saturation congruence): it tells us
that NFsat(C[t1]) ≈icc NFsat(C[NFsat(t1)]) and NFsat(C[t1]) ≈icc NFsat(C[NFsat(t2)]). So,
by transitivity of (≈icc) we only have to prove NFsat(C[NFsat(t1)]) ≈icc NFsat(C[NFsat(t1)]),
which is a consequence of our assumption NFsat(t1) ≈icc NFsat(t2) and congruence of
(≈icc). 
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12. From the logic to the algorithm:
deciding unicity
The saturating focused logic corresponds to a computationally complete presentation of the
structure of canonical proofs we are interested in. From this presentation it is extremely
easy to derive a terminating search algorithm complete for unicity – we moved from a
whiteboard description of the saturating rules to a working implementation of the algo-
rithm usable on actual examples in exactly one day of work. The implementation [Scherer,
2015b] is around 700 lines of readable OCaml code.
In Section 6.2 (Rudiments of proof search), we proved the decidability of inhabitation
for propositional logic. Decidability results for quantifier-free logics are easily obtained by
constructing a search space, for the proofs of a given judgment, that is both complete for
provability (it contains a proof it he judgment is at all provable) and finite. Three key
observations were used to exhibit this finite search space:
1. Cut-free proofs in propositional logic have the subformula property, which bounds
the formula appearing in the proof the finite set of sub-formulas of the root judgment.
2. The contexts of the logic are sets of formulas, and in particular the set of contexts
over the finite set of formulas is finite. Thus, the set of possible judgments is finite.
3. We can restrict ourselves to the subset of proof where, along any path of the proof
tree, all judgments occurs at most once – and all provable formulas remain provable
under that restriction. This sub-system of recurrence-free proofs is thus complete
for provability, and is finite – as the set of possible judgments is finite.
In the present chapter, we would like to justify our implementation by proposing a
similarly finite subsystem of our saturation logic, which enjoys canonical proofs. The goal
is to be able to decide whether a type is uniquely inhabited by exploring this subsystem,
so it should be unicity complete.
The subformula property is preserved in saturated proof terms, which are cut-free proofs
with additional structure. But the two other restrictions above are too brutal for our
needs. They preserve completeness for provability, but they lose many computational
behaviors, they break computational completeness and even unicity completeness. We
refine them into two restrictions that give us finiteness (and, in particular, break com-
putational completeness for types with infinitely many distinct inhabitants) but preserve
unicity completeness, and in fact let us enumerate at least n different inhabitants if they
exist.
1. To detect non-unicity, it suffices to keep at most two variables of each type in the
context. This suggest a definition of contexts as 2-bounded multisets of formulas,
which give a finite context space over a finite space of formulas. The fact that this
restriction is unicity complete was proved in Chapter 9 (Counting terms and proofs).
2. Similarly, we restrict ourselves to the subset of proofs where, along any path of the
proof tree, all judgments occur at most two times. This relaxation of the recurrence-
free criterion suffices to recover completeness for unicity, as we shall prove in this
chapter.
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12.1. Implementing search
12.1.1. Implementation overview
The central idea to cut the search space while remaining complete for unicity is the two-
or-more approximation. We use a plurality monad Plur, defined in set-theoretic terms
as Plur(S)
def
= 1 + S + S × S, representing zero, one or “at least two” distinct elements
of the set S. Each typing judgment is reformulated into a search function which takes as
input the context(s) of the judgment and its goal, and returns a plurality of proof terms
– we search not for one proof term, but for (a bounded set of) all proof terms. Reversing
the usual mapping from variables to types, the contexts map types to pluralities of formal
variables – just as we did in Chapter 9 (Counting terms and proofs).
In the search algorithm, the sinv-end rule does not merely pass its new context Γ′ to the
saturation rules, but it also trims it by applying the two-or-more rule: if the old context
Γ already has two variables of a given formula N , drop all variables for N from Γ′; if
it already has one variable, retain at most one variable in Γ′. This amounts to defining
a selection function SelectΓ,Γ′( ) for use in the sat rule. This trimming respects the
selection requirement select-specif, as it always keep at least one proof of each formula
provable in either Γ or Γ′. Proving that it is complete for unicity was the topic of Chapter 9
(Counting terms and proofs).
To effectively implement the saturation rules, a useful tool is an obligation search func-
tion (called select oblis in our prototype) which takes a selection predicate on positive
or atomic formulas P at, and searches for (a plurality of) each negative formula N from
the context that might be the starting point of an elimination judgment of the form
Γ ` n ⇓ P at, for a P at accepted by the selection predicate. For example, if we want to
prove X and there is a formula Y → Z×X, this formula will be part of the search results
– although we do not know yet if we will be able to prove Y . For each such P at, it returns
a proof obligation, that is either a valid derivation of Γ ` n ⇓ P at, or a request, giving
some formula Q and expecting a derivation of Γ ` ? ⇑ Qat before returning another proof
obligation for P at.
The rule sat-atom (Γ; ∅ `sat ? : X−) uses this obligation search function to search
for all negatives that could potentially be eliminated into a X−, and feeding (pluralities
of) answers to the returned proof obligations (by recursively searching for introduction
judgments) to obtain (pluralities of) elimination proofs of X−.
The rule sat uses the selection function to find the negatives that could be eliminated
in any strictly positive formula and tries to fullfill (pluralities of) proof obligations. This
returns a binding context (with a plurality of neutrals for each positive formula), which is
filtered a posteriori to keep only the “new” bindings – that use the new context. The new
binding are all added to the search environment, and saturating search is called recursively.
It returns a plurality of proof terms; each of them results in a proof derivation (where the
saturating set is trimmed to retain only the bindings useful to that particular proof term).
Finally, to ensure termination while remaining complete for unicity, we do not search
for proofs where a given subgoal occurs strictly more than twice along a given search
path. This is easily implemented by threading an extra “memory” argument through each
recursive call, which counts the number of identical subgoals below a recursive call and
kills the search (by returning the “zero” element of the plurality monad) at two. Note
that this does not correspond to memoization in the usual sense, as information is only
propagated along a recursive search branch, and never shared between several branches.
This fully describes the algorithm, which is easily derived from the logic. It is effective,
and our implementation answers instantly on all the (small) types of polymorphic functions
we tried. But it is not designed for efficiency, and in particular saturation duplicates a lot
of work (re-computing old values before throwing them away).
We can give a presentation of the algorithm as a system of inference rules that is
terminating and deterministic. Using the two-or-more counting approximation result of
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Chapter 9 (Counting terms and proofs), we can prove the correctness of this presentation.
12.1.2. A formal description of the algorithm
In Figure 12.1 (Saturation algorithm) we present a complete set of inference rules that
captures the behavior of our search algorithm.
Data structures The judgments uses several kinds data-structures.
• 2-sets S, T . . . , are sets restricted to having at most two (distinct) elements; we use
{. . . }2 to build a 2-set, and (∪2) for union of two-sets (keeping at most two elements
in the resulting union). We use the usual notation x ∈ S for 2-set membership. To
emphasize the distinction, we will sometimes write {. . . }∞ for the usual, unbounded
sets. Remark that 2-sets correspond to the “plurality monad” of Section 12.1.1 (Im-
plementation overview): a monad is more convenient to use in an implementation,
but for inference rules we use the set-comprehension notation.
• 2-mappings are mappings from a set of keys to 2-sets. In particular, Γat denotes a
2-mapping from negative or atomic types to 2-sets of formal variables. We use the
application syntax Γat(Nat) for accessing the 2-set bound to a specific key, Nat 7→ S
for the singleton mapping from one variable to one 2-set, and (⊕) for the union of
2-mappings, which applies (∪2) pointwise:
(Γat ⊕ Γat′)(Nat) def= Γat(Nat) ∪2 Γat
′
(Nat)
Finally, we write ∅ for the mapping that maps any key to the empty 2-set.
• multisets M are mappings from elements to a natural number count. The “mem-
ories” of subgoal ancestors are such mappings (where the keys are “judgments” of
the form Γat `foc Qat), and our rules will guarantee that the value of any key is at
most 2. We use the application syntax M(Γat `foc Qat) to access the count of any
element, and (+) for pointwise addition of multisets:
(M +M ′)(Γat `foc Qat)
def
= M(Γat `foc Qat) +M ′(Γat `foc Qat)
• (ordered) lists Σ of strictly positive formulas.
Finally, we use a substraction operation (−2) between 2-mappings, that can be defined
from the 2-set restriction operation S \2 n (where n is a natural number in {0, 1, 2}).
Recall that cardinal(S) is the cardinal of the set (or 2-set) S.
(Γat
′ −2 Γat)(Nat)
def
= Γat
′
(Nat) \2 cardinal(Γat(Nat))
S \2 0
def
= S ∅ \2 1
def
= ∅ {a, . . . }2 \2 1
def
= {a}2 S \2 2
def
= ∅
Note that {a, b} \2 1 is not uniquely defined: it could be either a or b, the choice does
not matter. The defining property of S \2 n is that it is a minimal 2-set S′ such as
S′ ∪2 T = S for some set T .
Judgments The algorithm is presented as a system of judgment-directed (that is, di-
rected by the types in the goal and the context(s)) inference rules. It uses the following
five judgment forms:
• invertible judgments M @ Γat; Γat′; Σ `alginv S : N | Qat
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• saturation judgments M @ Γat; Γat′ `algsat S : Qat
• post-saturation judgments M @ Γat `algpost S : Qat
• introduction judgments M @ Γat `alg S ⇑ P
• elimination judgments M @ Γat `alg S ⇓ N
All algorithmic jugments respect the same conventions:
• M is a memory (remembering ancestors judgments for termination), a multiset of
judgments of the form Γ ` A
• Γat,Γat′ are 2-mappings from negative or atomic types to 2-sets of formal variables
(we will call those “contexts”)
• Σ is an ordered list of pairs x : P of formal variables and positive types
• S is a 2-set of proof terms of the saturating focused logic
The S position is the output position of each judgment (the algorithm returns a 2-set
of distinct proof terms); all other positions are input positions; any judgment has exactly
one applicable rule, determined by the value of its input positions.
Sets of terms We extend the term construction operations to 2-sets of terms:
λx. S
def
= {λx. t | t ∈ S}2
S T
def
= {t u | t ∈ S, u ∈ T}2
(S, T )
def
= {(t, u) | t ∈ S, u inT}2
πi S
def
= {πi t | t ∈ S}2
σi S
def
= {σi t | t ∈ S}2
match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ S1σ2 x→ S2 def= {match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ t1σ2 x→ t2 | ti ∈ Si}2
Invertible rules The invertible focused rules Γat; Σ `inv ? : N | Qat exhibit “don’t care”
non-determinism in the sense that their order of application is irrelevant and captured
by invertible commuting conversions (see Section 7.2.6). In the algorithmic judgment, we
enforce a specific order through the two following restrictions.
First, we use the incremental move rules instead of a batch release rule (see Section 7.2.4
(Batch or incremental validation of non-polarized contexts) for a discussion of the design
space). The negative or atomic formulas that are shifted in the positive context Σ are
moved incrementally to a temporary context Γat′. By using an ordered list for the pos-
itive context, we fix the order in which positives are deconstructed. When the head of
the ordered list has been fully deconstructed (it is negative or atomic), the new rule
alg-sinv-release moves it into Γat′.
Second, the invertible right-introduction rules are restricted to judgments whose ordered
context Σ is empty. This enforces that left-introductions are always applied fully before
any right-introduction. Note that we could arbitrarily decide to enforce the opposite
order by un-restricting right-introduction rules, and requiring that left-introduction (and
releases) only happen when the succedent is positive or atomic.
After the decomposition of Σ is finished, the final invertible rule alg-sinv-end uses 2-
mapping substractions Γat −2 Γat′ to trim the new context Γat′ before handing it to the
saturation rules: for any given formula Nat, all bindings for Nat are removed from Γat′
if there are already two in Γat, and at most one binding is kept if there is already one in
Γat. Morally, the reason why it is correct to trim (that is, it does not endanger unicity
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Figure 12.1.: Saturation algorithm
alg-sinv-sum
M @ Γat; Γat
′
;x : P 1,Σ `alginv S1 : N | Q
at
M @ Γat; Γat
′
;x : P 2,Σ `alginv S2 : N | Q
at
M @ Γat; Γat
′
;x : P1 + P2,Σ `alginv match x with
∣∣∣∣ σ1 x→ S1σ2 x→ S2 : N | Qat
alg-sinv-prod
M @ Γat; Γat
′
; ∅ `alginv S1 : N1 | ∅
M @ Γat; Γat
′
; ∅ `alginv S2 : N2 | ∅
M @ Γat; Γat
′
; ∅ `alginv (S1, S2) : N1 ×N2 | ∅
alg-sinv-arr
M @ Γat; Γat
′
;x : P `alginv S : N | ∅
M @ Γat; Γat
′
; ∅ `alginv λx. S : P → N | ∅
alg-sinv-unit
M @ Γat; Γat′; ∅ `alginv {()} : 1 | ∅
alg-sinv-empty
M @ Γat; Γat′;x : 0,Σ `alginv {absurd(x)} : 1 | ∅
alg-sinv-release
M @ Γat; Γat
′ ⊕ (Nat′ 7→ {x}2); Σ `alginv S : N | Q
at
M @ Γat; Γat
′
;x :
〈
Nat
′
〉+at
,Σ `alginv S : N | Q
at
alg-sinv-end
M @ Γat; (Γat
′ −2 Γat) `algsat S : Qat
M @ Γat; Γat
′
; ∅ `alginv S : ∅ | Q
at
alg-sat-kill
M(Γat `foc Qat) = 2
M @ Γat; ∅ `algsat ∅ : Qat
alg-sat-post
M(Γat `foc Qat) < 2 M ⊕2 (Γ ` P ) @ Γat `algpost S : Qat
M @ Γat; ∅ `algsat S : Qat
alg-post-intro
M @ Γat `alg S ⇑ P
M @ Γat `algpost S : P
alg-post-atom
M @ Γat `alg S ⇓ X−
M @ Γat `algpost S : X−
alg-sat
Γ′ 6= ∅
∀(P | P subformula (Γat,Γat′)), SP
def
=
⋃
2
{Sne |M @ Γ,Γ′ `alg Sne ⇓ P}
B
def
=
⊕
P
{P 7→ {xn}2 | n ∈ SP }
M @ Γ,Γ′; ∅;B `alginv S : ∅ | Q
at
S′
def
=
{
let x̄ = n̄ in t
∣∣∣∣∣ t ∈ S,(x̄, n̄) def= {(xn, n) | ∃P, xn ∈ B(P )}∞
}
2
M @ Γat; Γat
′ `algsat S′ : Qat
alg-sintro-sum
M @ Γat `alg S1 ⇑ P1
M @ Γat `alg S2 ⇑ P2
M @ Γat `alg (σ1 S1) ∪2 (σ2 S2) ⇑ P1 + P2
alg-sintro-var
S
def
= {x | (x : X+) ∈ Γat}2
M @ Γat `alg S ⇑ X+
alg-sintro-end
M @ Γat; ∅; ∅ `alginv S : N | ∅
M @ Γat `alg S ⇑ 〈N〉+
alg-selim
N subformula Γat
Svar
def
= Γat(N)
Sproj
def
=
⋃
2
{πi S |M @ Γat `alg S ⇓M1 ×M2, Mi = N}
Sapp
def
=
⋃
2
{S T |M @ Γat `alg S ⇓ P → N, M @ Γat `alg T ⇑ P}
M @ Γat `alg Svar ∪2 Sproj ∪2 Sapp ⇓ N
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completeness is that the next rules in bottom-up search will only use the merged context
Γat ∪2 Γat′ (which is preserved by trimming by construction of (−2)), or saturate with
bindings from Γat′. Any strictly positive that can be deduced by using one of the variables
present in Γat′ but removed from Γat∪2 Γat′ has already been deduced from Γat. It is useful
to trim in this rule (we could trim much more often) because subsequent saturated rules
will test the new context Γat′ −2 Γat for emptyness, so it is interesting to minimize it. In
any case, we need to trim in at least one place in order for typing judgments not to grow
unboundedly.
Saturation rules If the (trimmed) new context is empty, we test whether the judgment of
the current subgoal has already occurred twice among its ancestors; in this case, the rule
alg-sat-kill terminates the search process by returning the empty 2-set of proof terms.
In the other case, the number of occurrences of this judgment is incremented in the rule
alg-sat-post, and one of the (transparent) “post-saturation” rules alg-post-intro or
alg-post-atom are applied.
This is the only place where the memory M is accessed and updated. The reason why
this suffices is any given phase (invertible phase, or phase of non-invertible eliminations and
introductions) is only of finite length, and either terminates or is followed by a saturation
phase; because contexts grow monotonously in a finite space (of 2-mappings rather than
arbitrary contexts), the trimming of rule alg-sinv-end returns the empty context after
a finite number of steps: an infinite search path would need to go through alg-sat-post
infinitely many times, and this suffices to prove termination.
The most important and complex rule is alg-sat, which proceeds in four steps. First,
we compute the 2-set SP of all ways to deduce any strict positive P from the context
– for any P we need not remember more than two ways. We know that we need only
look for P that are deducible by elimination from the context Γat,Γat′ – the finite set of
subformulas is a good enough approximation. Because we retain at least one neutral of
each newly provable positive P , this algorithm corresponds to a selection function that
satisfies select-specif.
Second, we build a context B binding a new formal variable xn for each elimination
neutral n – it is crucial for canonicity that all n are new and semantically distinct from
each other at this point, otherwise duplicate bindings would be introduced. Third, we
compute the 2-set S of all possible (invertible) proofs of the goal under this saturation
context B, and add the let-bindings to those proof terms in the final returned 2-set.
Non-invertible introduction and elimination rules The introduction rule alg-sintro-sum
collects solutions using either left or right introductions, and unites them in the result 2-set.
Similarly, all elimination rules are merged in one single rule alg-selim, which corresponds
to all ways to deduce a given formula N : directly from the context, by projection of a
pair, or application of a function. The search space for this sequent is finite, as goal types
grow strictly at each type, and we can kill search for any type that does not appear as a
subformula of the context.
(The inference-rule presentation differs from our OCaml implementation at this point.
The implementation is more effective, it uses continuation-passing style to attempt to
provide function arguments only for the applications we know are found in context and
may lead to the desired result. Such higher-order structure is hard to render in an inference
rule, so we approximated it with a more declarative presentation here. This is the only
such simplification.)
12.2. Correctness
Lemma 12.2.1 (Termination).
The algorithmic inference system only admits finite derivations.
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Proof. We show that each inference rule is of finite degree (it has a finite number of
premises), and that there exists no infinite path of inference rules – concluding with
König’s Lemma.
Degree finiteness The rules that could be of infinite degree are alg-sat (which quantifies
over all positives P ) and alg-selim (which quantifies over arbitrarily many elimination
derivations). But both rules have been restricted through the subformula property to only
quantify on finitely many formulas (alg-sat) or possible elimination schemes (alg-selim).
Infinite paths lead to absurdity We first assert that any given phase (invertible, satu-
ration, introductions/eliminations) may only be of finite length. Indeed, invertible rules
have either the context or the goal decreasing structurally. Saturation rules are either
alg-sat if Γat′ 6= ∅, which is immediately followed by elimination and invertible rules, or
alg-sat-kill or alg-sat-post if Γat′ = ∅, in which case the derivation either terminates or
continues with a non-invertible introduction or elimination. Introductions have the goal
decreasing structurally, and eliminations have the goal increasing structurally, and can
only form valid derivations if it remains a subformula of the context Γat.
Given that any phase is finite, any infinite path will necessarily have an infinite number
of phase alternation. By looking at the graph of phase transitions (invertible goes to
saturating which goes to introductions or eliminations, which go to invertible), we see
that each phase will occur infinitely many times along an infinite path. In particular,
an infinite path would have infinitely many invertible and saturation phases; the only
transition between them is the rule alg-sinv-end which must occur infinitely many times
in the path.
Now, because the rules grow the context monotonically, an infinite path must eventually
reach a maximal stable context Γat, that never grows again along the path. In particular,
for infinitely many alg-sinv-end we have Γat maximal and thus Γat′ −2 Γat = ∅ – if the
trimming was not empty, Γat′ would grow strictly after the next saturation phase, while
we assumed it was maximal.
This means that either alg-sat-kill or alg-sat-post incurs infinitely many times along
the infinite path. Those rules check the memory count of the current (context, goal) pair
Γat `foc Qat. Because of the subformula property (formulas occurring in subderivations
are subformulas of the root judgment concluding the complete proof), there can be only
finitely many different Γat `foc Qat pair (Γat is a 2-mapping which grows monotonically).
An infinite path would thus necessarily have infinitely many steps alg-sat-kill or
alg-sat-post with the same (context, goal) pair. This is impossible, as a given pair can
only go at most twice through alg-sat-post, and going through alg-sat-kill terminates
the path. There is no infinite path. 
Lemma 12.2.2 (Totality and Determinism).
For any algorithmic judgment there is exactly one applicable rule.
Proof. Immediate by construction of the rules. Invertible rules M @ Γat; Γat′; Σ `alginv S :
N | Qat are directed by the shape of the context Σ and the goal N . Saturation rules
M @ Γat; Γat′ `algsat S : Qat are directed by the new context Γat
′. If Γat′ = ∅, the memory
M(Γat `foc Qat) decides whether to kill or post-saturate, in which case the shape of the goal
(either strict positive or atomic) directs the post-saturation rule. Finally, non-invertible
introductions M @ Γat `alg S ⇑ P are directed by the goal P , and there is exactly one
non-invertible elimination rule. 
Remark 12.2.1. The choice we made to restrict the ordering of invertible rules is not
necessary – we merely wanted to demonstrate an example of such restrictions, and re-
flect the OCaml implementation. We could keep the same indeterminacy as in previous
systems; totality would be preserved (all judgments have one applicable rule), but deter-
minism dropped. There could be several S such that M @ Γat; Γat′; Σ `alginv S : A |, which
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would correspond to (2-set restrictions of) sets of terms equal upto invertible commuting
conversion. ∗
Lemma 12.2.3 (Soundness).
For any algorithmic judgment returning a 2-set S, any element t ∈ S is a valid proof term
of the corresponding saturating judgment.
Proof sketch. By induction, this is immediate for all rules except alg-sat. This rule is
designed to fit the requirements of the saturated logic sat rule. t
Definition 12.2.1 Recurrent ancestors.
This definition is a reminder and specialization of Definition 6.2.5 (Recurrent ancestor).
Consider a complete algorithmic derivation of a judgment with empty initial memory
∅. Given any subderivation Pleafward, we call recurrent ancestor any other subderivation
Πrootward that is on the path between Πleafward and the root (it has Πleafward as a strict
subderivation) and whose derived judgment is identical to the one of Πleafward except for
the memory M and the output set S.
Lemma 12.2.4 (Correct Memory).
In a complete algorithmic derivation whose conclusion’s memory is M , each subderivation
of the form M ′ @ Γat; ∅ `algsat S : Qat has a number of recurrent ancestors equal to
M ′(Γat `foc Qat)−M(Γat `foc Qat)
Proof. This is immediately proved by reasoning on the path from the start of the com-
plete derivation to the subderivation. By construction of the algorithmic judgment, each
judgment of the form M ′ @ Γat′; ∅ `algsat S′ : Qat is proved by either the rule alg-sat-kill,
which terminates the path with the invariant maintained, or the rule alg-sat-post, which
continues the path with the invariant preserved by incrementing the count in memory. 
Lemma 12.2.5 (Recurrence Decrementation).
If a saturated logic derivation contains n + 2 occurrences of the same judgment along a
given path, then there is a valid saturated logic derivation with n + 1 occurrences of this
judgment.
Proof. We have actually already proved this in Section 6.2.2 (Recurrent ancestors in
derivations).
If t is the proof term with n+ 2 occurrences of the same judgment along a given path,
let u1 be the subterm corresponding to the very last occurrence of the judgment, and u2
the last-but-one. The term t[u1/u2] is a valid proof term (of the same result as t), with
only n+ 1 occurrences of this same judgment. 
Note that this transformation changes the computational meaning of the term – it must
be used with care, as it could break unicity completeness.
Theorem 12.2.6 (Provability completeness).
If a memory M contains multiplicities of either 0 or 1 (never 2 or more), then any algo-
rithmic judgment with memory M is complete for unicity: if the corresponding saturating
judgment is inhabited, then the algorithmic judgment returns an inhabited 2-set.
Proof. If the saturating judgment Γat; Γat′ `sat t : Qat holds for a given t, we can assume
without loss of generality that t contains no two recurring occurrences of the same judg-
ment along any path – indeed, it suffices to repeatedly apply Lemma 12.2.5 (Recurrence
Decrementation) to obtain such a t with no recurring judgment.
The proof of our result goes by induction on (the saturated derivation of) this no-
recurrence t, mirroring each inference step into an algorithmic inference rule returning an
inhabited set. Consider the following saturated rule for example:
Γat ` u ⇑ P1
Γat ` σ1 u ⇑ P1 + P2
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We can build the corresponding algorithmic rule
M ′ @ Γat `alg S1 ⇑ P1
M ′ @ Γat `alg S2 ⇑ P2
M ′ @ Γat `alg σ1 S1 ∪2 σ2 S2 ⇑ P1 + P2
By induction hypothesis we have that S1 is inhabited; from it we deduce that σ1 S1 is
inhabited, and thus σ1 S1 ∪2 σ2 S2 is inhabited.
It would be tempting to claim that the resulting set is inhabited by t. That, in our
example above, u inhabits S1 and thus t = σ1 u inhabits σ1 S1 ∪2 σ2 S2. This stronger
statement is incorrect, however, as the union of 2-sets may drop some inhabitants if it
already has found two distinct terms.
The first difficulty in the induction are with judgments of the form Γat; ∅ `sat u : Qat:
to build an inhabited result set, we need to use the rule alg-sat-post and thus check that
Γat `foc Qat does not occur twice in the current memory M ′. By Lemma 12.2.4 (Correct
Memory), we know that M ′(Γat `foc Qat) is the sum of the number of recurrent ancestors
and of M(Γat `foc Qat). By definition of t (as a term with no repeated judgment), we
know that Γat `foc Qat did not already occur in t itself – the count of recurrent ancestors
is 0. By hypothesis on M we know that M(Γat `foc Qat) is at most 1, so the sum cannot
be 2 or more.
The second and last subtlety happens at the sinv-end rule for Γat; Γat′ `sinv f : ∅ | Qat.
We read saturated derivation of the premise Γat; Γat′ `sat f : Qat, but build an algorithmic
derivation in the trimmed context M @ Γat; (Γat′ −2 Γat) `algsat S : Qat. It is not necessarily
the case that f is well-defined in this restricted context. But that is not an issue for
inhabitation: the only variables removed from Γat′ are those for which at least one variable
of the same type appears in Γat. We can thus replace each use of a trimmed variable by
another variable of the same type in Γat, and get a valid derivation of the exact same
size.1 
Theorem 12.2.7 (Unicity completeness).
If a memory M contains multiplicities of 0 only, then any algorithmic judgment with
memory M is complete for unicity: if the corresponding saturating judgment has two
distinct inhabitants, then the algorithmic judgment returns a 2-set of two distinct elements.
Proof. Consider a pair of distinct inhabitants t 6= u of a given judgment. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that t has no judgment ocurring twice or more. (We cannot also
assume that u has no judgment occurring twice, as the recurrence reduction of a general
u may be equal to t.)
Without loss of generality, we will also assume that t and u use a consistent ordering
for invertible rules (for example the one presented in the algorithmic judgment); this
assumption can be made because reordering inference steps gives a term in the (≈icc)
equivalence class, that is thus βη-equivalent to the starting term.
Finally, to justify the sinv-end rule we need to invoke the “two or more” result of
Chapter 9 (Counting terms and proofs), as we detail here. Without loss of generality
we assume that t and u never use more than two variables of any given type (additional
variables are weakened as soon as they are introduced). If t and u have distinct shapes
(they are in disjoint equivalent classes of terms that erase to the same logic derivation),
we immediately know that the disequality t 6= u is preserved. If they have the same shape,
we need to invoke Corollary 9.3.6 (Two-or-more approximation) to know that we can pick
two distinct terms in this restricted space.
We then prove our result by parallel induction on t and u: the saturated judgment is
1This argument was already used in Scherer and Rémy [2015], but there it was invalid. Indeed, there
was a strict condition (Section 11.2.4 (Comparison with the previous approach of Scherer and Rémy
[2015])) on the fact that each saturated variable had to be used in the right-hand side, which was not
robust to the replacement of one variable for another. Our use of a saturation function in the current
presentation avoids this issue.
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inhabited by at least two distinct inhabitants. As long as their subterms start with the
same syntactic construction, we keep inducing in parallel. Their head constructor may
only differ in a non-invertible introduction or elimination rule (we assumed that invertible
steps were performed in the same order), for example we may have
Γat ` p ⇑ P1
Γat ` σ1 p ⇑ P1 + P2
Γat ` q ⇑ P2
Γat ` σ2 q ⇑ P1 + P2
We then invoke Theorem 12.2.6 (Provability completeness) on p and q: we can build
corresponding derivations M ′ @ Γat `alg S ⇑ A and M ′ @ Γat `alg T ⇑ B where S and
T are inhabited, and thus σ1 S ∪2 σ2 T is inhabited by at least two distinct terms. The
memory hypothesis of the provability theorem is fulfilled: because we know that there are
no repetitions in t, and that we iterated in parallel on the structures of t and u, we know
that each judgment was seen at most once during the parallel induction. As we assumed
our starting memory was all 0, the memory M ′ at the point where t and u differ is thus,
by Lemma 12.2.4 (Correct Memory), of at most 1 for any judgment.
There is one difficulty during the parallel induction, which is the sinv-end case. We read
a saturated derivations of premise Γat; Γat′ `sat t : Qat and Γat; Γat′ `sat u : Qat, but build
an algorithmic derivation in the trimmed contextM @ Γat; (Γat′ −2 Γat) `algsat S : Qat. This
is why we restricted t and u to not use more than two different variables of each type, so
that they remain well-typed under this restriction. 
Theorem 12.2.8.
Our unicity-deciding algorithm is terminating and unicity complete.
Proof. Our unicity-deciding algorithm takes a judgment bΣc± ` b(N | X+)c± and returns
the 2-set S uniquely determined by a complete algorithmic derivation of the judgment
∅ @ ∅; ∅; Γ `alginv S : N | X+ – whose memory is empty. There always exists exactly one
derivation by Lemma 12.2.2 (Totality and Determinism), and it is finite by Lemma 12.2.1
(Termination). Our algorithm can compute the next rule to apply in finite time, and all
derivations are finite, so the algorithm is terminating. This root judgment has an empty
memory, hence it is complete for unicity by Theorem 12.2.7 (Unicity completeness). 
12.3. Going further
12.3.1. Optimizations
The search space restrictions described above are those necessary for termination. Many
extra optimizations are possible, that can be adapted from the proof search literature –
with some care to avoid losing completness for unicity. For example, there is no need to
cut on a positive if its atoms do not appear in negative positions (nested to the left of
an odd number of times) in the rest of the goal. We did not develop such optimizations,
except for two low-hanging fruits we describe below.
Eager redundancy elimination Whenever we consider selecting a proof obligation to
prove a strict positive during the saturation phase, we can look at the negatives that
will be obtained by cutting it. If all those atoms are already present at least twice in the
context, this positive is redundant and there is no need to cut on it. Dually, before starting
a saturation phase, we can look at whether it is already possible to get two distinct neutral
proofs of the goal from the current context. In this case it is not necessary to saturate at
all.
This optimization is interesting because it significantly reduces the redundancy implied
by only filtering of old terms after computing all of them. Indeed, we intuitively expect
that most types present in the context are in fact present twice (being unique tends to be
the exception rather than the rule in programming situations), and thus would not need
266
to be saturated again. Redundancy of saturation still happens, but only on the “frontier
formulas” that are present exactly once.
Subsumption by memoization One of the techniques necessary to make the inverse
method competitive is subsumption [McLaughlin and Pfenning, 2008]: when a new judg-
ment is derived by forward search, it is only added to the set of known results if it is not
subsumed by a more general judgment (same goal, smaller context) already known.
In our setting, being careful not to break computational completeness, this rule becomes
the following. We use (monotonic) mutable state to grow a memoization table of each
proved subgoal, indexed by the right-hand side formula. Before proving a new subgoal, we
look for all already-computed subgoals of the same right-hand side formula. If one exists
with exactly the same context, we return its result. But we also return eagerly if there
exists a larger context (for inclusion) that returned zero result, or a smaller context that
returned two-or-more results.
Interestingly, we found out that this optimization becomes unsound in presence of the
empty type 0. Its equational theory tells us that in an inconsistent context (0 is provable),
all proofs are equal. Thus a type may have two inhabitants in a given context, but a
larger context that is inconsistent (let us prove 0) will have a unique inhabitant, breaking
monotonicity. The optimization could still be applied for all judgments that do not have
0 as a subformula of the context.
12.4. Evaluation
In this section, we give some practical examples of code inference scenarios that our current
algorithm can solve, and some that it cannot – because the simply-typed theory is too
restrictive.
The key to our application is to translate a type using prenex-polymorphism into a
simple type using atoms in stead of type variables – this is semantically correct given
that bound type variables in System F are handled exactly as simply-typed atoms. The
approach, of course, is only a very first step and quickly shows it limits. For example,
we cannot work with polymorphic types in the environment (ML programs typically do
this, for example when typing a parametrized module, or type-checking under a type-class
constraint with polymorphic methods), or first-class polymorphism in function arguments.
We also do not handle higher-kinded types – even pure constructors.
All the examples mentioned in this section are available as tests in our prototype im-
plementation [Scherer, 2015b].
12.4.1. Inferring polymorphic library functions
The Haskell standard library contains a fair number of polymorphic functions with unique
types. The following examples have been checked to be uniquely defined by their types:
fst : ∀αβ. α× β → α curry : ∀αβγ. (α× β → γ)→ α→ β → γ
uncurry : ∀αβγ. (α→ β → γ)→ α× β → γ
either : ∀αβγ.(α→ γ)→ (β → γ)→ α+ β → γ
When the API gets more complicated, both types and terms become harder to read
and uniqueness of inhabitation gets much less obvious. Consider the following operators
chosen arbitrarily in the lens [Kmett, 2012] library.
(<.) :: Indexable i p => (Indexed i s t -> r)
-> ((a -> b) -> s -> t) -> p a b -> r
(<.>) :: Indexable (i, j) p => (Indexed i s t -> r)
-> (Indexed j a b -> s -> t) -> p a b -> r
(%@~) :: AnIndexedSetter i s t a b
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-> (i -> a -> b) -> s -> t
non :: Eq a => a -> Iso’ (Maybe a) a
The type and type-class definitions involved in this library usually contain first-class
polymorphism, but the documentation [Kmett, 2013] provides equivalent “simple types”
to help user understanding. We translated the definitions of Indexed, Indexable and
Iso using those simple types. We can then check that the first three operators are unique
inhabitants; non is not.
12.4.2. Inferring module implementations or type-class instances
The Arrow type-class is defined as follows:
class Arrow (a : * -> * -> * ) where
arr :: (b -> c) -> a b c
first :: a b c -> a (b, d) (c, d)
second :: a b c -> a (d, b) (d, c)
(***) :: a b c -> a b’ c’ -> a (b, b’) (c, c’)
(&&&) :: a b c -> a b c’ -> a b (c, c’)
It is self-evident that the arrow type (→) is an instance of this class, and no code should
have to be written to justify this: our prototype is able to infer that all those required
methods are uniquely determined when the type constructor a is instantiated with an
arrow type. This also extends to subsequent type-classes, such as ArrowChoice.
As most of the difficulty in inferring unique inhabitants lies in sums, we study the “ex-
ception monad”, that is, for a fixed type X, the functor α 7→ X +α. Our implementation
determines that its Functor and Monad instances are uniquely determined, but that its
Applicative instance is not.
Indeed, the type of the Applicative method ap specializes to the following: ∀αβ. X +
(α → β) → X + α → X + β. If both the first and the second arguments are in the error
case X, there is a non-unique choice of which error to return in the result.
This is in fact a general result on applicative functors for types that are also monads:
there are two distinct ways to prove that a monad is also an applicative functor.
ap :: Monad m => m (a -> b) -> m a -> m b
ap mf ma = do ap mf ma = do
f <- mf a <- ma
a <- ma f <- mf
return (f a) return (f a)
Note that the type of bind for the exception monad, namely ∀αβ. X + α → (α →
X+β)→ X+β, has a sum type thunked under a negative type. It is one typical example
of a type which cannot be proved unique by the focusing discipline alone, and which is
correctly recognized unique by our algorithm.
12.4.3. Artificial examples
Our prototype will correctly detect that
∀αβ. α→ (α→ β + β)→ β
is uniquely inhabited. This type is an example of uniquely inhabited type that is not “neg-
atively non-duplicated”, as the type β has several occurrences in negative position (Sec-
tion 6.2.4 (Positive and negative positions in a formula)); negative non-duplication is a
sufficient criterion used in previous work on unique inhabitation [Aoto and Ono, 1994]
that does not scale to sums.
A more interesting example is the continuation monad. If we define with a monomorphic
return type
Cont γ α
def
= (α→ γ)→ γ
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then the bind operation on an arbitrary monad Cont A is not uniquely inhabited. In fact,
the identity at this type, Cont A→ Cont A, is already not uniquely inhabited.
If, however, we choose 0 as the return type, then both Cont 0 → Cont 0 and the bind
operation on Cont 0 are uniquely inhabited.
This example highlights the theoretical importance of properly handling the empty type.
The equational theory is very different from a fixed atom X+ with variable of this type in
the environment. We conjecture that a similar result would be obtained with a definition
of continuations using a polymorphic return type, but handling polymorphism comes at a
higher cost in complexity.
12.4.4. Non-applications
Here are two related ideas we wanted to try, but that do not fit in the simply-typed
lambda-calculus; the uniqueness algorithm must be extended to richer type systems to
handle such applications.
We can check that specific instances of a given type-class are canonically defined, but
it would be nice to show as well that some of the operators defined on any instance are
uniquely defined from the type-class methods – although one would expect this to often
fail in practice if the uniqueness checker doesn’t understand the equational laws required
of valid instances. Unfortunately, this would require uniqueness check with polymorphic
types in context (for the polymorphic methods).
Another idea is to verify the coherence property of a set of declared instances by trans-
lating instance declarations into terms, and checking uniqueness of the required instance
types. In particular, one can model the inheritance of one class upon another using a
pair type (Comp α as a pair of a value of type Eq α and Comp-specific methods); and the
system can then check that when an instance of Eq X and Comp X are declared, build-
ing Eq X directly or projecting it from Comp X correspond to βη-equivalent elaboration
witnesses. Unfortunately, all but the most simplistic examples require parametrized types
and polymorphic values in the environment to be faithfully modelled.
12.4.5. On impure host programs
The type system in which program search is performed does not need to exactly coincide
with the ambiant type system of the host programming language, for which the code-
inference feature is proposed – forcing the same type-system would kill any use from a
language with non-termination as an effect. Besides doing term search in a pure, termi-
nating fragment of the host language, one could also refine search with type annotations
in a richer type system, for example using dependent types or substructural logic – as long
as the found inhabitants can be erased back to host types.
However, this raises the delicate question of, among the unique βη-equivalence class of
programs, which candidate to select to be actually injected into the host language. For
example, the ordering or repetition of function calls can be observed in a host language
passing impure function as arguments, and η-expansion of functions can delay effects.
Even in a pure language, η-expanding sums and products may make the code less efficient
by re-allocating data. There is a design space here that we have not explored.
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13. Related Work
13.1. Previous work on unique inhabitation
The problem of unique inhabitation for the simply-typed lambda-calculus (without sums)
has been formulated by Mints [1981], with early results by Babaev and Soloviev [1982],
and later results by Aoto and Ono [1994], Aoto [1999] and Broda and Damas [2005].
These works have obtained several different sufficient conditions for a given type to
be uniquely inhabited. While these cannot be used as an algorithm to decide unique
inhabitation for any type, it reveals fascinating connections between unique inhabitation
and proof or term structures. Some sufficient criteria are formulated on the types/formulas
themselves, other on terms (a type is uniquely inhabited if it is inhabited by a term of a
given structure).
A simple criterion on types given in Aoto and Ono [1994] is that “negatively non-
duplicated formulas”, that is formulas where each atom occurs at most once in negative
position (nested to the left of an odd number of arrows), have at most one inhabitant.
This was extended by Broda and Damas [2005] to a notion of “deterministic” formulas,
defined using a specialized representation for simply-typed proofs named “proof trees”.
Aoto [1999] proposed a criterion based on terms: a type is uniquely inhabited if it
“provable without non-prime contraction”, that is if it has at least one inhabitant (not
necessarily cut-free) whose only variables with multiple uses are of atomic type. Re-
cently, Bourreau and Salvati [2011] used game semantics to give an alternative presen-
tation of Aoto’s results, and a syntactic characterization of all inhabitants of negatively
non-duplicated formulas.
Those sufficient conditions suggest deep relations between the static and dynamics se-
mantics of restricted fragments of the lambda-calculus – it is not a coincidence that con-
traction at non-atomic type is also problematic in definitions of proof equivalence coming
from categorial logic [Dosen, 2003]. However, they give little in the way of a decision
procedure for all types – conversely, our decision procedure does not by itself reveal the
structure of the types for which it finds unicity.
An indirectly related work is the work on retractions in simple types (A is a retract of
B if B can be surjectively mapped into A by a λ-term). Indeed, in a type system with a
unit type 1, a given type A is uniquely inhabited if and only if it is a retract of 1. Stirling
[2013] proposes an algorithm, inspired by dialogue games, for deciding retraction in the
lambda-calculus with arrows and products; but we do not know if this algorithm could be
generalized to handle sums. If we remove sums, focusing already provides an algorithm
for unique inhabitation.
13.2. Counting inhabitants
Broda and Damas [2005] remark that normal inhabitants of simple types can be described
by a context-free structure. This suggests, as done in Zaoinc [1995], counting terms by solv-
ing a set of polynomial equations. Further references to such “grammatical” approaches
to lambda-term enumeration and counting can be found in Dowek and Jiang [2011].
Of particular interest to us was the recent work of Wells and Yakobowski [2004]. It is
similar to our work both in terms of expected application (program fragment synthesis)
and methods, as it uses (a variant of) the focused calculus LJT [Herbelin, 1994] to perform
proof search. It has sums (disjunctions), but because it only relies on focusing for canon-
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icity it only implements the weak notion of η-equivalence for sums – it is not canonical,
as discussed in Section 10.6.4 (Non-canonicity of the full focused system), it counts an
infinite number of inhabitants in presence of a sum thunked under a negative. Their tech-
nique to ensure termination of enumeration is very elegant. Over the graph of all possible
proof steps in the type system (using multisets as contexts: an infinite search space), they
superimpose the graph of all possible non-cyclic proof steps in the logic (using sets as
contexts: a finite search space). Termination is obtained, in some sense, by traversing the
two in lockstep. We took inspiration from this idea to obtain our termination technique:
our bounded multisets can be seen as a generalization of their use of set-contexts.
13.3. Non-classical theorem proving and more canonical systems
Automated theorem proving has motivated fundamental research on more canonical rep-
resentations of proofs: by reducing the number of redundant representations that are
equivalent as programs, one can reduce the search space – although that does not nec-
essarily improve speed, if the finer representation requires more book-keeping. Most of
this work was done first for (first-order) classical logic; efforts porting them to other logics
(linear, intuitionistic, modal) were of particular interest, as it often reveals the general
idea behind particular techniques, and is sometimes an occasion to reformulate them in
terms closer to type theory.
An important brand of work studies connection-based, or matrix-based, proof methods.
They have been adapted to non-classical logic as soon as Wallen [1987]. It is possible to
present connection-based search “uniformly” for many distinct logics [Otten and Kreitz,
1996], changing only one logic-specific check to be performed a posteriori on connections
(axiom rules) of proof candidates. In intuitionistic setting, that would be a comparison on
indices of Kripke Worlds; it is strongly related to labeled logics [Galmiche and Méry, 2013].
On the other hand, matrix-based methods rely on guessing the number of duplications of a
formula (contractions) that will be used in a particular proof, and we do not know whether
that can be eventually extended to second-order polymorphism – by picking a presentation
closer to the original logic, namely focused proofs, we hope for an easier extension.
Some contraction-free calculi have been developed with automated theorem proving for
intuitionistic logic in mind. A presentation is given in Dyckhoff [1992] – the idea itself
appeared as early as Vorob’ev [1958]. The idea is that sums and (positive) products do
not need to be deconstructed twice, and thus need not be contracted on the left. For
functions, it is actually sufficient for provability to implicitly duplicate the arrow in the
argument case of its elimination form (A → B may have to be used again to build the
argument A), and to forget it after the result of application (B) is obtained. More advanced
systems typically do case-distinctions on the argument type A to refine this idea, see
Dyckhoff [2013] for a recent survey. Unfortunately, such techniques to reduce the search
space break computational completeness: they completely remove some programmatic
behaviors. Consider the type Stream(A,B)
def
= A × (A → A×B) of infinite streams of
state A and elements B: with this restriction, the next-element function can be applied
at most once, hence Stream(X,Y ) → Y is uniquely inhabited in those contraction-free
calculi. (With focusing, only negatives are contracted, and only when picking a focus.)
Focusing was introduced for linear logic [Andreoli, 1992a], but is adaptable to many
other logics. For a reference on focusing for intuitionistic logic, see Liang and Miller
[2007]. To easily elaborate programs as lambda-terms, we use a natural deduction pre-
sentation (instead of the more common sequent-calculus presentation) of focused logic,
closely inspired by the work of Brock-Nannestad and Schürmann [2010] on intuitionistic
linear logic.
Some of the most promising work on automated theorem proving for intuitionistic logic
comes from applying the so-called “Inverse Method” (see Degtyarev and Voronkov [2001]
for a classical presentation) to focused logics. The inverse method was ported to linear logic
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in Chaudhuri and Pfenning [2005], and turned into an efficient implementation of proof
search for intuitionistic logic in McLaughlin and Pfenning [2008]. It is a “forward” method:
to prove a given judgment, start with the instances of axiom rules for all atoms in the
judgment, then build all possible valid proofs until the desired judgment is reached – the
subformula property, bounding the search space, ensures completeness for propositional
logic. Focusing allows important optimization of the method, notably through the idea of
“synthetic connectives”: invertible or non-invertible phases have to be applied all in one
go, and thus form macro-steps that speed up saturation.
In comparison, our own search process alternates forward and backward-search. At a
large scale we do a backward-directed proof search, but each non-invertible phase performs
saturation, that is a complete forward-search for positives. Note that the search space of
those saturation phases is not the subformula space of the main judgment to prove, but the
(smaller) subformula space of the current subgoal’s context. When saturation is complete,
backward goal-directed search restarts, and the invertible phase may grow the context,
incrementally widening the search space. (The forward-directed aspects of our system
could be made richer by adding positive products and positively-biased atoms; this is not
our main point of interest here. Our coarse choice has the good property that, in absence of
sum types in the main judgment, our algorithm immediately degrades to simple, standard
focused backward search.)
13.3.1. Maximal multi-focusing
An important result for canonical proof structures is maximal multi-focusing [Miller and
Saurin, 2007, Chaudhuri, Miller, and Saurin, 2008a]. Multi-focusing refines focusing by
introducing the ability to focus on several formulas at once, in parallel, and suggests
that, among formulas equivalent modulo valid permutations of inference rules, the “more
parallel” ones are more canonical. Indeed, maximal multi-focused proofs turn out to be
equivalent to existing more-canonical proof structures such as linear proof nets [Chaudhuri,
Miller, and Saurin, 2008a] and classical expansion proofs [Chaudhuri, Hetzl, and Miller,
2012].
In Scherer [2015a] we proposed a multi-focused natural deduction and a λ-calculus
interpretation for it, whose maximal multi-focused terms are canonical for ΛC→,×,+.
Saturating focused proofs are almost maximal muli-focused proofs in this sense. The
difference is that multi-focusing allow to focus on both variables in the context and the goal
in the same time, while our right-focusing rule sat-intro can only be applied sequentially
after sat (which does multi-left-focusing). To recover the exact structure of maximal
multi-focusing, one would need to allow sat to also focus on the right, and use it only
when the right choices do not depend on the outcome on saturation of the left (the foci
of the same set must be independent), that is when none of the bound variables are used
(typically to saturate further) before the start of the next invertible phase. This is a rather
artificial restriction from a backward-search perspective. Maximal multi-focusing is more
elegant, declarative in this respect, but is less suited to proof search.
Unfortunately, it is unclear how to extend the definition of maximal multi-focusing in
presence of units, in particular of the empty type 0. Two distinct left-focusing phases may
both release the empty type 0 in the following invertible context, and this means that they
be equated in the multi-focusing phase. We have worked on such formulations, but found
them unsatisfying; the saturating logic, adapted to use selection functions, seems to lends
itself to the empty type more gracefully.
13.3.2. Lollimon: backward and forward search together
We described in Section 11.2.5 (The roles of forward and backward search in a saturated
logic) the way our saturated proof search mixes backward and forward search. It is inter-
esting to compare it to Lollimon [López, Pfenning, Polakow, and Watkins, 2005], a system
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which similarly mixes backward and forward search.
Lollimon is part of the research on logic programming that understands the execution
of logic program as given by the operational behavior of proof search in a well-chosen logic
– typically with uniform proofs or focusing. Cut-elimination is not the only way to give
an operational semantics to proof systems that is suitable for programming, proof search
also has a rich “programmable” operational behavior.
More specifically, the research arc on Concurrent LF and related systems tries to studies
a wider range of logic to capture the operational behavior of interesting systems, typically
concurrent systems with several interacting actors or processes. Lollimon uses a mix
of intuitionistic logic and linear logic – linear logic is suitable to represent consumable
resources and, thus, essential to the modeling of systems with modifiable state.
In Lollimon, as in our case, forward search comes from the behavior of the left-focusing
rule with positive conclusion, that is the forward-chaining rule of the logic. This forward
search ingredient provides an elegant way to describe behaviors that are asynchronous
(they do not necessarily rely on a communication between independent parts of a formula)
but non-invertible – one example is the computation of a future alongside the rest of the
program. Furthermore, when the forward search strategy performs forward search until
saturation is reached, Lollimon can easily describe algorithms that rely on saturation, such
as computing the transitive closure of a graph.
Because of this focus on representing the operation behavior of a variety of system, the
Lollimon logic is not prescriptive: it does not actually enforce saturating or any other
forward-search strategy, it is their implementation of the proof search algorithm that
made specific implementation choices. In contrast, saturated logic is formulated is a
strongly prescriptive way: while the choice of the saturation function gives some leeway,
the logic enforces saturation phase as long as new hypotheses are present, and a form of
completeness for provability through the select-specific restriction.
Saturated logic is prescriptive because we can afford it: in the more limited applications
that we are interested in, either the search of a unique inhabitant or equivalence checking,
there is a natural choice of selection function that allows some form of “full saturation”
and yet remains terminating, so enforcing (restricted) saturation is practical.
I believe that the consideration of program terms – the type-theoretic rather than proof-
theoretic setting – also gives some intuitions that would be harder to acquire in the Lol-
limon setting. Our distinction between “old” and “new” formulas would be possible in a
purely logical setting, but the idea of only saturating on the neutrals that use the “new”
formulas relies on the intuition of considering proof terms as programs – those new neutral
may have new values that we did not know about yet. The saturation selection strategy
used in our unicity-checking algorithm, the “two or more” criterion (we can keep at most
two variables of each type to find out if two distinct programs are possible), would not at
all be natural in a purely proof-theoretic setting.
13.4. Equivalence of terms in presence of sums
Ghani [1995b] first proved the decidability of equivalence of lambda-terms with sums, using
sophisticated rewriting techniques. The two works that followed [Altenkirch, Dybjer,
Hofmann, and Scott, 2001, Balat, Di Cosmo, and Fiore, 2004] used normalization-by-
evaluation instead. Finally, Lindley [2007] was inspired by Balat, Di Cosmo, and Fiore
[2004] to re-explain equivalence through rewriting. Our idea of “cutting sums as early
as possible” was inspired from Lindley [2007], but in retrospect it could be seen in the
“restriction (A)” in the normal forms of Balat, Di Cosmo, and Fiore [2004], or directly in
the “maximal conversions” of Ghani [1995b].
Note that the existence of unknown atoms is an important aspect of our calculus. With-
out them (starting only from base types 0 and 1), all types would be finitely inhabited.
This observation is the basis of the promising unpublished work of Ahmad, Licata, and
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Harper [2010], also strongly relying on (higher-order) focusing. Finiteness hypotheses also
play an important role in Ilik [2014], where they are used to reason on type isomorphisms
in presence of sums.
In Munch-Maccagnoni and Scherer [2015], I collaborated with Guillaume Munch-Maccagnoni
to rephrase the problem of sum equivalence in a notational framework of abstract machine
calculi called System L. Historically this work comes from both the search for a term
notation that would give a clear computational meaning to classical logic, and the fine-
grained study of weak reduction strategies, notably the duality between call-by-name and
call-by-value reduction. It subsumes both by using a “polarized” reduction strategy. In a
typed setting – System L can also be studied as an untyped calculus – this “polarization”
can be seen as going beyond focusing. In particular, the relation between System L’s re-
duction and cut-elimination in strongly focused systems is similar to the relation between
reduction in a direct-style effectful λ-calculus and an indirect-style monadic calculus.
13.5. Elaboration of implicits
Probably the most visible and the most elegant uses of typed-directed code inference for
functional languages are type-classes [Wadler and Blott, 1989] and implicits [Oliveira,
Moors, and Odersky, 2010]. Type classes elaboration is traditionally presented as a sat-
isfiability problem (or constraint solving problem [Stuckey and Sulzmann, 2002]) that
happens to have operational consequences. Implicits recast the feature as elaboration of
a programming term, which is closer to our methodology. Type-classes traditionally try
(to various degrees of success) to ensure coherence, namely that a given elaboration goal
always give the same dynamic semantics wherever it happens in the program – often by
making instance declarations a toplevel-only construct. Implicits allow a more modular
construction of the elaboration environment, but have to resort to priorities to preserve
determinism [Oliveira, Schrijvers, Choi, Lee, Yi, and Wadler, 2014].
We propose to reformulate the question of determinism or ambiguity by presenting
elaboration as a typing problem, and proving that the elaborated problems intrinsically
have unique inhabitants. This point of view does not by itself solve the difficult questions
of which are the good policies to avoid ambiguity, but it provides a more declarative
setting to expose a given strategy; for example, priority to the more recently introduced
implicit would translate to an explicit weakening construct, removing older candidates at
introduction time, or a restricted variable lookup semantics.
(The global coherence issue is elegantly solved, independently of our work, by using a
dependent type system where the values that semantically depend on specific elaboration
choices (for example a balanced tree ordered with respect to some specific order) have a
type that syntactically depends on the elaboration witness. This approach meshes very
well with our view, especially in systems with explicit equality proofs between terms,
where features that grow the implicit environment could require proofs from the user that
unicity is preserved.)
13.6. Smart completion and program synthesis
Type-directed program synthesis has seen sophisticated work in the recent years, notably
Perelman, Gulwani, Ball, and Grossman [2012], Gvero, Kuncak, Kuraj, and Piskac [2013].
Type information is used to fill missing holes in partial expressions given by the users,
typically among the many choices proposed by a large software library. Many poten-
tial completions are proposed interactively to the user and ordered by various ranking
heuristics.
Our uniqueness criterion is much more rigid: restrictive (it has far less potential appli-
cations) and principled (there are no heuristics or subjective preferences at play). Com-
plementary, it aims for application in richer type systems, and in programming constructs
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(implicits, etc.) rather than tooling with interactive feedback.
An aspect of interaction which could be interesting in our system is the failure case
were at least two distinct inhabitants are found. A first question is, among all the possible
counter-examples our algorithm could provide, which will be the more beneficial to the
user? We suspect that having a computationally-observable difference as early in the terms
as possible is preferable. A second is whether the user could interact with the system to
refine the search space, possibly navigating between alternatives proposed by the system
– for now the only refinement tools are type annotations.
Synthesis of glue code interfacing whole modules has been presented as a type-directed
search, using type isomorphisms [Aponte and Di Cosmo, 1996] or inhabitation search in
combinatory logics with intersection types [Düdder et al., 2014].
13.6.1. Focusing and program synthesis
We were very interested in the recent Osera and Zdancewic [2015], which generates code
from both expected type and input/output examples. It is based on bidirectional type-
checking, but we believe that it is in fact using focusing. The works are complementary:
they have interesting proposals for data-structures and algorithm to make term search
efficient, while we bring a deeper connection to proof-theoretic methods. They indepen-
dently discovered the idea that saturation must use the “new” context, in their work it
plays the role of an algorithmic improvement they call “relevant term generation”.
This work has been expanded upon in Frankle, Osera, Walker, and Zdancewic [2016],
and at the time of writing there is work underway to strengthen the connection to focusing.
It is fully in line with the approach we proposed in Section (Motivation: Unicity as the
ideal code inference criterion), and we hope to be able to study the connections more in
detail. This work, notably, seems more advanced in terms of study of applicability to real
scenarios, so a cooperation could be very fruitful.
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14. Future work
14.1. A semantic proof of canonicity for saturating logic
I am uncomfortable with the proof technique used in the presented canonicity proof Theo-
rem 11.4.7 (Canonicity of saturating focused logic) in Section 11.4 (Canonicity of saturated
proofs). In my experience, proving canonicity by induction on a βη-equivalence deriva-
tion is fragile; for example, in very the first iteration of the proof, I completely forgot to
prove the congruence case, considering only β and η-reductions at the toplevel of the case.
This proof is crucial to the development, and in particular it is the one that justifies the
correctness of our saturation approach as an equivalence checking algorithm, a question
which deserves a better, robust, conclusive proof.
I would like to provide an alternative proof of canonicity using a more semantic proof
technique using the results of Chapter 8 (Semantics). In the preparation of this document I
attempted to prove that if two saturated derivations are not (≈icc)-equivalent, then they
are semantically distinct (Section 8.3 (Semantic equivalence for PIL(→,×, 1,+, 0))), by
building a modelM in which their interpretation differ. This proof technique is simple on
paper but the details are subtle; for example, the presence of the empty type implies that
we may not be able to build a semantic valuation for all environments, and the results on
saturated consistency in Section 11.3.2 (Saturated consistency) are crucial. I have lacked
the time to finish this proof effort, but that is a goal in the short to medium term.
Manipulating semantic equivalence directly involves a fair amount of boilerplate, moving
from terms to semantic values and conversely. An option to clarify such a proof would be
to first propose a more syntactic logical relation that corresponds to semantic equivalence,
and perform a proof against this logical relation.
Such a more semantic approach is that it would prove that saturation decides not
only βη-equivalence, but more generally the contextual/semantic equivalence, the correct
golden standard for equivalence. As a side-effect, this implies in particular – combined
to the soundness result of Theorem 8.4.3 (Semantic soundness of βη-equivalence) – that
contextual equivalence implies βη-equivalence, which is not a trivial result, even though
it could be established more directly.
14.2. Pushing the application front
Despite some interesting experiments with our software prototype, we have not yet pushed
efforts in the direction of practical application of this work to real-world programming
language. I think that supporting richer type systems would help to make it more widely
applicable, but it may already be possible to provide the current capabilities as a code
inference tool for typed functional languages, and thus gather some usage experience.
14.3. Substructural logics
Instead of moving to more polymorphic type systems, one could move to substructural
logics. We could expect to refine a type annotation using, for example, linear arrows,
to get a unique inhabitant. We observed, however, that linearity is often disappointing
in getting “unique enough” types. Take the polymorphic type of mapping on lists, for
example: ∀αβ. (α → β) → (List α → List β). Its inhabitants are the expected map
composed with any function that can reorder, duplicate or drop elements from a list.
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Changing the two inner arrows to be linear gives us the set of functions that may only
reorder the mapped elements: still not unique. An idea to get a unique type is to request
a mapping from (α ≤ β) to (List α ≤ List β), where the subtyping relation (≤) is seen
as a substructural arrow type.
(Dependent types also allow to capture List.map, as the unique inhabitant of the de-
pendent induction principle on lists is unique.)
14.4. Equational reasoning
We have only considered pure, strongly terminating programs so far. One could hope
to find monadic types that uniquely defined transformations of impure programs (e.g.
(α → β) → M α → M β). Unfortunately, this approach would not work by simply adding
the unit and bind of the monad as formal parameters to the context, because many
programs that are only equal up to the monadic laws would be returned by the system. It
could be interesting to enrich the search process to also normalize by the monadic laws.1 In
the more general case, can the search process be extended to additional rewrite systems?
14.5. Unique inhabitation with polymorphism or dependent
types
We have started experimenting with an extension of saturated proof search to System F,
with no strong results so far.
The general problem with polymorphism is the loss of the subformula property, and
thus the loss of termination in our algorithm – or any algorithm, as the problem becomes
undecidable as shown by reducing unicity to inhabitation.2 In the details, this appears
when trying to build a negative neutral out of ∀-quantified formula during a left-focusing
phase: there is an infinite space of possible instantiations choices.
First, remark that the algorithm of Chapter 11 (Saturation logic for canonicity) directly
extends to the sub-system where ∀-quantifiers are only present in positive subformulas oc-
currences – this is the easy subset where no instantiation choices have to be made. Gilles
Dowek and Ying Jiang studied this almost-non-polymorphic fragment in Dowek and Jiang
[2009]; it gives a precise formal status to our handling of prenex polymorphism in our ex-
periments. Note that formulas with positive ∀ occurrences are a more general fragment
than just prenex polymorphism, although type systems such as Mitchell’s Fη [Mitchell,
1988] bridge the gap by allowing to lift positive quantifiers into prenex position by sub-
typing/containment.
Second, our suggestion for future work would be to replace the problem of “at a use site,
how to instantiate this polymorphic neutral to make further progress”, which leads to a
natural explosion of the saturation dynamics – there will often be infinitely many strict
positives to deduce – by the different question of “at the abstraction site, is there a set of
instantiations that summarizes the polymorphic value in its full generality?”.
For example, if the polymorphic type ∀α, (X+ → α)→ (Y + → α)→ α is in an invertible
context, we could in a sense “invertibly decompose” it by instantiating it either with X+
or with Y +, as we can easily prove that no other instantiation leads to an inhabited type.
Note that we are taking a “closed world” view here: we are assuming that the context has
no other way to build a value of this type that we have ourselves, and thus that we can
1While reviewing this manuscript, Sam Lindley remarked that the specific case of monad laws should be
relatively easy, as monad laws can be seen as a weaker form of sum laws. If we consider an abstract
monad M A as a sum 0 +A, with the expected implementations of bind and return, the reduction and
weak η-expansion on sums suffice to recover the usual monad laws – the equational theory of Eugenio
Moggi’s computational λ-calculus.
2Undecidability of inhabitation in System F is an old result recalled in Wells [1994] – an article that is
itself related to the different issue of decidability of typability of a term.
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reason on the possible values that were passed to us by enumerating the terms we could
build ourselves at this type.
In a more general setting, this suggests a generalization of Noam Zeilberger’s higher-
order focusing rule [Zeilberger, 2009] that “decomposes” polymorphic hypotheses that
could look somewhat like
draft-polymorphic-higher-order-rule
∀Σ′, Σ′, α  A(α) =⇒ Γat; Σ,Σ′ `inv N | P at
Γat; Σ, ∀α,A(α) `inv N | P at
Where the Σ  A relation ranges over the minimal set of contexts that must be inhabited
for A to be inhabitable.
We have been trying to find a way to enumerate those “most general contexts” by
reusing our (unicity-aware) proof search procedure on A(α), in a mode that would col-
lect inhabitation constraints (the minimal context is an output, rather than an input,
of the enumeration procedure). If this succeeded, it would give a new understanding of
parametricity results in terms of syntactic proof search.
Note that the interaction between this idea of closed-world proof search and focusing
is unknown and quite likely to be a delicate issue. The fact that ∀-quantifiers in positive
position are invertibly introduced would suggest to consider polymorphic types as nega-
tives, but our higher-order focusing approach instead consider them (in negative position)
as positives.
Finally, on a more technical level, we think that extending our proof search procedure
to System F (and beyond) would benefit from an explicit handling of metavariables as
done in Lengrand, Dyckhoff, and McKinna [2011]. Explicit meta-variables let us explicitly
represent the state of proof search as a derivation, and this let us explore a richer setting
of proof search strategies – choices metavariable instantiation order – notably breadth-
first search strategies. Without this explicit representation of search state, the natural
approach is to have a recursive proof search procedure that provides complete proof of each
judgment when called, so it imposes a depth-first approach. This inflexibility is acceptable
in a simply-typed setting where each search branch terminates, but in a undecidable setting
it makes the system halt as soon as some subspace becomes infinite – we would hope for
a better behavior in this case.
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programmation et le choix des outils formels utilisés dans sa recherche; en cela il incarne
une approche de la recherche en langage de programmation qui m’a toujours convaincue.
J’ai eu le plaisir de côtoyer Roberto Di Cosmo à l’IRILL, en tant que collègue si sym-
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partageons aussi une appartenance aux communautés OCaml et du logiciel libre. Je ne
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qui m’a ouvert les yeux sur la programmation logique comme une autre interprétation
calculatoire de la logique. Mon travail s’inscrit dans la tradition opposée de la program-
mation fonctionnelle, mais utilise les outils logiques du focusing que Dale et son équipe,
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prises) et que j’ai grand plaisir à retrouver – ce manuscrit en particulier doit beaucoup à
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